thesis about the cuban missile crisis

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The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory

Myths versus reality.

• Sheldon M. Stern
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Thirteen Months: Cuba’s Perspective on the Missile Crisis

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• Philip Brenner  

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The Cuban missile crisis may be the most studied confrontation in our history. Yet until recently, Cuba has been left out of the Cuban missile crisis. 1 The traditional view focused attention on the fabled 13 days in October 1962, from the time President John F. Kennedy learned that the Soviets were constructing sites for intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, until Chairman Nikita Khrushchev ordered the sites dismantled and the missiles removed. From this perspective, the crisis was a showdown between the two superpowers, and Cuba was merely the location where the confrontation occurred.

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John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

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See, for example, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, 1971); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), chaps. 30–31; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York, 1967); Lester H. Brune, The Missile Crisis of October 1962 (Claremont, CA, 1985); Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962 (Baltimore, MD, 1976); T. Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York, 1986); Herbert L. Matthews, Revolution in Cuba (New York, 1975).

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For example, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink (New York, 1989); Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis , rev. ed., (Washington, D.C., 1989); Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1989); Thomas G. Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro,” in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory (New York, 1989), pp. 136–41. Much new data has become available because of five major conferences on the missile crisis. Edited transcripts and analyses of the first two conferences can be found in Blight and Welch, On the Brink . The first included nearly all of the living members of the ExComm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council, formed by President Kennedy on 16 October 1962), and the second included many of these men and three Soviet experts. A transcript of the third conference—held in Moscow in January 1989, with participation by U.S., Soviet, and Cuban delegates—is available in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27–28, 1989 , Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1992). The transcript from the fourth conference, “Cuba Between the Superpowers”—held in Antigua in January 1991 with U.S., Soviet, and Cuban participants—is available from the Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development. It is edited by James G. Blight, David Lewis, and David A. Welch. The fifth conference was held in Havana, Cuba in January 1992 and was attended by former policymakers from the United States and the former Soviet Union, and former and current policymakers from Cuba, including President Fidel Castro. A transcript will be available from the Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development.

Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, With Fidel (New York, 1975), pp. 150–1.

Allison, Essence of Decision , p. 239; Blight and Welch, On the Brink , pp. 249–50, 294–5; Garthoff, Reflections (1989), pp. 6–10; H. L. Matthews, Fidel Castro (New York, 1970), p. 227; Szulc, Fidel , pp. 578–9.

Sergo Mikoyan, “La Crisis del Caribe, en retrospectiva,” America Latina , no. 4 (April 1988), p. 45; also comments made by Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation at the Moscow conference, 27 January 1989 (during the conference). Certainly, Soviet leaders relied on several sources of intelligence to develop their analysis of an impending U.S. invasion. While the Soviet conclusion seems to have coincided with the Cuban assessment, it is not clear how much influence the Cuban view had. See Soviet comments in Blight and Welch, On the Brink , pp. 238, 249, 258. On the expulsion, see W. Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York, 1987), p. 80; M. H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986 (New York, 1987), pp. 155–8.

Carlos Franqui, Family Portrait With Fidel , trans. Alfred MacAdam (New York, 1984), p. 185, claims that Adzhubei gave Castro the report in person. Matthews, Revolution in Cuba , p. 208, writes that Castro received Adzhubei’s information from a copy of a report submitted to Khrushchev that was sent to Havana.

H. Thomas, The Cuban Revolution (New York, 1977), p. 607; Matthews, Revolution in Cuba , p. 208. For a report of earlier comments by Cardona see Dinerstein, Making of a Missile Crisis , p. 141.

Garthoff, Reflections (1989), p. 6; Laurence Chang, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 1990), vol. I, p. 43; interviews with Cuban officials; Allyn et al., Back to the Brink , pp.15–18.

Morley, Imperial State and Revolution , pp. 191–202; D. Rich, The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: Its Evolution and Enforcement, A Study Prepared for the Commonwealth Countries (Washington, D.C., July 1988), pp. 24–37.

25 July 1962 Memorandum, p. 5. Also see Morley, Imperial State and Revolution , pp. 149–50; A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York, 1978), pp. 512–17, 575; N. Fuentes, Nos Impusieron La Violencia (Havana, 1986); Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba,” pp. 137–8.

Allison, Essence of Decision , p. 47; E. Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 102–3; N. L. Cotayo, El Bloqueo a Cuba (Havana, 1983), pp. 314–15. The exercises began on 21 October, at which point they were in reality no longer exercises but prepositioning for a possible invasion.

Cotayo, El Bloqueo , pp. 308–13. For a description of some of the press and congressional demands, see Thomas G. Paterson and William J. Brophy, “October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962,” Journal of American History 72 (June 1986); Thomas, Cuban Revolution , pp. 621–2; Abel, Missile Crisis , pp. 12–13; Allison, Essence of Decision , p. 188; A. Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1974), pp. 8–10.

