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Legal Research: A Guide to Case Law

Introduction.

• Federal Court Decisions
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Authors: Emily Carr, Senior Legal Reference Librarian, Law Library of Congress

Elizabeth Osborne, Senior Legal Reference Librarian, Law Library of Congress

Editors: Barbara Bavis, Bibliographic and Research Instruction Librarian, Law Library of Congress

Anna Price, Legal Reference Librarian, Law Library of Congress

Note: This guide is adapted from a research guide originally published on the Law Library's website .

Created: September 9, 2019

Last Updated: February 1, 2023

Each branch of government produces a different type of law. Case law is the body of law developed from judicial opinions or decisions over time (whereas statutory law comes from legislative bodies and administrative law comes from executive bodies). This guide introduces beginner legal researchers to resources for finding judicial decisions in case law resources. Coverage includes brief explanations of the court systems in the United States; federal and state case law reporters; basic Bluebook citation style for court decisions; digests; and online access to court decisions.

Court Systems and Decisions

One court that creates binding precedent on all courts below.

Thirteen circuits (12 regional and 1 for the federal circuit) that create binding precedent on the District Courts in their region, but not binding on courts in other circuits and not binding on the Supreme Court.

Ninety-four districts (1 district court and 1 bankruptcy court each) plus the U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. District Courts must adhere to the precedents set by the Supreme Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in which they sit.

The United States has parallel court systems, one at the federal level, and another at the state level. Both systems are divided into trial courts and appellate courts. Generally, trial courts determine the relevant facts of a dispute and apply law to these facts, while appellate courts review trial court decisions to ensure the law was applied correctly.

Stare Decisis (Precedent)

In Latin, stare decisis means "to stand by things decided." In the U.S. legal system, this Latin phrase represents the "doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." ( Black's Law Dictionary , 11th ed.) Typically, a court will deviate from precedent only if there is a compelling reason. Under "vertical" stare decisis , the decisions of the highest court in a jurisdiction create mandatory precedent that must be followed by lower courts in that jurisdiction. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court creates binding precedent that all other federal courts must follow (and that all state courts must follow on questions of constitutional interpretation). Similarly, the highest court in a state creates mandatory precedent for the lower state courts below it. Intermediate appellate courts (such as the federal circuit courts of appeal) create mandatory precedent for the courts below them. A related concept is "horizontal" stare decisis , whereby a court applies its own prior decisions to similar facts before it in the future.

Case Law Reporters

Decisions are published in serial print publications called “reporters,” and are also published electronically. Reporters are discussed in greater detail under " Federal Court Decisions " and " State Court Decisions ." Information about how to cite decisions in a reporter is discussed under " Citations ."

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• Last Updated: Mar 29, 2023 2:13 PM
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The Case Study Teaching Method

It is easy to get confused between the case study method and the case method , particularly as it applies to legal education. The case method in legal education was invented by Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895. Langdell conceived of a way to systematize and simplify legal education by focusing on previous case law that furthered principles or doctrines. To that end, Langdell wrote the first casebook, entitled A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts , a collection of settled cases that would illuminate the current state of contract law. Students read the cases and came prepared to analyze them during Socratic question-and-answer sessions in class.

The Harvard Business School case study approach grew out of the Langdellian method. But instead of using established case law, business professors chose real-life examples from the business world to highlight and analyze business principles. HBS-style case studies typically consist of a short narrative (less than 25 pages), told from the point of view of a manager or business leader embroiled in a dilemma. Case studies provide readers with an overview of the main issue; background on the institution, industry, and individuals involved; and the events that led to the problem or decision at hand. Cases are based on interviews or public sources; sometimes, case studies are disguised versions of actual events or composites based on the faculty authors’ experience and knowledge of the subject. Cases are used to illustrate a particular set of learning objectives; as in real life, rarely are there precise answers to the dilemma at hand.

Our suite of free materials offers a great introduction to the case study method. We also offer review copies of our products free of charge to educators and staff at degree-granting institutions.

For more information on the case study teaching method, see:

• Martha Minow and Todd Rakoff: A Case for Another Case Method
• HLS Case Studies Blog: Legal Education’s 9 Big Ideas
• Teaching Units: Problem Solving , Advanced Problem Solving , Skills , Decision Making and Leadership , Professional Development for Law Firms , Professional Development for In-House Counsel
• Educator Community: Tips for Teachers

Watch this informative video about the Problem-Solving Workshop:

<< Previous: About Harvard Law School Case Studies | Next: Downloading Case Studies >>

Definition of Case Law

What is case law.

In order to preserve a uniform enforcement of the laws, the legal system adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis , which is Latin for “stand by decided matters.”  This means that a court will be bound to rule in accordance with a previously made ruling on the same type of case. Precedent, or case law, is binding on courts of the same level or lower, and applies only if there is no legislative statute created, or higher court ruling, that overrules it.

Example of Case Law Application

Case law by jurisdiction.

Case law is specific to the jurisdiction in which it was rendered. For instance, a ruling in a California appellate court would not usually be used in deciding a case in Oklahoma. While there is no prohibition against referring to case law from a state other than the state in which the case is being heard, it holds little sway. Still, if there is no precedent in the home state, relevant case law from another state may be considered by the court.

Case Law Search

In addition, the Law Library of Congress offers a great deal of information on statutes, case law, and other legal issues. This includes a Guide to Law Online .

Dissecting Case Law Citations

In the United States, people are not required to hire an attorney to represent them in either civil or criminal matters. Laypeople navigating the legal system on their own can remember one rule of thumb when it comes to referring to case law or precedent in court documents: be as specific as possible, leading the court, not only to the case, but to the section and paragraph containing the pertinent information. The Cornell Law School website offers a variety of information on legal topics, including citation of case law, and even provides a video tutorial on case citation .

