critical essay in equality

English Studies

This website is dedicated to English Literature, Literary Criticism, Literary Theory, English Language and its teaching and learning.

“Equality” by Maya Angelou: A Critical Analysis

Equality” by Maya Angelou was published in 1978 in her collection And Still I Rise.

Introduction: “Equality” by Maya Angelou

Table of Contents

Equality” by Maya Angelou was published in 1978 in her collection And Still I Rise . The poem uses powerful repetition and vivid imagery to convey the speaker’s unwavering determination in the fight for equality and freedom. Angelou uses metaphors like “blinders” and “padding” to represent societal barriers imposed upon the speaker, and emphasizes an enduring, rhythmic spirit with references to drums and a pulsing tempo. Her work doesn’t simply mention qualities and features, it embodies them.

Text: “Equality” by Maya Angelou

You declare you see me dimly through a glass which will not shine, though I stand before you boldly, trim in rank and marking time. You do own to hear me faintly as a whisper out of range, while my drums beat out the message and the rhythms never change. Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free. You announce my ways are wanton, that I fly from man to man, but if I’m just a shadow to you, could you ever understand ? We have lived a painful history, we know the shameful past, but I keep on marching forward, and you keep on coming last. Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free. Take the blinders from your vision, take the padding from your ears, and confess you’ve heard me crying, and admit you’ve seen my tears. Hear the tempo so compelling, hear the blood throb in my veins. Yes, my drums are beating nightly, and the rhythms never change. Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free.

Annotations: “Equality” by Maya Angelou

Literary And Poetic Devices: “Equality” by Maya Angelou

Themes: “Equality” by Maya Angelou

• Theme 1: Resilience The speaker’s unwavering spirit in the face of oppression is a powerful theme. They’ve been subjected to attempts to diminish and silence them (“you declare you see me dimly”) but their strength shines through. The repeated phrase “And still, like dust, I’ll rise” highlights that no matter how they are treated, their spirit remains unbroken.
• Theme 2: Inherent Human Equality Angelou challenges the very foundation of oppression by highlighting the shared humanity between the speaker and those who would seek to dominate them. The lines “the same hot blood,” and “the same cool breath” emphasize that the speaker is fundamentally equal to those who treat them unjustly.
• Theme 3: Defiance Against Oppression This poem stands as a defiant call against all forms of oppression. The speaker boldly proclaims “Equality – and I will be free” challenging the power of their oppressors. The repeated phrase “You may… but still” (as in “You may shoot me with your words… but still, like air, I’ll rise.”) highlights their refusal to be subdued.
• Theme 4: Inevitability of Change Angelou cleverly uses natural imagery to convey the inevitability of social change and the pursuit of justice. The rising sun is a recurring image of hope and new beginnings, while the reference to “the tide that rushes in” paints the fight for equality as a natural and unstoppable force.

Literary Theories and “Equality” by Maya Angelou

Critical Questions about “Equality” by Maya Angelou

1. How does Angelou use the drumming imagery to establish both the speaker’s internal rhythm and connection to a greater movement?

• “Now you understand / Just why my head’s not bowed. / I don’t shout or jump about / Or have to talk real loud. / When you see me passing, / It ought to make you proud.”
• Analysis: The drumbeat can represent the indomitable spirit within the speaker, and likely connects to broader traditions of African and African-American music as expressions of resistance and community.

2. How does the shift in tone, from questioning to assertive, reflect the speaker’s journey toward empowerment?

• “You may trod me in the very dirt / But still, like dust, I’ll rise.”
• Analysis: Early stanzas pose questions, reflecting doubt and uncertainty. Yet, the declarations of the later stanzas show a shift toward an unwavering belief in inevitable equality.

3. How does the speaker’s connection to nature undermine the oppressor’s attempts to diminish them?

• “Does my sassiness upset you? / Why are you beset with gloom? / ’Cause I walk like I’ve got oil wells / Pumping in my living room.”
• Analysis: Natural imagery (sun, tide) portrays forces beyond human control. This links the drive for equality to something unstoppable, making attempts at control seem futile.

4. Could this poem be interpreted as a call to action, and if so, what kind of action is encouraged?

• “Equality, and I will be free.”
• Analysis: The poem doesn’t outline practical steps, but stirs a defiant spirit. Is this about inner strength, collective action, or something else entirely?

Literary Works Similar to “Equality” by Maya Angelou

• “Still I Rise” by Maya Angelou: Shares themes of perseverance and defiance against oppression, similar tone of unwavering determination.
• “Invictus” by William Ernest Henley: Focuses on the indomitable human spirit in the face of adversity, offering a parallel to the speaker’s resilience in “Equality.”
• “Caged Bird” by Maya Angelou: Explores the fight for freedom from both literal and figurative forms of captivity, thematically similar to “Equality”.
• “I, Too” by Langston Hughes: Asserts the speaker’s place in American society, mirroring “Equality’s” demand for recognition of inherent equality.
• Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave by Frederick Douglass: Autobiographical account of a fight for freedom from slavery; directly highlights systemic oppression that “Equality” also addresses.
• “ Letter from Birmingham Jail ” by Martin Luther King Jr.: A powerful argument for social justice and call to action, similar to the implicit challenge in “Equality” against complacency.
• “Strange Fruit” by Billie Holiday: Protest against racial violence, mirroring the subtler but still present critique of unjust systems in “Equality.”
• “A Change Is Gonna Come” by Sam Cooke: Civil Rights era anthem embodying hope and the inevitability of change, similar to the thematic undercurrent in “Equality.”

Suggested Readings: “Equality” by Maya Angelou

Scholarly monographs:.

• Braxton, Joanne M. Maya Angelou’s I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings: A Casebook . Oxford University Press, 1999. (Provides in-depth analysis of Angelou’s work, often including attention to her poetry and the recurring themes relevant to understanding “Equality”.)
• Gillespie, Marcia Ann, et al. Maya Angelou: A Glorious Celebration . Doubleday, 2008. (While focused on Angelou’s life, this work likely offers contextual details and insights that could shed further light on the motivations and themes present in “Equality”.)

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles:

• McWhorter, John. “Saint Maya.” The New Republic , vol. 219, no. 11, 1998, pp. 35-41. (Offers a critical, sometimes contrarian perspective on Angelou’s legacy, inviting a multifaceted understanding of how readers engage with “Equality”.)
• Neubauer, Paul. “Maya Angelou: Poetic Witness.” The Missouri Review , vol. 31, no. 3, 2008, pp. 77-95. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20712891. (Focuses specifically on Angelou’s poetic techniques, providing tools for close reading and deeper analysis of “Equality.”)

Reputable Websites:

• Poetry Foundation: Maya Angelou. https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poets/ maya-angelou (Offers biographical information, access to Angelou’s poems, and may include critical essays or resources relevant to specific poems, including “Equality.”)
• The Academy of American Poets: Maya Angelou. https://poets.org/poet/maya-angelou (Similar to the Poetry Foundation, providing a starting place for research and potential critical analyses.)

Related posts:

• “The Darkling Thrush” by Thomas Hardy: Analysis
• “The Lady of Shalott” by Lord Tennyson: Analysis
• “Yet Do I Marvel” by Countee Cullen: Analysis
• “Terminus” by Ralph Waldo Emerson: Analysis

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

By Maya Angelou

‘Equality’ by Maya Angelou is an uplifting poem with a positive message. It speaks movingly about the possibilities of the future.

Maya Angelou

Nationality: American

She's also known for her autobiographical works.

Poem Analyzed by Andrew Walker

B.A. Honors in Professional Writing and Communication (Minor in Historical Studies)

Angelou’s writing style , story, and typical literary content make the topic of equality a very natural one for her to write about and discuss in a promising and impressive fashion. The topic of equality is hardly a new or unique idea, and thankfully the concept has received a great deal of momentum since Angelou was born in 1928. Her input on the topic in the form of her distinctive poetry offers a compelling message that has remained relevant since the moment it was written. Angelou’s use of metaphor , imagery , repetition and notable word choice creates a significant and noticeable atmosphere that stays with the reader long after the poem has been read and re-read.

Equality Analysis

You declare you see me dimly through a glass which will not shine, (…) while my drums beat out the message and the rhythms never change.

‘Equality’ is a poem without a stable form, but rather the structure of the poem flows in accordance with its own content. This first verse , for example, follows a similar structure to the other main verses in that its rhyming pattern is ABCB and that is contains a number of thematic elements that will be repeated later. It is different in that the first eight lines of the poem are all one verse, in contrast to the use of two quatrains that will be employed later on. In this case, the content simply flows naturally from one idea to the next, and these eight lines work well as one verse, without the interruption of thought that a line break usually creates.

Throughout the poem, Angelou employs a similar style , with that rhyming pattern holding true, though occasionally using half-rhymes rather than full ones. The poem is written as a message spoken by a single narrator addressing another figure but is written as though the “I” is representative of a larger group and the “you” is representative of something similar.

In the first verse, the speaker discusses the idea of being seen, and how this idea does not necessarily mean as much as it might. The idea of being seen “through a glass which will not shine” brings to mind the image of a pair of glasses, a spyglass, or a similar lens through which one person can see something else — except that the glass does not shine. This metaphor suggests that while the speaker is seen, they are not necessarily seen entirely, or understood for having been seen. The “though” in the third line makes it seem as though the following description of “standing boldly” is something that is being missed by the observer. The speaker is seen, but their pose, their demeanour, and their intentions are not.

The second half of the first verse begins with an oddly-worded phrase: “You do own to hear me faintly.” Grammatically, this makes little sense (“own to” in general is not a logical phrase), but here, the use of the word “own” is telling. Ownership over another person, and “owning” the ability to listen to them, albeit faintly, is an indication that the topic of the poem is likely centered around slavery and taking away the freedoms of another individual. In this light, the “I” of the poem likely represents those who have been oppressed and sold into slavery, while the “you” represents their forced masters. While the themes expressed thus far could be applied to many elements of injustice, the word choice here is indicative of something specific and markedly terrible.

The last two lines of the verse use a metaphor for hope to signal a slight “silver lining” to the piece. The drums of the speaker are not likely a literal reference, but another way of expressing a personal and intimate aspect of self that endures throughout even the worst of hardships.

When the speaker declares that the rhythm never changes, it suggests that this beat or rhythm has been with them for a long time, and their own terrible experiences cannot change the things that are a part of them. In the context of slavery, this brings to mind the musical culture native to various African peoples. If this is the intended reference, it suggests that the music they grew up within freedom is still a part of them, and their memory of it and desire to follow it cannot be broken, no matter what is done to them.

Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free.

These next two lines use repetition to make a powerful point more pronounced. The meaning behind the words is simple enough to decipher — the speaker equates equality with freedom. They will still live in the same area physically, surrounded by the same people, but if they are equals among those people, they will consider themselves liberated. With the implied theme of slavery prominent in the first verse, these lines take on additional contextual meaning, though it is hardly necessary to think too deeply on it — to be equal in a society is to be free within it.

The repetition of the line, as well as the way the two lines separate two similarly-structured verses has a strong influence on the pace of the poem. It breaks up the verses and cuts through the atmosphere as well, by introducing a hopeful, almost idealistic (which is a sad commentary in itself, as yearning for equality should never be an idealistic thing to do) element to the poem following a verse that has its own darker and more downcast atmosphere. It almost reads as the chorus in a song, and this may have even been the author’s intention — though it is also likely that the substantial repetition surrounding this line is to highlight its immeasurable importance to the meaning of the whole.

Stanza Three

You announce my ways are wanton, (…) could you ever understand ?

After the break for the call for equality, the poem resumes its previous structure, with the noticeable difference of breaks between the two quatrains that were merged in the first verse. The first line of this next verse gives the poem a harsh, accusing tone , and gives the speaker a kind of moral high ground. The atmosphere in this verse is only slightly altered from the first one, and reads in a more mournful, almost pleading tone, though the words have a bite to them. The speaker is accused of being immoral or indecent and told that their life consists of being with one man and then the other as often as they deem necessary.

The use of the word “wanton,” along with the common expression of moving “from man to man” suggests that the speaker is a prostitute, or can be compared to one in their personal life. Interestingly, the accusation is not denied but rather is met with another accusation from the narrator: that someone who judges them for the things they do is someone who could not understand being in a position to do them.

The language used here is powerful. The speaker describes their own self as being “a shadow” in the eyes of their accuser, suggesting that they are beneath them in their social hierarchy. However, they follow up this observation by pointing out that because of this metaphorical distance between the two, the accuser cannot possibly understand their own accusation. In a way, the speaker is placed above the accuser not by denying their words, but by defending their actions.

In this verse, the notion of the “you” and the “I” is challenged somewhat, because the idea of social injustice is harder to apply here. If the speaker is a sex worker, for example, then the other’s judgement of them only makes sense if they chose the industry, as their response makes sense if they had reasons for choosing that industry that others might not understand. While the motifs established so far remain strong — equality, persecution, and willful blindness, for instance — the simple roles of the “you” and the “I” are challenged somewhat.

Stanzas Four and Five

We have lived a painful history, we know the shameful past, (…) Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free.

In the next verse, the “I” becomes a “we,” and this amplifies the impression the reader has of a group that is being discriminated against. The “painful history” and “shameful past” suggest that the speaker is one of the latest generations amidst a long line of persecuted or hated people, all of whom simply yearned for equality. The idea of slavery and the long period of racist discrimination that followed it continues to fit with the words of the poem.

The last verse, which described the speaker as being either in an unfortunate personal situation or an undesirable industry for employment makes it plausible that while the speaker may not be a slave in their society, they may be experiencing racist discrimination following a time when such a thing was sadly commonplace.

The verse does revisit the theme of hope in the work, however, by stating that the “we” of the poem have endured their difficult history and painful lineage and that the speaker responds to everything they’ve described in this poem by moving forward and not giving up. The final line, “and you keep on coming last” could have a plethora of meanings depending on the actual roles of the “I” and the “you.” It implies that while the speaker and their comrades are moving forward, the rest of their more privileged society is complacent and is metaphorically standing still by accepting their lots, in direct contrast to those who seek to improve their lives.

After this, the credo equating freedom with equality is repeated, once again affirming the message intended for the work and breaking up the flow of the harsh, unapologetic verses. The sense of repetition is obvious here, and its reasoning clear — this is the message that must remain with the reader, and possibly with the narrator, above all others.

Stanzas Six and Seven

Take the blinders from your vision, take the padding from your ears, (…) Yes, my drums are beating nightly, and the rhythms never change.

The next verse returns the role of the accuser to the speaker, who speaks in an almost commanding way to their society here, demanding that they “confess” their willful blindness to the injustices they create. In the narrator’s mind, it is impossible that anyone is entirely oblivious to pain seen on such a massive scale, and they know that their tormentor is aware of their own wrongdoings. The image of blinders and paddings is an effective metaphor for those who would rather not acknowledge an ugly truth, and it is used to great effect here, as the speaker confesses their own moments of weakness in the form of pain and tears that others have heard and seen, but chosen to ignore.

Stanza Eight

In the final full verse of the poem in this structure, the perspective shifts slightly. It begins as a continuation of the previous command and begins with the word “hear,” indicating that they are once again telling someone else to “remove the padding” around their ears and listen, but this time the sound is not a literal one. While the flow of blood does make some sound, it is not something that can easily be literally listened to — but a heartbeat is a symbolic noise with great meaning.

The beat of a heart is being compared to the beat of a drum, and in this way, the speaker’s literal drive for life is metaphorically one and the same with the culturally significant beat of drums, that remnant of home, repeated here to conclude the verse and remind the reader and the other alike that despite the tears and vulnerability expressed here, they are as strong as ever, and will not give up on what it is they truly need:

Historical Context

In her life, Maya Angelou was an African-American poet and civil rights activist, though these terms seem almost simple when applied to her. Throughout her life, she has worked in the film, television, and theatre industries, in the music industry, in the sex trade industry, and, finally, in the literary industry. Her experiences throughout life are well-documented in her autobiographies and collections of poetry, but she is widely remembered for her civil activism. She worked alongside Martin Luther King Jr., and was considered a spokesperson for people of colour across the United States. She constantly made a point of critiquing what was considered normal and was not afraid of demanding change.

From her childhood, Angelou was the subject of discrimination. In one notable example, she was sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend at the age of eight. When she told her family what had happened, they reported the crime. The man was found guilty and served a jail sentence of one day. He was later murdered, and Angelou became mute, afraid to speak for fear that her voice , in reporting the crime, had killed her abuser.

Throughout ‘Equality’ , there are clear themes of discrimination, which line up with Angelou’s public contributions towards the fight for civil rights. Her own experiences make it very likely that she is the narrator of the poem. This is particularly notable within the second and third verses (after the first “equality and I will be free”), where Angelou is more than likely discussing her years working as a prostitute and table dancer, among other similar jobs. Angelou joined this industry, largely illegally, to care for her newborn son while fighting against racism in society — this is likely a sliver of the meaning behind “could you ever understand?” in that verse.

For around ten years, Angelou worked in the music industry, and brought that element of culture to the fight for equality with Martin Luther King Jr. She released her first album, Miss Calypso , in 1957, which is recorded in the calypso style, an Afro-Caribbean style of music that may be the inspiration behind the repeated references to the drums and the beat that never changes.

The themes of ‘Equality’ and the themes of Angelou’s autobiographical works share many similarities with one another. It is clear that this is a deeply personal piece for its author, and is designed to resonate strongly with the reader by bringing them into Angelou’s own world, just for long enough to understand what it is she spent her life fighting for as best as she could.

Home » Maya Angelou » Equality

About Andrew Walker

Join the poetry chatter and comment.

Exclusive to Poetry + Members

Join Conversations

Share your thoughts and be part of engaging discussions.

Expert Replies

Get personalized insights from our Qualified Poetry Experts.

Connect with Poetry Lovers

Build connections with like-minded individuals.

Could you highlight any important metaphors in more detail?

In the opening stanza, Angelou uses dirty “glass” as a metaphor for the way people perceive black people. The suggestion is that views are unfairly tarnished. She also likens her voice to a drum to highlight which I think is a powerful metaphor. In most songs, the drum beat is ever present beneath everything else. The same could be said of her message.

Can you include what message the poem conveys Thank you😁.

Perhaps unsurprisingly it is promoting equality.

Can you include the types of figurative language/literary devices used in the poem for each stanza? What figurative language is “We have lived a painful history, we know the shameful past”?

Hello. The line you have quoted I wouldn’t say is figurative. I’d say it is meant to be taken quite literally. In the first stanza, there is lots of figurative language. For instance when the speaker says “through a glass that will not shine” I think what the speaker is trying to say is that societies views on people of colour are clouded. There is always an (unfair) prejudice. What I love about the opening stanza is that the lines alternate between 7 and 8 syllables consistently which makes it appear like the rhythm of the drum mentioned at the end of the stanza. I’m not going to comment on the refrain but in the following section, there are two beautiful images. The first is that the speaker is accused of flying “from man to man” the use of the word fly is an interesting verb because the noun is …  Read more »

So touching

It’s a lovely poem, isn’t it?

Access the Complete PDF Guide of this Poem

Poetry+ PDF Guides are designed to be the ultimate PDF Guides for poetry. The PDF Guide consists of a front cover, table of contents, with the full analysis, including the Poetry+ Review Corner and numerically referenced literary terms, plus much more.

Get the PDF Guide

Experts in Poetry

Our work is created by a team of talented poetry experts, to provide an in-depth look into poetry, like no other.

Cite This Page

Walker, Andrew. "Equality by Maya Angelou". Poem Analysis , https://poemanalysis.com/maya-angelou/equality/ . Accessed 20 August 2024.

Help Center

Request an Analysis

(not a member? Join now)

Poem PDF Guides

PDF Learning Library

Beyond the Verse Podcast

Poetry Archives

Poetry Explained

Poet Biographies

Useful Links

Poem Explorer

Poem Generator

[email protected]

Poem Solutions Limited, International House, 36-38 Cornhill, London, EC3V 3NG, United Kingdom

(and discover the secrets to understanding poetry)

Get Free PDFs to Help You Learn Poetry

Download Poetry PDF Guides

Complete Poetry PDF Guide

Perfect Offline Resource

Covers Everything Need to Know

One-pager 'snapshot' PDF

Offline Resource

Gateway to deeper understanding

Get this Poem Analysis as an Offline Resource

Poetry+ PDF Guides are designed to be the ultimate PDF Guides for poetry. The PDF Guide contains everything to understand poetry.

You declare you see me dimly through a glass which will not shine, though I stand before you boldly, trim in rank and marking time . You do own to hear me faintly as a whisper out of range, while my drums beat out the message and the rhythms never change. Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free. You announce my ways are wanton, that I fly from man to man, but if I’m just a shadow to you, could you ever understand ? We have lived a painful history, we know the shameful past, but I keep on marching forward, and you keep on coming last. Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free. Take the blinders from your vision, take the padding from your ears, and confess you’ve heard me crying, and admit you’ve seen my tears. Hear the tempo so compelling, hear the blood throb in my veins. Yes, my drums are beating nightly, and the rhythms never change. Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free.

Summary of Equality

Analysis of literary devices used in equality, analysis of poetic devices used in equality, quotes to be used.

Equality, and I will be free. Equality, and I will be free.

Related posts:

Post navigation.

Equality By Maya Angelou

247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples

Looking for exciting equality topics to write about? The issue is hot, controversial, and definitely worth studying!

🔝 Top 10 Gender Equality Essay Topics

• 🏆 Best Essay Examples

🥇 Most Interesting Equality Topics to Write about

🎓 simple & easy equality essay titles.

• 📝 Interesting Titles
• 💡 Controversial Topics

❓ Equality Essay Questions

In your equality essay, you might want to focus on racial, social, or gender inequality in historical perspective or nowadays. Whether you will choose to write an argumentative or persuasive essay, this article will help you. We’ve gathered top race and gender equality title ideas and added excellent equality essay examples to inspire you even more.

• Gender equality as a fundamental human right
• History of women’s empowerment
• Preventing violence against women and girls
• Gender bias in medical sphere
• Reproductive rights of women
• Child marriage in developing countries
• Gender equality in economy: is it possible?
• Gender stereotypes in the workplace
• Women representation in political institution
• Gender quotas in parliaments: do they work?