F. Castro, “The Duty of a Revolutionary Is to Make the Revolution: The Second Declaration of Havana,” in Martin Kenner and James Petras, eds., Fidel Castro Speaks (New York, 1969), pp. 85–106 (esp. p. 104); Dominguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution , pp. 115–16; H. M. Erisman, Cuba’s International Relations (Boulder, CO, 1985), pp. 20–1.

In a statement on 4 September he cautioned against the introduction of “offensive ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba.” On the 13th he warned against Cuba becoming “an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union.” See Hilsman, To Move a Nation , p. 171; “The President’s News Conference of September 13,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 674–5. One authoritative Soviet view of President Kennedy’s statements—by Anatoly Gromyko, the son of the Soviet foreign minister at the time—focused only on the aspects of bellicosity in what Kennedy said, and ignored any mention of the implicit warning against placing ballistic missiles or combat troops in Cuba. See Anatoly Gromyko, “The Caribbean Crisis, Part 1,” in Ronald R. Pope, ed., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD, 1982), pp. 165–7.

R. L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 8, fn. 9; Dominguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution , p. 36.

“Balance del Primer Encuentro con La Realidad Sovietica,” 23 May 1963, reprinted in F. Castro, La Revolucion de Octubre y La Revolucion Cubana: Discursos 1959–1977 (Havana, 1977), p. 91.

This was how Aleksandr Alekseev, who was soon to become the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, claims to have understood Castro. See Aleksandr Alekseev, “Karibskii Krizis: kak eto bylo [The Caribbean Crisis: As It Really Was],” Ekho Planety , no. 33 (Moscow, November 1988).

Barton J. Bernstein, “The Cuban Missiles Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?” Political Science Quarterly , vol. 95 (Spring 1980), p. 99. The estimate of time necessary to prepare a missile for firing was made by Soviet military officials at the 1989 Moscow conference.

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A. Gilly, Inside the Cuban Revolution , trans. Felix Gutierrez (New York, 1964), p. 48, as quoted in Thomas, Cuban Revolution , p. 630.

R. F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 1969), p. 109; Abel, Missile Crisis , pp. 194–95.

Matthews, Fidel Castro , p. 232; C. A. Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York, 1983), p. 211. Also see Franqui, Family Portrait , pp. 194–5. Castro himself suggested this interpretation in 1974 by saying: “We felt very passionate…. We were annoyed by matters of form, by certain formalities in the conduct of the negotiations.” See Mankiewicz and Jones, With Fidel , p. 152. At the 1989 Moscow conference, Cuban participants acknowledged that the necessity of time made the lack of consultation understandable, but they argued that even then Khrushchev should have qualified his acceptance of Kennedy’s proposal with a requirement that Cuba’s security demands be satisfied; Allyn, et al., Back to the Brink , p. 72.

Ibid., p. 73. Szulc, Fidel , pp. 585–8; Thomas, Cuban Revolution , p. 636; Julien, “Sept Heures Avec M. Fidel Castro,” p. 6.

P. Bonsai, Cuba, Castro and the United States (Pittsburgh, PA, 1971), p. 187; Cole Blasier, The Giant’s Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA, 1983), pp. 104–7; Garthoff, Reflections (1989), p. 138; Matthews, Fidel Castro , p. 199; Szulc, Fidel , pp. 585–6.

R. Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba (New York, 1985), p. 44.

Blight and Welch, On the Brink , p. 281. Also see Davis S. Bobrow, “Stories Remembered and Forgotten,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (June 1989), pp. 197–201.

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Brenner, P. (1992). Thirteen Months: Cuba’s Perspective on the Missile Crisis. In: Nathan, J.A. (eds) The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-11462-4_6

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The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Causes and Effects Essay

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The Causes for the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Role of Cuba

The effects of the cuban missile crisis.

The focus on nuclear weapons was the typical feature of two powerful states’ development during the period of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States were ready to use the possibilities of the nuclear weapons in order to state their superiority at the global political arena. As a result, any conflict could become the reason for developing the global nuclear war.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 in which the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States were involved was the turning point of the states’ confrontation in the Cold War because of risks to develop the nuclear conflict (Carter, 2008). Although there are many opinions on the causes and effects of the Cuban missile crisis, it is possible to determine the main factors which can be discussed as influential for developing the most threatening situation in the world during the period of the Cold War.

Thus, the causes for the crisis are closely associated with the Soviet Union’s intentions to protect the state from the US blockades and Cuba from the US invasion, and the effects depend on the peaceful resolution of the conflict with improving the connections between the two powerful states.