Case Law Example in Civil Lawsuit Against Child Services

The Roes accompanied the boy to his therapy sessions. When they were told of the boy’s past, they asked if their children were safe with him in their home. The therapist assured them that they had nothing to worry about. Unfortunately, that was not true. Just two months after being placed with the Roe family, the Roe’s son told his parents that the boy had molested him. The boy was arrested two days later, and admitted to having sexually molested the couple’s son several times.

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What Is Case Law?

You may have heard of case law , but what does the term actually mean?

Case law refers to legal principles developed through judicial decisions. As opposed to laws contained in statutes and enacted by the legislative process, case law comes about through the aggregation of court opinions interpreting and applying the law to individual cases. In the U.S. legal system, the rulings of higher courts are binding on lower courts. Courts also adhere to stare decisis , which generally requires that courts follow the precedent set by previous court decisions.

What does case law do? Here are a few important examples:

• Miranda rights . You are probably familiar with the Miranda warning , in which officers recite a person's "right to remain silent." The requirement that police must issue such a warning to a criminal suspect in custody before beginning an interrogation came from a the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona in 1956. Through that ruling, the Court created a set of rights to which criminal suspects are still entitled to almost 50 years later.
• Gay marriage cases. The Supreme Court is expected to rule on same-sex marriage during its current term; meantime, lower courts have been ruling on the constitutionality of state laws regarding same-sex marriage, overturning a number of state bans on same-sex marriage. In these instances, case law has generally worked to counter state law by interpreting the U.S. Constitution, which is the supreme law in every state and pre-empts state law when the two conflict .
• Strict product liability. In a lawsuit for injuries caused by a defective consumer product, the manufacturer or retailer of that product may be held strictly liable for the injury , meaning that the plaintiff is not required to prove fault in order to recover. This legal principle has its roots in case law , specifically, the 1963 California Supreme Court decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products .

You can find key decisions from both state and federal courts, as well as state and federal statutes, constitutions, and more at FindLaw's Cases and Codes .

Related Resources:

• How Does the U.S. Supreme Court Work? (FindLaw's Law and Daily Life)
• Supreme Court Calendar: 10 Cases to Watch in January (FindLaw's Law and Daily Life)
• SCOTUS on Ala. Gay Marriage: A Signal of What's to Come? (FindLaw's U.S. Supreme Court Blog)
• Federal Court Overturns Calif.'s Foie Gras Ban (FindLaw's California Case Law Blog)

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Landmark US Cases Related to Equality of Opportunity in K-12 Education

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*denotes US Supreme Court Case

School Finance

Serrano v. Priest (CA, 1971)

The 1971 case, also referred to as Serrano I, was the first of three cases called  Serrano v. Priest .  Students of Los Angeles County public schools and their families argued that the California school finance system, which relied heavily on local property tax, disadvantaged the students in districts with lower income. The California Supreme Courtfound the system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because there was too great a disparity in the funding provided for various districts.

*San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (TX, 1973)

Parents of students in a Texas school district argued that the school finance system in Texas, which relied on local property tax for funding beyond that provided by the state, disadvantaged the children whose districts were located in poorer areas. Unlike the state court in  Serrano v. Priest , the Supreme Court found that the system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause after determining that the system did not intentionally or substantially discriminate against a class of people.

Robinson v. Cahill (NJ, 1973)

Prior to this case, the New Jersey public school funding system relied heavily on local property tax.  The New Jersey Supreme Court found that this system violated the state constitutional guarantee of access to a “thorough and efficient” public education system.

Levittown v. Nyquist (NY, 1982)

The New York school finance system also relied on local property tax, and several districts with low funding challenged the system.  The New York Court of Appeals recognized inequality in the per-pupil spending between districts but concluded that the disparity was not great enough to jeopardize the constitutional right to education.

Abbott v. Burke (NJ, 1985-2011)

New Jersey’s Education Law Center claimed that New Jersey’s school finance system both disadvantaged students in low-income districts and contributed to significant differences in the adequacy of education offered in poor districts compared to wealthy districts.  The New Jersey Supreme Court found the system unconstitutional and ordered that the state implement a program to ensure that funding in the “Abbott Districts” would be comparable to that of the wealthier districts.

Rose v. Council for Better Education (KY, 1989)

The Kentucky Supreme Court found the state school finance system in violation of the Kentucky constitution, formally recognizing adequate education as a fundamental constitutional right.  The Court ordered the state to adhere to seven specific goals in its education reform. 

DeRolph v. State (OH, 1997)

Ohio’s school finance system, which relied heavily on local property tax and contributed to disparities between wealthier and poorer school districts, was found unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio constitution requires that the state provide a certain level of education.  The court called for decreased reliance on property tax as well as other reforms, but the finance system was found unconstitutional several more times in subsequent cases  DeRolph II  and  DeRolph III .

Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York (NY, 2001-2006)

The Campaign for Fiscal Equity argued that New York’s school finance system was unconstitutional because it failed to provide adequate funding to public schools, thus denying students access to the constitutionally-guaranteed right to a basic education. The Court of Appeals ordered the state to reform the system to ensure students would have the opportunity to receive an adequate education.

Desegregation

*Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Prior to this case, the "separate but equal doctrine" allowed public schools to deny admission to students based on race.   The Supreme Court unanimously found that segregation of public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause on the basis that segregation was psychologically harmful to black students. The case outlawed state-sanctioned segregation of public schools.

*Green v. County School Board (1968)

Although  Brown v. Board of Education  made de jure segregation, or segregation by law, illegal in public schools, public school districts were still experiencing de facto segregation.  This case found that "freedom of choice" plans, which allowed students to choose the public school they attended, did not adequately address the issue of integrating public schools. The Court declared that school districts must adopt realistic plans for active integration.

*Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1970)

Before this case was heard by the Supreme Court, a district court had ordered that busing be used to integrate public schools in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district.  The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the district court's decision.

*Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1973)

In one of the first cases involving segregation in the northern United States, Latino and African-American students claimed that their Denver school district was practicing de jure segregation.  The Supreme Court found that the district could not consider a school desegregated simply because it had both Latino and African-American students, as both groups of students were similarly discriminated against.  The Court also ruled that if a significant portion of the school district were shown to be de jure segregated, the rest of the district could be assumed to practice de jure segregation (as opposed to de facto segregation) unless the district were able to prove otherwise.