🏆 Best Equality Essay Examples & Topic

• Employment Relations: Effects of Unitarism on Inequality In view of this, management teams are evaluating employee loyalty on the basis of the extent to which they have internalized the firm’s corporate vision even if it is at the expense of their personal […]
• Freedom and equality According to Liliuokalani of Hawaii, the conquest contravened the basic rights and freedoms of the natives and their constitution by undermining the power of their local leaders.
• Relation Between Justice and Inequality The structure of institutions needs to be changed in that everyone can relate hence creating a rift in the judgment delivered between the rich and the poor is unproductive.
• Marriage Equality: Same-Sex Marriage This is because it forms the basis of organization in any given society.”Marriage refers to an institution in which interpersonal relationships, usually intimate and sexual, are acknowledged in a variety of ways, depending on the […]
• Gender Inequality in Workplace Gender is the main reason for inequalities in the workplace; this is because nowadays there is a steady increase in the number of women in workplaces in the world.
• Does Democracy Require Equality of Income or Wealth? While wealth equality as the presence of equivalent opportunities to exert political power appears to be the essential factor in establishing democracy, income equality as the opportunity to build wealth is also a factor.
• SDGs – Equality Education and Gender Equality The quality of education for girls can affect their employment and their ability to support themselves financially. With a good education, women have a larger range of jobs to choose from and the opportunity to […]
• Equality, Diversity and Inclusive Education The major goal of inclusive learning is to value the diversity of the human community and also ensure that there is equity in the provision of education to all groups of people, such that not […]
• Gender-Sensitive Education and Equality This is because they are in the best position to determine the level of success that has been achieved, and what could be impeding the achievement of this equality.
• Inequality in Society: Conflict and Functionalism Theories Functionalism theory views inequality as unavoidable and important to the society while conflict theory considers inequality to result from conflict and coercion in the social system.
• Gender and Sports: Men and Women Equality Sport is considered to be one of the most appealing but at the same time the most controversial institutions in the world.
• Sociological perspectives of Gender Inequality The events taking place in the modern world and the occurrence of the feminist movements during the past few decades can be used to offer a deeper understanding on the subject of gender inequality and […]
• The Progress of Gender Equality The key achievements have been the removal of all forms of discrimination against women, the promotion of legal literacy, education, and the general protection of the rights of women.
• Gender Equality in Higher Education: The Underrepresentation of Women in Educational Leadership A prime example of gender inequality is the underrepresentation of women in educational leadership, and this problem is going to be considered here in detail.
• Inequality and Development The irritating consumerism of the rich and the shortage of basic needs in low income societies lead to the multiplication of conflicts between the rich and poor.
• Equality of Opportunity in Society Policies developed by the political class to pursue equality of opportunity distract society from addressing the issues that contribute to the inequalities, depriving people of good life regardless of their social class.
• Absolute Gender Equality in a Marriage Despite the fact that the principles of gender equality in marriage will clearly affect not only the relationships between a husband and a wife but also the roles of the spouses considerably, it is bound […]
• Social Equality and Economic Growth Social equality provides individuals with equal opportunities to contribute to the growth of the economy. Equality also ensures that the potential of the society is fully exploited to enhance the development of the entire community.
• Deaf Culture and Sign Language: Social Equality in Society Most importantly, the ASL Level 1 course has facilitated an accurate understanding and respect of the Deaf culture as a means of enhancing social equality in diverse societies. Most importantly, ASL Level 1 has been […]
• Missouri Compromise: Economic Equality Among American States These impacts include enhancing economic equality, political balance, unity of the northern and southern states of America, and controlling the spread of slavery in the country. Finally, the Missouri Compromise controlled the spread and prevalence […]
• The Meaning of Equity: The Struggle for Equality However, there is a significant difference between equality and equity, and in my opinion, the latter approach is much fairer and provides more benefits. Therefore, for me, equity is the idea that both society and […]
• Creating a Culture of Gender Equality in the Workplace This proposal will consider the existing gender inequality within the field of architecture and propose several changes an architecture firm should undertake to create a culture of gender equality.
• J. S. Murray’s “On the Equality of the Sexes” It is possible to say that Murray’s ideas presented in On the Equality of the Sexes are ahead of her time.
• The Struggle for Gender Equality Before going any further it is crucial to emphasize the pitfalls when it comes to asserting the rights of women when it comes to the need for similar treatment in comparison to men.
• Social, Cultural and Gender Inequality From a Global Perspective It is the duty of the tutor to craft a lecture-room environment that serves to enhance meaningful discussions concerning gender. This is due to the fact that students learn best in various ways.
• Fairness and Equality in the Modern Business World The reduction in the gender wage gap between men and women in the workplace indicates the progress that society has made in making the world a fairer and equal place.
• Title IX: Gender Equality in Education Education provides opportunities for developing the abilities of girls and boys, women and men to participate in the social, economic, and political life of the state and is the basis for the development of a […]
• Enhancing Equality in the Society Since equality is at the heart of human rights, the government should contribute to its growth by lawfully establishing the same rights for every person regardless of their SES, age, race, and other features.
• The Fighter for Equality: Nelson Mandela In 1941, he moved to Johannesburg, and, along with his work as a lawyer, he entered the University of the Witwatersrand at the Faculty of Law. He organized the Campaign of Disobedience to the Authorities, […]
• Multinational Corporations Managing Diversity & Equality The supposed acceptances of diversity as a good contradict the well-established structural barrier to implementing greater openness to differences in the workplaces.
• Gender Issues of Equality and Representation in the K-12 Education System This paper examines the gender issues of equality and representation in the K-12 education system and gives out the major findings based on the observed trends from the structured study of literature in the area.
• Gender Equality: Plan to Address the Issue The vice president of administration and finance should use a powerful plan to address the issues affecting the institution. To begin with, I will use a powerful plan to address the issues affecting different female […]
• Were the Goals of Hampton/Tuskegee Consistent with the Democratic Ideals of self-Determination and Equality? Thus, considering the situation which took place in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is possible to state that proclaiming democratic ideas in the education, the main goals of Hampton/Tuskegee idea were directed at […]
• Nonhuman Animals in Moral Equality Theories The subject-of-a-life is the basis of human rights; however, according to Regan, animals have this property as well and as such deserve animal rights.
• Hobbes and Locke on the Issue of Equality The concept of equality is significant in the discussion of liberty, property, and the role of government in the lives of people.
• Chimamanda Adichie: The Issue of Equality and Tolerance After centuries of discrimination and alienation between the communities of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, after hundreds of years of wars based on religion and nationality, modern society has slowly started coming to senses and […]
• Gender Equality and Development Despite the progress of the last century on ensuring the equal rights for both genders, there are still issues that have to be addressed by the global society.
• Equality of Transgender and LGBTQ+ Populations The principles of the struggle for the transgender and LGBTQ+ populations should include respect for the choice and self-identification of a person.
• Aspects of Equality for Transgender Athletes The authors of the article claim that transgender athletes deserve equal representation and the right to participate in competitions in the divisions of the gender they identify themselves by referring to social structures and justice.
• The Discussion of Concepts of Gender Equality In the article, the author presents such concepts as violence, harm, empowerment, freedom, and universal care from the point of view of capitalism, liberalism, and feminism to reach the point of gender equality.
• How to Have Both Private Property and Equality in a State It is possible to have both private property and equality in a state by developing measurable notions through a qualitative analysis of freedom and equality in their relatable aspect.
• Gender Equality in Children’s Perception Despite the variety of achievements made on the subject in different parts of the world, the general tendency leads society toward accepting the idea of equality between men and women.
• Fairness and Equality in the Modern Labor World The establishment of an equal position between people is one of the most critical forces that will help the organic and stable development of society and the surrounding world.
• Workplace Equality for Minorities Steps must be taken to ensure that labor is appropriately paid and that the current model, in which work performed predominantly by minorities is undervalued, is not perpetuated.
• The Telus Company’s Equality and Diversity Practices In order to be a prominent representative in the framework of equality and inclusion, the corporation admits the importance of ensuring that its staff, at all levels, demonstrates the variety of customers and communities.
• Racial Equality in the Brown v Board of Education Case The Brown v Board of Education of Topeka was one of the events that resulted in a step towards demolishing inequality, being preceded by an unfair ruling.
• Income Equality and Social Policy Advocacy Lag The lag in income equality can be seen from statistical data: the income inequality ratio in the US is nine to one, which is worse than in Portugal, the UK, France, Canada, Germany, and some […]
• The Philosophy of Equality and Inclusiveness: Key Principles For example, inclusiveness reinforces the understanding of a person with disabilities that one is entitled to the same services as the rest.
• Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s Address on Equality and Rights The same rights enable both a man and a woman to be part of enhancing the growth and development of a nation. The women would acquire their rights by using their penmanship, words, wealth, influence, […]
• Equality of Victims in the Legal System One of the most problematic issues concerning the inefficiencies of the legal system is the relatively low investigation rate of specific murder cases.
• Activists’ Role in African Americans’ Struggle for Equality The civil rights movement became one of the most notable phenomena in the history of the United States because it forever changed the political, legal, and social landscape of the country.
• “The Struggle for Black Equality: 1954-1992” by Harvard Sitkoff The author discusses the belittling of black people and the preservation of white supremacy, describes how black citizens’ inability to vote escalated into them being assaulted and murdered, and explains how law facilitated racial barriers.
• Women’s Equality Regarding Their Overall Wellness According to Poczatkova and Kribikova, the underrepresentation of women, particularly in the fields of science and research, is reproduced in the outcomes of the findings of studies and the subsequent applicability.
• Gender Equality as Target of Social Work As far as health care is concerned, the primary issue of gender inequality addresses the issue of access to the services and the quality of care provided.
• Cultural Diversity and Social Equality The power of equality is to allow one to express their cultural identity without the fear of being marginalized in society.
• Nursing Regulations as to Patient Equality I did not know that he was the father of the senior director at the hospital, and the older man was waiting for him. The incident was the subject of discussion in the workplace, and […]
• Martin Luther King Jr. as an Equality Activist At one time, Martin doubted which profession to give preference to medicine or law, everything was decided in favor of the ministry of the church, which influenced the education and literacy of the future leader.
• Naomi Osaka’s Case of Gender Equality in Sports The recent case of retirement by Naomi Osaka is a prime example of how gender roles and racism in sports can affect even the best athletes making sports an important discussion in the context of […]
• Promoting Equality in the UK Primary School Education System What is the nature of the relationship between inequalities in the UK primary school education system and its administrative structures? The context of this research is the primary school education system in the UK.
• Is Political and Racial Equality Possible in American Society? The study of this issue is important to modern American politics as it directly reflects the problems and opportunities of racial and ethnic minorities. It is also important to strive for justice and equality in […]
• Populism Discourse and Social Equality Regarding the definition, in this paper, populism will be viewed as “an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society”.
• Impairment Pain Management and Disability Equality The purpose of the policy is to examine approaches to pain management to ensure disability equality. The first method is a formalized approach to pain management, assessment, and frequent reassessment/ monitoring of the patient’s state.
• Gender Equality: Definition, Challenges Over the decades, society viewed the female gender as an inferior sect in the community hence the emergent issues of imbalance in the system.
• Abolition vs. Equality in the American Civil War The Resolution was signed by Abraham Lincoln, the 16th President of the United States who believed the annihilation of slavery and preserving the Union to be the core targets of the war.
• Workplace Relations and Equality Policymaking It is agreeable that many employees have expressed their concerns due to the increasing cases of inequality, discrimination, and abuse in the workplace. The problem of inequality and discrimination at the workplace continues to affect […]
• Women in Islam: Some Rights, No Equality Notwithstanding the principles of equality of men and women in Islamic tradition, women’s low status should be attributed not to the ideals set in the Quran but to the cultural norms of the patriarchal society.
• Female Criminality and Gender Equality The present paper considers this theory by exploring the differences in treatment of females in the United States and Nigeria and assessing their impact on female criminality in the two countries.
• Diversity and Equality at Business Management Level The analysis was carried out in 2010 and revealed that 40% of all company directors in the UK were foreign. When compared to 2005, this represents a 14% increase in the number of overseas directors […]
• Disability Equality of a Disabled Lone Parent Although the officials were initially reluctant owing to her physical condition and the nature of work she was to perform, they allowed her to try.
• Media and ICT Industries Gender Equality Initiatives Therefore, the inability to use media and social networks to build a business is a serious obstacle to the development of women’s entrepreneurship in less developed countries.
• Syrian Conflict and Women Rights: Way to Equality or Another Discrimination The main reason for a low percentage of women in the workforce is Syrian social norms, which stereotypically reflect the role of women in homes serving their husbands and in the private sector.
• Financing Public Education: The Concept of Equality It is also critical to reach impartiality for everyone around the country to have equal opportunities to build their future with the help of education.
• Empowering Gender Equality in the United Arab Emirates Workforce The objective of the paper is to track changes in gender equality policies, especially concerning the equal representation of all women in the country’s workforce.
• Gender Equality in Finland and the U.S. Legal Situation: discuss the laws regarding general gender equality and the representation of women in positions of political power. Political Situation: analyze the current political landscape in the United States as well as Finland and […]
• Negative Impact of Oil on Wealth Equality and Economy of United Arab Emirates Oil has created wealth inequality in UAE and a shift in world energy focus to green energy will negatively impact the economy of UAE.
• The Women’s Movement and Gender Equality: ERA Opponents of the ERA argue that it is redundant due to the already existing Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Gender Problems, Equality and Perspectives: “Glass Ceiling” Trend The word “ceiling” depicts a kind of barrier for the progress of women and the word “glass” is used as an adjective for ceiling because as glass in invisible, the barrier is also invisible. The […]
• Private Clubs and Gender Equality In the clubs, members of the society get opportunity to pursue their goals and interests collectively and for the benefit of all.
• Affirmative Action Advances Racial Equality by Glenn and Williams The opponents of affirmative action, on the other hand, argue that affirmative action penalizes innocent people simply because they are white, and in most cases, the result is that it leads to people who are […]
• Black Women and the Struggle for Equality The rates in which the black females are incarcerated by males vary based on the level of education that the women have, and also the level of civilization that the Africa women are in.
• Is FGM a Human Rights Issue in the Development of Humanism and Equality? Among the problems faced by developed states that receive migrants from third-world countries, the protection of women’s and girls’ rights in the field of reproductive health stands out.
• Equality in the UN Operations: Chinese Perspective During the Cold, War China felt that the instrument of peacekeeping operations was exploited as a tool by the superpowers to further their interests and not the interests of the nations involved.
• Order, Freedom, Equality, & Justice In order to include all the necessary points into the new constitution it is advisable that the already existing constitutions of the developed countries are consulted and the works of the reputable scholars in the […]
• Welfare and Equality: Richard Titmuss’ Theories According to Titmuss, the realities of 20th century’s living in Western countries were defined by the fact that, unlike what it used to be the case, during course of earlier centuries, the amount of socially […]
• Social Factors in the US History: Respect for Human Rights, Racial Equality, and Religious Freedom The very first years of the existence of the country were marked by the initiatives of people to provide as much freedom in all aspects of social life as possible.
• Equality or Priority in the Ideal of Equality Before attempt to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss the definition of the doctrine of egalitarianism, prioritarianism and the purpose of this doctrine.
• In Pursuit of Educational Equality Images of spaciousness and majesty, of endless plains and soaring mountains, fill our folklore and our music and the anthems that our children sing.”This land is your land,” they are told; and, in one of […]
• Freedom, Equality & Solidarity by Lucy Parsons In the lecture and article ‘The Principles of Anarchism’ she outlines her vision of Anarchy as the answer to the labor question and how powerful governments and companies worked for hand in hand to stifle […]
• Equality of Opportunity and Social Justice: Affirmative Action If this is the situation in advanced nations of the world, the plight in the newly emerging states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America can easily be imagined as to how difficult would it be […]
• Women in Developing Countries: Globalization, Liberalization, and Gender Equality Owing to issues of gender, the voices of women in developing countries are never heard when it comes to the creation of trade agreements and policies or in their negotiations.
• Gender Equality Question: “Hamlet” by William Shakespeare For the past few centuries, the rise of various movements have marked a certain change in the ideas and philosophies of man regarding the true nature of his existence, the pronounced inequalities of not only […]
• Equality: The Use of TV to Develop Our Gender Roles In this sense, when it is the men who predominantly work outside of the home, they will usually see the home as a place of leisure and so use the TV as a source of […]
• Feminism and Support of Gender Equality Nowadays, it involves advocacy and a set of activities aimed to protect the rights of a plethora of discriminated groups, including LGBT community members and racial minorities.
• Gender Equality in Sweden and America The parental leave is extended to fathers, and the government strives to maintain a fair gender proportion in the top positions in public agencies.
• Criminology. Female Incarceration and Equality The power dynamics between the two genders and the observable differences in male and female behavior shape their crime patterns, avenues into the justice system, and responses to incarceration.
• Equality: Benefits of Showing Real Differences The purpose of this paper is to apply the concept of equality to explain why people should strive to reveal and show that there are real human differences instead of surmising that they exist.
• The Enlightenment: Giving Start to Equality The ideas inherent to the philosophy of the Enlightenment changed the course of history and gave rise to the French Revolution and the start of the Constitution of the United States, human rights, and the […]
• Appiah’s Ideas of Racism, Equality, and Justice The existence of visible differences in people’s appearances created the basis for the distribution of populations into groups depending on the color of their skin and some other features.
• Empathy, Equality and Justice as Reflective Values Related to the principle of empathy is the notion of equality, which is extremely important as an addition to the ability to empathize.
• Social and Gender Equality Ideals and Theories According to Friedrich, there is no need of elevating the selfish desires of the human race in the pretext of democracy or hot pursuit for gender equality. However, the equality of outcome tends to be […]
• Gender Equality Issues in the Workplace Environment Hence, the gathering of information to validate the allegations is central to the resolution of the gender issue in the case study.
• Chapters 1-2 of “Liberty, Equality, Power” by Murrin et al. The voyage resulted in Pope’s decree of the division of all non-Christian lands between Portugal and Spain, dying out of the local population of Carribean and Bahama Islands and replacing it with black slaves from […]
• Chapter 3 of “Liberty, Equality, Power” by Murrin et al. In the subsequent part of the chapter, the author illustrates the events of Indians’ settlement. The author claims that mercantilism ideals became the prevention of ethnic diversity support.
• Gender Equality in the Laing O’Rourke Company The construction industry in the UK has been in a steady decline for from 2011 to 2016, with its fall culminating in autumn, when Carillion, one of the largest construction company in the region, disintegrated.
• Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality Concepts According to Georgellis and Sankae, the Theory of Gender Role emerged out of the consistent work of different psychologists who were interested in explaining the differences between men and women from a socio-economic angle.
• Male Nurses and Gender Equality in the Workplace The research will go further to examine how the concept of gender equality in the nursing working environment can address the problem of the nursing shortage.
• Equality and Diversity in the United Arab Emirates The principles of equality and diversity are promoted in many modern organizations, and it is important to evaluate specific competing drivers that contribute to incorporating diversity into the strategy of the UAE-based company and discuss […]
• Democracy and Oligarchy: the Meaning of Equality Aristotle’s meaning of equality is a form of government that is democratically rooted and not aligned to the issue of state and class.
• Equality and Diversity in Business Ethics The leader will identify the skills and dexterities of the workers and design the best teams that can deliver the targeted goals.
• Gender Equality and Its Development Another important indication of the progress is the creation of UN Women, which addressed the known shortcomings of the global women’s rights movements, such as barriers to funding and lack of centralized effort aimed at […]
• Equality, Diversity and Human Rights in Healthcare Equity can be achieved in a health system that acknowledges the diversity of the population respecting the expectations and needs of the patients, the staff and the services as a whole.
• The Question of Gender Equality: Scott vs. Terrall The paper also answers the question of gender equality, in terms of the standing of women in scientific society, and explains why the arguments of both authors are valid and provide a useful insight into […]
• Educational Equality for All Students In spite of the gravity of multiculturalism in the American society, the teachers and students tend to misinterpret the concept of the intercultural environment by often regarding representatives of various ethnicities as “monocultural”.
• UAE Employee Equality in Sick Leave Provision The actual laws and regulations concerning the provision of sick leaves to the employees in the UAE will be compared to the evidential data of the realities in the modern workplaces.
• Gender and Racial Equality at the Workplace In this light, this paper seeks to identify the prevailing obstacles to the full attainment of racial and gender equality in the workplace setting.
• LULAC: Efforts to Promote Racial Equality However, even after the official acceptance of Hispanic people as citizens with the full access to the civil rights and liberties, LULAC is still essential for the promotion of racial equality.
• Equality and Diversity in Business Environment The employees will also present adequate competencies in order to improve the level of performance. Employees should use different approaches and ideas in order to promote the concept of diversity.
• What Is the Point of Equality Theory? The antagonism that seems to crop up from the two interpretations gives rise to the concept of egalitarianism that seeks to diminish the differences that arise from the understanding of liberty and equality.
• American Democracy and Equality Criticism However, the absence of even the smallest traces of ‘equality’ in America can be confirmed not only within the context of what accounts for the living standards, on the part of the country’s rich and […]
• Developing a Culture of Gender Equality by Awadhi The author is one of the modern and educated women in the UAE, which provides evidence of her ability to develop an article describing the state of women in the country.

📝 Interesting Gender Equality Title Ideas

• Rationalizing Equality in the USA The effects of power abuse still in the minds of the federalists and the antifederalists, both groups had a hard time to come into terms with the intended ratification and implementation of the United States […]
• Equity and Equality of Resources by R. Dworkin As a matter of fact, resolution for this problem should be measures adopted to promote and empower individuals in the society, who are the main beneficiaries of equality in resource sharing.
• Toleration in T. Nagel’s “Equality and Partiality” He argues that the state has the right to enforce only those rules that are based on the values accepted by all of the citizens. Nagel shows that the government should show respect to all […]
• US Education: Goals, Methods, and Equality Issues Despite the fact that nowadays, in the 21st century, honoring diversity has become an almost a common tradition, recognizing the need for diversity in education is still a controversial issue in the sphere of education.
• Gender Equality: Women Leadership in Financial Sector The primary purpose of the study is to assess the effectiveness of various GE tools in the context of the financial sector in the US.
• Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment by Gemechu Ogato The article “The Quest for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in the least Developed Countries” presents a macro work. The ideas presented in this article will guide more societies and governments to identify better policies […]
• Men and Women Equality in the African Diaspora Although the historic and social events and changes in the USA typical for the period of the 1960s-1980s contribute to the stating the ideals of civil rights and gender and racial equality, black women in […]
• Equality and Globalization: Changing Gender Expectations The 21st century has experienced globalization, which is the increase in the integration of nations. Globalization has changed the gender expectations that were traditionally held by members of society.
• Gender Equality and Globalization’ Issues Since the world policies adopt a new progressive direction, the idea of gender equality enters the category of the ultimate Millennium development goals.
• US Progress in Freedom, Equality and Power Since Civil War When it comes to the pursuit of freedom and ideals of democracy, progress since the Civil War can be seen in the establishment of a sufficiently capable Federal government, efficient judiciary and presidency systems with […]
• Equality in the American System of Education According to Andrew Carnegie, the problem of our age is the proper administration of wealth in such a manner that would lead people to attach to each other as a family and live in harmony.
• Social Equity and Equality Concept Comparison In his view, American society has never been equal; hence application of equality in the distribution of important resources is impossible, meaning public administrators must undertake the role of studying the society to comprehend the […]
• Equality’ and Diversity Sociological Issues This plan ensures equity and equality in terms of access to healthcare for the American citizenry. Indeed, Daley and Feit confirm that healthcare professionals have the duty to offer services of equal quality to people, […]
• Gender Equality and Title IX The function of Title IX is to guarantee gender equality in college sports and it has supported the development of female sports.
• Mary Wollstonecraft’s Achievements in Struggles for Gender Equality First wave feminists advocated for women to be granted the right to vote in the U.S. Their persistent pressure made the U.S.government to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment of 1920, which granted women the right to […]
• The Equality Act 2010 and Individual Employment Rights Since this study focuses on the case of Ladele and McFarlane with reference to the principle of conscientious, religious objection to same-sex relationships, we shall only look at elements of the Act that deal with […]
• Gender Equality: Male Dominance The simple reason is that gender inequality exists in affluent societies wherein women are free to do what they want, have access to education, and have the capacity to create wealth.
• Inequality of Development of Saudi Arabia Given the significance of oil in the country’s economic growth, the government channels most of its funds towards the development of the oil industry.
• Inequity Issue in the Workplace In this case the success or failure of an organization to reach the stated objectives lay in the hands of the people who are concerned and more importantly in the leader who spells the vision […]
• How Can the Objective of Equality at Work be Promoted through Recruitment and Selection? To investigate the relationship that such equality has with Human Resource Management practices To given insights on the mechanisms through which the objective of equality at work could be promoted through recruitment and selection For […]
• “Savage Inequality” a Book by Jonathan Kozol Kozol argues that, in spite of a century of lawful and governmental action, America upholds uneven and divided education system whereby the deprived that form the marginal children, debatably who warrant the most resources, obtain […]
• “8 Is Not Hate: The Meaning of a Proposition” and “Prop 8 Hurt My Family—Ask Me How; Marriage Equality USA” The modern day and age offers rights and freedoms that people have not experienced some time before and the majority of official rulings have acknowledged that people have a right to marry whomever they want, […]
• Equality to All? Karl Marx’s “The Communist Manifesto” In many western nations, the classical movement was driven by the quest to transform the economy and the political philosophy. The intention was to meet the needs and aspirations of the colonial powers.
• American Socioeconomic Equality The researchers also state that such tax policy contributes to the increase of the wealth gap even though the productivity is on the rise.
• Is It Possible for Managers to Reduce Inequality in Business Organizations? Organizational culture: it is the HRM to blame One of the greatest problems of the HRM personnel is the inability to embrace the needs and wants of every single member of the staff.
• Gender inequality in Algeria The fact that women helped to build back the ruins of society and the heroism they showed in the war efforts, was forgotten by their husbands and the government.
• Tunisia’s Gender Equality These people feel that the government should advance democracy in this country, and Muslims should be taught the importance of following the law of the country, for the good of all people.
• How harness all the potentiality among the people to ensure there is equality According to Jackson, some of the benefits derived from promoting diversity are that the organization is able to harness various potentials.
• The Impact of Higher Education Expansion on Income Inequality in China Trends in the access to higher education since the expansion of education reforms in 1989 signal a rise in inequality. Wu observes that during the expansion of education in China, the Gini Coefficient rose to […]
• Color Blindness and Equality We should always endeavor to judge people by the content of their character, as opposed to the color of their skin.
• Public Policy and Social Inequality From the studies that have been conducted, it has been identified that the inequality changes that have been experienced in the different states of the world are not monotonic; other factors play a critical role […]
• Inequality in U.S Healthcare: The Americare Insurance System The other insurance is the Medicaid that covers the poor and the unemployed people. This means that the better option of insurance is a universal insurance plan that caters for everyone.
• Building Workplace Equality Moreover, the Indian sales personnel will have the idea of the mentality of Indians and will have the tactics to convince them.
• Affirmative Action: Achieving Race Equality in School Admissions Therefore, this paper is bent on showing the effectiveness of affirmative action towards achieving equality on the basis of race in school admissions to enhance educational diversity, and in the hiring process to promote racial […]
• Ensure equality of representation The title of the article renders a reader to prepare for a critical examination of the subject being reviewed by the authors.
• Income Inequality in Marxism, Structuralism, Neoliberalism, and Dependency Theory The peculiar features of every country’s development should be discussed from the point of the character of the economic relations within the country and from the point of the country’s position within the global economic […]
• Religious Equality in America If the government were to ensure that there is religious equality, then the uniqueness of each religion will be lost. The task of this essay is to establish whether it is possible or not to […]
• What Is ‘Liberal Representative Democracy’ and Does the Model Provide an Appropriate Combination of Freedom and Equality? Freedom and equality are guaranteed under this form of democracy because they are enshrined in the constitution which is always the supreme law of a given country.
• Full Frontal Feminism – What is Still Preventing Women from Achieving Equality? The aim of the book remains relevant in the modern society as young women continue to be the key victims of violence against women.
• Greater equality: the hidden key to better health and higher scores Main arguments of the authors In their article, “Greater equality: the hidden key to better health and higher scores”, Wilkinson and Picket argue that equality in terms of income levels among the population is more […]

💡 Controversial Gender Equality Essay Topics

• Media Patterns and Social Inequality
• Discrimination and Fight for Equality
• There Will Never Be Equality in the World; There Will Always Be Very Rich and Very Poor People
• Equality of Opportunity and Condition Concepts
• Gender inequality in Canada
• Social Capital and Health Inequality
• Managing Diversity and Equality
• Dimensions to Political Thinking: Human Equality, Power, and Order
• The Influence on Health of Economic Inequality
• Scholars Comment on Gender Equality
• The Problem of Social and Economic Inequality in Modern Society
• Obtaining Objective Truth in Regards to Martin Luther King’s Role in the Fight for Equality in the United States
• Capitalism and World Inequality
• Education in Australia as a Tool of Promoting Equality of Opportunity
• Inequality of Women in China
• Coretta Scott King: Fighting and Advocating for Equality
• The Problem of the Racial Inequality in US
• Racial Inequality in America in 1998
• Citizens’ Equality in the United States
• The Race Equality Concept
• Anti-same-sex Marriage Laws and Amendments Violate the Constitutional Guarantees of Equality for all Citizens of the United States
• Free Exercise Clause: Freedom and Equality
• American Africans Action in the Struggle for Equality
• Chaucer and Sophocles Views on Gender Equality
• Liberty, Equality and Power
• The Fight for Equality in Martin Luther King’s Life and Writings
• African American Women and the Struggle for Racial Equality
• Gender Equality in the United States, China and Egypt
• Equality of Men and Women
• Are Women Important in Gulf Politics? What are the Main Barriers to Gender Equality?
• Are Economic Liberalization and Equality Compatible?
• Are Robots the Solution to Equality in the Job Interview Process?
• Can Certified Tea Value Chains Deliver Gender Equality in Tanzania?
• Can Guaranteed Tax Base Formulas Achieve Spending Equality?
• Can Liberty and Equality Be Reconciled in Political Theory?
• Can Recruitment and Selection Methods Be Chosen To Promote Equality at Work?
• Does Equal Opportunity Bring Men and Women Closer to Wealth Equality?
• Does the Media Hinder the Cause for Gender Equality?
• Does School Tracking Affect Equality of Opportunity?
• How Elvis Presley Brought Racial Equality?
• How Gender Equality Has Been Bridged in Sports in American Colleges?
• How Does Inclusive Practice Promotes Equality and Supports Diversity?
• How Mirror and Window Books Can Teach Children Equality?
• Why Is Gender Equality Ruining Everyone’s Happiness?
• Why the Americans Understand the Equality of the Sexes?
• Why Does Tocqueville Believes That Equality Leads to a Love of Centralized Authority?
• Why Cultural Ideology Constraints Fairness and Equality?
• What Has Limited the Impact of UK Disability Equality Law on Social Justice?
• Why Didn’t the Reconstruction Bring Justice and Equality to Freed Blacks?
• Why Embracing Gender Distinctions Can Create Equality?
• Why Freedom and Equality Is an Artificial Creation?
• Why Have Some Feminists Criticised the Idea of Gender Equality?
• Why Organizations Are Struggling for Achieve Equality and Manage Diversity?
• How To Transform Quatic Agricultural Systems Towards Gender Equality?
• What Are the Two Political Ideals of Freedom and Equality Claimed by Long and Roosevelt?
• Cultural Psychology Ideas
• Human Behavior Research Topics
• Equity Research Ideas
• Freedom Topics
• Integrity Questions
• Social Democracy Essay Titles
• Mindfulness Research Ideas
• Virtue Ethics Questions
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2024, February 28). 247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/equality-essay-examples/

"247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples." IvyPanda , 28 Feb. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/topic/equality-essay-examples/.