The revolution in Cuba in 1959 made the United States discuss different methods to prevent the expansion of the Communist ideas at the territories near the US boundaries. The development of different plans to establish the anti-Communist regime in Cuba resulted in the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, which was supported and realized by the US government (Pressman, 2001).

The US President John F. Kennedy controlled the realization of the operation, but it was ineffective. The attempts of the invasion were considered by the Soviet Union as threatening to the Communist regime and to the world’s peace. The reaction of the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to the actions of the US government was to place the Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba according to the agreement with Fidel Castro.

After the revolution, Fidel Castro relied on the support of the most powerful Communist state that is why the Soviet Union’s intentions were shared by the Cuban leader, and the construction of the missile sites was justified from the point of defense (Schier, 2010). The actions of Khrushchev could be explained with references to the risk of anti-Communist movements in Cuba.

During the year of 1962, the intensified Cuban missile crisis increased the tension between the two powerful states ready to use the nuclear weapons in order to regulate the international conflict. The fact of the Bay of Pigs Invasion along with the results of the Berlin Crisis made the situation more complicated. In spite of the fact that the USA was against the idea of placing the missile constructions in Cuba, the Soviet Union continued to realize the idea to protect the state interests and perform the necessary security procedures.

Kennedy stated that the USA would focus on any measures to prevent the threat for the US nation’s security. However, during September of 1962, the Soviet Union realized all the necessary preparation procedures in order to construct the missile sites in Cuba (Pressman, 2001). The ignorance of Kennedy’s statement and position was also a result of the US policy in relation to constructing the missiles in Turkey which were discussed as potential risks for the Soviet Union.

The United States paid much attention to the possibilities for the Soviet Union to construct the missile sites in Cuba, but only a few indicators were noticed during September of 1962. All the controversial activities of the Soviet Union in Cuba were explained with references to the necessity to protect Cuba from the further invasions from the United States or other non-Communist countries.

The tensions between the powerful states were intensified, and there were no opportunities to assess adequately the Soviet Union’s intentions in relation to defending Cuba and attacking the United States with the help of the missiles constructed at the territories of Cuba (Schier, 2010). From this point, the Soviet Union and the United States had no intentions to develop the nuclear war, but such a risk was obvious because of Kennedy and Khrushchev’s goals to protect the states’ interest by all means.

The Development of the Crisis and John F. Kennedy’s Reaction to the Soviet Union’s Activities in Cuba

The United States suspected that the Soviet Union constructed the missile sites in Cuba, but this information was not supported with evidence and facts. On October 14, during the operations to gather the necessary evidence, the U-2 aircraft took clear photographs on which the construction of the missile sites was fixed. It was noticed that the construction was realized for medium-range ballistic missiles as well as for intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Thus, the 13-day crisis started on October 15 when the information about the photographs was released. In a few days, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) was organized in order to develop the plan of actions directed toward resolving the conflict situation (Stein, 2008).

To react to the construction of the missile sites, the threat of the nuclear war, and the Soviet Union’s attacks, several different strategic approaches were proposed by the members of the EXCOMM. The problem was in the fact that there was no any prepared plan of actions because of the focus on the Soviet Union’s acceptance of conditions and agreements not to construct nuclear missiles at the territories near the USA.

It is possible to refer to different visions of the problem by the United States and by the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union placed the nuclear missiles in Cuba in response to placing the US missiles in Turkey and as the support for Cuba to prevent the further invading activities from the United States.

From this perspective, the first measure discussed by the EXCOMM as the absence of reaction could be discussed as rather relevant in relation to the situation, but it was risky because of impossibility to predict the Soviet Union’s future actions and analyze their real intentions (Schier, 2010).

The approach is known as ‘do nothing’ was rejected by the majority of the EXCOMM representatives. Different variants of diplomatic measures were discussed as effective means to guarantee the Soviet Union’s removal of the missiles from the territories of Cuba. Nevertheless, the necessity to develop negations could lead to the unwanted concessions for the United States.

Kennedy paid much attention to the military actions as the best approaches to make the Soviet Union realize the removal of the missiles. Thus, the accents were made on the active blockade of the missiles and invasion of Cuba. The possibility of the airstrike was discussed as the reserved variant of actions during the discussion of the problem.

However, the method of blockade was chosen as the most effective in order to prevent the Soviet Union from the further transportation of the missiles to the territories of Cuba. The blockade of the missiles’ transportation was also supported by the US government’s demand to remove the constructed missiles in Cuba. This approach was chosen because of a range of advantages.

The open blockade demonstrated the power of the United States and the readiness of the President to use the military forces. Furthermore, the method of blockade helped accentuate the US naval superiority in the region, and the realization of the measure provided Khrushchev with the necessary time to remove the constructed missile sites in Cuba (Carter, 2008). As a result, Khrushchev became responsible for the next step in the conflict.