*Milliken v. Bradley (1974)

This case concerns plans for public school integration across districts.  A district court had ordered a system to integrate a segregated Detroit school district; this system involved busing students into and out of neighboring school districts that were not de jure segregated.  The Supreme Court found that this ruling was unconstitutional and specifically that integration could only be legally enforced in districts that displayed de jure segregation.

*Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1981)

A Washington state initiative prevented districts from enforcing mandatory busing policies.  A school district in Seattle, which relied on such a policy to integrate its schools, challenged the initiative in court.  The Supreme Court found the initiative in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it clearly targeted integration efforts and primarily disadvantaged minority students.

*Freeman v. Pitts (1992)

A school district in Georgia had been found to be segregated several decades earlier and ordered to desegregate by eliminating segregation in six specific areas.  After four of the areas had been accounted for, the district court supervising the school district ceased to supervise those four areas but continued to oversee the integration of the other two.  The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, ruling that a court did not need to maintain control of a school district’s desegregation efforts in all areas if the district was compliant; it only needed to supervise the areas that had not yet been integrated. 

*Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)

A district court sought to remedy de facto segregation in a Missouri school district.  The court ordered a number of changes, including higher pay for teachers and staff that would be funded through increased taxes.  The Supreme Court found that the plan proposed by the district court was unconstitutional because the segregation was de facto and only affected a single school district.  The plan, which would have affected multiple districts, did not fall within the district court’s scope of power.

*Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District (2006)

This case concerned the student placement practices of two school districts.  The districts normally allowed students to choose which school they attended, unless a school was overenrolled. In that case, with the goal of racial balance within schools in mind, the districts looked to race as one of the primary factors in placing the student.  The Supreme Court found this practice unconstitutional.  The districts had either not been segregated or had already achieved integration, and the goal of racial balance was found not to be well-defined enough to justify using students’ as the sole factor in their placement.

Sheff v. O’Neill (2008, Connecticut Supreme Court)

The 2008 settlement of the Sheff v. O’Neill case was one of several settlements following a 1996 hearing.  Students in Hartford, Connecticut argued that the city’s schools were segregated and that minority students were not receiving the same resources as white students. District lines had been drawn such that students in the city were separated from students in the suburbs. The Connecticut Supreme Court found the districting unconstitutional and ordered the state to remedy the segregation. Over the following years, various settlements called for the creation of charter and magnet schools to increase racial diversity in Hartford.

Language Equity

*Lau v. Nichols (1974)

Non-English-speaking Chinese-American students in San Francisco claimed that they were being denied equal protection by the school system’s failure to provide additional English language instruction.  While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the students, it did so by relying on Section 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act rather than the Equal Protection Clause; Section 601 protects against discrimination on the basis of national origin. This case paved the way for future decisions regarding bilingual education.

*Plyler v. Doe (1982)

A Texas law allowed the state to withhold school funds for undocumented children.  The Supreme Court found that this law violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of these children because it discriminated against them on the basis of a factor beyond their control, and because this discrimination could not be found to serve a large enough state interest.

Gender Equity/Title IX (Focused on K-12 Only)

Force v. Pierce City R-VI School District (1983)

A female middle-school student was unable to try out for her school’s football team, as the tryouts were restricted to boys only.  She claimed that the school’s policy violated her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.  The district court ruled in the student’s favor, finding that the school offered no justifiable reason for preventing girls from trying out.

Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Education Department (1989)

The state of New York awards merit scholarships to high-achieving high-school students.  Prior to this case, scholarships were awarded based solely on SAT scores.  There was evidence to show, however, that female students received lower SAT scores than males, and that SAT scores were not adequate predictors of female student performance in college.  When female students challenged the practice in court, a federal court determined that the reliance exclusively on SAT scores discriminated against female students and ordered that the state consider high school grades in conjunction with SAT scores in determining scholarship eligibility.

Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District (1990)

A female high school student was dismissed from her school’s National Honor Society (NHS) chapter upon discovery that she was pregnant.  The NHS faculty council cited the student’s engaging in premarital sex as the reason for her dismissal, claiming that this behavior was inconsistent with the values expected of NHS members. The district court found no violation of Title IX. However, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had ignored testimony that the NHS had not dismissed a male student who had also publically admitted to fathering a child while unmarried and ordered the district court to consider this evidence.

*Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (1992)

A female high school student had been sexually harassed by a teacher.  Faculty and administration at the school had discouraged the student from pressing charges against the teacher, and the student sought monetary damages.  The Supreme Court ruled that the student could indeed sue for damages under Title IX.

Chipman v. Grant County School District (1998)

Female high school students who were unmarried mothers were denied admission to their school’s National Honor Society (NHS).  The NHS chapter claimed that the denial was based on the girls’ characters.  However, the court ruled that the chapter had violated Title IX by discriminating against pregnant women.

Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Children v. Commonwealth (1971)

Prior to this case, a Pennsylvania law allowed public schools to deny admission to students with cognitive disabilities.  The district court hearing the case found the law unconstitutional and required that the state ensure the right to free education for children with disabilities at an appropriate level for the individual child. 

Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia (1972)

Shortly after the  PARC v. Commonwealth  decision, several children challenged the District of Columbia public schools in court for both expelling and refusing admission to disabled students.  The schools argued that they did not have the funding or resources to provide an education to disabled children. The district court found the practice in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and ordered the school board to provide equal access to education for disabled students.

*Board of Education v. Rowley (1982)

A New York public school refused to provide a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student, claiming that her academic performance and progress demonstrated that she did not need one.  The student’s parents argued that the school denied her access to education at a level equal to that of her peers. However, the Supreme Court found that the school was providing the child with a free and appropriate public education (FAPE), guaranteed to children with disabilities under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA, later revised and now called the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)). The Court determined that the school was not responsible for providing a maximally beneficial education and that FAPE could be achieved even if the instruction provided only some educational benefit.