IvyPanda . (2024) '247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples'. 28 February.

IvyPanda . 2024. "247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples." February 28, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/equality-essay-examples/.

1. IvyPanda . "247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples." February 28, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/equality-essay-examples/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "247 Equality Topics & Essay Examples." February 28, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/equality-essay-examples/.

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

This article is concerned with social and political equality. In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contested concept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical power suitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least since the French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals. There is controversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality), the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). This article will discuss each of these issues in turn.

1. Defining the Concept

2.1 formal equality, 2.2 proportional equality, 2.3 moral equality, 2.4 presumption of equality, 3.1 simple equality and objections to equality in general, 3.2 libertarianism, 3.3 utilitarianism, 3.4 equality of welfare, 3.5 equality of resources, 3.6 responsibility and luck-egalitarianism, 3.7 equality of opportunity for welfare or advantage, 3.8 capabilities approaches, 4. relational equality, 5. equality among whom, 6.1. kinds of egalitarianism, 6.2 equality vs. priority or sufficiency, other internet resources, related entries.

‘Equality’ is a contested concept: “People who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging” (Dworkin 2000, p. 2). Our first task is therefore to provide a clear definition of equality in the face of widespread misconceptions about its meaning as a political idea. The terms ‘equality’ (Greek: isotes ; Latin: aequitas , aequalitas ; French: égalité ; German Gleichheit ), ‘equal’, and ‘equally’ signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. ‘Equality’ must then be distinguished from ‘identity’, which refers to one and the same object corresponding to itself in all its features. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’ – the concept of merely approximate correspondence (Dann 1975, p. 997; Menne 1962, p. 44 ff.; Westen 1990, pp. 39, 120). Thus, to say that men are equal, for example, is not to say that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than ‘sameness’.

Judgements of equality presume a difference between the things compared. According to this definition, the notion of ‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality may be seen as problematic because it would violate the presumption of a difference. Two non-identical objects are never completely equal; they are different at least in their spatiotemporal location. If things do not differ they should not be called ‘equal’, but rather, more precisely, ‘identical’, such as the morning and the evening star. Here usage might vary. Some authors do consider absolute qualitative equality admissible as a borderline concept (Tugendhat & Wolf 1983, p. 170).

‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both to describe and prescribe, as with ‘thin’: “you are thin” and “you are too thin”. The approach taken to defining the standard of comparison for both descriptive and prescriptive assertions of equality is very important (Oppenheim 1970). In the descriptive case, the common standard is itself descriptive, for example when two people are said to have the same weight. In the prescriptive use, the standard prescribes a norm or rule, for example when it is said people ought to be equal before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is a descriptive component, since the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which the rule or norm applies. The question of this identification – who belongs to which category? – may itself be normative, as when we ask to whom the U.S. laws apply. On the other hand, the comparative standards contain something normative – a moral or legal rule, such as the U.S. laws – specifying how those falling under the norm are to be treated. Such a rule constitutes the prescriptive component (Westen 1990, chap. 3). Sociological and economic analyses of (in-)equality mainly pose the questions of how inequalities can be determined and measured and what their causes and effects are. In contrast, social and political philosophy is in general concerned mainly with the following questions: what kind of equality, if any, should obtain, and with respect to whom and when ? Such is the case in this article as well.

‘Equality’ and ‘equal’ are incomplete predicates that necessarily generate one question: equal in what respect? (Rae 1980,p. 132 f.) Equality essentially consists of a tripartite relation between two (or several) objects or persons and one (or several) qualities. Two objects A and B are equal in a certain respect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general term. ‘Equality’ denotes the relation between the objects compared. Every comparison presumes a tertium comparationis , a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equality applies – equality thus referring to a common sharing of this comparison-determining attribute. This relevant comparative standard represents a ‘variable’ (or ‘index’) of the concept of equality that needs to be specified in each particular case (Westen 1990, p. 10); differing conceptions of equality here emerge from one or another descriptive or normative moral standard. There is another source of diversity as well: As Temkin (1986, 1993, 2009) argues, various different standards might be used to measure inequality, with the respect in which people are compared remaining constant. The difference between a general concept and different specific conceptions (Rawls 1971, p. 21 f.) of equality may explain why some people claim ‘equality’ has no unified meaning – or is even devoid of meaning. (Rae 1981, p. 127 f., 132 f.)

For this reason, it helps to think of the idea of equality or inequality, in the context of social justice, not as a single principle, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic core of today’s egalitarianism. Different principles yield different answers. Both equality and inequality are complex and multifaceted concepts (Temkin 1993, chap. 2). In any real historical context, it is clear that no single notion of equality can sweep the field (Rae 1981, p. 132). Many egalitarians concede that much of our discussion of the concept is vague, but they believe there is also a common underlying strain of important moral concerns implicit in it (Williams 1973). Above all, it serves to remind us of our common humanity, despite various differences (cf. 2.3. below). In this sense, egalitarianism is often thought of as a single, coherent normative doctrine that embraces a variety of principles. Following the introduction of different principles and theories of equality, the discussion will return in the last section to the question how best to define egalitarianism and its core value.

2. Principles of Equality and Justice

Equality in its prescriptive usage is closely linked to morality and justice, and distributive justice in particular. Since antiquity equality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. (On the history of the concept, cf. Albernethy 1959, Benn 1967, Brown 1988, Dann 1975, Thomson 1949.) People and movements throughout history have used the language of justice to contest inequalities. But what kind of role does equality play in a theory of justice? Philosophers have sought to clarify this by defending a variety of principles and conceptions of equality. This section introduces four such principles, ranging from the highly general and uncontroversial to the more specific and controversial. The next section reviews various conceptions of the ‘currency’ of equality. Different interpretations of the role of equality in a theory of justice emerge according to which of the four principles and metrics have been adopted. The first three principles of equality hold generally and primarily for all actions upon others and affecting others, and for their resulting circumstances. From the fourth principle onward, i.e., starting with the presumption of equality, the focus will be mainly on distributive justice and the evaluation of distribution.

When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard in this respect. This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle articulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , V.3. 1131a10–b15; Politics , III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23). The crucial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons (Berlin 1955–56). But others claim that what is at stake here is a moral principle of justice, one reflecting the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments. On this view, the postulate of formal equality demands more than consistency with one’s subjective preferences: the equal or unequal treatment in question must be justifiable to the relevantly affected parties, and this on the sole basis of a situation’s objective features.

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , 1130b–1132b; cf. Plato, Laws , VI.757b–c). A way of treating others, or a distribution arising from it, is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, a way of treating others or a distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due. Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, namely when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and comprehensive formulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequate equality.

Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons \((P_1, P_2)\) and two or more allocations of goods to persons \((G)\) and \(X\) and \(Y\) as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality \(E\). This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If \(P1\) has \(E\) in the amount of \(X\) and if \(P_2\) has \(E\) in the amount \(Y\), then \(P_1\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(X'\) and \(P_2\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(Y'\), so that the ratio \(X/Y = X'/Y'\) is valid. (For the formula to be usable, the potentially large variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregate value.)

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.

This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. Reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth -– this is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle’s idea of justice as proportional equality contains a fundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality (Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. Aristotle’s analysis makes clear that the argument involves those features that decide whether two persons are to be considered equal or unequal in a distributive context.

On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these formal and proportional principles. Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles, which themselves only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice.

Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. It needs to be made precise – i.e., its open variables need to be filled out. The formal postulate remains empty as long as it is unclear when, or through what features, two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice – over who is due what – can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal (Aristotle, Politics , 1282b 22). For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, which are discussed below.

Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right, which assumed a natural order in which all human beings were equal. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time: everyone deserved the same dignity and respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which envisioned that all humans were equal before God, although this principle was not always adhered to in the later history of the church. This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be the result of a decline from the natural equality that characterized our harmonious state of nature, a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by binding individual subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant’s moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights. During the French Revolution, equality, along with freedom and fraternity, became a basis of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789.

The principle that holds that human beings, despite their differences, are to be regarded as one another’s equals, is often also called ‘human equality’ or ‘basic equality’ or ‘equal worth’ or ‘human dignity’ (William 1962, Vlastos 1962, Kateb 2014, Waldron 2017, Rosen 2018). Whether these terms are synonyms is a matter of interpretation, but “they cluster together to form a powerful body of principle” (Waldron 2017, p. 3).

This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is widely accepted (Carter 2011, but see also Steinhoff 2015). In a period in which there is not agreement across the members of a complex society to any one metaphysical, religious, or traditional view (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39–44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p. 5).

Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p. 227), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of providing all persons with equal treatment. Recognizing that human beings are all equally individual does not mean treating them uniformly in any respects other than those in which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.

Disputes arise, of course, concerning what these claims amount to and how they should be resolved. Philosophical debates are concerned with the kind of equal treatment normatively required when we mutually consider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moral equality is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are to arrive at a clear moral standard. Nevertheless, no conception of just equality can be deduced from the notion of moral equality. Rather, we find competing philosophical conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality. These need to be assessed according to their degree of fidelity to the deeper ideal of moral equality (Kymlicka 1990, p. 44).

Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality . More materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria – the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is at stake here is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed, particularly once the approaches described above prove inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. In the domain of political justice, all members of a given community, taken together as a collective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution of social goods, as well as on the distribution’s fair realization. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., no ownership should be recognized without justification. Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal shares. (With different terms and arguments, this principle is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959, 111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach by Williams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by Tugendhat (1993, 374; 1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2002, chap. 5); for criticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap. 10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. (For a justification of the presumption in favor of equality s. Gosepath 2004, II.8.; Gosepath 2015.)

The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice (Gosepath 2004). One has only to analyze what can justify unequal treatment or unequal distribution in different spheres. To put it briefly, the following postulates of equality are at present generally considered morally required.

Strict equality is called for in the legal sphere of civil freedoms, since – putting aside limitation on freedom as punishment – there is no justification for any exceptions. As follows from the principle of formal equality, all citizens must have equal general rights and duties, which are grounded in general laws that apply to all. This is the postulate of legal equality. In addition, the postulate of equal freedom is equally valid: every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life, and this in the most far-reaching manner possible in a peaceful and appropriate social order.

In the political sphere, the possibilities for political participation should be equally distributed. All citizens have the same claim to participation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution, control, and exercise of political power. This is the postulate – requiring equal opportunity – of equal political power sharing. To ensure equal opportunity, social institutions have to be designed in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged, e.g. have a stutter or a low income, have an equal chance to make their views known and to participate fully in the democratic process.

In the social sphere, equally gifted and motivated citizens must have approximately the same chances to obtain offices and positions, independent of their economic or social class and native endowments. This is the postulate of fair equality of social opportunity. Any unequal outcome must nevertheless result from equality of opportunity, i.e., qualifications alone should be the determining factor, not social background or influences of milieu.

The equality required in the economic sphere is complex, taking account of several positions that – each according to the presumption of equality – justify a turn away from equality. A salient problem here is what constitutes justified exceptions to equal distribution of goods, the main subfield in the debate over adequate conceptions of distributive equality and its currency. The following factors are usually considered eligible for justified unequal treatment: (a) need or differing natural disadvantages (e.g. disabilities); (b) existing rights or claims (e.g. private property); (c) differences in the performance of special services (e.g. desert, efforts, or sacrifices); (d) efficiency; and (e) compensation for direct and indirect or structural discrimination (e.g. affirmative action).

These factors play an essential, albeit varied, role in the following alternative egalitarian theories of distributive justice. These offer different accounts of what should be equalized in the economic sphere. Most can be understood as applications of the presumption of equality (whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not); only a few (like strict equality, libertarianism, and sufficiency) are alternatives to the presumption.

3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?

Every effort to interpret the concept of equality and to apply the principles of equality mentioned above demands a precise measure of the parameters of equality. We need to know the dimensions within which the striving for equality is morally relevant. What follows is a brief review of the seven most prominent conceptions of distributive equality, each offering a different answer to one question: in the field of distributive justice, what should be equalized, or what should be the parameter or “currency” of equality?

Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with the same material level of goods and services, represents a strict position as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generally rejected as untenable.

Hence, with the possible exception of Babeuf (1796) and Shaw (1928), no prominent author or movement has demanded strict equality. Since egalitarianism has come to be widely associated with the demand for economic equality, and this in turn with communistic or socialistic ideas, it is important to stress that neither communism nor socialism – despite their protest against poverty and exploitation and their demand for social security for all citizens – calls for absolute economic equality. The orthodox Marxist view of economic equality was expounded in the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875). Marx here rejects the idea of legal equality, on three grounds. First, he indicates, equality draws on a limited number of morally relevant perspectives and neglects others, thus having unequal effects. In Marx’s view, the economic structure is the most fundamental basis for the historical development of society, and is thus the point of reference for explaining its features. Second, theories of justice have concentrated excessively on distribution instead of the basic questions of production. Third, a future communist society needs no law and no justice, since social conflicts will have vanished.

As an idea, simple equality fails because of problems that are raised in regards to equality in general. It is useful to review these problems, as they require resolution in any plausible approach to equality.

(i) We need adequate indices for the measurement of the equality of the goods to be distributed. Through what concepts should equality and inequality be understood? It is thus clear that equality of material goods can lead to unequal satisfaction. Money constitutes a typical, though inadequate, index; at the very least, equal opportunity has to be conceived in other terms.

(ii) The time span needs to be indicated for realizing the desired model of equal distribution (McKerlie 1989, Sikora 1989). Should we seek to equalize the goods in question over complete individual lifetimes, or should we seek to ensure that various life segments are as equally provisioned as possible?

(iii) Equality distorts incentives promoting achievement in the economic field, and the administrative costs of redistribution produce wasteful inefficiencies (Okun 1975). Equality and efficiency need to be balanced. Often, Pareto-optimality is demanded in this respect, usually by economists. A social condition is Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none (Sen 1970, chap. 2, 2*). A widely discussed alternative to the Pareto principle is the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion. This stipulates that a rise in social welfare is always present when the benefits accruing through the distribution of value in a society exceed the corresponding costs. A change thus becomes desirable when the winners in such a change could compensate the losers for their losses, and still retain a substantial profit. In contrast to the Pareto-criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion contains a compensation rule (Kaldor 1939). For purposes of economic analysis, such theoretical models of optimal efficiency make a great deal of sense. However, the analysis is always made relative to a starting situation that can itself be unjust and unequal. A society can thus be (close to) Pareto-optimality – i.e., no one can increase his or her material goods or freedoms without diminishing those of someone else – while also displaying enormous inequalities in the distribution of the same goods and freedoms. For this reason, egalitarians claim that it may be necessary to reduce Pareto-optimality for the sake of justice, if there is no more egalitarian distribution that is also Pareto-optimal. In the eyes of their critics, equality of whatever kind should not lead to some people having to make do with less, when this equalizing down does not benefit any of those who are in a worse position.

(iv) Moral objections : A strict and mechanical equal distribution between all individuals does not sufficiently take into account the differences among individuals and their situations. In essence, since individuals desire different things, why should everyone receive the same goods? Intuitively, for example, we can recognize that a sick person has other claims than a healthy person, and furnishing each with the same goods would be mistaken. With simple equality, personal freedoms are unacceptably limited and distinctive individual qualities insufficiently acknowledged; in this way they are in fact unequally regarded. Furthermore, persons not only have a moral right to their own needs being considered, but a right and a duty to take responsibility for their own decisions and the resulting consequences.

Working against the identification of distributive justice with simple equality, a basic postulate of many present-day egalitarians is as follows: human beings are themselves responsible for certain inequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside from minimum aid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for such inequalities (but cf. relational egalatarians, discussed in Section 4 ). On the other hand, they are due compensation for inequalities that are not the result of self-chosen options. For egalitarians, the world is morally better when equality of life conditions prevail. This is an amorphous ideal demanding further clarification. Why is such equality an ideal, and what precise currency of equality does it involve?

By the same token, most egalitarians do not advocate an equality of outcome, but different kinds of equality of opportunity, due to their emphasis on a pair of morally central points: that individuals are responsible for their decisions, and that the only things to be considered objects of equality are those which serve the real interests of individuals. The opportunities to be equalized between people can be opportunities for well-being (i.e. objective welfare), or for preference satisfaction (i.e., subjective welfare), or for resources. It is not equality of objective or subjective well-being or resources themselves that should be equalized, but an equal opportunity to gain the well-being or resources one aspires to. Such equality depends on their being a realm of options for each individual equal to the options enjoyed by all other persons, in the sense of the same prospects for fulfillment of preferences or the possession of resources. The opportunity must consist of possibilities one can really take advantage of. Equal opportunity prevails when human beings effectively enjoy equal realms of possibility.

(v) Simple equality is very often associated with equality of results (although these are two distinct concepts). However, to strive only for equality of results is problematic. To illustrate the point, let us briefly limit the discussion to a single action and the event or state of affairs resulting from it. Arguably, actions should not be judged solely by the moral quality of their results, as important as this may be. One must also consider the way in which the events or circumstances to be evaluated have come about. Generally speaking, a moral judgement requires not only the assessment of the results of the action in question (the consequentialist aspect) but, first and foremost, the assessment of the intention of the actor (the deontological aspect). The source and its moral quality influence the moral judgement of the results (Pogge 1999, sect. V). For example, if you strike me, your blow will hurt me; the pain I feel may be considered bad in itself, but the moral status of your blow will also depend on whether you were (morally) allowed such a gesture (perhaps through parental status, although that is controversial) or even obliged to execute it (e.g. as a police officer preventing me from doing harm to others), or whether it was in fact prohibited but not prevented. What is true of individual actions (or their omission) has to be true mutatis mutandis of social institutions and circumstances like distributions resulting from collective social actions (or their omission). Social institutions should therefore be assessed not only on the basis of information about how they affect individual quality of life. A society in which people starve on the streets is certainly marked by inequality; nevertheless, its moral quality, i.e., whether the society is just or unjust with regard to this problem, also depends on the suffering’s causes. Does the society allow starvation as an unintended but tolerable side effect of what its members see as a just distributive scheme? Indeed, does it even defend the suffering as a necessary means, as with forms of Social Darwinism? Or has the society taken measures against starvation which have turned out to be insufficient? In the latter case, whether the society has taken such steps for reasons of political morality or efficiency again makes a moral difference. Hence even for egalitarians, equality of results is too narrow and one-sided a focus.

(vi) Finally, there is a danger of (strict) equality leading to uniformity, rather than to a respect for pluralism and democracy (Cohen 1989; Arneson 1993). In the contemporary debate, this complaint has been mainly articulated in feminist and multiculturalist theory. A central tenet of feminist theory is that gender has been and remains a historically variable and internally differentiated relation of domination. The same holds for so-called racial and ethnic differences, which are often still conceived of as marking different values. The different groups involved here rightly object to their discrimination, marginalization, and domination, and an appeal to equality of status thus seems a solution. However, as feminists and multiculturalists have pointed out, equality, as usually understood and practiced, is constituted in part by a denial and ranking of differences; as a result it seems less useful as an antidote to relations of domination. “Equality” can often mean the assimilation to a pre-existing and problematic ‘male’ or ‘white’ or ‘middle class’ norm. In short, domination and a fortiori inequality often arises out of an inability to appreciate and nurture differences, not out of a failure to see everyone as the same. To recognize these differences should however not lead to an essentialism grounded in sexual or cultural characteristics. There is a crucial debate between those who insist that sexual, racial, and ethnic differences should become irrelevant, on the one hand, and those believing that such differences, even though culturally relevant, should not furnish a basis for inequality: that one should rather find mechanisms for securing equality, despite valued differences. Neither of these strategies involves rejecting equality. The dispute is about how equality is to be attained (McKinnon 1989, Taylor 1992).

Proposing a connection between equality and pluralism, Michael Walzer’s theory (1983) aims at what he calls “complex equality”. According to Walzer, relevant reasons can only speak in favor of distributing specific types of goods in specific spheres, not in several or all spheres. Against a theory of simple equality promoting equal distribution of dominant goods, which underestimates the complexity of the criteria at work in each given sphere, the dominance of particular goods needs to be ended. For instance, purchasing power in the political sphere through means derived from the economic sphere (i.e., money) must be prevented. Walzer’s theory of complex equality is not actually aimed at equality per se, but at the separation of spheres of justice; the theory’s designation is misleading. Any theory of equality should, however, as per Walzer, avoid monistic conceptions and recognize instead the complexity of life and the plurality of criteria for justice.

The preceding considerations yield the following desideratum: instead of simple equality, a more complex equality needs to be conceptualized. That concept should resolve the problems discussed above through a distinction of various classes of goods, a separation of spheres, and a differentiation of relevant criteria.

Libertarianism and economic liberalism represent minimalist positions in relation to distributive justice. Citing Locke, they both postulate an original right to freedom and property, thus arguing against redistribution and social rights and for the free market (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1960). They assert an opposition between equality and freedom: the individual (natural) right to freedom can be limited only for the sake of foreign and domestic peace. For this reason, libertarians consider maintaining public order the state’s only legitimate duty. They assert a natural right to self-ownership (the philosophical term for “ownership of oneself” – i.e., one’s will, body, work, etc.) that entitles everybody to hitherto unowned bits of the external world by means of mixing their labor with it. All individuals can thus claim property if “enough and as good” is left over for others (Locke’s proviso). Correspondingly, they defend market freedoms and oppose the use of redistributive taxation schemes for the sake of egalitarian social justice. A principal objection to libertarian theory is that its interpretation of the Lockean proviso – nobody’s situation should be worsened through an initial acquisition of property – leads to an excessively weak requirement and is thus unacceptable (Kymlicka 1990, pp.108–117). However, with a broader and more adequate interpretation of what it means for one a situation to be worse than another, it is much more difficult to justify private appropriation and, a fortiori , all further ownership rights. If the proviso recognizes the full range of interests and alternatives that self-owners have, then it will not generate unrestricted rights over unequal amounts of resources. Another objection is that precisely if one’s own free accomplishment is what is meant to count, as the libertarians argue, success should not depend strictly on luck, extraordinary natural gifts, inherited property, and status. In other words, equal opportunity also needs to at least be present as a counterbalance, ensuring that the fate of human beings is determined by their decisions and not by unavoidable social circumstances. Equal opportunity thus seems to be the frequently vague minimal formula at work in every egalitarian conception of distributive justice. Many egalitarians, however, wish for more – namely, an equality of (at least basic) life conditions .