The effective blockade or ‘quarantine’ provided the United States with the opportunity to avoid the uncontrolled confrontation between the states which could end with the nuclear war. Thus, President Kennedy informed the nation about the Soviet Union’s missile sites in Cuba and the intention to realize the blockade with the help of the national television on October 22.

The response of the Soviet Union to the actions of the United States was provided on October 23. The leaders of the state proclaimed that the actions of the USA were rather aggressive and threatening for the world peace (Gibson, 2012). The tension between the two powerful states increased significantly because the Soviet Union did not follow the US demands and the missiles were not removed.

The negotiations and discussions of the conflict could not result in the solution satisfactory for both the sides of the conflict. The speech of the US President provoked significant international reaction to the conflict where the Western countries were inclined to support the position of the United States, and they discussed Kennedy’s approach to resolving the crisis as rather reasonable.

The countries from the left camp considered the activities of the United States as too aggressive and provocative in relation to the risk of the nuclear war. On October 27, the message by Khrushchev was broadcasted to demonstrate the response of the Soviet Union to the proposed concessions.

It was stated in the message that the Soviet Union would remove the missiles from the territory of Cuba only after the removal of the US missiles from Turkey (Stein, 2008). The United States continued to support their vision of the conflict and rejected the conditions proposed in the message by Khrushchev. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s missiles shot down the US plane, and the crisis was deepened.

The risk of the war became obvious. The United States focused on the peaceful resolution of the conflict and accepted Khrushchev’s demands to remove the missiles from the territories of Turkey. The leaders of the state expected the removal of the Soviet Union’s missiles from Cuba in response to the US actions as it was stated earlier in Khrushchev’s message (Gibson, 2012).

As a result, the rejection of the proposed conditions by Khrushchev could lead to his complete responsibility for the further development of military actions. On October 28, the crisis was resolved when Khrushchev agreed with the prepositions and actions of the United States. Thus, the resolution of the conflict was the result of the effective diplomatic strategies used by Kennedy and the United States’ administration in order to regulate the problem.

The Cuban-based missiles were dismantled as well as the US missiles were dismantled and removed from the territories of Turkey (Carter, 2008). The thirteen days of the crisis ended with starting a new page in the international relations between the two powerful states of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Focusing on the effects of the Cuban missile crisis, it is possible to state that the blockade realized by the United States and the associated demands were the only relevant method to resolve the conflict successfully for both the sides and avoid the development of the nuclear war. However, the nuclear war cannot be discussed as the goal of the Soviet Union determined before placing the missiles in Cuba or as the end goal of the United States to resolve the conflict in the region.

The prestige and role of Kennedy at the global political arena increased because of the obvious success of his diplomatic strategies used to resolve the Cuban crisis. Khrushchev also benefited from the peaceful resolution of the conflict when the United States confirmed the decision not to invade Cuba in the future.

The negative consequences of the crisis were connected with the status of Khrushchev in the Kremlin because of his impossibility to resolve the conflict to his advantage. Thus, Khrushchev’s intentions and motivation in relation to placing the missiles in Cuba remain to be the topic for many discussions (Stein, 2008). It is possible to state that the location of the missiles at the territories of Cuba was the part of the developed strategy used by the Soviet Union in order to succeed in the Cold War.

The effective resolution of the crisis led to the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with references to improving the channels for the direct communication between the presidents. Thus, the Moscow-Washington hotline was worked out in order to prevent the similar conflicts in the future. Later, in 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the agreement forbidding the exploration of the nuclear weapons.

Thus, the Cuban crisis can be discussed as the first influential step toward discussing the development of nuclear weapons as the illegal activities, which can result in the millions of victims and enormous devastation. The strategic model to regulate the crisis which was realized by Kennedy and the US administration during the process of the conflict resolution is discussed by researchers as the classical model utilized today as the example of the successful diplomatic approach to resolving crises (Gibson, 2011).

It was important for Kennedy to develop such a plan and conditions which could satisfy the opposite side and which could be successfully accepted by the both sides. It is possible to state that the effects of the Cuban crisis are in definite changes in the United States and Soviet Union’s policies. Thus, both the states realized the significant dependence on each other, which was emphasized with references to the threat of the nuclear war.

The relations between these two world powerful states achieved the new stage, and attempts of collaboration were realized in order to avoid the development of such conflict situations in the future (George, 2003). If the causes of the crisis cannot be stated clearly because of impossibility to conclude about Khrushchev’s intentions, the positive effects of the crisis are obvious.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is the result of the prolonged confrontation between the two world powerful states such as the United States and the Soviet Union. The situation of the intensified tensions between the states’ leaders and developed Cold War provoked the placement of the Soviet Union’s missiles at the territories of Cuba as the reaction to the US invasion of Cuba and aggression.