*Smith v. Robinson (1984)

The parents of a boy with cerebral palsy brought suit against his school district for transferring him to a school with inadequate resources.  Before bringing the case to court, the parents had gone through the administrative process detailed in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA).  The Supreme Court determined that since the EHA was designed to be comprehensive, disabled students and their families must rely only on the EHA in making such claims against schools.

*Honig v. Doe (1988)

The EHA (now IDEA) contains a “stay-put” clause, which states that, in cases where a school wishes to take disciplinary action against a student with disabilities, the school cannot remove the student from the program set in that student’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) until the new plan has been agreed upon by the parents.  A student with an IEP who had been threatened with expulsion brought suit against his school for violating the stay-put clause.  The Supreme Court confirmed that schools must adhere to the stay-put clause, although they can take other disciplinary actions (e.g. a ten-day suspension) if they suspect a student’s behavior may be dangerous.

*Forest Grove School District v. T.A. (2009)

A student with learning disabilities switched from a public school to a private school after the public school failed to meet his needs as a student (a free and appropriate public education, or FAPE). A hearing officer ordered that the public school district reimburse the student for the private school expenses. However, the student had not been receiving special education at the public school. The Supreme Court ruled that the school could be forced to reimburse the student if FAPE had not been provided, regardless of whether the student had previously received special education.

« Section 4: Lawsuits

What is case law?

Case law is a key component of the legal system and if you’re considering a career in law you’ll need to familiarise yourself with it. Below we explore what case law is, how it can affect future judicial decisions and shape the law as we know it.

By Grant Longstaff . Published 3 April 2024.

Simply put, case law is a law which is established following a decision made by a judge or judges. Case law is developed by interpreting and applying existing laws to a specific situation and clarifying them when necessary. This process then sets a legal precedent which other courts are required to follow, and it will help guide future rulings and interpretations of a particular law.

Importance of case law

Case law plays a significant role in shaping the legal system and ensures it evolves when necessary. It can provide clarity and guidance to legal professionals on how laws are interpreted and applied in real life situations, and helps to ensure consistency in court rulings by drawing on the legal precedents which have informed previous cases.

How case law works

Case law develops through a process of judicial reasoning and decision making. The parties involved in a legal dispute will present their arguments and evidence in a court of law. The judge then considers all of the legal principles, statutes and precedents before reaching a decision. This decision – known as a judgement – becomes part of the body of case law.

Depending on your future practice area you may need to regularly find and interpret case law to establish if it’s still suitable. Remember, case law evolves, and so a decision which once was solid may now be lacking.

This all may feel a little daunting right now, but if you choose to study law you’ll come to understand the importance of case law, develop keen research skills, explore legal case studies and learn of the judicial decisions which have shaped today’s justice system.

Judicial decisions and precedents

Judicial decisions are key to developing case law as each decision contributes to the body of legal precedents shaping future rulings. These precedents are binding and must be followed by lower courts. You can find a detailed guide to the court structure in the UK on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website.

When it comes to reviewing these judicial principles and legal precedents, you’ll likely find they come as either a law report or transcript. A transcript is simply a written record of the court’s judgement. A law report on the other hand is generally only written when the case sets a precedent. The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales (ICLR) – the official law reporting service – describes law reports as a “highly processed account of the case” and will “contain all of the components you’ll find in a transcript, along with a number of other important and useful elements of content.” It’s also worth remembering a law report will wield more weight than a transcript when it comes to building your legal case or argument.

Common law and stare decisis

Common law refers to the wider legal system which was developed in medieval England and has evolved throughout the centuries since. It relies deeply on case law, using the judicial decisions and precedents, to change over time. Case law helps establish new principles and redefine existing ones. It also helps resolve any ambiguity and allows for nuance to be incorporated into common law.

When it comes to case law you’ll likely come across the term “stare decisis”, a Latin phrase, meaning “to stand by decisions”. In a legal setting, stare decisis refers to the principle that decisions made by higher courts are binding on lower courts, promoting fairness and stability throughout common law and the legal system.

Ultimately, case law is a crucial element of the legal system, providing guidance, consistency, and precedent for legal interpretations and rulings.

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Have questions about what the legal concept and definition of case law is and how it works?

Get all of your case law questions answered and more in this resource guide. So you can know the differences between case law and civil law and much more!

What is a Case Law?

Case law (used interchangeably with common law) refers to the body of law created by judicial decisions in legal cases. When a court makes a ruling or decision on a particular legal issue, that decision becomes a precedent that can be used to guide future similar cases.

Case law is an important source of law, particularly in countries with a common law legal system, such as the United States (except for Louisiana, which is the only civil law state), the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

Case law helps to interpret and apply statutes and regulations to specific factual situations.

It fills gaps in legislation and provides guidance on how the law should be understood and enforced.

Judges analyze a case’s facts and legal principles and issue a written opinion explaining their reasoning and conclusions.

These judicial opinions serve as legal precedents that lower courts must follow when deciding similar cases in the future.

However, it’s important to note that not all case law is binding on all courts.

Precedents from higher courts within the same jurisdiction usually carry more weight and are considered binding, while decisions from lower courts or courts in different jurisdictions may only have persuasive value.

Legal professionals and researchers often rely on case law to understand how courts have interpreted and applied the law in specific situations.

They analyze the reasoning and principles established in previous cases to argue their positions or advise clients on legal strategies.

In addition to judicial decisions, case law can also encompass administrative decisions, arbitration awards, and other legal rulings that have a significant impact on the interpretation and development of the law.

What is the Importance of Case Law?