In any event, with a shift away from a strictly negative idea of freedom, economic liberalism can indeed itself point the way to more social and economic equality. For with such a shift, what is at stake is not only assuring an equal right to self-defense, but also furnishing everyone more or less the same chance to actually make use of the right to freedom (e.g. Van Parijs 1995, Steiner 1994, Otsuka 2005). In other words, certain basic goods need to be furnished to assure the equitable or “fair value of the basic liberties” (Rawls 1993, pp. 356–63).

It is possible to interpret utilitarianism as concretizing moral equality – and this in a way meant to offer the same consideration to the interests of all human beings (Kymlicka 1990, pp. 31f., Hare 1981, p. 26, Sen 1992, pp. 13f.). From the utilitarian perspective, since everyone counts as one and no one as more than one (Bentham), the interests of all should be treated equally without consideration of contents of interest or an individual’s material situation. For utilitarianism, this means that all enlightened personal interests have to be fairly aggregated. The morally proper action is the one that maximizes utility (Hare 1984). This conception of equal treatment has been criticized as inadequate by many opponents of utilitarianism. At least in utilitarianism’s classical form – so the critique reads – the hoped for moral equality is flawed, because all desires are taken up by the utilitarian calculation, including “selfish” and “external” preferences (Dworkin 1977, p. 234) that are meant to all have equal weight, even when they diminish the ‘rights’ and intentions of others. This conflicts with our everyday understanding of equal treatment. What is here at play is an argument involving “offensive” and “expensive” taste: a person cannot expect others to sustain his or her desires at the expense of their own (Kymlicka 1990, p. 40 f.). Rather, according to generally shared conviction, equal treatment consistently requires a basis of equal rights and resources that cannot be taken away from one person, whatever the desire of others. In line with Rawls (1971, pp. 31, 564, cf. 450), many hold that justice entails according no value to interests insofar as they conflict with justice. According to this view, unjustified preferences will not distort the mutual claims people have on each other. Equal treatment has to consist of everyone being able to claim a fair portion, and not in all interests having the same weight in disposal over my portion. Utilitarians cannot admit any restrictions on interests based on morals or justice. As long as utilitarian theory lacks a concept of justice and fair allocation, it must fail in its goal of treating everyone as equals. As Rawls (1971, pp. 27) also famously argues, utilitarianism that involves neglecting the separateness of persons does not contain a proper interpretation of moral equality as equal respect for each individual.

The concept of welfare equality is motivated by an intuition that when it comes to political ethics, what is at stake is individual well-being. The central criterion for justice must consequently be equalizing the level of welfare. But taking welfare as what is to be equalized leads to difficulties resembling those of utilitarianism. If one contentiously identifies subjective welfare with preference satisfaction, it seems implausible to count all individual preferences as equal, some – such as the desire to do others wrong – being inadmissible on grounds of justice (the offensive taste argument). Any welfare-centered concept of equality grants people with refined and expensive taste more resources – something distinctly at odds with our moral intuitions (the expensive taste argument) (Dworkin 1981a). However, satisfaction in the fulfillment of desires cannot serve as a standard, since we wish for more than a simple feeling of happiness. A more viable standard for welfare comparisons would seem to be success in the fulfillment of preferences. A fair evaluation of such success cannot be purely subjective, but requires a standard of what should or could have been achieved. This itself involves an assumption regarding just distribution, so it cannot stand as an independent criterion for justice. Another serious problem with any welfare-centered concept of equality is that it cannot take account of either desert (Feinberg 1970) or personal responsibility for one’s own well-being, to the extent this is possible and reasonable.

Represented above all by both Rawls and Dworkin, resource equality avoids such problems (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981b). It holds individuals responsible for their decisions and actions, but not for circumstances beyond their control, such as race, sex, skin-color, intelligence, and social position, thus excluding these as distributive criteria. Equal opportunity is insufficient because it does not compensate for unequal innate gifts. What applies for social circumstances should also apply for such gifts, as both are purely arbitrary from a moral point of view.

According to Rawls, human beings should have the same initial expectations of “basic goods,” i.e., all-purpose goods; this in no way precludes ending up with different quantities of such goods or resources, as a result of personal economic decisions and actions. When prime importance is accorded an assurance of equal basic freedoms and rights, inequalities are just when they fulfill two provisos: on the one hand, they have to be linked to offices and positions open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; on the other hand, they have to reflect the famous ‘difference principle’ in offering the greatest possible advantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, p. 5 f.; 1971, § 13). Otherwise, the economic order requires revision. Due to the argument of the moral arbitrariness of talents, the commonly accepted criteria for merit (like productivity, working hours, effort) are clearly relativized. The difference principle only allows the talented to earn more to the extent this raises the lowest incomes. According to Rawls, with regard to the basic structure of society, the difference principle should be opted for under a self-chosen “veil of ignorance” regarding personal and historical circumstances and similar factors: the principle offers a general assurance of not totally succumbing to the hazards of a free market situation; and everyone does better than with inevitably inefficient total equal distribution, whose level of well-being is below that of those worst off under the difference principle.

Since Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the classical focal point of present-day political philosophy, it is worth noting the different ways his theory claims to be egalitarian. First, Rawls upholds a natural basis for equal human worth: a minimal capacity for having a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Second, through the device of the “veil of ignorance,” people are conceived as equals in the “original position.” Third, the idea of sharing this “original position” presupposes the parties having political equality, as equal participants in the process of choosing the principles by which they would be governed. Fourth, Rawls proposes fair equality of opportunity. Fifth, he maintains that all desert must be institutionally defined, depending on the goals of the society. No one deserves his or her talents or circumstances, which are products of the natural lottery. Finally, the difference principle tends toward equalizing holdings. However, it is important to keep in mind, as Scheffler (2003) has pointed out, that the main focus of Rawls’ theory is justice as such; it is only secondarily about an egalitarian conception of justice. In addition, since the primary subject is the basic structure, pure procedural justice has priority over distributive or allocative justice Equality is not the only or single value for Rawls.

Dworkin’s equality of resources (1981b), on the other hand, is concerned with equality as such. His theory stakes a claim to being even more ‘ambition- and endowment-insensitive’ than Rawls’ theory. Unequal distribution of resources is considered fair only when it results from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Dworkin proposes a hypothetical auction in which everyone can accumulate bundles of resources through equal means of payment, so that in the end no one is jealous of another’s bundle (the envy test). The auction-procedure also offers a way to precisely measure equality of resources: the measure of resources devoted to a person’s life is defined by the importance of the resources to others (Dworkin 1981b, p. 290). In the free market, how the distribution then develops depends on an individual’s ambitions. The inequalities that thus emerge are justified, since one has to take responsibility for how one’s choices turn out (i.e., one’s “option luck”) in the realm of personal responsibility. In contrast, unjustified inequalities based on different innate provisions and gifts, as well as on brute luck, should be compensated for through a fictive differentiated insurance system: its premiums are established behind Dworkin’s own “veil of ignorance,” in order to then be distributed in real life to everyone and collected in taxes. For Dworkin, this is the key to the natural lottery being balanced fairly, preventing a “slavery of the talented” through excessive redistribution.

Only some egalitarians hold inequality to be bad per se. Most of today’s egalitarians are pluralistic, recognizing other values besides equality. So called luck-egalitarians regard the moral significance of choice and responsibility as one of the most important values besides equality (for an overview over the debate see Lippert-Rasmussen 2015). They hold that it is bad – unjust or unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own (Temkin 1993, 13) and therefore strive to eliminate involuntary disadvantages, for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible (Cohen 1989, 916).

The principle of responsibility provides a central normative vantage point for deciding on which grounds one might justify which inequality. The positive formulation of the responsibility principle requires an assumption of personal responsibility and holds that inequalities which are the result of self-chosen options are just. (See above all Dworkin, 1981b, p. 311; contra: Anderson, 1999.) Unequal portions of social goods are thus fair when they result from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Individuals must accept responsibility for the costs of their decisions. Persons are themselves responsible for certain inequalities that result from their voluntary decisions, and they deserve no compensation for such inequalities, aside from minimal provisions in cases of dire need (see below). In its negative formulation , the responsibility principle holds that inequalities which are not the result of self-chosen options are to be rejected as unjust; persons disadvantaged in this way deserve compensation. That which one can do nothing about, or for which one is not responsible, cannot constitute a relevant criterion. Still, the initial assumption remains an ascription of responsibility, and each individual case requires close scrutiny: one is responsible and accountable unless there is an adequate reason for being considered otherwise (but cf. Stemplowska 2013 for a different interpretation)..

If advantages or disadvantages that are due to arbitrary and unearned differences are unfair, this holds for social circumstances as well as natural endowments. The reasons favoring an exclusion of features like skin-color, size, sex, and place of origin as primarily discriminative apply equally to other natural human qualities, like intelligence, appearance, physical strength, and so forth. The kind and the extent of one’s natural abilities are due to a lottery of nature; considered from a moral standpoint, their distribution is purely arbitrary (Rawls, 1971, § 48). To sum up: natural and social endowment must not count, and personal intentions and voluntary decisions should count. Thus, a given social order is just when it equalizes as much as possible, and in a normatively tenable way, all personal disadvantages for which an individual is not responsible, and accords individuals the capacity to bear the consequences of their decisions and actions, as befits their capacity for autonomy.

Objections to all versions of “brute-luck egalitarianism” come from two sides. Some authors criticize its in their view unjustified or excessively radical rejection of merit: The luck-egalitarian thesis of desert only being justifiably acknowledged if it involves desert “all the way down” (Nozick 1974, p. 225) not only destroys the classical, everyday principle of desert, since everything has a basis that we ourselves have not created. In the eyes of such critics, along with the merit-principle this argument also destroys our personal identity, since we can no longer accredit ourselves with our own capacities and accomplishments. (Cf. the texts in Pojman & McLeod 1998, Olsaretti 2003.) Other authors consider the criterion for responsibility to be too strong, indeed inhuman (or “harsh”) in its consequences, since human beings responsible for their own misery would (supposedly) be left alone with their misery (Anderson 1999, also MacLeod 1998, Scheffler 2003, Wolff 1998, Fleurbaey 1995, Voigt 2007, Eyal 2017, Olsaretti 2009, Stemplowska 2009). However, pluralistic egalitarians should be able to argue that there are special cases, in which people are so badly off that they should be helped, even if they got into the miserable situation through their own fault. But even when people are in terrible situations, which did not arise through their own fault (‘bad brute luck’) – for instance, when they are disabled from birth – and egalitarians therefore have reasons to help them, these reasons are supposedly stigmatizing, since in these cases the principles of distribution would be based on pity. In these cases, political institutions have to take certain decisions – for example, in which category a particular case of distress should be placed – and gather relevant information on their citizens. Against such a procedure, one could object that it subjects the citizens to the tutelage of the state and harms their private sphere (Anderson 1999, also Hayek 1960: 85–102).

Approaches based on equality of opportunity can be read as revisions of both welfarism and resourcism. Ranged against welfarism and designed to avoid its pitfalls, they incorporate the powerful ideas of choice and responsibility into various, improved forms of egalitarianism. Such approaches are meant to equalize outcomes resulting from causes beyond a person’s control (i.e., beyond circumstances or endowment), but to allow differential outcomes that result from autonomous choice or ambition. But the approaches are also aimed at maintaining the insight that individual preferences have to count, as the sole basis for a necessary linkage back to the individual perspective: otherwise, there is an overlooking of the person’s value. In Arneson’s (1989, 1990) concept of equal opportunity for welfare , the preferences determining the measure of individual well-being are meant to be conceived hypothetically – i.e., a person would decide on them after a process of ideal reflection. In order to correspond to the morally central vantage of personal responsibility, what should be equalized are not enlightened preferences themselves, but rather real opportunities to achieve or receive a good, to the extent that it is aspired to. G.A. Cohen’s (1989, p. 916 f.) broader conception of equality of access to advantage attempts to integrate the perspectives of welfare equality and resource equality through the overriding concept of advantage. For Cohen, there are two grounds for egalitarian compensation. Egalitarians will be moved to furnish a paralyzed person with a compensatory wheelchair independently of the person’s welfare level. This egalitarian response to disability overrides equality of (opportunity to) welfare. Egalitarians also favor compensation for phenomena such as pain, independent of any loss of capacity – for instance by paying for expensive medicine. But, Cohen claims, any justification for such compensation has to invoke the idea of equality of opportunity to welfare. He thus views both aspects, resources and welfare, as necessary and irreducible. Much of Roemer’s (1998) more technical argument is devoted to constructing the scale to calibrate the extent to which something is the result of circumstances. An incurred adverse consequence is the result of circumstances, not choice, precisely to the extent that it is a consequence that persons of one or another specific type can be expected to incur.

Theories that limit themselves to the equal distribution of basic means, in the hope of doing justice to the different goals of all human beings, are often criticized as fetishistic, because they focus on means as opposed to what individuals gain with these means (Sen 1980). The value that goods have for someone depends on objective possibilities, the natural environment, and individual capacities. Hence, in contrast to the resourcist approach, Amartya Sen proposes orientating distribution around “capabilities to achieve functionings,” i.e., the various things that a person manages to do orbe in leading a life (Sen 1992). In other words, evaluating individual well-being has to be tied to a capability for achieving and maintaining various precious conditions and “functionings” constitutive of a person’s being, such as adequate nourishment, good health, the ability to move about freely or to appear in public without shame. The real freedom to acquire well-being is also important here, a freedom represented in the capability to oneself choose forms of achievement and the combination of “functionings.” For Sen, capabilities are thus the measure of an equality of capabilities human beings enjoy to lead their lives. A problem consistently raised with capability approaches is the ability to weigh capabilities in order to arrive at a metric for equality. The problem is intensified by the fact that various moral perspectives are blended in the concept of capability (Cohen 1993, p. 17–26, Williams 1987). Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) has linked the capability approach to an Aristotelian, essentialistic, “thick” theory of the good – a theory meant to be, as she puts it, “vague,” incomplete, and open-ended enough to leave place for individual and cultural variation. On the basis of such a “thick” conception of necessary and universal elements of a good life, certain capabilities and functionings can be designated as foundational. In this manner, Nussbaum can endow the capability approach with a precision that furnishes an index of interpersonal comparison, but at the risk of not being neutral enough regarding the plurality of personal conceptions of the good, a neutrality normally required by most liberals (most importantly Rawls 1993; but see Robeyns 2009 for a different take on the comparison with Rawls). For further discussion, see the entry on the capability approach .

Since the late 1990s, social relations egalitarianism has appeared in philosophical discourse as an increasingly important competitor to distribuitivist accounts of justice, especially its luck egalitarian versions (cf. Lippert-Rassmussen 2018). Proponents of social relations egalitarianism include Anderson (1999), Miller (1997), Scanlon (1996, 2018), Scheffler (2003, 2005, 2015), Wolff (1998, 2010) and Young (1990). Negatively, they are united in a rejection of the view that justice is a matter of eliminating differential luck. Positively, they claim that society is just if, and only if, individuals within it relate to one another as equals. Accordingly, the site of justice (i.e. that to which principles of justice apply) is society, not distributions. Relational Egalitarianism has a certain overlap with many theories of recognition and non-domination. Certain status differences are at the core of their objections, like those stigmatizing differences in status, whereby the badly off are caused to experience themselves as inferior, and are treated as inferiors, or when inequalities create objectionable relations of power(Honneth/Fraser 2003) and domination (Pettit 2001).

What does it mean that (and when do) individuals within a society relate to one another as equals? Racial discrimination, for example, is a paradigmatic instance of this condition?s violation. But once we move beyond a handful of such examples things become much less clear.

These claims to social and political equality exclude all unequal, hierarchical forms of social relationships, in which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon others:

As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as citizens, without any need for a moralized accounting of the details of their particular circumstances. (Scheffler 2003, p. 22)

However, forms of differentiation that do not violate moral equality (see above) are not per se excluded from social equality, if they are compatible with the recognition of the equal social status of concerned parties, as with differences relating to merit, need, and, if appropriate, race, gender, and social background (as in cases of affirmative action or fair punishment).

Where there is social equality, people feel that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions. (Miller, 1997, p. 232)

Thus the question has to be answered whether – and if so, why – other dimensions, such as a person’s natural talents, creativity, intelligence, innovative skills or entrepreneurial ability, can be the basis for legitimate inequalities.

Relational egalitarians need a certain conception of what an equal standing in society amounts to and implies in terms of rights and goods. One way to offer such an account would be to rely (like Anderson 1999) on the capabilities approach (§3.8) and sufficitarianism (§6.2.): In a democratic community that preserves the free and equal status of persons, at least three sets of conditions have to be fulfilled.

First, certain political conditions are necessary to allow citizens to participate as equals in democratic deliberation. These include, among others, the capabilities to vote, hold office, assemble, petition the government, speak freely, and move about freely (Rawls 1999, p.53). The principle of democratic equality (as asked for by Anderson 1999) requires us to eliminate social hierarchies that prevent a democratically organized society, a society in which we cooperate and decide upon state action as equals. Persons morally owe each other the capabilities and conditions to live as equals in a democratic community (Christiano 2008, Kolodny 2014). Democracy can be interpreted as realizing public equality in collective decision-making.

Second, to participate as an equal in civil society, certain civil conditions must obtain. These include the conditions that make it robustly likely that injustices such as marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism (Anderson 1999 with reference to Young 1990), or domination (Pettit 2001) can be to avoided. Third, certain social conditions and personal capabilities have to obtain that enable people to enjoy equal standing in society. Citizens need, in this regard, adequate nutrition, shelter, clothing, education, and medical care. This last point leads into the debate over whether a relational egalitarian conception of social justice yields intrinsic and instrumental reasons of justice to care about distributive inequality in socially produced goods, despite its emphasis on just social relationships and not the distribution of goods per se (Schemmel 2011, Elford 2017).

Justice is primarily related to individual actions. Individual persons are the primary bearers of responsibility (the key principle of ethical individualism). This raises two controversial issues in the contemporary debate.

One could regard the norms of distributive equality as applying to groups rather than individuals. It is often groups that rightfully raise the issue of an inequality between themselves and the rest of society, as with women and racial and ethnic groups. The question arises of whether inequality among such groups should be considered morally objectionable in itself, or whether even in the case of groups, the underlying concern should be how individuals (as members of such groups) fare in comparative terms. If there is a worry about inequalities between groups of individuals, why does this not translate into a worry about inequalities between members of the group?

A further question concerns whether the norms of distributive equality (whatever they are) apply to all individuals, regardless of where (and when) they live. Or rather, do they only hold for members of communities within states and nations? Most theories of equality deal exclusively with distributive equality among people in a single society. There does not, however, seem to be any rationale for that limitation. Can the group of the entitled be restricted prior to the examination of concrete claims? Many theories seem to imply this, especially when they connect distributive justice or the goods to be distributed with social cooperation or production. For those who contribute nothing to cooperation, such as the disabled, children, or future generations, would have to be denied a claim to a fair share. The circle of persons who are to be the recipients of distribution would thus be restricted from the outset. Other theories are less restrictive, insofar as they do not link distribution to actual social collaboration, yet nonetheless do restrict it, insofar as they bind it to the status of citizenship. In this view, distributive justice is limited to the individuals within a society. Those outside the community have no entitlement to social justice. Unequal distribution among states and the social situations of people outside the particular society could not, in this view, be a problem of social distributive justice (Nagel 2005). Yet here too, the universal morality of equal respect and the principle of equal distribution demand that all persons consider one another as prima facie equally entitled to the goods, unless reasons for an unequal distribution can be advanced. It may be that in the process of justification, reasons will emerge for privileging those who were particularly involved in the production of a good, but there is no prima facie reason to exclude from the outset other persons, such as those from other countries, from the process of distribution and justification (Pogge 2002). That may seem most intuitively plausible in the case of natural resources (e.g. oil) that someone discovers by chance on or beneath the surface of his or her property. Why should such resources belong to the person who discovers them, or on whose property they are located? Nevertheless, in the eyes of many if not most people, global justice, i.e., extending egalitarian distributive justice globally, demands too much from individuals and their states (Miller 1998; but cf. Caney 2005). Alternatively, one might argue that there are other ‘special relations’ between members of one society that do not exist between members of different societies. Nationalism is an example for such a (controversial) thesis that may provide a case for a kind of local equality (Miller 1995). For further discussion, see the entry on global justice.

Another issue is the relationship between generations. Does the present generation have an egalitarian obligation towards future generations regarding equal living conditions? One argument in favor of this conclusion might be that people should not end up unequally well off as a result of morally arbitrary factors. However, the issue of justice between generation is notoriously complex (Temkin 1992). For further discussion, see the entry on intergenerational justice .

6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?

Does equality play a major role in a theory of justice, and if so, what is this role? A conception of justice is egalitarian when it views equality as a fundamental goal of justice. Temkin has put it as follows:

… an egalitarian is any person who attaches some value to equality itself (that is, any person that cares at all about equality, over and above the extent it promotes other ideals). So, equality needn’t be the only value, or even the ideal she values most… . Egalitarians have the deep and (for them) compelling view that it is a bad thing – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. (Temkin 1986, p. 100, cf. 1993, p. 7)

In general, the focus of the modern egalitarian effort to realize equality is on the possibility of a good life, i.e., on an equality of life prospects and life circumstances – interpreted in various ways according to various positions in the “equality of what” debate (see above).

It is apparent that there are three sorts of egalitarianism: intrinsic, instrumental and constitutive. (For a twofold distinction cf. Parfit 1997, Temkin 1993, p. 11, McKerlie, 1996, p. 275.)

Intrinsic egalitarians view equality as a good in itself. As pure egalitarians, they are concerned solely with equality, most of them with equality of social circumstances, according to which it is intrinsically bad if some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. But it is in fact the case that people do not always consider inequality a moral evil. Intrinsic egalitarians regarde quality as desirable even when the equalization would be of no use to any of the affected parties, such as when equality can only be produced through depressing the level of well being of everyone’s life. But something can only have an intrinsic value when it is good for at least one person, when it makes one life better in some way or another.

The following “ leveling-down ” objection indicates that doing away within equality in fact ought to produce better circumstances; it is otherwise unclear why equality should be desired. (For such an objection, cf. Nozick 1974, p. 229, Raz 1986, chap. 9, p. 227, 235, Temkin 1993, pp. 247–8.) Sometimes inequality can only be ended by depriving those who are better off of their resources, rendering them as poorly off as everyone else. (For anyone looking for a drastic literary example, Kurt Vonnegut’s 1950 science-fiction story Harrison Bergeron is recommended.) This would have to be an acceptable approach according to the intrinsic conception. But would it be morally good if, in a group consisting of both blind and sighted persons, those with sight were rendered blind because the blind could not be offered sight? That would be morally perverse. Doing away with inequality by bringing everyone down contains – so the objection goes – nothing good. Such leveling-down objections would of course only be valid if there were indeed no better and equally egalitarian alternatives available, but there are nearly always such alternatives: e.g. those who can see should have to help the blind, financially or otherwise. When there are no alternatives, in order to avoid such objections, intrinsic egalitarianism cannot be strict, but needs to be pluralistic . Then intrinsic egalitarians could say there is something good about the change, namely greater equality, although they would concede that much is bad about it. Pluralistic egalitarians do not have equality as their only goal; they also admit other values and principles, above all the principle of welfare, according to which it is better when people are doing better. In addition, pluralistic egalitarianism should be moderate enough to not always grant equality victory in the case of conflict between equality and welfare. Instead, they must accept reductions in equality for the sake of a higher quality of life for all (as with Rawls’ difference principle).

At present, many egalitarians are ready to concede that equality in the sense of equality of life circumstances has no compelling value in itself, but that, in a framework of liberal concepts of justice, its meaning emerges in pursuit of other ideals, like universal freedom, the full development of human capacities and the human personality, the mitigation of suffering and defeat of domination and stigmatization, the stable coherence of modern and freely constituted societies, and so forth (Scanlon 1996, 2018). For those who are worse off, unequal circumstances often mean considerable (relative) disadvantages and many (absolute) evils; as a rule, these (relative) disadvantages and (absolute) evils are the source of our moral condemnation of unequal circumstances. But this does not mean that inequality as such is an evil. Hence, the argument goes, fundamental moral ideals other than equality stand behind our aspiring for equality. To reject inequality on such grounds is to favor equality either as a byproduct or as a means, and not as a goal or intrinsic value. In its treatment of equality as a derived virtue, the sort of egalitarianism – if the term is actually suitable – here at play is instrumental .

As indicated, there is also a third, more suitable approach to the equality ideal: a constitutive egalitarianism. According to this approach, to the aspiration to equality is rooted in other moral grounds, namely because certain inequalities are unjust. Equality has value, but this is an extrinsic value, since it derives from another, higher moral principle of equal dignity and respect. But it is not instrumental for this reason, i.e., it is not only valued on account of moral equality, but also on its own account. (For the distinction between the origin of a value and the kind of value it is, cf. Korsgaard 1996.) Equality stands in relation to justice as does a part to a whole. The requirement of justification is based on moral equality, and in certain contexts, successful justification leads to the above-named principles of equality, i.e., formal, proportional equality and the presumption of equality. Thus, according to constitutive egalitarianism, these principles and the resulting equality are required by justice, and by the same token constitute social justice.

It is important to further distinguish two levels of egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism, respectively. On a first level, a constitutive egalitarian presumes that every explication of the moral standpoint is incomplete without terms such as ‘equal,’ ‘similarly,’ etc. In contrast, a non-egalitarianism operating on the same level considers such terms misplaced or redundant. On a second level, when it comes to concretizing and specifying conceptions of justice, a constitutive egalitarian gives equality substantive weight. On this level, more and less egalitarian positions can be found, according to the chosen currency of equality (the criteria by which just equality is measured) and according to the reasons for unequal distributions (exemptions of the presumption of equality) that the respective theories regard as well grounded. Egalitarianism on the second level thus relates to the kind, quality and quantity of things to be equalized. Because of such variables, a clear-cut definition of second level egalitarianism cannot be formulated. In contrast, non-egalitarians on this second level advocate a non-relational entitlement theory of justice.