Non-resolved conflicts between the two states stimulated the development of new problems and conflicts, and Cuban crisis became such an influential conflict which made the public speak about the threat of not only the third world war but also about the possibilities of the nuclear war. On the one hand, the Soviet Union focused on protecting the interests of the Cuban revolution and preventing the further attempts of the US forces to invade Cuba.

On the other hand, the United States responded to the risk of being attacked by the Soviet Union’s missiles because of the intensified conflicts. From this point, the causes for the development of the crisis were closely associated with the years of the Cold War and confrontation between the two states.

The blockade of the Soviet Union’s transport with the materials for constructing the missiles sites in Cuba along with the demand to remove the built missiles sites was discussed by the United States as the most effective measure to resolve the conflict following the interests of the both sides. That is why the realized diplomatic measures can be considered as the first step to resolving the prolonged Cold War and to avoiding the further crises.

Carter, E. (2008). The Cuban missile crisis . USA: Paw Prints.

George, A. (2003). Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans faced the Cuban missile crisis . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gibson, D. (2011). Speaking of the future: Contentious narration during the Cuban missile crisis. Qualitative Sociology, 34 (2), 503–522.

Gibson, D. (2012). Talk at the brink: Deliberation and decision during the Cuban missile crisis . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pressman, J. (2001). September statements, October missiles, November elections: Domestic politics, foreign-policy making, and the Cuban missile crisis. Security Studies, 10 (3), 80–114.

Schier, H. (2010). Cuban missile crisis . USA: ABDO.

Stein, C. (2008). Cuban missile crisis: In the shadow of nuclear war . USA: Enslow Publishers, Inc.

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Cuban Missle Crisis facts at your fingertips

• Thesis Statement

Through an unique combination of debate and diplomacy, nuclear war was avoided in October of 1962. On the U.S. side, there was a lot of strong and thought–filled debate. One of the main aspects was how to retaliate to the Soviet missiles in Cuba, and which options to use. EX-COMM went back and forth with the ideas and what they should do, and the result wasn’t fully decided until the day that Kennedy gave his speech. During that time the joint chiefs continued to press for an airstrike. Kennedy had to carefully think this over. In the end, he decided that an airstrike was not the best course of action, partly because the estimated casualties, both military and civilian, were too high. As it turned out, casualties would have been much higher than anticipated, and Kennedy was not looking to start a nuclear war, but rather to avoid it. Another important debate was whether or not to blow off soviet vessels’ rudders if they refused to stop at the blockade line. This was put under much consideration by many people, and Kennedy rejected the idea at first. Fortunately, it never came to that. Also, the Americans constantly wondered what to do about the four soviet submarines trailing some of the freighters, and even had to surface one. Another huge problem was what to do if the American reconnaissance planes were shot at by Soviet or Cuban anti-aircraft guns. Fortunately, this never happened; if it did, it might have led to nuclear war.

            The internal Soviet debate was just as thorough as the internal American debate. One of the most important and obvious debates was whether or not to put the missiles in Cuba in the first place. It was a while before the next big debate within the Soviet Union, which took place after Kennedy’s address to the America. That debate was about how to react to his speech. After the blockade was formed, Khrushchev had to decide whether he should order his ships to turn around or attempt to fight their way through. The final debate within the Soviet Union was the one that saved the world from nuclear war. It was what they should ask of the U.S if the Soviet Union were to remove their missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev originally had the idea of the Americans signing an agreement to never invade, or help an invasion of Cuba. But after more thought and discussion, he decided to come up with a plan that he found more appealing. Then he asked that the U.S. remove their missiles from Turkey. But the U.S. decided to ignore that idea and only respond to the first.

            There were multiple instances of diplomacy and debate between the Soviets and the Americans. An important debate occurred between Adlai Stevenson and Zurin at the U.N. concerning the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Another great example is the letters between John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev about each other’s actions.   Diplomatic actions started with the first meeting between Kennedy and Gromyko; at the meeting, Gromyko stated that Soviet aid was only for defense purposes, while Kennedy had proof that Soviet offensive missiles did exist in Cuba, contrary to what Ambassador Dobrynin had said. In their second meeting, Kennedy presented the U.S. offer to never invade Cuba, if the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba., On the Soviet side diplomacy continued when Gromyko contacted Khrushchev, who eventually agreed to the American terms. A key point in the diplomatic effort was the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, considered by many the turning point in the crisis.

            In essence, diplomatic actions or initiatives were carried out by both sides; both parties relied on debate, which in turn was both internal and mutual. The combination of diplomatic actions and debate were crucial to a peaceful solution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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What was the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis?

Should the united states maintain the embargo against cuba that was inflamed by the cuban missile crisis.

• What was the Cold War?
• How did the Cold War end?
• Why was the Cuban missile crisis such an important event in the Cold War?