Case law is of great importance for several reasons:

• Binding Precedent : Case law establishes binding precedents that lower courts must follow when deciding similar cases. These precedents provide consistency and predictability in the legal system, ensuring that similar cases are treated similarly. They help in promoting fairness and equality in the application of the law.
• Interpretation of Legislation : Case law plays a crucial role in interpreting statutes and regulations. It helps to clarify and define the meaning of laws that may be broad or ambiguous, providing guidance on how they should be applied in specific situations. Judges analyze the legislative intent behind the law and the principles established in previous cases to interpret and apply statutes effectively.
• Legal Guidance : Case law provides legal professionals, including judges, lawyers, and legal researchers, with guidance on how the law has been interpreted and applied in specific scenarios. It helps them understand how courts have approached similar legal issues in the past and assist in formulating arguments, preparing legal strategies, and advising clients. (it may be binding or merely persuasive)
• Legal Development : Case law contributes to the evolution and development of the law. As new legal issues arise, courts have the opportunity to shape and expand legal principles through their decisions. Over time, case law can establish new legal doctrines or modify existing ones, adapting the law to societal changes and emerging issues.
• Checks and Balances : Case law serves as a check on the legislative and executive branches of government.Courts have the power to review and invalidate laws or government actions if they are found to be inconsistent with constitutional principles or legal rights. Through case law, courts can safeguard individual rights, ensure the rule of law, and maintain a balance of power in the legal system.
• Flexibility and Adaptability : Case law allows the law to adapt to changing circumstances and societal needs. It provides flexibility by allowing judges to consider each case’s unique facts and circumstances and make decisions accordingly. This adaptability helps the legal system to address emerging issues and address novel situations that may not have been anticipated by legislation.

Overall, case law is essential for the functioning of a legal system based on precedents and helps ensure consistency, fairness, and the ongoing development of the law.

How Does Case Law Work?

Case law works through a process of legal precedent. Here’s a general overview of how case law works:

• Legal Dispute : Case law begins with a legal dispute between parties, such as individuals, organizations, or the government. The dispute typically involves a question of law, where the parties have conflicting interpretations or applications of the law.
• Trial and Decision : The dispute is brought before a court, where both parties present their arguments and evidence. The court examines the facts of the case and applies relevant statutes, regulations, and legal principles to reach a decision. The decision is based on the judge’s interpretation of the law and the application of legal precedents.
• Written Opinion : After reaching a decision, the court issues a written opinion explaining the reasoning behind the decision. The opinion provides an analysis of the relevant legal issues, the facts of the case, and the application of the law. It may also discuss the precedents relied upon and any new legal principles established.
• Precedent and Stare Decisis : The written opinion becomes a precedent, which means it sets a legal rule or principle that must be followed in similar cases. Precedents are considered binding on lower courts within the same jurisdiction, creating a doctrine called “stare decisis,” which means “to stand by things decided.” Stare decisis ensures consistency and stability in the interpretation and application of the law.
• Citations and Research : Legal professionals and researchers cite and rely on case law to support their arguments and analyze legal issues. They refer to relevant precedents from higher courts or similar jurisdictions to persuade judges, shape legal strategies, and provide guidance on legal matters. Case law serves as a valuable resource for legal research and analysis.
• Appeals and Higher Courts : If a party disagrees with a lower court’s decision, they may have the right to appeal to a higher court. Higher courts, such as appellate courts or supreme courts, review the legal issues, arguments, and precedents presented in the case. They can affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the lower court, potentially establishing new precedents or clarifying existing ones.
• Evolution and Development : Case law evolves and develops over time as new cases are decided, and precedents are established. Courts may adapt or refine legal principles based on changing societal values, technological advancements, or new legal challenges. This evolution helps the law to remain relevant and responsive to the needs of society. It’s important to note that the weight and authority of case law can vary. Precedents from higher courts within the same jurisdiction generally carry more weight and are considered binding, while decisions from lower courts or courts in different jurisdictions may only have persuasive value.

Who Creates Case Law?

Case law is created by judges through their decisions in legal cases. When a judge presides over a case and issues a ruling, their decision becomes part of the body of case law.

Judges have the authority to interpret and apply the law to the facts of a specific case and provide legal reasoning in their written opinions.

Typically, the process of creating case law starts with a legal dispute brought before a court.

The parties present their arguments, evidence, and legal interpretations to the judge. The judge examines the facts, applies relevant statutes, regulations, and legal principles, and renders a decision.

The judge’s decision, along with the legal analysis and reasoning provided in their written opinion, becomes a precedent.

Precedents serve as binding or persuasive authorities for future cases with similar legal issues. Lower courts within the same jurisdiction are generally bound to follow precedents set by higher courts within that jurisdiction.

It’s important to note that case law is not created in every legal case. Not all cases result in written opinions or establish new precedents.

Many legal disputes are resolved through settlement and alternative dispute resolution methods or are decided based on existing well-established precedents.

However, when a case involves novel legal issues or presents an opportunity to clarify or develop the law, judges have the power to create new case law through their decisions.

What is the Difference Between Civil and Case Law?

The terms “civil law” and “case law” refer to different aspects of the legal system. Here’s a breakdown of their differences:

• Legal System : Civil law is based on codified laws, statutes, and comprehensive legal codes. It is also known as a “codified” legal system.
• Source of Law : Civil law relies primarily on written laws enacted by legislative bodies, such as statutes, codes, and regulations. These laws are organized into comprehensive legal codes that cover various areas of law, such as civil law, commercial law, and administrative law.
• Role of Precedent : In civil law systems, judicial decisions do not generally create binding precedents. Courts interpret and apply the law based on statutes and codes rather than relying on prior court decisions. The emphasis is on the literal interpretation of the law and the application of legal principles.
• Inquisitorial System : Civil law systems often use an inquisitorial system, where judges play an active role in investigating and gathering evidence, questioning witnesses, and seeking the truth. The judge takes the lead in determining the facts of the case and applying the law.
• Examples : Civil law systems are commonly found in countries influenced by the Napoleonic Code, such as France, Germany, Italy, and many other European and Latin American countries. It is estimated that about 150 countries have a civil law-type legal system.
• Legal Precedents : Case law, also known as “common law,” refers to the body of law created by judicial decisions in legal cases.
• Legal System : Case law is typically associated with common law legal systems, which have evolved through a history of court decisions and legal principles established by judges.
• Source of Law : In case law systems, courts rely on judicial decisions and precedents as important sources of law. Courts interpret and apply statutes and regulations but also consider prior court decisions to guide their reasoning.
• Role of Precedent : Precedents are binding or persuasive authorities that guide the interpretation and application of the law in subsequent cases. Lower courts are generally bound to follow precedents set by higher courts within the same jurisdiction.
• Adversarial System : Case law systems often use an adversarial system, where opposing parties present their arguments and evidence, and the judge acts as an impartial arbiter, applying the law to the facts presented by the parties.
• Examples : Case law systems are commonly found in common law jurisdictions, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and other countries with a historical influence from English law. It is estimated that about 80 countries have legal systems that are influenced by case law.