Alongside the often-raised objections against equality mentioned in the section on “simple equality” (3.1. above) there is a different and more fundamental critique formulated by first level non-egalitarians: that equality does not have a foundational role in the grounding of claims to justice. While the older version of a critique of egalitarianism comes mainly from the conservative end of the political spectrum, thus arguing in general against “patterned principles of justice” (Nozick 1974, esp. pp. 156–157), the critique’s newer version also often can be heard in progressive circles (Walzer 1983, Raz 1986, chap. 9, Frankfurt 1987, 1997, Parfit 1997, Anderson 1999). This first-level critique of equality poses the basic question of why justice should in fact be conceived relationally and (what is here the same) comparatively. Referring back to Joel Feinberg’s (1974) distinction between comparative and non-comparative justice, non-egalitarians object to the moral requirement to treat people as equals, and the many demands for justice emerging from it. They argue that neither the postulate nor these demands involve comparative principles, let alone any equality principles. They reproach first-level egalitarians for a confusion between “equality” and “universals.” As the non-egalitarians see things, within many principles of justice – at least the especially important ones – the equality-terminology is redundant. Equality is thus merely a byproduct of the general fulfillment of actually non-comparative standards of justice: something obscured through the unnecessary insertion of an expression of equality (Raz 1986, p. 227f.). At least the central standards of dignified human life are not relational but “absolute.” As Harry Frankfurt puts it: “It is whether people have good lives, and not how their lives compare with the lives of others” (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). And again: “The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34).

From the non-egalitarian perspective, what is really at stake in helping those worse off and improving their lot is humanitarian concern , a desire to alleviate suffering. Such concern is not understood as egalitarian, as it is not focused on the difference between the better off and the worse off as such (whatever the applied standard), but on improving the situation of the latter. Their distress constitutes the actual moral foundation. The wealth of those better off only furnishes a means that has to be transferred for the sake of mitigating the distress, as long as other, morally negative consequences do not emerge in the process. The strength of the impetus for more equality lies in the urgency of the claims of those worse off, not in the extent of the inequality. For this reason, instead of equality the non-egalitarian critics favor one or another entitlement theory of justice , such as Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism (cf. 3.2. above) and Frankfurt’s (1987) doctrine of sufficiency , according to which “What is important from the moral point of view is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough , it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21).

Parfit’s (1997) priority view accordingly calls for a focus on improving the situation of society’s weaker and poorer members, and indeed all the more urgently the worse off they are, even if they can be less helped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishes between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. According to prioritarians, benefiting people is more important the worse off those people are. This prioritising will often increase equality, but they are two distinct values, since in an important respect equality is a relational value while priority is not. However, egalitarians and prioritarians share an important feature, in that both hold that the best possible distribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. It is thus a matter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort of egalitarianism or a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case, entitlement-based non-egalitarian arguments can practically result in an equality of outcome as far-reaching as egalitarian theories. Hence the fulfillment of an absolute or non-comparative standard for everyone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequently results in a certain equality of outcome, where such a standard comprises not only a decent but a good life. Consequently, the debate here centers on the basis – is it equality or something else? – and not so much on the outcome – are persons or groups more or less equal, according to a chosen metric? Possibly, the difference lies even deeper, in their respective conceptions of morality in general.

Egalitarians can respond to the anti-egalitarian critique by conceding that it is the nature of some (however certainly far from all) essential norms of morality and justice to be concerned primarily with the adequate fulfillment of the separate claims of individuals. However, whether a claim can itself be considered suitable can be ascertained only by asking whether it can be agreed on by all those affected in hypothetical conditions of freedom and equality. (See, e.g., Casal 2007 for a deeper discussion and critique of the doctrine of sufficiency.) This justificatory procedure is more necessary if it is less evident that what is at stake is actually suffering, distress, or an objective need. In the view of the constitutive egalitarians, all the judgments of distributive justice should be approached relationally, by asking which distributive scheme all concerned parties can universally and reciprocally agree to. As described at some length in the pertinent section above, many egalitarians argue that a presumption in favor of equality follows from this justification requirement. In the eyes of such egalitarians, this is all one needs for the justification and determination of the constitutive value of equality.

Secondly, even if – for the sake of argument – the question is left open as to whether demands for distribution according to objective needs (e.g. alleviating hunger) involve non-comparative entitlement-claims, it is nonetheless always necessary to resolve the question of what needy individuals are owed. And this is tied in a basic way to the question of what persons owe one another in comparable or worse situations, and how scarce resources (money, goods, time, energy) must be invested in light of the sum total of our obligations. While the claim on our aid may well appear non-relational, determining the kind and extent of the aid must always be relational, at least in circumstances of scarcity (and resources are always scarce). Claims are either “satiable” (Raz 1986, p. 235) – i.e., an upper limit or sufficiency level can be indicated, after which each person’s claim to X has been fulfilled – or they are not. For insatiable claims, to stipulate any level at which one is or ought to be sufficiently satisfied is arbitrary. If the standards of sufficiency are defined as a bare minimum, why should persons be content with that minimum? Why should the manner in which welfare and resources are distributed above the poverty level not also be a question of justice? If, by contrast, we are concerned solely with claims that are in principle “satiable,” such claims having a reasonable definition of sufficiency, then these standards of sufficiency will most likely be very high. In Frankfurt’s definition, for example, sufficiency is reached only when persons are satisfied and no longer actively strive for more. Since people find themselves ourselves operating, in practice, in circumstances far beneath such a high sufficiency level, they (of course) live under conditions of (moderate) scarcity. Then the above mentioned argument holds as well – namely, that in order to determine to what extent it is to be fulfilled, each claim has to be judged in relation to the claims of all others and all available resources. In addition, the moral urgency of lifting people above dire poverty cannot be invoked to demonstrate the moral urgency of everyone having enough. In both forms of scarcity – i.e., with satiable and insatiable claims – the social right or claim to goods cannot be conceived as something absolute or non-comparative. Egalitarians may thus conclude that distributive justice is always comparative. This would suggest that distributive equality, especially equality of life-conditions, should play a fundamental role in any adequate theory of justice in particular, and of morality in general.

• Albernethy, Georg L. (ed.), 1959, The Idea of Equality , Richmond: John Knox.
• Anderson, Elizabeth, 1999, “What Is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics , 109: 287–337.
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Aristotle, Politics , in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Arneson, Richard, 1989, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophical Studies , 56: 77–93; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 229–241.
• –––, 1990, “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 19: 158–194.
• –––, 1993, “Equality,” in R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 489–507.
• Babeuf, Gracchus, 1796, “Manifeste des Égaux,” in Histoire de G. Babeuf et du Babouvisme , Paris 1884, Engl. trans. in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49–52.
• Baker, John, Kathleen Lynch, Sara Cantillon, Judy Walsh, 2004, Equality. From Theory to Action , Houndsmill/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Bedau, Hugo Adam, 1967, “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality,” in J. R. Pennock, J. Chapman (eds.), Equality , New York: Atherton, pp. 3–27.
• Benn, Stanley, 1967, “Equality, Moral and Social,” in P. Edwards(ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol 3, New York: Macmillan, pp. 38–42.
• Benn, Stanley I. and Richard S. Peters, 1959, Social Principles and the Democratic State , London: Allen & Unwin.
• Berlin, Isaiah, 1955–56, “Equality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LVI , pp. 301–326.
• Brown, Henry Phelps, 1988, Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality , Oxford: Clarendon.
• Callinicos, Alex, 2000, Equality , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Caney, Simon, 2005, Justice Beyond Borders , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Carter, Ian, 2011, “Respect and the Basis of Equality”, Ethics , 121(3): 538–571.
• Casal, Paula, 2007, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”, Ethics , 117(2): 296–326.
• Cavanagh, Matt, 2002, Against Equality of Opportunity , Oxford: Clarendon.
• Christiano, Thomas, 2008, The constitution of equality: democratic authority and its limits , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Cohen, Gerald A., 1989, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics , 99: 906–944.
• –––, 1993, “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” in M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–29.
• –––, 2000, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich? , Harvard: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2007, Rescuing Justice and Equality , manuscript.
• Dahrendorf, Ralf, 1962, “On the Origin of Social Inequality,” in P. Laslett & W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and Society , 2nd Series, Oxford: Blackwell.
• Daniels, Norman, 2003, “Democratic equality: Rawls’s complex egalitarianism,” in S. Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 241–276.
• Dann, Otto, 1975, “Gleichheit,” in V. O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , pp. 995–1046.
• Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1981a, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 10: 185–246; reprinted in R. Dworkin, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.11–64.
• –––, 1981b, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 10: 283–345; reprinted in R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000, pp. 65–119.
• –––, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Elford, Gideon, 2017, “Relational Equality and Distribution,” Journal of Political Philosophy , 25: 80–99.
• Eyal, Nir, 2017, “Luck Egalitarianism, Harshness, and the Rule of Rescue”, in S.M. Liao and C. O’Neil (eds.), Current Controversies in Bioethics , pp. 160–176, New York: Routledge.
• Feinberg, Joel, 1970, “Justice and Personal Desert,” in J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving , Princeton; reprinted in L. P. Pojman & O. McLeod (eds.), 1998, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 70–83.
• –––, 1974, “Non-Comparative Justice,” Philosophical Review , 83: 297–358.
• Fleurbaey, Marc, 2008, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Frankfurt, Harry, 1987, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics , 98: 21–42; reprinted in H. Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About , Cambridge University Press, pp. 134–168; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 261–273.
• –––, 1997, “Equality and Respect,” Social Research , 64: 3–15.
• Gosepath, Stefan, 2004, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
• –––, 2015, “The Principles and the Presumption of Equality,” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social equality: on what it means to be equals , Oxford University Press, pp. 167–185.
• Habermas, Jürgen, 1983, “Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm,” in J. Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 53–126; English translation, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” in J. Habermas, 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , tr. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 43–115.
• –––, 1992, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; Engl. Trans.: Habermas, Jürgen, 1996, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy , tr. W. Rehg, Cambridge: MIT Press.
• Hajdin, Mane (ed.), 2000, The Notion of Equality , Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Hare, Richard M., 1981, Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Method and Point , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1984, “Rights, Utility and Universalization: Reply to J. L. Mackie,” in R. G. Frey (ed.), Utilities and Rights, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press; reprinted Oxford: Blackwell 1985.
• Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960, The Constitution of Liberty , London: Routledge.
• Hinsch, Wilfried, 2002, Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten , Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
• –––, 2003, “Angemessene Gleichheit,” in R. Geiger, J. C. Merle, N. Scarano (eds.), Modelle politischer Philosophie , Paderborn: Mentis, pp. 260–271.
• Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, in E. Curley (ed.), 1994, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 , Indianapolis: Hackett.
• Holtug, Nils and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), 2006, Egalitarianism. New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Honneth, Axel and Nancy Fraser, 2003, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange , New York: Verso.
• Kaldor, Nicholas, 1939, “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparison of Utility,” The Economic Journal , 49: 549–552.
• Kant, Imanuel, 1785, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kants Gesammelte Schriften , ed. by Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902ff., vol. IV.
• –––, 1797, Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kants Gesammelte Schriften , ed. by Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902ff., vol. VI.
• Kateb, George, 2014, Human Dignity , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Kersting, Wolfgang, 2002, Kritik der Gleichheit. Über die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und der Moral , Weilerswist: Velbrück.
• Kolodny, Nico, 2014, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 42 (4):287–336.
• Korsgaard, Christine, 1996, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” in C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–253.
• Kymlicka, Will, 1990, Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Lakoff, Sandford A., 1964, Equality in Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, 2015, Luck Egalitarianism , London: Bloomsbury Academic.
• –––, 2018, Relational Egalitarianism: Living as Equals , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Locke, John, 1690, in C. B. MacPerson (ed.), 1980, The Second Treatise of Government , Indianapolis: Hackett.
• MacKinnon, Catherine, 1989, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• MacLeod, Colin M., 1998, Liberalism, Justice, and Markets , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Marshall, Thomas Humphrey, 1950, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in T. Marshall, 1950, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–75; reprinted London: Pluto 1981, 1992.
• Marx, Karl, 1875, Critique of the Gotha Program ; reprinted in Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW) vol. 19, Berlin 1978; and in Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA-B), Berlin 1975 ff., vol. I 25.
• McKerlie, Dennis, 1989, “Equality and Time,” Ethics , 99: 274–296; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–75.
• –––, 1996, “Equality,” Ethics , 106: 274–296.
• Menke, Christoph, 2000, Spiegelungen der Gleichheit , Berlin: Akademie 2000; reprinted Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2004.
• Menne, Alfred, 1962, “Identität, Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit,” Ratio , 4: 44ff.
• Miller, David, 1995, On Nationality , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1997, “Equality and Justice,” Ratio , 10: 222–237.
• –––, 1998, “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in D. R. Mapel & T. Nardin (eds.), International Society. Diverse Ethical Perspectives , Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.164–181.
• Murphy, Liam and Thomas Nagel, 2002, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice , Oxford University Press.
• Nagel, Thomas, 1979, “Equality,” in T. Nagel, Mortal Questions , Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–127.
• –––, 1991, Equality and Partiality , Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2005, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 33 (2): 113–147.
• Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia , New York: Basic Books.
• Nussbaum, Martha, 1992, “Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory , 20: 202–246.
• –––, 2000, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Okun, Arthur M., 1975, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff , Washington: The Brookings Institution.
• Olsaretti, Serena (ed.), 2003, Desert and Justice , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2009, “Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice,”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , CIX(2): 165–188.
• Oppenheim, Felix, 1970, “Egalitarianism as a Descriptive Concept,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 7: 143–152; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–65.
• Otsuka, Michael, 2005, Libertarianism without Inequality , NewYork: Oxford University Press.
• Parfit, Derek, 1995, Equality or Priority? , The Lindley Lectures, Lawrence, KA: The University of Kansas.
• –––, 1997, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio , 10: 202–221.
• Plato, Republic , in J. M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 971–1223.
• Plato, Laws , in J. M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 1318–1616.
• Pettit, Philip, 2001, A Theory of Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pogge, Thomas W., 1999, “Human Flourishing and Universal Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 16 (1): 333–361, and in E. Frankel Paulet al. (eds.), 1999, Human Flourishing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 333–361.
• –––, 2002, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Pojman, Louis P. and Owen McLeod (eds.), 1998, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pojman, Louis P. and Robert Westmoreland (eds.), 1996, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rae, Douglas et al. (eds.), 1981, Equalities , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1999.
• –––, 1993, Political Liberalism , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Robeyns, Ingrid, 2009, “Justice as fairness and the capability approach”, in: Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World. Essays for Amartya Sen’s 75 th Birthday , Oxford University Press, pp. 397–413.
• –––, 2017, Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined , Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
• Roemer, John E., 1998, Equality of Opportunity , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Rosen, Gideon, 2018, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1755, in M. Cranston (ed.), 1984, A Discourse on Inequality , London: Penguin; partly reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36–45.
• –––, 1762, in M. Cranston (ed.), 1987, The Social Contract , Harmondsworth: Penguin.
• Scanlon, Thomas, 1996, The Diversity of Objections to Inequality , The Lindley Lectures, Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas; reprinted in T. Scanlon, 2003, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 202–218.
• –––, 2018, Why Does Inequality Matter? , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Scheffler, Samuel, 2003, “What is Egalitarianism?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 31: 5–39; reprinted in Equality and Tradition , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–207.
• –––, 2005, “Choice, Circumstances and the value of Equality,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 4: 5–28.
• –––, 2015, “The Practice of Equality,” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social Equality: Essays on What it Means to be Equals , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21–44.
• Schemmel, Christian, 2011, “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distibutions,” Social Theory and Practice , 37: 365–390.
• Sen, Amartya, 1970, Collective Choice and Social Welfare , San Fransisco: Holden-Day; reprinted Amsterdam 1979.
• –––, 1980, “Equality of What?,” in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values , I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197–220; reprinted in A. Sen, 1982, Choice, Welfare and Measurement , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 353–372, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1997; also in S. Darwall (ed.), 1995, Equal Freedom , Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
• –––, 1992, Inequality Reexamined , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Shaw, George Bernard, 1928, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism , New York: Brentano’s Publishers.
• Sikora, R.I., 1989, “Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distribution Schemes,” Ethics , 99: 492–502.
• Steinhoff, Uwe (ed.), 2015, Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth? For and Against “Basic Equality” and the Principle of Equal Respect and Concern , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Steiner, Hillel, 1994, An Essay on Rights , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Stemplowska, Zofia, 2009, “Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility,” Political Studies , 57: 237–259.
• –––, 2013, “Rescuing Luck Egalitarianism,”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 44(4): 402–419.
• Sypnowich, Christine (ed.), 2006, The Egalitarian Conscience. Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Tawney, R. H., 1931, Equality , London: Allen & Unwin.
• Taylor, Charles, 1992, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Temkin, Larry, 1986, “Inequality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 15: 99–121; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–88.
• –––, 1992, “Intergenerational Inequality,” in Laslett, P. & J.S. Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age Groups and Generations , New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169–205.
• –––, 1993, Inequality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2009, “Illuminating Egalitarianism,” in T. Christiano & J. Christman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy , Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, pp. 155–178.
• Thomson, David, 1949, Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Tugendhat, Ernst and Ursula Wolf, 1983, Logisch-Semantische Propädeutik , Stuttgart: Reclam.
• Tugendhat, Ernst, 1993, Vorlesungen über Ethik , Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
• –––, 1997, Dialog in Letitia , Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.
• Van Parijs, Philippe, 1995, Real Freedom For All. What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Vlastos, Gregory, 1962, “Justice and Equality,” in R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; reprinted in J. Waldron (ed.), 1984, Theories of Rights , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 41–76; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 120–133.
• Voigt, Kristin, 2007, “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities,” Ethics , 112(3): 529–57.
• Vonnegut, Kurt, 1950, “Harrison Bergeron,” in K. Vonnegut, 1950, Welcome to the Monkey House , New York: Delacorte Press, pp. 7–13; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–311.
• Waldron, Jeremy, 2017, One another’s equals: the basis of human equality , Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
• Walzer, Michael, 1983, Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality , New York/London: Basic Books.
• Westen, Peter, 1990, Speaking Equality , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• White, Stuart, 2006, Equality , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Williams, Bernard, 1973, “The Idea of Equality”, in B. Williams, Problems of the Self , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 230–249, reprinted in: L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–102.
• –––, 1987, “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in A. Sen, The Standard of Living , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 94–102.
• Wolff, Jonathan, 1998, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 27: 97–122.
• –––, 2010, “Fairness, respect and the egalitarian ethos revisited,” Journal of Ethics , 14 (3–4): 335–350.
• Young, Iris Marion, 1990, Justice and the Politics of Difference , Princeton: Princeton University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

• The Equality Studies Centre , University College/Dublin.

consequentialism | egalitarianism | equality: of opportunity | impartiality | justice: distributive | justification, political: public | libertarianism | luck: justice and bad luck

Copyright © 2021 by Stefan Gosepath < stefan . gosepath @ fu-berlin . de >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

• Home ›
• Reviews ›

The Equal Society: Essays in Theory and Practice

George Hull (ed.), The Equal Society: Essays in Theory and Practice , Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, 354pp., $100.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781498515719.

Reviewed by Valentin Beck, Freie Universität Berlin

What would be the central characteristics of a society in which its citizens are truly treated as equals? While egalitarian thinkers are united in their affirmation of the value of equality, they notoriously have -- for centuries -- disagreed about its interpretation. Egalitarianism now is a dominant current within Western moral and political philosophy, but it is also very broad and multifaceted. There is a wide range of mutually inconsistent egalitarian conceptions, ranging from libertarian and meritocratic positions to social liberal, communitarian and socialist ones. Therefore, the decisive question is not whether one should be an egalitarian, but what kind of egalitarian one should be, and how to interpret the central tenet of equal treatment more concretely in political theory and practice.

The anthology under review sheds light on this question. It offers a fascinatingly rich collection of original essays from a diverse group of scholars, some of whom have been shaping egalitarian discourse for decades. An introduction by George Hull and a helpful index complete a collection that will surely be indispensable for those wishing to take stock of recent developments in egalitarian thought. The book's more theoretical first part is dedicated to expansions and revisions of the concept of equality. It focuses on theoretical innovations concerning, among other topics, the interpretation of "social" or "relational" equality, and methodological issues such as the relation of non-ideal to ideal theory. The second part contains contributions on more applied issues, namely equality in higher education (Ann E. Cudd), the challenges to equality posed by the gendered division of labour (Gina Schouten), workplace democracy (Pierre-Yves Néron), modern constitutionalism (David Bilchitz) and historical redress claims (Daryl Glaser). The division of the book into two parts should not be misinterpreted, however. All of the contributions in one way or the other address the theoretical challenge of fleshing out the tenet of equal treatment. And while the articles in the second part have a more specific focus, those in the first also contain more concrete references to what the tenet of equal treatment implies in practice.

The volume does not take stock of the entire range of egalitarian theories, but rather assembles a variety of innovative positions and perspectives. At least six such areas receive in-depth treatment in the volume: first, the idea of "social" or "relational equality", as opposed to "distributional equality" (Jonathan Wolff, Miranda Fricker, Tom P. S. Angier, Lucy Allais, Néron and Daniel Putnam); second, the focus on race as a neglected category in egalitarian thinking (Charles W. Mills and Glaser); third, reflection on capabilities as metric of justice and wellbeing (Fricker, Bekka Williams and Hull); fourth, the importance of rectificatory justice for establishing more equal societies (Mills and Glaser); fifth, African-communitarianism as a distinct egalitarian current (Thaddeus Metz); and sixth, a negativist methodology, according to which specific inequalities or injustices should be the starting point of egalitarian theorizing, rather than the affirmation of an abstract ideal (particularly Wolff, Mills and Fricker). The treatment of this array of topics is generally very stimulating and deserves to be studied in detail. Without wishing to neglect any of these areas or essays in particular, I will limit my more extensive comments to the essays of Mills, Fricker and Wolff, in which several of the above-mentioned innovative concepts are concerned. At the end of this review, I will briefly reflect on why the present volume, which is up-to-date on an impressive number of issues, excludes any treatment of international and global economic inequalities as well as intergenerational environmental inequalities.

In "Racial Equality" Mills addresses race as a neglected category as well as the issues of methodological negativism (see Hull's introduction, p. 3, for this term) and corrective justice, which are interlinked. Mills has gained prominence by arguing that contemporary political philosophy, and particularly its contractualist strand, does not adequately address racial inequalities in liberal societies. In this essay, he argues that race is an essential category and shows the extent to which it has been neglected in what he calls "mainstream social justice theory, particularly Rawlsianism" (p. 44). Beyond this deconstructive concern, however, Mills also demonstrates how egalitarian theorizing can better incorporate issues of racial inequalities. He points to different positions on the metaphysics of race, ranging from simple eliminativism, according to which race does not exist in any sense, to variants of anti-eliminativism, including the constructivist variant to which Mills himself subscribes. Anti-eliminativist constructivism holds that races do not exist biologically, but as "socio-political constructs brought into existence through discriminatory socio-political processes" (p. 44).

From this angle, Mills analyses different forms of racism in "racist societies", which are distinguished from "overtly racist regimes" such as the U.S. under Jim Crow, Nazi Germany or South Africa under apartheid, because they lack features such as an "overtly racist ideology" or de jure discriminations (see p. 49). What matters is that racist societies still structurally advantage whites to a very significant extent, even in the absence of formal discrimination. Mills sets aside racism of the interpersonal kind, embodied in individual actions, since it is deemed "not relevant for racial inequality as a broad social phenomenon" (p. 45). Alternatively, one might argue that individual racist behaviour is relevant and could be integrated into the structural analysis that Mills is championing, since structural injustices likely influence the forms that interpersonal racism takes. Be that as it may, Mills focuses on "socio-institutional" racism (see p. 45) as the more fundamental phenomenon and which can exist even in the absence of interpersonal racism. He holds that racially unequal societies possess a "racialized basic structure" (p. 54), which discriminates against black people even while they possess formal equality with white people. These distinctions allow for the observation that ideal theory of the Rawlsian kind, which justifies principles for societies that are at least approximately just, cannot address racial discriminations of the kind that are typical for Western societies, since they simply do not exist in this framework.

This is where methodological negativism comes into play. Mills states that, instead of focusing on scenarios of roughly full compliance, theorists should start by designing principles of non-ideal theory with the aim of establishing transitional justice. This will lead to substantially different principles and priority rules, compared for example to the well-known principles that are discussed by Rawls under the notion of justice as fairness. Ideal theory does not become altogether obsolete in this variant of methodological negativism, however. Its proper function is to illustrate the ideal of a just society, which could one day be realized if principles of non-ideal theory are implemented. So despite his harsh criticism of Rawlsian ideal theory, Mills acknowledges a need for ideal theory next to non-ideal theorizing. Within his framework of "modified Rawlsianism" (p. 66), his use of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is also broadly in line with Rawls' usage.