Cuban missile crisis

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• HistoryNet - Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis
• PBS LearningMedia - Cuban Missile Crisis | Retro Report
• John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum - Cuban Missile Crisis
• The History Learning Site - Cuban Missile Crisis
• Khan Academy - The Cuban Missile Crisis
• Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - The Cuban Missile Crisis
• GlobalSecurity.org - Cuban Missile Crisis
• Academia - Cuban Missile Crisis
• Warfare History Network - The Cuban Missile Crisis: On the Brink of Nuclear War
• Alpha History - The Cuban Missile Crisis
• Hoover Institution - The 1962 Sino-Indian War and the Cuban Missile Crisis
• Spartacus Educational - Cuban Missile Crisis
• The National Security Archive - The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary
• Cuban missile crisis - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
• Cuban missile crisis - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)

What was the Cuban missile crisis?

The Cuban missile crisis was a major confrontation in 1962 that brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to war over the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba.

When did the Cuban missile crisis take place?

The Cuban missile crisis took place in October 1962.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of an acutely antagonistic period in U.S.-Soviet relations. It played an important part in Nikita Khrushchev ’s fall from power and the Soviet Union’s determination to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. The crisis also marked the closest point that the world had ever come to global nuclear war.

Whether the U.S. should maintain its embargo against Cuba that was inflamed by the Cuban Missile Crisis is hotly debated. Some say Cuba has not met the conditions required to lift it, and the US will look weak for lifting the sanctions. Others say the 50-year policy has failed to achieve its goals, and Cuba does not pose a threat to the United States. For more on the Cuba embargo debate, visit ProCon.org .

Cuban missile crisis , (October 1962), major confrontation that brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to war over the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba .

Having promised in May 1960 to defend Cuba with Soviet arms, the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev assumed that the United States would take no steps to prevent the installation of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Such missiles could hit much of the eastern United States within a few minutes if launched from Cuba. The United States learned in July 1962 that the Soviet Union had begun missile shipments to Cuba. By August 29 new military construction and the presence of Soviet technicians had been reported by U.S. U-2 spy planes flying over the island, and on October 14 the presence of a ballistic missile on a launching site was reported.

After carefully considering the alternatives of an immediate U.S. invasion of Cuba (or air strikes of the missile sites), a blockade of the island, or further diplomatic maneuvers, U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy decided to place a naval “quarantine,” or blockade, on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of missiles. Kennedy announced the quarantine on October 22 and warned that U.S. forces would seize “offensive weapons and associated matériel” that Soviet vessels might attempt to deliver to Cuba. During the following days, Soviet ships bound for Cuba altered course away from the quarantined zone. As the two superpowers hovered close to the brink of nuclear war, messages were exchanged between Kennedy and Khrushchev amidst extreme tension on both sides. On October 28 Khrushchev capitulated , informing Kennedy that work on the missile sites would be halted and that the missiles already in Cuba would be returned to the Soviet Union. In return, Kennedy committed the United States to never invading Cuba. Kennedy also secretly promised to withdraw the nuclear-armed missiles that the United States had stationed in Turkey in previous years. In the following weeks both superpowers began fulfilling their promises, and the crisis was over by late November. Cuba’s communist leader, Fidel Castro , was infuriated by the Soviets’ retreat in the face of the U.S. ultimatum but was powerless to act.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of an acutely antagonistic period in U.S.-Soviet relations. The crisis also marked the closest point that the world had ever come to global nuclear war. It is generally believed that the Soviets’ humiliation in Cuba played an important part in Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 1964 and in the Soviet Union’s determination to achieve, at the least, a nuclear parity with the United States.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Written by: brian domitrovic, sam houston state university, by the end of this section, you will:.

• Explain the various military and diplomatic responses to international developments over time

Suggested Sequencing

Use this narrative with the John F. Kennedy’s Inauguration Narrative and the John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961 Primary Source to cover President Kennedy’s inauguration and his approach to the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the central foreign policy crisis of the Kennedy administration and represents the closest the world came to the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The crisis began in October 1962, with U.S. U-2 aircraft taking reconnaissance photographs of Cuba that showed the Soviet Union had recently placed nuclear missiles there and was preparing them with the capacity to launch and reach targets in the United States. Kennedy deliberated with his advisers and, on October 22, made a television address revealing the Soviet moves, demanding that they be reversed, and announcing a naval quarantine of Cuba that would permit no shipments related to missile preparations.

After several tense days, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed, to Kennedy’s satisfaction, to remove the missiles in exchange for official American recognition of Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba, the end of the quarantine, and the removal of American nuclear missiles from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-member Turkey. The crisis was defused, and the missiles left Cuba as the quarantine was lifted in November.