In summary, civil law refers to a legal system based on comprehensive legal codes. In contrast, case law refers to the body of law created by judicial decisions in common law systems.

Civil law relies on written laws enacted by legislatures, while case law relies on judicial decisions and precedents as important sources of law.

What are Some of the Most Important Case Law Decisions in U.S. History?

Numerous important case law decisions in U.S. history have shaped and influenced the legal landscape. Here are some notable case law examples:

• Marbury v. Madison (1803) : This landmark case established the principle of judicial review, asserting that the Supreme Court has the power to declare laws or executive actions unconstitutional.
• Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): Although later overturned, this highly controversial case held that African Americans, whether enslaved or free, were not entitled to citizenship and had no standing to sue in federal courts. It was later overturned by the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
• Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) : In this case, the Supreme Court upheld racial segregation, endorsing the doctrine of “separate but equal.” This decision was later overturned by Brown v. Board of Education (1954).
• Brown v. Board of Education (1954) : This landmark case declared racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, leading to the desegregation of schools and catalyzing the civil rights movement.
• Miranda v. Arizona (1966) : This case established the “Miranda rights,” requiring law enforcement to inform criminal suspects of their constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney.
• Roe v. Wade (1973) : This case recognized a constitutional right to abortion, legalizing it nationwide and establishing a framework for state regulations on the procedure. Roe v. Wade was overturned by the Supreme Court in June 2022.
• United States v. Nixon (1974) : This case played a significant role in defining executive privilege, as the Supreme Court ruled that President Richard Nixon had to hand over tape recordings related to the Watergate scandal.
• Bush v. Gore (2000) : In a highly contentious decision, the Supreme Court ruled to halt the recount of votes in Florida during the presidential election, effectively determining the outcome of the election in favor of George W. Bush.
• Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) : This case determined that restrictions on independent political spending by corporations and unions violated the First Amendment, leading to a significant impact on campaign finance laws.
• Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) : In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, establishing marriage equality nationwide.

These are just a few examples of important case law decisions in U.S. history.

Each of these cases significantly impacted constitutional interpretation, civil rights, individual liberties, and the functioning of the U.S. legal system.

What are Some of the Benefits of Case Law?

Case law offers several benefits within the legal system:

• Interpretation and Application : Case law provides guidance on how to interpret and apply statutes, regulations, and legal principles to specific factual scenarios. It helps to clarify and define the meaning of laws that may be broad or ambiguous, ensuring consistent and fair application of the law.
• Precedent and Consistency : Case law establishes binding precedents that lower courts must follow when deciding similar cases. This promotes consistency and predictability in the legal system, ensuring that similar cases are treated similarly. Precedents help to create a coherent body of law and reduce uncertainty in legal outcomes.
• Legal Predictability : Case law provides legal professionals and individuals with a degree of predictability regarding the likely outcomes of legal disputes. By examining past cases and the precedents they set, lawyers and litigants can assess the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments and make informed decisions about their legal strategies.
• Legal Guidance : Case law serves as a valuable resource for legal professionals, including judges, lawyers, and legal researchers. It helps them understand how courts have interpreted and applied the law in specific situations. Lawyers can use case law to support their arguments, advise clients, and shape legal strategies. Judges can refer to precedents to guide their decision-making.
• Evolution and Adaptability : Case law allows the law to adapt to changing circumstances and societal needs. As new legal issues arise, courts have the opportunity to shape and expand legal principles through their decisions. Over time, case law can establish new legal doctrines, modify existing ones, and address emerging issues not anticipated by legislation.
• Checks and Balances : Case law serves as a check on the legislative and executive branches of government. Courts have the power to review and invalidate laws or government actions if they are found to be inconsistent with constitutional principles or legal rights. Case law helps to maintain a balance of power and ensure the rule of law.
• Legal Education and Research : Case law is an important aspect of legal education, as it allows law students to study and analyze real-world legal disputes. It also provides a foundation for legal research, enabling scholars and researchers to analyze legal principles, track legal trends, and contribute to the development of the law.

Overall, case law plays a vital role in interpreting, applying, and evolving the law. It provides structure, predictability, and legal guidance within the legal system.

What are Some of the Limitations of Case Law?

While case law has its benefits, it also has certain limitations. Here are some of the limitations of case law:

• Incomplete or Inconsistent Precedents : Precedents are often based on specific facts and circumstances of a particular case. This can result in limited or incomplete guidance for future cases with similar legal issues. Moreover, different courts or jurisdictions may reach different conclusions on similar legal issues, leading to inconsistency in the development of the law.
• Rigidity and Stagnation : The reliance on precedents can sometimes lead to a rigid legal system that is slow to adapt to societal changes and evolving needs. Precedents may not always address new or emerging legal issues, potentially hindering the law from keeping pace with technological advancements, social progress, or changing norms.
• Overreliance on Past Decisions : Strict adherence to precedents can limit judicial creativity and the ability to consider new legal arguments or alternative interpretations. In some cases, judges may feel constrained by existing precedents even if they believe a different outcome would be more just or fair.
• Overturning Precedents : While precedents provide stability and predictability, they can also create legal inertia. Overturning or modifying precedents can be challenging, requiring a significant burden of proof and a shift in judicial thinking. As a result, outdated or unjust precedents may persist even when societal attitudes have changed.
• Lack of Legislative Input : Case law is primarily shaped by judicial decisions, and it may sometimes encroach on the role of legislatures. This can raise concerns about democratic legitimacy, as unelected judges make significant legal decisions that impact society without direct democratic input.
• Limited Applicability : Case law is jurisdiction-specific, and decisions made in one jurisdiction may not be binding or persuasive in another. This can create inconsistency and confusion when legal issues span multiple jurisdictions or when courts have divergent interpretations of the law.
• Time and Resources : Researching and analyzing case law can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, particularly when dealing with a complex or nuanced legal issue. The sheer volume of case law and the need to examine multiple precedents can be a challenge, particularly for legal professionals without access to comprehensive legal databases or research tools.