Fricker, too, is renowned for addressing a category that has hitherto been neglected in egalitarian thought, namely that of epistemic injustice (2007). In "Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability", Fricker builds on central themes of her groundbreaking monograph. Her goal is to show that any society dedicated to furthering human well-being has to take seriously the ways in which it enables or constrains the capacities of its members to contribute to commonly shared knowledge. In order to enhance the well-being of their members, societies must realize their capability of epistemic contribution, understood as a "combined capability" in the sense coined by Martha Nussbaum (that is, as both an internally developed and an externally enabled capability). Fricker affirms and significantly extends the capabilities metric developed by Sen and Nussbaum. Her work is more closely aligned with Nussbaum than with Sen, since she emphasizes her sympathies for the project of formulating a "list of capabilities that might at least roughly capture workable universal characterisation of human well-being" (p. 77). However, Nussbaum's list is incomplete according to Fricker, because it displays a bias towards capabilities of practical as opposed to theoretical reason (see p. 75). In going back to Wolff and Avner de-Shalit (2007, p. 45), Fricker defends a "two-directional conception of human well-being" (p. 76), reminding us that "while it is good to receive it is also good to give " (p. 75). Fricker posits that the capability of epistemic contribution consists in being able to "contribute to the pool of shared epistemic materials -- materials for knowledge, understanding, and very often for practical deliberation" (p. 76).

It is not Fricker's aim to show that we can sometimes be morally obliged not to withhold knowledge from others, which would be a relatively easy and straightforward task depending on the concrete type and context of concealment in question. She instead aims to show that it is good and even essential for their wellbeing for individuals to contribute knowledge to society. Individuals' capabilities of epistemic contribution can be constrained or enabled by certain types of interpersonal behaviour as well as by societal structures. To justify why the protection of this capability of theoretical reason is important, Fricker draws on the value of non-domination in the sense of liberty from arbitrary interference made famous by Philip Pettit. Pettit argues that freedom from arbitrary interference can only be secured through public institutions which allow members of society to publicly contest such interferences. For such contestation, however, the capability of epistemic contribution must in turn be realized (see p. 86).

Beyond introducing a concept that deserves the concern of egalitarians in theory and practice, Fricker sheds light on a number of other hotly debated issues, such as the critique of recipient-oriented approaches to equality and the conceptualization of relational equality. Fricker also has interesting things to say on what she calls a "failure-first methodology" (p. 74), which informs her account of epistemic injustice and her concept of epistemic contribution. Her methodology is similar to Mills', in that it places an emphasis on starting with the negative. But it diverges at least in one respect: for Fricker, starting with the negative is not necessarily tied to non-ideal theorizing, since the concepts of "justice" and "equality" need to be comprehensively interpreted by taking into account the "endemic pressures for collapse into injustice and inequality" (p. 73). Fricker therefore emphasizes that a failure-first-methodology is conceptually distinct from the dichotomy of ideal and non-ideal theorizing and can yield fruitful results within either framework.

In "Social Equality, Relative Poverty and Marginalised Groups", Wolff answers these methodological questions differently. Wolff's aim is to analyze how absolute and relative poverty prevent the achievement of a (truly) equal society, which he defines as one that is free from asymmetrical relations and from relations of estrangement and alienation. His methodology for this enterprise is set out at the start of the essay. Like Mills and Fricker, Wolff emphasizes the importance of "starting from problems with the actual world rather than a depiction of an ideal world" (p. 24). But unlike Mills and Fricker, who each acknowledge the significance of ideal theory when appropriately combined with non-ideal theory, Wolff completely rejects ideal theory. He holds that "an ideal theory of social equality is hard to sustain, because it is very difficult to give precise and unique content to an ideal of social equality" (p. 22). Instead, there are "many different ways in which a society could count as a 'society of equals' . . . . Quaker Society, a Kibbutz, and a 1960s Californian Hippy community may all, if things go well, count as small-scale societies of equals" (p. 23). In place of the term of non-ideal theory Wolff suggests that of "real-world political philosophy" (p. 22), because it avoids any connotation of dependence on ideal theorizing.

Looking at the work of Mills, Fricker, and Wolff, we can distinguish three variants of methodological negativism. Mills' variant is placed within the classical Rawlsian understanding of ideal and non-ideal theory, but displays a much greater emphasis on the latter as opposed to the former. Fricker's approach underlines the distinctness and complementarity of the negativist methodology by stating that it can be applied to either non-ideal or ideal theorizing. Wolff's methodological negativism transcends the classic distinction of ideal and non-ideal theory by rejecting the focus on ideals for political theory altogether. Mills' and Fricker's approaches to methodological negativism are in principle compatible, but Wolff's approach cannot be reconciled with them, due to his complete rejection of ideal theory.

Methodological concerns are not the only focus in Wolff's article. His two main themes are providing an account of different forms of poverty, and reflecting on how to tackle them from a perspective that values the idea of "social equality" (widely treated as synonymous with "relational equality"). This idea has gained steam in recent years since being affirmed in the writings of thinkers such as Elizabeth Anderson, Samuel Scheffler and Tim Scanlon, and it is also treated in a number of other contributions to the volume (compare the third paragraph above; see also Fourie/Schuppert/Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Wolff dedicates particular attention to the notion of relative poverty and how it is connected with that of social (in)equality. Poverty is dependent on what is customary in a given society, Adam Smith noted when he wrote that "in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt" (Smith 1776, book 5, ch. 2). According to Wolff, "one is in relative poverty if one lacks the consumption and household goods customary in one's society, or lacks resources sufficient to allow a social life, or is unable to purchase what is needed to avoid shame" (p. 26). While this tripartite notion of relative poverty has material implications, it is preferable to purely monetary definitions (e.g. defining poverty as receiving an income below 60 percent of the median income). Numerical definitions of poverty scratch only at the surface of what it means to be poor, and fail to distinguish between material inequalities, as problematic as they may otherwise be, and poverty. Wolff's definition shows how relative poverty and social inequality are connected yet distinct phenomena. They are not identical because there can be other forms of inequality that are not reflected in a lack of resources to participate in customary social practices -- such as asymmetric race or gender relations. Wolff analyses different constellations of deprivation that result from the desire to "fit in", such as when people spend resources on status goods such as mobile phones despite lacking the resources for basic necessities (see p. 29). Fighting poverty effectively might also be complicated by the fact that "fitting in" to a local community might require different resources or efforts than fitting in to society more broadly.

Wolff's account of poverty is illuminating. It shows how relative poverty may be interpreted from a social egalitarian perspective, according to which equal distributions of specific goods are not of ultimate, but only derivative egalitarian concern. His essay should be of interest not only for normative and empirical theorists, but also for policy-makers and others who deal with the goal of poverty-alleviation in practice.

The articles by Mills, Fricker and Wolff are representative of a collection that embodies the state of the art of contemporary egalitarian theory in many respects. Two important subjects, however, are missing from the otherwise multifaceted picture. There is no engagement with economic inequalities beyond the nation state. Neither does this work treat intergenerational environmental inequalities resulting from environmental degradation and man-made climate change. These two concerns give egalitarians reason to question the fairness and legitimacy of the international order. To start with, the distribution of income and capital across nation states remains highly unequal, which increases incentives for those who find themselves in less fortunate circumstances to seek better living conditions abroad. Furthermore, while trade with resources, goods and services has never been more global and interdependent than today, it may be argued that the current system has primarily benefitted the world's wealthy and powerful, and that it rests on practices that are highly environmentally destructive and which violate the basic human rights of labourers and affected populations. Finally, past and present generations have contributed to environmental degradation and fossil fuel consumption to a much larger degree than future generations will, assuming they act in such a way as to avoid the most catastrophic outcomes.

What should we make of the absence of these topics in an anthology that seeks to shed light on contemporary egalitarian theorizing? An uncharitable reading may trace it back to an unexpressed particularism. It would be hard to argue that demands of equal treatment stop at national or communal borders or generational confines -- at least not in a highly interdependent world like ours. Neither could the widely shared social (or relational) egalitarian perspective plausibly attach any such categorical constraints to egalitarian demands. New technologies now allow an increasing number of the world's least well-off individuals to compare themselves to more privileged individuals across national boundaries, which in turn affects what they seek to achieve in life and what they will regard as justified or unjustified inequalities. A more charitable interpretation is that a single anthology simply cannot cover all of the issues that are currently at the forefront of egalitarian theory. However, it should be clear that while it remains important and rewarding to reflect on the conditions of "The Equal Society", an egalitarian should certainly not stop there. Instead, she should also ask what it would mean to transform transnational and transgenerational relations in a way so that all humans are (truly) treated as equals.

Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals , Oxford University Press 2015.

Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing , Oxford University Press 2007.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776], edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press 1976.

Jonathan Wolff/Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage , Oxford University Press 2007.

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice

2016, The Philosophical Quarterly

Related Papers

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2017)

Valentin Beck

Shlomi Segall

Equality is an undisputed political and moral value. But until quite recently, political philosophers have not fully explored its complexity. This article tackles the vast literature on equality and egalitarianism of the past thirty-five years or so, and shows how complex and multi-layered the concept of equality can be. Specifically, it unpacks three major questions we might ask about equality. We first ask what is equality. This question can be unpacked into two sub-questions. Distinguishing first between formal and distributive accounts of equality, we may ask what the currency of egalitarianism can be. The article goes through currencies such as welfare, resources, and capabilities, showing their respective strengths and weaknesses. A second important sub-question here is what is the relevant scope as well as temporal dimensions of equality. Among whom is equality valuable, and in what time-frame, precisely, is it valuable? This hints at our second major question, namely concerning the value of equality. Is equality indeed valuable, or are we confusing it for some other value, be it giving priority to the worse off, or lifting individuals above a certain threshold of deprivation. The article goes through some famous criticisms to equality's purported lack of value (the leveling down objection), explores some potential answers, and then examines the relative strength of equality's two main rivals, namely priority and sufficiency. The third major question we ask concerns what is the proper account of egalitarian justice. In particular, setting aside the question of currency, should our conception of distributive justice be informed by responsibility-sensitive accounts, or rather be focused on a responsibility-insensitive accounts that moreover place an emphasis on equality of relations rather than individuals holdings? We explore this in the two final sections, one devoted to understanding luck egalitarianism, and the other to its rival, relational egalitarianism.

The Philosophical Quarterly

Arthur Schipper

The Philosophical Quarterly (2017); The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice. EDITED BY George Hull. (London: Lexington Books, 2015. Pp. vii + 354. Price £70.00.) http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/10/10/pq.pqw063.full?keytype=ref&ijkey=6pdzSKo8XubTuAq You can access the article by following the link above.

Gillian Brock

The Southern Journal of Philosophy

Chris Lebron

Sunday Business Post

Marie Moran

Cyrielle Poiraud

Cette thèse s’inscrit au sein de la littérature des théories modernes et contemporaines de la justice sociale, en s’intéressant plus particulièrement à la question de l’égalité et à la manière dont elle s’est affirmée en tant que préoccupation fondamentale pour ces théories. En s’appuyant essentiellement sur les travaux d’Amartya Sen, d’Emmanuel Levinas et de G.W.F. Hegel, il est suggéré que l’égalité constitue la condition de possibilité de la justice, et ainsi de la liberté, cette dernière étant affirmée comme l’objet de la justice. Ce travail tend également à envisager les limites d’une telle conception : le premier chapitre permet d’affirmer la relation d’interdépendance des valeurs de liberté et d’égalité au regard de la justice sociale en démontrant la nécessité d’un principe d’égalité par l’argument de la raison humaine. Le second chapitre approfondit l’argument de l’impartialité, tel que développé par Sen. De là, le troisième chapitre déploie la nécessité d’une médiation ins...

Social Epistemology

Elizabeth Anderson

Philosophy in review

Eduardo Frajman

Philosophy &amp; Social Criticism

Matthias Fritsch

The article considers the relationships among three arguments that purport to establish the intrinsically contradictory or paradoxical nature of the modern project aiming at the equal consideration of all. The claim that the inevitable historical insertion of universal-egalitarian norms leads to always particular and untransparent interpretations of grammatically universal norms may be combined with the claim that the logic of determination of political communities tends to generate exclusions. The combination of these two claims lends specific force to the third argument according to which equal consideration perpetually requires the non-egalitarian project of understanding (excluded) individuals on their own terms. Hence, taking off from a recent debate between Christoph Menke and Jürgen Habermas, I argue that the former is right to diagnose an aporetic self-reflection in egalitarian universalism, while agreeing with the latter about the indispensability of deliberative democratic...

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

RELATED PAPERS

Philosophy & Public Affairs

Martin O'Neill

Res Publica

Judy Walsh , John Baker , sara cantillon

Steven Smith

Keith Hyams

Robert Jubb

International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education

Felix Orina

Archana Parashar

Critical Philosophy of Race

Carina Fourie , Ivo Wallimann-Helmer , Fabian Schuppert

Chiara Cordelli

Justice, Democracy and the Right to Justification

Anthony Laden

Gabriel Wollner

Social and Personality Psychology Compass

Susan Saegert

Thom Brooks

M. Sellers & S. Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy

Kostas Koukouzelis

Kathleen M Lynch

Henrieta Serban

Ivan Cerovac

Phenomenology and Mind

Federica Liveriero

François Hudon

Human Studies

Scott Harris

The Yale Law Journal

zillah eisenstein

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

5 Essays to Learn More About Equality

“Equality” is one of those words that seems simple, but is more complicated upon closer inspection. At its core, equality can be defined as “the state of being equal.” When societies value equality, their goals include racial, economic, and gender equality . Do we really know what equality looks like in practice? Does it mean equal opportunities, equal outcomes, or both? To learn more about this concept, here are five essays focusing on equality:

“The Equality Effect” (2017) – Danny Dorling

In this essay, professor Danny Dorling lays out why equality is so beneficial to the world. What is equality? It’s living in a society where everyone gets the same freedoms, dignity, and rights. When equality is realized, a flood of benefits follows. Dorling describes the effect of equality as “magical.” Benefits include happier and healthier citizens, less crime, more productivity, and so on. Dorling believes the benefits of “economically equitable” living are so clear, change around the world is inevitable. Despite the obvious conclusion that equality creates a better world, progress has been slow. We’ve become numb to inequality. Raising awareness of equality’s benefits is essential.

Danny Dorling is the Halford Mackinder Professor of Geography at the University of Oxford. He has co-authored and authored a handful of books, including Slowdown: The End of the Great Acceleration—and Why It’s Good for the Planet, the Economy, and Our Lives . “The Equality Effect” is excerpted from this book. Dorling’s work focuses on issues like health, education, wealth, poverty, and employment.

“The Equality Conundrum” (2020) – Joshua Rothman

Originally published as “Same Difference” in the New Yorker’s print edition, this essay opens with a story. A couple plans on dividing their money equally among their children. However, they realize that to ensure equal success for their children, they might need to start with unequal amounts. This essay digs into the complexity of “equality.” While inequality is a major concern for people, most struggle to truly define it. Citing lectures, studies, philosophy, religion, and more, Rothman sheds light on the fact that equality is not a simple – or easy – concept.

Joshua Rothman has worked as a writer and editor of The New Yorker since 2012. He is the ideas editor of newyorker.com.

“Why Understanding Equity vs Equality in Schools Can Help You Create an Inclusive Classroom” (2019) – Waterford.org

Equality in education is critical to society. Students that receive excellent education are more likely to succeed than students who don’t. This essay focuses on the importance of equity, which means giving support to students dealing with issues like poverty, discrimination and economic injustice. What is the difference between equality and equity? What are some strategies that can address barriers? This essay is a great introduction to the equity issues teachers face and why equity is so important.

Waterford.org is a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving equity and education in the United States. It believes that the educational experiences children receive are crucial for their future. Waterford.org was founded by Dr. Dustin Heuston.

“What does equality mean to me?” (2020) – Gabriela Vivacqua and Saddal Diab

While it seems simple, the concept of equality is complex. In this piece posted by WFP_Africa on the WFP’s Insight page, the authors ask women from South Sudan what equality means to them. Half of South Sudan’s population consists of women and girls. Unequal access to essentials like healthcare, education, and work opportunities hold them back. Complete with photographs, this short text gives readers a glimpse into interpretations of equality and what organizations like the World Food Programme are doing to tackle gender inequality.

As part of the UN, the World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization focusing on hunger and food security . It provides food assistance to over 80 countries each year.

“Here’s How Gender Equality is Measured” (2020) – Catherine Caruso

Gender inequality is one of the most discussed areas of inequality. Sobering stats reveal that while progress has been made, the world is still far from realizing true gender equality. How is gender equality measured? This essay refers to the Global Gender Gap report ’s factors. This report is released each year by the World Economic Forum. The four factors are political empowerment, health and survival, economic participation and opportunity, and education. The author provides a brief explanation of each factor.

Catherine Caruso is the Editorial Intern at Global Citizen, a movement committed to ending extreme poverty by 2030. Previously, Caruso worked as a writer for Inquisitr. Her English degree is from Syracuse University. She writes stories on health, the environment, and citizenship.

You may also like

What is Social Activism?

15 Inspiring Movies about Activism

15 Examples of Civil Disobedience

Academia in Times of Genocide: Why are Students Across the World Protesting?

Pinkwashing 101: Definition, History, Examples

15 Inspiring Quotes for Black History Month

10 Inspiring Ways Women Are Fighting for Equality

15 Trusted Charities Fighting for Clean Water

15 Trusted Charities Supporting Trans People

15 Political Issues We Must Address

15 Trusted Charities Fighting for LGBTQ+ Rights

16 Inspiring Civil Rights Leaders You Should Know

About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Social Inequality — Equality

Essays on Equality

What makes a good equality essay topic.

When it comes to crafting an exceptional equality essay, the choice of topic plays a pivotal role. A remarkable essay topic should not only captivate the reader's attention but also provoke thought and remain relevant to the subject of equality. Below are some innovative suggestions on how to brainstorm and select the perfect essay topic:

• Brainstorm: Initiate the process by brainstorming ideas that revolve around equality. Delve into various aspects such as gender equality, racial equality, LGBTQ+ rights, social justice, and economic equality. Jot down any ideas that spring to mind during this creative process.
• Research: Once you have compiled a list of potential topics, embark on thorough research to gather more information. Explore recent news articles, scholarly journals, and books that delve into your chosen topics. This process will help you gain a deeper understanding and unearth unique perspectives.
• Consider your interests: Handpick a topic that genuinely captivates your interest. Writing about something you are passionate about will not only make the process more enjoyable but also reflect in the quality of your essay.
• Relevance: Ensure that your chosen topic remains pertinent to the current socio-political climate. Consider the impact it has on individuals and society as a whole. Seek out topics that are timely and hold significance in today's world.
• Uniqueness: Aim for a topic that stands out from the crowd. Steer clear of ordinary or overexplored subjects. Instead, focus on a specific aspect or angle that hasn't been extensively explored. This will make your essay more compelling and original.
• Controversial issues: Controversial topics have the potential to generate lively discussions and debates. However, it is crucial to approach these topics with sensitivity and respect for diverse opinions. Present balanced arguments and consider multiple perspectives to ensure a well-rounded essay.

Remember, an exceptional equality essay topic should ignite curiosity, encourage critical thinking, and promote a deeper understanding of the subject. Now, let's proceed to explore some of the best equality essay topics that will inspire your writing.

Revolutionary Equality Essay Topics

Here are some groundbreaking equality essay topics that you can consider:

• The Empowering Role of Education in Achieving Gender Equality.
• Exploring the Intersectionality of Race and Gender in the Battle for Equality.
• Analyzing the Impact of Socioeconomic Factors on the Rights of the LGBTQ+ Community.
• The Challenges Faced by Minority Women in Paving Their Way to Corporate Leadership.
• The Evolution of Feminism: From Suffragettes to Modern Activism.
• The Pivotal Role of Media in Shaping Public Perception of Equality.
• Breaking Barriers and Overcoming Stereotypes: Promoting Equality in the World of Sports.
• The Profound Impact of Gender Equality on Economic Growth.
• The Significance of LGBTQ+ Representation in Mainstream Media.
• Exploring the Connection Between Disability Rights and Equality.
• Masculinity Unveiled: The Role of Men in the Feminist Movement.
• The Struggles Faced by Transgender Individuals in Today's Society.
• The Complex Relationship Between Religion and LGBTQ+ Rights.
• Analyzing the Wage Gap: Causes, Consequences, and Potential Solutions.
• Government Policies and Their Effectiveness in Promoting Equality.
• The Impacts of Colonialism on Indigenous Peoples' Quest for Equality.
• The Psychological Effects of Discrimination on Marginalized Communities.
• The Power of Inclusive Language in Fostering Equality.
• The Nexus of Immigration and Equality.
• Social Media as a Catalyst for Activism in the Pursuit of Equality.

These topics encompass a wide range of equality issues and offer ample opportunities for in-depth exploration and analysis.

Provocative Equality Essay Questions

To delve deeper into the chosen equality topics, here are ten essay questions that can guide your research and analysis:

• How has the feminist movement evolved over the past century, and what obstacles does it face in the present day?
• In what ways do socioeconomic factors influence access to education and opportunities for marginalized communities?
• What are the main hurdles faced by LGBTQ+ individuals in their pursuit of legal recognition and societal acceptance?
• How does media representation contribute to the perpetuation of gender stereotypes and inequality?
• What are the ethical implications of affirmative action policies in promoting equality?
• How does systemic racism affect the criminal justice system and contribute to racial disparities?
• What role does religion play in either fostering or hindering LGBTQ+ rights?
• How does the concept of intersectionality contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of inequality?
• What are the psychological effects of discrimination on individuals from marginalized communities?
• How can society achieve true equality without neglecting individual differences and unique cultural identities?

These questions serve as a launchpad for exploring different aspects of equality and provide opportunities for critical analysis and discussion.

Equality Essay Prompts

To ignite your writing on equality, here are five creative essay prompts:

• Envision a world where gender roles are completely reversed. How do you think this would impact society, and what challenges might arise?
• Compose a personal reflection on a time when you witnessed or experienced inequality. What lessons did you learn from this experience?
• If you could interview any historical figure who fought for equality, who would it be and why? What questions would you ask them?
• Create a fictional story set in a utopian society where equality is fully realized. What does this society look like, and what measures were taken to achieve equality?
• Analyze the role of art and creativity in promoting social change and advancing the cause of equality.

These prompts encourage creative thinking and offer unique angles for exploring the concept of equality.

Writing Equality Essay FAQ

Here are some frequently asked questions about writing equality essays:

Q: How can I make my equality essay stand out?

A: To make your essay stand out, choose a unique topic, provide compelling evidence and examples, and present original insights. Additionally, ensure your writing is clear, concise, and well-structured.

Q: Can I use personal experiences in an equality essay?

A: Yes, incorporating personal experiences can add depth and authenticity to your essay. However, remember to connect your experiences to broader societal issues and provide a balanced perspective.

Q: How can I engage readers in my equality essay?

A: Engage readers by starting with a captivating introduction, using thought-provoking questions, providing real-life examples, and encouraging readers to reflect on their own beliefs and actions.

Q: Is it necessary to consider counterarguments in an equality essay?

A: Yes, considering counterarguments demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the topic and allows you to present a balanced viewpoint. Addressing counterarguments strengthens your essay's credibility and persuasiveness.

Q: How can I ensure my equality essay is well-researched?

A: Conduct thorough research using reliable sources, such as academic journals, reputable news outlets, and books written by experts in the field. Take notes, cite your sources accurately, and critically evaluate the information gathered.

Remember, writing an equality essay is an opportunity to contribute to important discussions and promote positive change. Embrace creativity and critical thinking to make your essay impactful and inspiring.

The Worldwide Issue of Women's Equality

The case for equality in modern society, made-to-order essay as fast as you need it.

Each essay is customized to cater to your unique preferences

+ experts online

Environment for Social Justice and Equality

All men are still not created equal in america, all people are equal: how equality is achieved in modern america, the way how i see the world, let us write you an essay from scratch.

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

The Purpose of Education and The Importance of Equality of Educational Opportunity

Understanding diversity leads to equality, liberty vs. equality debate: 'equality' marginalizes people, woman's rights as global issue: gender inequality, get a personalized essay in under 3 hours.

Expert-written essays crafted with your exact needs in mind

The Civil Rights Movement: a Struggle for Equality

Equality in the treatment of white defendants and black defendants in the united states, the right to equality in islam, sexuality does not determine equality, gender pay gap phenomenon, good and evil are equally important, equality in america: keeping our country happy, women's rights and equality in marriage in the ucf theatre's production of man and superman by george bernard shaw, the fight for equality and civil rights in the life and career of jackie robinson, gender wage gap issue: equal pay for equal work, separate but equal is equal: plessy v ferguson, the applicability of transformative, fractured and imposed constitutionalism in africa, race-based affirmative action in postsecondary institutions, the lack of equality in society in shakespeare’s "the merchant of venice" and in hansberry’s "a raisin in the sun", the legal dilemma behind equal pay for equal work in india, topdog/underdog: a sociological approach to norms and inequality, interpreting global inequality in "guns, germs, and steel", the evolution of women’s political equality in canada, whina cooper – woman who made the difference, key features of good quality edible fungi.