The roots of the crisis lay in the superpowers’ contest over Berlin that had come to a head the previous year. Because of the Potsdam agreement after World War II, West Berlin remained an enclave of the United States and its allies within Soviet-dominated East Germany. In 1961, Khrushchev had appealed to Kennedy at a summit in Vienna to permit the effective incorporation of West Berlin into East Germany. Kennedy refused, and in August, Khrushchev ordered the Berlin Wall to be built separating East and West Berlin. This stemmed the large flow of emigrants from East to West that had characterized the city since its division.

The building of the wall represented an admission on the part of the Soviet Union that the United States had rejected its proposal on Berlin outright, requiring the U.S.S.R. to undertake the embarrassing secondary option: the wall. Smarting from this development, Khrushchev sought other arenas in which the Soviet Union could clearly beat the United States in a geopolitical contest. An opportunity arose early in 1962, when the leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro, declared his allegiance to the cause of Marxist-Leninism and international communism.

Fidel Castro (right) led a communist revolution in Cuba and attempted to forge a relationship with the Soviet Union.

In April 1961, Castro, who had seized power in a coup in 1959, easily fended off the Bay of Pigs invasion undertaken by Cuban exiles who had been covertly supported by the United States during the Kennedy administration. Emboldened by this accomplishment, Castro aspired to export revolution throughout Latin America. In making his communist allegiances known in early 1962, Castro also indicated to the Soviet Union that, should it lack enthusiasm for communist expansionism in Latin America, he would court Chairman Mao’s communist China as an alternative partner.

Khrushchev decided he would submit to Castro’s pressure and make Cuba the vehicle for the geopolitical victory he sorely desired after the 1961 developments in Berlin. In the summer of 1962, therefore, the Soviet Union increased its exports of important military materiel to Cuba, depriving formerly favored allies such as Gamel Abdel Nasser’s Egypt in the process. The shipments included nuclear missile components that, when readied, could easily reach the United States.

Khrushchev understood that in the near future, the United States would detect these developments, but he accepted the risk that a crisis would ensue. Besides building the Berlin Wall and limiting Chinese influence over Cuba, Khrushchev wished to give the impression that he had nuclear missiles to spare. In his presidential campaign of 1960, Kennedy had bemoaned a “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though he knew the balance of these weapons actually favored the United States. By having missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev hoped to discredit Kennedy by showing that not only was the missile gap real (which it was not) but also that it had become more extreme under Kennedy.

Khrushchev’s decision was exceedingly dangerous and risky. Placing nuclear missiles 90 miles from Florida in a country that several years before had been something of a U.S. client state and violating the 138-year-old Monroe Doctrine was a move that could clearly get out of hand. The missiles threatened to destabilize the Cold War because they gave the Soviets first-strike capability, meaning they could strike the United States before it could launch a response. By obtaining first-strike capability, the Soviets would upset the logic of mutual assured destruction (MAD), because MAD prevented a nuclear war only if each side could strike the other with nuclear weapons. It was “one hell of a gamble,” as Kennedy observed during the crisis that October. The Soviet Politburo appears to have justified its decision by reasoning that U.S. nuclear missiles in Turkey, which bordered the Soviet Union, were no different than Soviet missiles so close to the United States in Cuba. However, the U.S. government did not regard the two situations as comparable.

On October 16, Kennedy received word from his national security staff that aerial photography definitively showed Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, with launch sites being readied. This information remained classified as Kennedy met with his advisers and military leadership for six successive days, debating the response to take. The options included diplomatic efforts, a naval blockade, and an invasion of Cuba. The military staff heavily favored invasion, but Kennedy feared that would elicit a Soviet march on Berlin that the United States might be powerless to oppose and would deliver Khrushchev exactly what he wanted. Ultimately, Kennedy chose the blockade but adjusted it to a “quarantine.” This meant that American naval vessels would only permit goods to pass into Cuba that were not associated with war materiel. This distinction implied that Kennedy’s action was not an act of war.

This 1962 aerial photograph shows the construction of a medium-range ballistic missile launch site in Cuba. Photographs like this were shown to President Kennedy at his briefings with national security teams during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

On October 22, Kennedy addressed the nation on television explaining the crisis the first the public had heard of it and the naval quarantine. Soviet responses to Kennedy’s moves were not conciliatory, and with large military forces of both superpowers gathered in and around Cuba, the world sensed that nuclear war could be imminent. The U.S. Navy was stopping and boarding ships, a U.S. reconnaissance pilot was shot down (the only combat fatality of the crisis), and at least one Soviet submarine with nuclear weapons was harassed by American forces.