It is important to recognize these limitations while also appreciating the valuable role that case law plays in shaping and guiding the legal system.

What is a Legal Precedent?

Legal precedent refers to a principle or rule established by a court through its decision in a particular case. It serves as a binding or persuasive authority in subsequent similar cases, guiding the interpretation and application of the law.

When a court decides a case, it examines the facts, considers the relevant statutes, regulations, and legal principles, and provides its reasoning in a written opinion.

The legal principles established in that decision become the precedent.

Precedents can shape the development of the law by providing guidance and establishing a framework for consistent and predictable outcomes in future cases.

There are two types of legal precedent:

• Binding Precedent : Binding precedent is a precedent that must be followed by lower courts within the same jurisdiction. It is typically set by higher courts, such as appellate courts or the highest court in the jurisdiction (such as a supreme court). Lower courts are bound to follow the legal principles established in binding precedents.
• Persuasive Precedent : Persuasive precedent refers to a precedent that is not binding on a court but can be considered and used as guidance or persuasive authority. Persuasive precedents can come from different jurisdictions, lower courts, or different branches of the same jurisdiction’s court system. Although not binding, persuasive precedents may carry weight and influence the court’s decision.

The principle of stare decisis, meaning “to stand by things decided,” is the foundation of legal precedent.

It promotes consistency, predictability, and fairness in the legal system by ensuring that similar cases are treated similarly.

However, it’s important to note that legal precedent is not immutable.

Precedents can be overturned or modified by subsequent courts, particularly when there are strong reasons to depart from them or if they are deemed to be inconsistent with evolving legal principles, societal changes, or higher court decisions.

Overall, legal precedent plays a crucial role in the common law legal system by providing a basis for interpreting and applying the law in a consistent and principled manner.

What is the Concept of Stare Decisis?

The concept of stare decisis, meaning “to stand by things decided,” is a fundamental principle in the common law legal system. It refers to the practice of courts following and adhering to established precedents in deciding cases with similar legal issues.

Stare decisis promotes consistency, predictability, and stability in the interpretation and application of the law.

Under stare decisis, courts are generally bound by the precedents set by higher courts within the same jurisdiction.

This means that lower courts must follow the legal principles and rules established in previous cases unless there are compelling reasons to depart from them.

Stare decisis operates on two fundamental principles :

• Binding Precedent : Binding precedents are those established by a higher court within the same jurisdiction. Lower courts are obligated to follow the legal principles and rules set by these binding precedents. This ensures consistency and uniformity in the application of the law within a jurisdiction.
• Persuasive Precedent : Persuasive precedents are those from lower courts, courts in different jurisdictions, or other legal authorities. While not binding, these precedents may carry persuasive value and can influence the court’s decision-making process. Courts may consider persuasive precedents and may adopt or depart from them based on the strength of the reasoning or the applicability to the current case.

Stare decisis serves several purposes:

• Consistency and Predictability : By following established precedents, stare decisis ensures that similar cases are treated similarly. It provides consistency and predictability in the legal system, allowing individuals and legal professionals to anticipate the likely outcomes of legal disputes.
•   Legal Stability : Stare decisis promotes stability in the law by providing a foundation of settled legal principles. This stability helps to maintain confidence in the legal system and encourages reliance on established rules and expectations.
• Respect for Precedent : Stare decisis reflects respect for the decisions of previous courts. It recognizes the value of established legal principles and the importance of upholding the rule of law by honoring the decisions of higher courts.

Despite its advantages, stare decisis is not an inflexible doctrine. Courts have the authority to depart from precedent under certain circumstances.

For example, if a higher court finds that a precedent is clearly incorrect, inconsistent with constitutional principles, or no longer reflects societal norms, it may choose to overrule or modify the precedent.

Overall, stare decisis is a crucial aspect of the common law system, providing stability, consistency, and respect for precedent in interpreting and developing the law.

Can Case Law be Overturned?

Yes, case law can be overturned or modified by subsequent court decisions. While the principle of stare decisis encourages courts to follow established precedents, there are circumstances in which courts may choose to depart from or overrule precedent.

There are a few ways in which case law can be overturned:

• Overruling : A court has the authority to expressly overrule a previous decision and declare it no longer valid. This can occur when a court finds that the previous decision was incorrect, inconsistent with the law, or no longer aligned with current legal principles or societal values. Overruling a precedent will nullify its binding effect.
• Distinguishing : Courts may distinguish a previous decision from the current case by demonstrating that the facts or legal principles are sufficiently different. This allows the court to limit the scope or applicability of the precedent to the specific circumstances of the earlier case without fully overruling it. Distinguishing allows for flexibility in the application of precedent.
• Abrogation by Legislation : In some cases, legislation enacted by the legislature can supersede or abrogate a particular case law precedent. When new legislation directly addresses the legal issue or conflict, it can override existing case law and establish a new legal framework.
• Evolution through Subsequent Interpretation : Over time, the interpretation and application of a precedent can evolve through subsequent court decisions. Courts may reinterpret or refine the scope and meaning of a precedent, effectively modifying its application or impact.

It is important to note that overturning or modifying a precedent is typically done cautiously and with careful consideration.

Courts are often hesitant to depart from established precedent as it can disrupt stability, create uncertainty, and undermine public confidence in the legal system.