1. Lynch, K., & Baker, J. (2005). Equality in education: An equality of condition perspective. Theory and research in education, 3(2), 131-164. (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1477878505053298) 2. Subrahmanian, R. (2005). Gender equality in education: Definitions and measurements. International Journal of Educational Development, 25(4), 395-407. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0738059305000349) 3. Lynch, K. (2001). Equality in education. Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 90(360), 395-411. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/30095506) 4. Hallinan, M. T. (1988). Equality of educational opportunity. Annual review of sociology, 14(1), 249-268. (https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.so.14.080188.001341) 5. Coleman, J. (1968). The concept of equality of educational opportunity. Harvard educational review, 38(1), 7-22. (https://meridian.allenpress.com/her/article-abstract/38/1/7/30900/The-Concept-of-Equality-of-Educational-Opportunity) 6. Gamoran, A., & Long, D. A. (2007). Equality of educational opportunity a 40 year retrospective (pp. 23-47). Springer Netherlands. (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-5916-2_2) 7. Bol, T., & Van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2013). Educational systems and the trade-off between labor market allocation and equality of educational opportunity. Comparative Education Review, 57(2), 285-308. (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/669122) 8. Brighouse, H., & Swift, A. (2009). Educational equality versus educational adequacy: A critique of Anderson and Satz. Journal of applied philosophy, 26(2), 117-128. (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00438.x)

Relevant topics

• Gender Equality
• Gun Control
• Women's Rights
• Pro Choice (Abortion)
• Discrimination
• Illegal Immigration
• Freedom of Speech
• Pro Life (Abortion)
• Homelessness
• Animal Testing

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Bibliography

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

MOVING SALE — Save 50% Off Select Books This Month

Look inside

A Brief History of Equality

Thomas Piketty

Translated by Steven Rendall

Harvard University Press books are not shipped directly to India due to regional distribution arrangements. Buy from your local bookstore, Amazon.co.in, or Flipkart.com.

This book is not shipped directly to country due to regional distribution arrangements.

Pre-order for this book isn't available yet on our website.

This book is currently out of stock.

Edit shipping location

Dropdown items

• Barnes and Noble
• Bookshop.org
• Waterstones

ISBN 9780674273559

Publication date: 04/19/2022

Request exam copy

A New York Times Book Review Editors’ Choice

A Public Books Best Book of the Year

“An opportunity for readers to see Piketty bring his larger argument about the origins of inequality and his program for fighting it into high relief.” —Nicholas Lemann, New York Times

The world’s leading economist of inequality presents a short but sweeping and surprisingly optimistic history of human progress toward equality despite crises, disasters, and backsliding. A perfect introduction to the ideas developed in his monumental earlier books.

It’s easy to be pessimistic about inequality. We know it has increased dramatically in many parts of the world over the past two generations. No one has done more to reveal the problem than Thomas Piketty. Now, in this surprising and powerful new work, Piketty reminds us that the grand sweep of history gives us reasons to be optimistic. Over the centuries, he shows, we have been moving toward greater equality.

Piketty guides us with elegance and concision through the great movements that have made the modern world for better and worse: the growth of capitalism, revolutions, imperialism, slavery, wars, and the building of the welfare state. It’s a history of violence and social struggle, punctuated by regression and disaster. But through it all, Piketty shows, human societies have moved fitfully toward a more just distribution of income and assets, a reduction of racial and gender inequalities, and greater access to health care, education, and the rights of citizenship. Our rough march forward is political and ideological, an endless fight against injustice. To keep moving, Piketty argues, we need to learn and commit to what works, to institutional, legal, social, fiscal, and educational systems that can make equality a lasting reality. At the same time, we need to resist historical amnesia and the temptations of cultural separatism and intellectual compartmentalization. At stake is the quality of life for billions of people. We know we can do better, Piketty concludes. The past shows us how. The future is up to us.

A sustained argument for why we should be optimistic about human progress…An engaged and clearheaded socialist thinker, Piketty sets forth…one of the most comprehensive and comprehensible social democratic programs available anywhere…He has laid out a plan that is smart, thoughtful, and motivated by admirable political convictions. —Gary Gerstle, Washington Post

An opportunity for readers to see Piketty bring his larger argument about the origins of inequality and his program for fighting it into high relief. —Nicholas Lemann, New York Times

A Brief History of Equality is a route into Piketty’s arguments in his earlier books, with their luxuriantly extensive data and historical detail. Anybody who has not been able to face those tomes…should read this one. —Diane Coyle, Financial Times

Peak Piketty…He possesses the rarest of abilities to analyze staggering quantities of information and offer original insights into the structures that underpin our economies…At a time when the concept of objective truth is under assault and when the nuance of argument can be drowned out by the shouting of slogans, there is something glorious about the scale of the work of Thomas Piketty. His arguments are vast in their detail, ever ambitious and always hopeful. This elegant and (by his standards) short book will allow any reader to understand the glory. —Paschal Donohoe, Irish Times

An analysis that might just provide a fresh opportunity for social hope…Piketty has undeniably identified clues about how to achieve a more egalitarian world. —Richard Horton, The Lancet

An activist’s history, part reckoning with the past and part manifesto for the future, designed to bolster the courage of those who would continue the forward march. It is an admirable undertaking…Piketty mounts an impassioned plea for a renewed and retooled commitment to equality in its various forms, laying out an ambitious blueprint for a new kind of democratic, self-managing and decentralized socialism, not least as a counter to the authoritarian, state-socialist model of China. —Darrin M. McMahon, Literary Review

Piketty is now attempting to revive an egalitarian political project that he traces all the way back to the Enlightenment, but which has stalled since 1980. In A Brief History of Equality he lays out a program of democratic socialist reforms—to taxation, property rights, corporate governance, international regulation and much else—that would invert recent trends. —William Davies, London Review of Books

Tidier and more lucid…Piketty is guardedly optimistic about the prospects for future social progress. —Timothy Noah, New Republic

Piketty…avoid[s] the twin seductions of triumphalism and hopelessness. He treats the concept of equality more expansively here, including not only income and property but also gender and race. By moving the focus from inequality to equality, he suggests that what’s needed isn’t only the harsh light of critique but also the remedy of repair. —Jennifer Szalai, New York Times

[Piketty] argues that we’re on a trajectory of greater, not less, equality and lays out his prescriptions for remedying our current corrosive wealth disparities. —David Marchese, New York Times Magazine

A nice distillation of the ‘rockstar’ economist’s ideas and a good entry point for the uninitiated…[Piketty] points out that an unequal concentration of wealth is bad for growth and corrosive to democracy, precisely because it limits social mobility and prevents people from accessing key institutions…If the politics of Europe and America during the last decade have taught us anything, it is that the failure to address inequality is highly corrosive to the social contract. It fosters distrust and resentment, and makes people vulnerable to demagogy, populism, xenophobia, and reactionary politics of all kinds. —Jared Marcel Pollen, Quillette

Surprisingly optimistic…Building on his previous works and drawing on the sweeping historical record, Piketty brings his larger argument about the origins of inequality and the political, social, and institutional contexts of its evolution into sharp relief. —Era Dabla-Norris, Finance & Development

Thomas Piketty presents a narrative of history that is optimistic—a narrative that shows, despite numerous setbacks, over the long durée that civilization is trending towards social, economic and political equality. —Ethan Linehan, Marx and Philosophy Review of Books

Merciful in its brevity, although no less intellectually rigorous. Designed to be read by politically-minded citizens, not just economists, it distills the key concepts from Piketty’s previous three books…Piketty’s overview of 20th-century history and politics has given us a blueprint for achievable political transformation and reason to hope that progress is possible. —Eleni Vlahiotis, PopMatters

[Piketty] constantly rethinks and seeks to address new audiences. His impact on political thinking and strategy is undoubted: there can be no denying that the increasing call for wealth taxation draws on his lead. In this spirit, this book will occupy a valuable place in his wider set of writings. —Mike Savage, Administrative Science Quarterly

This thought-provoking book is recommended to all readers who want to learn more about how the scourge of inequality might be dealt with and enhance the lives of all humans. —Choice

Marked by Piketty’s trademark lucidity, impressive multidisciplinary scholarship, and provocative progressivism, this is a vital introduction to his ideas. —Publishers Weekly (starred review)

There is no historian of global inequality more impactful today than Piketty. His latest book is a succinct synthesis of the important lessons of his work to date—a valuable resource for all of us trying to build an economy that is driven by value creation for all and not value extraction for the few. —Mariana Mazzucato, author of Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism

Thomas Piketty helped put inequality at the center of political debate. Now, he offers an ambitious program for addressing it. The revitalized democratic socialism he proposes goes beyond the welfare state by calling for guaranteed employment, inheritance for all, power-sharing in corporations, and new rules for globalization. This is political economy on a grand scale, a starting point for debate about the future of progressive politics. —Michael J. Sandel, author of The Tyranny of Merit: Can We Find the Common Good?

A Brief History of Equality is a literally exceptional book. Thomas Piketty documents the economic growth and moral progress humanity has experienced over the past three centuries and draws a new inspiration from this history. Others who emphasize progress succumb to flatfooted views of well-being, technocratic fear of politics, and quietism about justice. But Piketty confronts historical progress with a subtle understanding of human flourishing, a keen appreciation for political struggle, and a deep commitment to a more just world. In this way, Piketty makes past progress into a call to continue the struggle for justice, with stronger historical foundations, a deeper understanding of the present, and a clearer vision for the future. —Daniel Markovits, author of The Meritocracy Trap: How America’s Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the Elite

A profound and optimistic call to action and reflection. For Piketty, the arc of history is long, but it does bend toward equality. There is nothing automatic about it, however: as citizens, we must be ready to fight for it, and constantly (re)invent the myriad of institutions that will bring it about. This book is here to help. —Esther Duflo, Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences

• Thomas Piketty is Professor of Economics and Economic History at L’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and at the Paris School of Economics and Codirector of the World Inequality Lab.

Book Details

• 5-1/2 x 8-1/4 inches
• Belknap Press

From this author

Capital and Ideology

Top Incomes in France in the Twentieth Century

The Economics of Inequality

Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Recommendations.

Visions of Inequality

Aquinas and the Market

Is Capitalism Obsolete?

Sorry, there was an error adding the item to your shopping bag.

Expired session

Sorry, your session has expired. Please refresh your browser's tab.

Main navigation

An item has been added to the cart

Added to shopping bag

• Copy to clipboard

Set your location

It looks like you're in   . Would you like to update your location?

Unavailable

Harvard University Press titles are not shipped directly to India due to local distribution arrangements.

Unavailable in country .

Shopping Bag

Your shopping bag is currently empty. Add items to your shopping bag, to complete check out.

Against Equality: A Critical Essay for the NAACP and Others

Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Vol. 48, Page 235, 2021

U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3869164

28 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2021

Richard Delgado

Seattle University School of Law

Jean Stefancic

Date Written: June 17, 2021

We address a recurring problem in movement scholarship and activism-- why do some civil rights organizations persist in promoting themselves as advocates of equal protection when street activists rarely mention it, and lawyers know that litigation brought under that clause almost always loses? We show how equal protection has receded in importance as a means of advancing the interests of outsider groups, yet many traditional organizations continue to be wedded to it. We show how better means are available for advancing the goals of these groups, including street demonstrations, struggle, righteous indignation, and voting. We offer an explanation for why this is so and conclude by urging methods that are likely to prove more productive.

Keywords: social change, social justice, critical race theory, legal activism

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Richard Delgado (Contact Author)

Seattle university school of law ( email ).

WA United States

901 12th Avenue, Sullivan Hall P.O. Box 222000 Seattle, WA n/a 98122-1090 United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics, related ejournals, discrimination, law & justice ejournal.

Subscribe to this fee journal for more curated articles on this topic

Law & Society: Private Law - Discrimination Law eJournal

Cultural anthropology: history, theory, methods & applications ejournal, political anthropology ejournal, legal anthropology: laws & constitutions ejournal, anthropology of race, ethnicity & indigenous people ejournal, human rights ejournal.

Subscribe to this free journal for more curated articles on this topic

Closing the equity gap

Jeni Klugman

Caren Grown and Odera Onyechi

Why addressing gender inequality is central to tackling today’s polycrises

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

As we enter 2023, the term “ polycrisis ” is an increasingly apt way to describe today’s challenges. 1 Major wars, high inflation, and climate events are creating hardship all around the world, which is still grappling with a pandemic death toll approaching 7 million people.

Faced with such daunting challenges, one might well ask why we should be thinking about the gender dimensions of recovery and resilience for future shocks. The answer is simple: We can no longer afford to think in silos. Today’s interlocking challenges demand that sharp inequalities, including gender disparities, must be addressed as part and parcel of efforts to tackle Africa’s pressing issues and ensure the continent’s future success.

“We can no longer afford to think in silos. … Gender disparities, must be addressed as part and parcel of efforts to tackle Africa’s pressing issues and ensure the continent’s future success.”

The burdens of the pandemic have been unequally borne across regions and countries, and between the poor and better off. Inequalities exist around gender—which can be defined as the “socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, attributes and opportunities that any society considers appropriate for men and women, boys and girls” and people with non-binary identities. 2 As Raewyn Connell laid out more than two decades ago, existing systems typically distribute greater power, resources, and status to men and behaviors considered masculine . 3 As a result, gender intersects with other sources of disadvantage, most notably income, age, race, and ethnicity.

This understanding is now mainstream. As recently observed by the IMF, “The gender inequalities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic follow different paths but almost always end up the same: Women have suffered disproportionate economic harm from the crisis.” 4 Among the important nuances revealed by micro-surveys is that rural women working informally continued to work through the pandemic , but with sharply reduced earnings in Nigeria and elsewhere. 5 And as the burden of child care and home schooling soared, rural households headed by women were far less likely than urban households to have children engaged in learning activities during school closures.

Important insights emerge from IFPRI’s longitudinal panel study (which included Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda) covering income loss, coping strategies, labor and time use, food and water insecurity, and child education outcomes. 6

Among the especially adverse impacts for women were greater food and water insecurity compared to men, including worrying about insufficient food and eating less than usual, while a large proportion of women also did not have adequately diverse diets. Moreover, many women had to add hours to their workday caring for sick family members, and their economic opportunities shrank, cutting their earnings and widening gender income gaps.

While today’s problems seem daunting, there remain huge causes for optimism, especially in Africa. Over the past three decades, many African countries have achieved enormous gains in levels of education, health, and poverty reduction. Indeed, the pace of change has been staggering and commendable. As captured in the Women Peace and Security Index , which measures performance in inclusion, justice, and security, 6 of the top 10 score improvers during the period 2017-2021 were in sub-Saharan Africa. [GIWPS.2022. “Women Peace and Security Index” Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security.] The Democratic Republic of Congo was among top score improvers since 2017, as the share of women with financial accounts almost tripled, to 24 percent; and increases exceeding 5 percentage points were registered in cell phone use and parliamentary representation. In the Central African Republic, improvements were experienced in the security dimension, where organized violence fell significantly, and women’s perceptions of community safety rose 6 percentage points up to 49 percent.

Looking ahead, efforts to mitigate gender inequalities must clearly be multi-pronged, and as highlighted above—we need to think outside silos. That said, two major policy fronts emerge to the fore.

Ensure cash transfers that protect against poverty , are built and designed to promote women’s opportunities, with a focus on digital payments. 7 Ways to address gender inequalities as part of social protection program responses 8 include deliberate efforts to overcome gender gaps in cell phone access by distributing phones to those women who need them, as well as private sector partnerships to subsidize airtime for the poorest, and to make key information services and apps freely available . 9 Programs could also make women the default recipient of cash transfer schemes, instead of the head of household. Furthermore, capacity-building initiatives can be built into program design to give women the skills and capabilities needed to successfully manage accounts and financial decisionmaking. 10

Reducing the risk of violence against women. Women who are not safe at home are denied the freedom from violence needed to pursue opportunities that should be afforded to all. In 2018, 10 of the 15 countries with the worst rates of intimate partner violence were in sub-Saharan Africa—in descending order of average intimate partner violence these were, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, Ethiopia, Liberia, South Sudan, Djibouti, and Uganda.

“As the burden of child care and home schooling soared, rural households headed by women were far less likely than urban households to have children engaged in learning activities.”

Conflicts and crises multiply women’s risk of physical, emotional, and sexual violence . During the pandemic, risk factors like economic stress were compounded by service closures and stay-at-home orders, which increased exposure to potential perpetrators. 11 Several governments responded by strengthening existing help services , including police and justice, supporting hotlines, ensuring the provision of psychological support, and health sector responses. 12 Examples of good practice included an NGO in North-Eastern Nigeria, which equipped existing safe spaces with phone booths to enable survivors to contact caseworkers.

However, given the high levels of prevalence and often low levels of reporting, prevention of gender-based violence is key. Targeted programs with promising results in prevention include community dialogues and efforts to change harmful norms, safe spaces, as well as possibilities to reduce the risk of violence through cash plus social protection programs. These efforts should be accompanied by more systematic monitoring and evaluation to build evidence about what works in diverse settings.

Finally, but certainly not least, women should have space and voices in decisionmaking. This case was powerfully put by former President Sirleaf Johnson in her 2021 Foresight essay, which underlined that “ economic, political, institutional, and social barriers persist throughout the continent, limiting women’s abilities to reach high-level leadership positions .” 13 Persistent gender gaps in power and decision-making, not only limits innovative thinking and solutions, but also the consideration of more basic measures to avoid the worsening of gender inequalities. Overcoming these gaps in power and decision-making requires safeguarding legal protections and rights, investing in women and girls financially, and opening space for women in political parties so that women have the platforms to access high-level appointed and competitive positions across national, regional, and international institutions. 14

Strengthening fiscal policy for gender equality

Senior Fellow, Center for Sustainable Development, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

Research Analyst, Center for Sustainable Development, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

It is often said that women act as “shock absorbers” during times of crisis; this is even more so in the current context of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increased geopolitical conflict. These three global crises have simultaneously stretched women’s ability to earn income and intensified their unpaid work. Well-designed fiscal policy can help cushion the effects of these shocks and enable women and their households to recover more quickly.

Over 60 percent of employed women in Africa work in agriculture, including in small-scale food production; women are the primary sellers in food markets, and they work in other sectors such as informal trading. At the same time, women are an increasing share of entrepreneurs in countries such as Ghana and Uganda, even as they face financial and other constraints to start and grow their firms. [Africa Gender Innovation Lab (GIL). 2020. “Supporting Women Throughout the Coronavirus Emergency Response and Economic Recovery.” World Bank Group. ] In addition to earning income for their households, women bear the major responsibility for unpaid domestic activities such as cooking; collecting water and fuelwood; caring for children, elderly, and other dependents—so women are more time-poor than are men.

African women and entrepreneurs have been impacted disproportionately more than men by the triple shocks mentioned earlier. Extreme weather events disrupt food production and agricultural employment, making it harder for women to earn income . 15 16 17 The pandemic and conflict in Ukraine further intensified women’s paid and unpaid activities . 18 19 Beyond climate change and the war in Ukraine, localized conflicts and insecurity in East and West Africa exposes women and girls to gender-based violence and other risks as they seek to support their families and develop new coping strategies. 20 21 22

“Responding to these shocks necessitates a large infusion of resources. In this context, fiscal policy can be deployed more smartly to advance gender equality and create an enabling environment for women to play a greater role in building their economies’ recovery and resilience.”

Responding to these shocks necessitates a large infusion of resources. In this context, fiscal policy can be deployed more smartly to advance gender equality and create an enabling environment for women to play a greater role in building their economies’ recovery and resilience. Public expenditure supports critical sectors such as education, health, agriculture, social protection, and physical and social infrastructure, while well-designed tax policy is essential to fund the public goods, services, and infrastructure on which both women and men rely.

Gender-responsive budgets, which exist in over 30 countries across the continent, can be strengthened. Rwanda provides a good model for other countries. After an early unsuccessful attempt, Rwanda invested seriously in gender budgeting beginning in 2011. 23 24 The budget is focused on closing gaps and strengthening women’s roles in key sectors—agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure—which are all critical for short- and medium-term economic growth and productivity. The process has been sustained by strong political will among parliamentarians. Led by the Ministry of Finance, the process has financed and been complemented by important institutional and policy reforms. A constitutional regulatory body monitors results, with additional accountability by civil society organizations.

However, raising adequate fiscal revenue to support a gender budget is a challenge in the current macro environment of high public debt levels, increased borrowing costs, and low levels of public savings. Yet, observers note there is scope to increase revenues through taxation reforms, debt relief, cutting wasteful public expenditure, and other means. 25 26 We focus here on taxation.

Many countries are reforming their tax systems to strengthen revenue collection. Overall tax collection is currently low; the average tax-to-GDP ratio in Africa in 2020 was 14.8 percent and fell sharply during the pandemic, although it may be rebounding. 27 Very few Africans pay personal income tax or other central government taxes, 28 29 and statutory corporate tax rates (which range from 25-35 percent), are higher than even the recent OECD proposal for a global minimum tax 30 so scope for raising them further is limited. Efforts should be made to close loopholes and reduce tax evasion.

As countries reform their tax policies, they should be intentional about avoiding implicit and explicit gender biases. 31 32 33 34 Most African countries rely more on indirect taxes than direct taxes, given the structure of their economies, but indirect taxes can be regressive as their incidence falls primarily on the poor. Presumptive or turnover taxes, for example, which are uniform or fixed amounts of tax based on the “presumed” incomes of different occupations such as hairdressers, can hit women particularly hard, since the burden often falls heavily on sectors where women predominate. 35 36

Property taxes are also becoming an increasingly popular way to raise revenue for local governments. The impact of these efforts on male and female property owners has not been systematically evaluated, but a recent study of land use fees and agricultural income taxes in Ethiopia finds that female-headed and female adult-only households bear a larger tax burden than male-headed and dual-adult households of property taxes. This is likely a result of unequal land ownership patterns, gender norms restricting women’s engagement in agriculture, and the gender gap in agricultural productivity. 37

“Indirect taxes can be regressive as their incidence falls primarily on the poor. Presumptive or turnover taxes … can hit women particularly hard, since the burden often falls heavily on sectors where women predominate.”

Going forward, two key ingredients for gender budgeting on the continent need to be strengthened. The first is having sufficient, regularly collected, sex-disaggregated administrative data related to households, the labor force, and other survey data. Investment in the robust technical capacity for ministries and academia to be able to access, analyze, and use it is also necessary. For instance, the World Bank, UN Women, and the Economic Commission for Africa are all working with National Statistical Offices across the continent to strengthen statistical capacity in the areas of asset ownership and control, work and employment, and entrepreneurship which can be used in a gender budget.

The second ingredient is stronger diagnostic tools. One promising new tool, pioneered by Tulane University, is the Commitment to Equity methodology, designed to assess the impact of taxes and transfers on income inequality and poverty within countries. 38 It was recently extended to examine the impact of government transfers and taxes on women and men by income level and other dimensions. The methodology requires standard household-level data but for maximum effect should be supplemented with time use data, which are becoming more common in several African countries. As African countries seek to expand revenue from direct taxes, lessons from higher income economies are instructive. Although there is no one size fits all approach, key principles to keep in mind for designing personal income taxes include building in strong progressivity, taxing individuals as opposed to families, ensuring that the allocation of shared income (e.g., property or non-labor income) does not penalize women, and building in allowances for care of children and dependents. 39 As noted, corporate income taxes need to eliminate the many breaks, loopholes, and exemptions that currently exist, 40 and countries might consider experimenting with wealth taxes.

In terms of indirect taxes, most African countries do not have single-rate VAT systems and already have zero or reduced rates for basic necessities, including foodstuffs and other necessities. While it is important to minimize exempted sectors and products, estimates show that goods essential for women’s and children’s health (e.g., menstrual health products, diapers, cooking fuel) should be considered part of the basket of basic goods that have reduced or zero rates. 41 And while African governments are being advised to bring informal workers and entrepreneurs into the formal tax system, 42 it should be noted that this massive sector earns well below income tax thresholds and already pays multiple informal fees and levies, for instance in fees to market associations. 43 44

Lastly, leveraging data and digital technologies to improve tax administration (i.e., taxpayer registration, e-filing, and e-payment of taxes) may help minimize costs and processing time, and reduce the incidence of corruption and evasion.32 Digitalization can also be important for bringing more female taxpayers into the net, especially if digital systems are interoperable; for instance, digital taxpayer registries linked to national identification or to property registration at the local level. However, digitalization can be a double-edged sword if privacy and security concerns are not built-in from the outset. Women particularly may need targeted digital financial literacy and other measures to ensure their trust in the system. Recent shocks have worsened gender inequality in Africa. It is therefore important now, more than ever, to invest in strengthening fiscal systems to help women and men recover, withstand future shocks, and reduce gender inequalities. While fiscal policy is not the only tool, it is an important part of government action. To be effective and improve both budgeting and revenue collection, more and better data, new diagnostic tools, and digitalization will all be necessary.