On October 26, Kennedy received an otherwise-standoffish letter from Khrushchev that appeared to offer notes of conciliation and compromise. Through back channels, Kennedy learned that the Soviets were willing to remove the missiles in exchange for two clear American concessions (in addition to the ending of the quarantine): a pledge not to invade Castro’s Cuba and the removal of the United States’ own missiles in Turkey. Diplomats conferred, and on October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that the Soviet Union would remove its missiles from Cuba. The United States confirmed that it would end the blockade when the missiles and their attending apparatus were gone (which it did in November), as well as pledging not to invade Castro’s island. The Turkey concession was kept secret (to Khrushchev’s chagrin), and the United States removed the missiles there the following April.

The release of sources, documents, and tape recordings over the years since 1962 has revealed that specific individuals had the capacity to carry out major military strikes during the crisis and refrained. Aboard a submarine near Cuba on October 27, Soviet officer Vasili Arkhipov cast the deciding vote against firing the vessel’s nuclear weapons in response to harassment from American naval forces.

In 1962, Vasili Arkhipov was an officer on the Soviet submarine B-59 , pictured here. A unanimous vote among its three top officers was required to launch the sub’s nuclear weapons. Arkhipov refused to assent without receiving orders from Moscow, an action that likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust.

By provoking the missile crisis, Khrushchev had secured an ally in Cuba, but it was an ally that had pushed him around to pursue its own goals. He also did not secure the prize – West Berlin – that had motivated him to act in the first place. In 1964, weakened and embarrassed, he was relieved of his office and replaced by the hardliner Leonid Brezhnev. Kennedy, on the other hand, was emboldened by the missile crisis, basking in the glory of getting tough with the Soviets while appearing conciliatory in the cause of world peace. The crisis made West Berlin a permanent entity, which Kennedy relished as another Cold War victory. He immortalized his success in a 1963 speech in that city in which he famously said, “Ich bin ein Berliner” [“I am a Berliner”] and urged that if people wished to compare Communism and the free world, “let them come to Berlin.” The missile crisis also introduced a new sober realism to U.S.-Soviet relations. A diplomatic hotline was installed between Moscow and Washington, DC, and a nuclear test ban treaty between the two powers was signed the following year.

Review Questions

1. The Cold War world came closest to seeing the use of nuclear weapons during the

• Berlin Airlift
• Korean conflict
• Cuban Missile Crisis
• Vietnam War

2. All the following occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis except

• reconnaissance photography
• a naval blockade
• a televised address to the American public by the president of the United States
• a military invasion of Cuba

3. The Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved by

• an American pledge not to invade Cuba
• immediate removal of American nuclear missiles in Turkey
• replacement of a naval blockade by a naval quarantine
• the Bay of Pigs invasion

4. The Cuban Missile Crisis can be seen in the larger geopolitical context as

• a clash of post-World War II global powers
• a failure by the United Nations to deal with World War II land claims
• the end of American interest in Latin America
• the beginning of friendlier relations between the United States and China

5. Fidel Castro’s leadership of Cuba alarmed the United States primarily because Castro

• rejected the advances of Communist China
• played the Soviet Union against the Communist Chinese
• aspired to export revolution throughout Latin America
• threatened an invasion of southern Florida

6. A year before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy disagreed over the fate of a city in which Cold War battleground nation?

7. Which concession did President Kennedy make to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis?

• Lifting the trade embargo with China
• Lifting the quarantine of Cuba
• Permitting nuclear forces in Cuba and Turkey
• Formally recognizing Communist China

Free Response Questions

• Analyze Nikita Khrushchev’s objectives in placing nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962.
• Evaluate the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the U.S. Cold War foreign policy.

AP Practice Questions

This map of the western hemisphere showing the full range of the nuclear missiles under construction in Cuba was used in Washington, DC, during secret meetings on the 1962 Cuban crisis.

1. What was a direct result of the situation depicted in the provided map?

• Postwar decolonization
• The extension of Cold War competition to Latin America
• An increase in the number of nonaligned nations
• The exposure of suspected communists within the U.S. government

2. The image most directly resulted from what earlier policy?

• The expansion of a free-market global economy
• Support for mutual coexistence
• A strategy of containment
• Island hopping

3. The situation portrayed in the image contributed to which of the following?

• The communist revolution in Cuba led by Fidel Castro
• The signing of a nuclear test ban treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
• The passage of new immigration laws banning the quota system
• The creation of NATO, on the basis of Western nations’ desire for collective security

Primary Sources

CIA History Staff, McAuliffe, Mary S. (ed). “CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis1962.pdf

“The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary.” The National Security Archive . https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/docs.htm

“To the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” National Archives Foundation . https://www.archivesfoundation.org/exhibit/to-the-brink-jfk-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis/

Suggested Resources

Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis . Second ed. New York: Pearson, 1999.

Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War . New York: Vintage, 2009.

Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis . New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Munton, Don, and David A. Welch. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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