• 1. Martin Wolf. 2022.“How to think about policy in a policy crisis”. Financial Times.
• 2. WTO. 2022. “Gender and Health”. World Health Organization.
• 3. Connell RW. 1995. “Masculinities”. Cambridge, UK. Polity Press.
• 4. Aoyagi, Chie.2021.“Africa’s Unequal Pandemic”. Finance and Development. International Monetary Fund.
• 5. WB.2022. “LSMS-Supported High-Frequency Phone Surveys”. World Bank.
• 6. Muzna Alvi, Shweta Gupta, Prapti Barooah, Claudia Ringler, Elizabeth Bryan and Ruth Meinzen-Dick.2022.“Gendered Impacts of COVID-19: Insights from 7 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia”. International Food Policy Research Institute.
• 7. Klugman, Jeni, Zimmerman, Jamie M., Maria A. May, and Elizabeth Kellison. 2020. “Digital Cash Transfers in the Time of COVID 19: Opportunities and Considerations for Women’s Inclusion and Empowerment”. World Bank Group.
• 8. IFPRI.2020. “Why gender-sensitive social protection is critical to the COVID-19 response in low-and middle-income countries”. International Food Policy Research Institute.
• 9. IDFR.2020. “Kenya: Mobile-money as a public-health tool”. International Day of Family Remittances.
• 10. Jaclyn Berfond Franz Gómez S. Juan Navarrete Ryan Newton Ana Pantelic. 2019. “Capacity Building for Government-to-Person Payments A Path to Women’s Economic Empowerment”. Women’s World Banking.
• 11. Peterman, A. et al.2020. “Pandemics and Violence Against Women and Children”.Center for Global Development Working Paper.
• 12. UNDP/ UN Women Tracker.2022. “United Nations Development Programme. COVID-19 Global Gender Response Tracker”. United Nations Development Programme. New York.
• 13. McKinsey Global Institute .2019. “The power of parity: Advancing women’s equality in Africa”.
• 14. Foresight Africa. 2022. “African Women and Girls: Leading a continent.” The Brookings Institution.
• 15. One recent study in West, Central Africa, East and Southern Africa found that women represented a larger share of agricultural employment in areas affected by heat waves and droughts, and a lower share in areas unaffected by extreme weather events. Nico, G. et al. 2022. “How Weather Variability and Extreme Shocks Affect Women’s Participation in African Agriculture.” Gender, Climate Change, and Nutrition Integration Initiative Policy Note 14.
• 16. Carleton, E. 2022. “Climate Change in Africa: What Will It Mean for Agriculture and Food Security?” International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).
• 17. Nebie, E.K. et al. 2021. “Food Security and Climate Shocks in Senegal: Who and Where Are the Most Vulnerable Households?” Global Food Security, 29.
• 18. Sen, A.K. 2022. “Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Taking a Toll on Africa.” United States Institute of Peace.
• 19. Thomas, A. 2020. “Power Structures over Gender Make Women More Vulnerable to Climate Change.” Climate Change News.
• 21. Kalbarczyk, A. et al. 2022. “COVID-19, Nutrition, and Gender: An Evidence-Informed Approach to Gender Responsive Policies and Programs.” Social Science & Medicine, 312.
• 22. Epstein, A. 2020. “Drought and Intimate Partner Violence Towards Women in 19 Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa During 2011-2018: A Population-Based Study.” PLoS Med, 17(3).
• 23. Stotsky, J. et al. 2016. “Sub-Saharan Africa: A Survey of Gender Budgeting Efforts. IMF Working Paper 2016/512.
• 24. Kadama, C. et al. 2018. Sub-Saharan Africa.” In Kolovich, L. (Ed.), Fiscal Policies and Gender Equality (pp. 9-32). International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• 25. Ortiz, I. and Cummins, M. 2021. “Abandoning Austerity: Fiscal Policies for Inclusive Development.” In Gallagher, K. and Gao, H. (Eds.), Building Back a Better Global Financial Safety Net (pp. 11-22). Global Development Policy Center.
• 26. Roy, R. et al. 2006. “Fiscal Space for Public Investment: Towards a Human Development Approach.”
• 27. ATAF, 2021.
• 28. Moore, M. et al. 2018. “Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and Development. Bloomsbury Publishing.
• 29. Rogan, M. 2019. Tax Justice and the Informal Economy: A Review of the Debates.” Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing Working Paper 14.
• 30. African Tax Administrative Forum (ATAF). 2021. African Tax Outlook 2021.
• 31. Stotsky, J. et al. 2016. “Sub-Saharan Africa: A Survey of Gender Budgeting Efforts.” IMF Working Paper 2016/512.
• 32. Coelho, M. et al. 2022. “Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality.” IMF Working Paper 2022/26.
• 33. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2021. Gender and Capital Budgeting.
• 34. Grown, C. and Valodia, I. 2010. Taxation and Gender Equity: A Comparative Analysis of Direct and Indirect Taxes in Developing and Developed Countries. Routledge.
• 35. Joshi, Anuradha et al. 2020. “Gender and Tax Policies in the Global South.” International Centre for Tax and Development.
• 36. Komatsu, H. et al. 2021. “Gender and Tax Incidence of Rural Land Use Fee and Agricultural In¬come Tax in Ethiopia.” Policy Research Working Papers.
• 38. Lustig, N. 2018. “Commitment to Equity Handbook: Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty.” Brookings Institution Press.
• 39. Grown, C. and Valodia, I. 2010. “Taxation and Gender Equity: A Comparative Analysis of Direct and Indirect Taxes in Developing and Developed Countries.” Routledge.
• 40. Cesar, C. et al. 2022. “Africa’s Pulse: An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa’s Economic Future.” World Bank.
• 41. Woolard, I. 2018. Recommendations on Zero Ratings in the Value-Added Tax System. Independent Panel of Experts for the Review of Zero Rating in South Africa.
• 42. It is important to distinguish between firms and individuals that are large enough to pay taxes but do not (which include icebergs, e.g., which are registered and therefore partially visible to tax authorities but do not pay their full obligations) and ghosts, e.g., those which should register to pay but do not and there invisible to tax authorities) and firms and individuals that are small and potentially but not necessarily taxable such as street vendors and waste pickers. Rogan, M. (2019). “Tax Justice and the Informal Economy: A Review of the Debates.” Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing Working Paper 14.
• 44. Ligomeka, W. 2019. “Expensive to be a Female Trader: The Reality of Taxation of Flea Market Trad¬ers in Zimbabwe.” International Center for Tax and Development Working Paper 93.

By Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi

Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi explores the role of gender equality in Africa’s economic development.

By Cina Lawson

Cina Lawson describes Togolese initiatives to expand the reach of social protection.

By Malado Kaba

Malado Kaba identifies four priorities for governments to transform the informal sector and economic prospects for African women.

By J. Jarpa Duwuni

J. Jarpa Dawuni identifies priority areas to expand access to justice for women and girls in Africa.

Next Chapter

06 | Climate Change Adapting to a new normal

Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2023

On January 30, AGI hosted a Foresight Africa launch featuring a high-level panel of leading Africa experts to offer insights on regional trends along with recommendations for national governments, regional organizations, multilateral institutions, the private sector, and civil society actors as they forge ahead in 2022.

Africa in Focus

What should be the top priority for Africa in 2023?

BY ALOYSIUS UCHE ORDU

Aloysius Uche Ordu introduces Foresight Africa 2023, which outlines top priorities for the year ahead and offers recommendations for supporting Africa at a time of heightened global turbulence.

Foresight Africa Podcast

The Foresight Africa podcast celebrates Africa’s dynamism and explores strategies for broadening the benefits of growth to all people of Africa.

• Media Relations
• Terms and Conditions
• Privacy Policy

Photo by Harry Gruyaert/Magnum

The great wealth wave

The tide has turned – evidence shows ordinary citizens in the western world are now richer and more equal than ever before.

by Daniel Waldenström   + BIO

Recent decades have seen private wealth multiply around the Western world, making us richer than ever before. A hasty glance at the soaring number of billionaires – some doubling as international celebrities – prompts the question: are we also living in a time of unparalleled wealth inequality? Influential scholars have argued that indeed we are. Their narrative of a new gilded age paints wealth as an instrument of power and inequality. The 19th-century era with low taxes and minimal market regulation allowed for unchecked capital accumulation and then, in the 20th century, the two world wars and progressive taxation policies diminished the fortunes of the wealthy and reduced wealth gaps. Since 1980, the orthodoxy continues, a wave of market-friendly policies reversed this equalising historical trend, boosting capital values and sending wealth inequality back towards historic highs.

The trouble with the powerful new orthodoxy that tries to explain the history of wealth is that it doesn’t fully square with reality. New research studies, and more careful inspection of the previous historical data, paint a picture where the main catalysts for wealth equalisation are neither the devastations of war nor progressive tax regimes. War and progressive taxation have had influence, but they cannot count as the main forces that led to wealth inequality falling dramatically over the past century. The real influences are instead the expansion from below of asset ownership among everyday citizens, constituted by the rise of homeownership and pension savings. This popular ownership movement was made possible by institutional changes, most important democracy, and followed suit by educational reforms and labour laws, and the technological advancements lifting everyone’s income. As a result, workers became more productive and better paid, which allowed them to get mortgages to purchase their own homes; homeownership rates soared in the West from the middle of the century. As standards of living improved, life spans increased so that people started saving for retirement, accumulating another important popular asset.

Today, the populations of Europe and the United States are substantially richer in terms of real purchasing-power wealth than ever before. We define wealth as the value of all assets, such as homes, bank deposits, stocks and pension funds, less all debts, mainly mortgages. When counting wealth among all adults, data show that its value has increased more than threefold since 1980, and nearly 10 times over the past century. Since much of this wealth growth has occurred in the types of assets that ordinary people hold – homes and pension savings – wealth has also become more equally distributed over time. Wealth inequality has decreased dramatically over the past century and, despite the recent years’ emergence of super-rich entrepreneurs, wealth concentration has remained at its historically low levels in Europe and has increased mainly in the US.

Among scholars in economics and economic history, a new narrative is just beginning to emerge, one that accentuates this massive rise of middle-class ownership and its implications for society’s total capital stock and its distribution. Capitalism, it seems, did not result in boundless inequality, even after the liberalisations of the 1980s and corporate growth in the globalised era. The key to progress, measured as a combination of wealth growth and falling or sustained inequality, has been political and institutional change that enabled citizens to become educated, better paid, and to amass wealth through housing and pension savings.

I n his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), Thomas Piketty examined the long-run evolution of capital and wealth inequality since industrialisation in a few Western economies. The book quickly received wide acclaim among both academics and policymakers, and it even became a worldwide bestseller.

Piketty’s narrative outlined wealth accumulation and concentration as following a U-shaped pattern over the past century. At the time of the outbreak of the First World War, wealth levels and inequality peaked as a result of an unregulated capitalism, low taxation or democratic influence. During the 20th century, wartime capital destruction and postwar progressive taxes slashed wealth among the rich and equalised ownership. Since 1980, however, goes Piketty’s narrative, neoliberal policies have boosted capital values and wealth inequality towards historic levels.

Immediately after publication, Capital generated fierce debate among economists, focused primarily on the book’s theoretical underpinnings. For example, Piketty had sketched a couple of ‘fundamental laws’ of capitalism, defining the economic importance of aggregate wealth. The first law stated that the share of capital income in total income (the other share coming from labour) is a function of how much capital there is in the economy and its rate of return to capital owners. The second law stated that the amount of capital in the economy, measured as its share in total output, is determined by the balance between saving to accumulate capital and income growth. While these laws were actually fairly uncontroversial relationships, almost definitions, they laid out a mechanistic view of inequality trends that attracted considerable attention and scrutiny among Piketty’s fellow theoretical economists.

My work arrives at a striking new conclusion for the history of wealth and inequality in the West

However, what the academic debate cared less about was the empirical side of the analysis. Almost nothing was said about the historical data and the empirical conclusions underlying the claims about U-shaped patterns and main driving forces. The void in critical scrutiny exposed a widespread disinterest among mainstream economists in history and the fine-grained aspects of source materials, measurement and institutional contexts.

In recent years, a new strand of historical wealth inequality research has emerged from universities around the world. It offers a more nuanced empirical picture, including new data and revised evidence, pointing to different results and interpretations. In Piketty’s book, most of the analysis centred on the historical experiences of France, and then there was additional evidence presented for the United Kingdom and Germany (together making up Europe) and the US. Newer work reexamines and extends the historical wealth accumulation and inequality trends. Some of these contributions also revise the earlier data series, such as those analysing Germany and the UK. Other studies expand the empirical base by incorporating previously unexplored countries, such as Spain and Sweden. A number of ongoing research projects into the history of wealth distribution examine more new countries, including Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada. Their findings will soon be added to this historical wealth database.

My work with new data, published in my book Richer and More Equal (2024), arrives at a new conclusion for the history of wealth and inequality in the West. The new results are striking. Data show that we are both richer and more equal today than we were in the past. An accumulation of housing wealth and pension savings among workers in the middle classes emerges as the main factor producing greater equality: today, three-fourths of all private assets are either homes or long-term pension and insurance savings.

U nderlying the change in personal wealth formation over the 20th century are a number of political and economic developments. The democratisation of the Western world began with the extension of universal suffrage during the 1910s. This movement initiated a process of reforming the educational system, to extend basic schooling to the population and facilitating access to higher education. New labour laws improved working life by restricting the working hours per day, allowing unions to be active. Better training and nicer workplaces raised worker productivity and earnings, creating opportunity for working- and middle-class households to purchase their own homes. The improved living standards also led to longer lives. Between the 1940s and today, life expectancy at birth increased by almost 20 years in Western countries, most of which were spent in retirement. Pension systems started evolving during the postwar era, both as public-sector unfunded systems based on promises about a future income, and as private-sector funded systems where individual pension funds were accumulated as part of people’s long-term saving.

At the core of the new findings are three empirical observations.

The first is that the populations in Western countries are richer today than ever before in history. By rich, again, I mean having a high level of average wealth in the adult population. Why this measure of riches captures relevant aspects of welfare is because higher wealth permits a lot of good things in life. It allows for higher consumption, more savings and larger investment for future prosperity. It also promises better insurance against unforeseen events. Figure 1 below illustrates the growth in the average real per-capita wealth in a selection of Western countries over the past 130 years. It is dramatic. During the first half of the past century, the average wealth in the Western population hovered at a stable level. Since the end of the Second World War, asset values started to increase, doubling the level in only a couple of decades. From 1950 to 2020, average wealth in the West increased sevenfold.

Over the past 130 years, a monumental shift in wealth composition has taken place

A fact to notice specifically is how wealth has grown each single postwar decade up to the present day. For several reasons, this consistency of growth is a marvel. It affirms the robustness of the result: we are wealthier today than in history, and this fact does not depend on the choice of start or end date but holds regardless of the time period considered. The steady increase in wealth is not confined to investment-driven growth in Europe’s early postwar decades. Neither does it hinge on the market liberalisations of the 1980s and ’90s. However, it is notable how the lifting of regulations and the historically high taxes since the 1980s are indeed associated with the highest pace of value-creation that the Western world has ever experienced.

Figure 1: rising real average wealth in the Western world. Note: wealth is expressed in real terms, meaning that it is adjusted for the rise in consumer prices and thus expresses change in purchasing power. The line is an unweighted mean of the average wealth in the adult population in six countries (France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US) expressed in constant 2022 US dollars. Source: Waldenström (2024, Chapter 2)

A second fact coming out of the historical evidence is that wealth in the aggregate has changed in its appearance. The composition of assets people hold tells us about the economic structure of society and what functions wealth plays in the population. For example, whether most assets are tied to the agricultural economy or to industrial activities signifies the degree of economic modernisation in the historical analysis. The importance of ordinary people’s assets in the aggregate signifies the degree to which workers take part in the value-creation processes of the market economy. Figure 2 below displays the division across asset classes in the aggregate portfolio since the end of the 19th century. It is evident that, over the past 130 years, a monumental shift in wealth composition has taken place. A century ago, wealth comprised primarily agricultural land and industrial capital. Today, the majority of personal wealth is tied up in housing and pension funds.

Figure 2: the aggregate composition of assets: from elite wealth to people’s wealth . Note: unweighted average of six countries (France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US). Source: Waldenström (2024, Chapter 3)

The transformation of wealth composition has strong distributional implications. Individual ownership data, often called microdata, show how ownership structures across wealth distribution bear a pattern of who owns what. Historically, the rich held agricultural estates and shares in industrial corporations. This is especially true over the long term of history, but it remains so now too. In contrast, the working population acquires wealth in their homes and long-term savings in pension funds. Homeownership rates today range from 50 to 80 per cent. Labor-force participation rates are even higher. In substance, this tells us that housing and work-related pension funds are assets that dominate the ownership of ordinary people in the lower and middle classes, which in turn links the relative aggregate importance of housing and pension funds for wealth inequality.

L ooking closer at the relationship between the share of a country’s citizens who own their homes and the level of wealth inequality, the distributional pattern becomes evident. Figure 3 below plots countries according to their homeownership rates and wealth inequality, as measured by the common Gini coefficient that ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (one individual owns everything), using recent wealth and homeownership surveys. Countries with higher levels of homeownership have lower wealth inequality. The straight line in the figure has a negative slope, which suggests that raising the homeownership rate by 10 points leads to an expected reduction in wealth inequality by 0.04 Gini points. As an example, France has a lower homeownership than Italy ( 60 per cent compared with 70 per cent), and a higher wealth inequality (0.67 versus Italy’s 0.61).

Figure 3: homeownership and wealth inequality in Europe and the US. Source: Waldenström (2024, Chapter 6)

The historical shift in the nature of wealth, from being elite-centric to more democratic, can thus be expected to have profound implications for the distribution of wealth. Figure 4 below presents the most recent data from European countries and the US. They reveal in graphical form how wealth inequality has decreased substantially over the past century. The wealthiest percentile once held around 60 per cent of all wealth. The share ranged from 50 per cent of wealth in the US and Germany to 70 per cent in the UK.

Most wealth today is in homes and pensions, assets predominantly of low- and middle-wealth households

Since the first half of the 20th century, the tide has turned. A great wealth equalisation took place throughout the Western world. From the 1920s to the 1970s, wealth concentration fell steadily. In the 1970s, wealth equalisation stopped, but then Europe and the US follow separate paths. In Europe, top wealth shares stabilise at historically low levels, perhaps with a slight increasing tendency. As of 2010, the richest 1 per cent in society holds a share of total wealth at around 20 per cent in Europe. That is roughly one-third of its share of national wealth from a century earlier. Countries like the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Finland have top percentile shares of around 16-18 per cent. A bit higher are countries like Spain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden with top shares at around 21-24 per cent. Germany has an even higher share, around 27 per cent, and Switzerland’s richest percentile group owns about 30 per cent of all wealth.

This stability of post-1970 top wealth shares may seem contradictory when contrasted with the large increases in aggregate wealth values over recent decades. However, it is consistent with most of the asset ownership patterns documented above, with most of wealth today being in housing and pensions, assets predominantly held by low- and middle-wealth households.

The US wealth concentration experience is somewhat different. Wealth inequality in the beginning of the 20th century was somewhat lower in the US than in most European countries, perhaps reflecting being a younger nation with less established elite structures. The equalisation trend also happened in the US, but it was less pronounced than in Europe. Today, US wealth concentration is currently much higher than in Europe. This situation, as the figure below shows, is the result of several years of steady increase. In historical perspective, however, even the current US level of wealth inequality is lower than it was before the Second World War, and it pales in comparison with the extreme levels of wealth concentration that the people of Europe experienced 100 years ago.

Figure 4: the great wealth equalisation over the 20th century. Source: Waldenström (2024, Chapter 5)

H ow can we account for these historical trends showing a steady growth in average household wealth and, at the same time, wealth inequality falling to historically low levels, where it has remained in Europe but has risen lately in the US? One approach is to break down the top wealth shares into the accumulation of wealth in the top and bottom groups of the distribution. In other words, we decompose the change in top wealth shares by documenting the changes in absolute wealth holdings in the numerator and denominator of the top wealth-share ratio. Figure 5 below shows these numbers, and they are striking.

During no historical time period during the past century did the wealth amounts of the rich fall on average. The falling wealth concentration from 1910 to 1980 was instead the result of wealth accumulating faster in the middle classes than in the top. Since 1950, wealth holdings have actually grown in the entire population. Between 1950 and 1980, it grew faster among the lower groups in the wealth distribution, explaining the continued equalisation. After 1980, wealth has instead grown faster in the top percentile than in the lower classes, which accounts for the halt of the long equalisation trend and a slight upward trend in the top wealth share, driven by the US development, whereas the European countries remained at its historically low levels.

Figure 5: Western wealth growth: the middle class vs the rich. The graph shows a six-country average (France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US) of the average annual growth rate of real (inflation-adjusted) net wealth per adult individual in the top 1 per cent and the lower 90 per cent of the wealth distribution during three time periods. Source: Waldenström (2024, Chapter 6)

Looking at the specific factors that could account for these trends in wealth growth and wealth inequality, there are some that match the evidence better than others. According to the orthodox narrative, the main explanation was the shocks to capital during the world wars and postwar capital taxes, all of which are believed to have created equality through lowering the top of the wealth distribution. In this telling, the physical capital destruction in wars reduced the fortunes of the rich, and the immediate postwar hikes in capital taxes and market regulations, such as price controls and capital market restrictions, prevented the entrepreneurs from rebuilding their wealth.

Wealth and inheritance taxes reached almost confiscatory levels in the early 1970s

However, the thesis has some issues. One is that the evidence shows little difference between belligerent and non-belligerent countries. During both wars, the wealth share of the top 1 per cent fell equally in belligerent countries like France and the UK as in non-belligerent Sweden. Including the immediate postwar years, which were heavily influenced by wartime turbulence, does not change this pattern. Germany’s data from the wars is less clear, but it appears that the country experienced larger losses than others, reducing top wealth shares. Spain, which stayed out of both world wars but fought a civil war in the 1930s, saw the wealth share of the richest 1 per cent remain virtually unchanged between 1936 and 1939, according to preliminary estimates. Looking at the US, top wealth shares fell during both wars.

Analysing instead the changes in absolute wealth held by the rich and by the rest reinforces the conclusion that wars were not a devastating moment for capital owners. In fact, the fortunes of the elite did not shrink significantly, except in France during the First World War and seemingly in Germany during both wars. In other cases, the capital values of the rich remained almost constant, and the wealth equalisation observed can be attributed to growing ownership among groups below the top tier.

Progressive tax policies after the Second World War offer another potential explanation for the wealth-equalisation trend. Capital taxation increased rapidly between the 1950s and the 1980s in most Western countries. Wealth and inheritance taxes reached almost confiscatory levels in the early 1970s, and this coincided with stagnating business activities, few startups, slowed economic growth, and an exodus of prominent entrepreneurs from high- to low-tax countries. Few studies have been able to analyse systematically the extent to which these taxes prevented the rise of new large fortunes, but studies of later periods suggest that there are good grounds to believe they did.

A general problem for the factors above – which focus on shocks to the capital of the rich and thus lowering the top of wealth distribution as the primus motor behind the great wealth equalisation of the 20th century – is that the evidence presented in Figure 5 above shows that it was instead the lifting of the bottom of the distribution that accounted for the equalisation. Let us therefore shift focus and examine the two main channels through which this happened: the accumulation of homeownership and saving for retirement.

At the turn of the 20th century, owning a decent home and saving for retirement were luxuries enjoyed by only a select few – maybe a couple of tens of millions in Western countries. Today, the once-elusive dreams of home ownership and pensions have become a reality for several hundreds of millions of people. Homeownership rates went from 20-40 per cent in the first half of the former century to 50-80 per cent in the modern era. Retirement savings also increased in the postwar period, reflecting the longer life spans that came with the general improvement of living standards. Funded pensions and other insurance savings comprised 5-10 per cent of household portfolios around 1950, but this share increased to 20-40 per cent in the 2000s.

The most crucial equalisation resulted from expanded wealth ownership among ordinary citizens

History demonstrates that the significant wealth equalisation over the past century was primarily driven by a massive increase in homeownership and retirement savings. But what initiated this accumulation of assets by households? The most comprehensive evidence highlights the role of political changes and economic developments that explicitly included new groups in the productive market economy. Firstly, the 1910s and ’20s witnessed a broad wave of political democratisation, extending universal suffrage to the Western world. Following this regime shift, a series of reforms transformed the economic reality for the masses. Educational attainment was expanded, and higher education became accessible to broader segments of society. New labour laws improved workers’ rights, making workplaces safer and reducing working hours. These changes enhanced workers’ productivity and real incomes. Simultaneously, the financial system evolved by offering better services to this new constituency of potential customers, including cheaper loans, savings plans, mutual funds and other financial services.

Thus, the primary drivers behind the great wealth equalisation of the 20th century were not wars or the redistributive effects of capital taxation. While these factors had some impact, the most crucial equalisation resulted from expanded wealth ownership among ordinary citizens, particularly through homeownership and pension savings, and the institutional shifts that enabled the accumulation of these assets.

A general lesson from history is that wealth accumulation is a positive, welfare-enhancing force in free-market economies. It is closely linked to the growth of successful businesses, which leads to new jobs, higher incomes and more tax revenue for the public sector. Various historical, social and economic factors have contributed to the rise of wealth accumulation in the middle class, with homeownership and pension savings being the primary ones.

As a closing remark, it should be recognised that the story of wealth equalisation is not one of unmitigated success. There are still significant disparities in wealth within and among nations, generating instability and injustice. Over the past years, wealth concentration has increased in some countries, most notably in the US. The extent to which this is due to productive entrepreneurship generating products, jobs, incomes and taxes, or to forces that exclude groups from acquiring personal wealth causing tensions and erosive developments in society, is a question that needs to be studied more. However, at this point it is still vital to acknowledge the progress toward greater equality that has been made in our past and understand how it has happened. Only then can we be in a stronger position to lay the foundation for further advancements in our quest for a more just and prosperous world.

Political philosophy

C L R James and America

The brilliant Trinidadian thinker is remembered as an admirer of the US but he also warned of its dark political future

Harvey Neptune

Neuroscience

The melting brain

It’s not just the planet and not just our health – the impact of a warming climate extends deep into our cortical fissures

Clayton Page Aldern

Falling for suburbia

Modernists and historians alike loathed the millions of new houses built in interwar Britain. But their owners loved them

Michael Gilson

Computing and artificial intelligence

Mere imitation

Generative AI has lately set off public euphoria: the machines have learned to think! But just how intelligent is AI?

Anthropology

Your body is an archive

If human knowledge can disappear so easily, why have so many cultural practices survived without written records?

Helena Miton

Illness and disease

Empowering patient research

For far too long, medicine has ignored the valuable insights that patients have into their own diseases. It is time to listen

Charlotte Blease & Joanne Hunt