The doctrine of stare decisis encourages courts to follow precedent but also allows for the evolution and development of the law when necessary.

Ultimately, the ability to overturn or modify case law allows the legal system to adapt to changing circumstances, correct errors, and ensure that the law remains responsive to societal needs and values.

Can Case Law be Challenged or Appealed?

Yes, case law can be challenged or appealed through the appellate process. When a losing party disagrees with a court’s decision in a particular case, they may have the right to seek an appeal to a higher court.

The appellate process allows for a review of the lower court’s decision and an opportunity to challenge or contest the legal reasoning or outcome.

Here are the key points regarding challenging or appealing case law:

• Appellate Courts : Appellate courts, also known as appeals courts or appellate tribunals, exist at different levels within the judicial system. These courts review the decisions made by lower courts to determine if any errors of law were committed or if the decision is otherwise unjust.
• Grounds for Appeal : In an appeal, the challenging party typically argues that the lower court made an error in interpreting or applying the law or that the decision was not supported by the evidence presented. Appeals are generally not based on the introduction of new evidence but rather on issues related to the legal process or interpretation of the law.
• Reviewing Legal Issues : Appellate courts primarily focus on reviewing legal issues rather than reevaluating the facts of the case. They analyze the legal reasoning, statutory interpretation, and application of legal principles employed by the lower court. The goal is to assess whether the lower court’s decision was legally sound and consistent with established precedent.
• Standard of Review : Appellate courts often apply a standard of review to evaluate the lower court’s decision. The standard of review can vary depending on the type of legal issue being appealed and the level of deference given to the lower court’s decision. Common standards of review include de novo review (a fresh examination of the legal issues) or review for clear error (assessing whether the lower court’s decision was reasonable based on the evidence and applicable law).
• Appellate Decision : After considering the arguments presented, the appellate court will issue its decision, which may affirm the lower court’s decision, reverse it, modify it, or remand the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The appellate court’s decision can become a binding precedent for future cases, influencing the development of the law.

It’s important to note that not all cases can be appealed, as there are specific criteria and procedural rules governing the right to appeal.

Additionally, the scope and availability of appeals can vary based on the jurisdiction and the level of the court being appealed to.

Overall, the appellate process allows for the review and potential challenge of case law decisions, providing an avenue for parties to seek a reevaluation of legal issues and potentially impact the development of the law.

Can Case Law Vary Between Different States in the U.S.?

Yes, case law can vary between different states in the United States. The United States has a federal system of government, which means there are two levels of government, with each state having its own separate legal system and courts.

As a result, courts in different states may interpret and apply the law differently, leading to variations in case law.

Each state has its own statutes, regulations, and legal precedents that govern the application of the law within its jurisdiction.

While federal law applies across the entire country, many legal issues are primarily regulated by state laws, such as family law, property law, contract law, and tort law.

When interpreting and applying state laws, courts in each state rely on their own precedents and legal principles.

The decisions made by higher courts within a state, such as the state’s Supreme Court or appellate courts, become binding precedents that lower courts in that state must follow.

As a result, the interpretation and application of the law can differ from state to state, leading to variations in case law.

However, it’s worth noting that federal law can also influence the interpretation and development of state case law.

For example, federal constitutional principles and federal statutes can shape how state courts interpret and apply their own laws.

In cases where there is a conflict between state and federal law, federal law generally takes precedence due to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Overall, the variation in case law between different states reflects the diversity and autonomy of the American legal system.

It underscores the importance of understanding the specific laws and precedents of the relevant state when dealing with legal matters in a particular jurisdiction.

Are All Court Decisions Considered Case Law?

​​No, not all court decisions are considered case law. Only certain court decisions, typically those that establish legal principles or interpretations, are considered case law or legal precedent.

Case law refers to the body of law created by judicial decisions that serve as binding or persuasive authority for future similar cases. Not all court decisions have the same precedential value.

For a court decision to be considered case law, it generally needs to meet certain criteria:

• Establishing Legal Principles : Case law typically arises from cases that involve legal issues and provide a basis for interpreting and applying the law. These cases often involve novel or significant legal questions that require a court to establish legal principles or interpretations.
• Binding or Persuasive Authority : A court decision should have binding or persuasive authority to be considered case law. Binding authority means that lower courts within the same jurisdiction are obligated to follow the decision as a precedent. Persuasive authority means that the decision is not binding but can be considered and used as guidance or persuasive precedent.
• Published and Accessible : Case law is usually published and made accessible to the legal community and the public. Published decisions are often found in legal databases, law reports, or court websites. These published decisions serve as reference materials for legal research and analysis.

It’s important to note that not every court decision is intended to establish a precedent.

Some court decisions may be specific to the facts of the case, have limited applicability, or deal with procedural matters.

Such decisions may not carry significant precedential value and may not be considered part of the broader body of case law.

Ultimately, case law consists of those court decisions that have been deemed to establish legal principles and provide authoritative guidance for future cases.

These decisions form the basis for the interpretation and application of the law within a particular jurisdiction.

How to Find Relevant Case Law for Legal Research?

Finding relevant case law for legal research involves several steps. Here’s a general guide on how to conduct legal research to find relevant case law:

• Identify the Jurisdiction : Determine the jurisdiction or jurisdictions relevant to your research. Case law can vary between different jurisdictions, so it’s crucial to identify the specific jurisdiction(s) that govern the legal issue you are researching. This can include federal, state, or international jurisdictions.
• Determine the Legal Issue : Clearly define the legal issue you are researching. Identifying the specific legal question or topic will help you narrow down your search and find more targeted results.
• Utilize Legal Research Databases : Access legal research databases that provide access to case law, such as Westlaw, LexisNexis, or Casemaker. These databases contain comprehensive collections of case law from various jurisdictions and allow you to search for relevant cases using keywords, case names, statutes, or other search parameters.
• Use Legal Citators : When you have found a relevant case, utilize legal citators within the research databases. Citators provide information about the subsequent treatment and history of a case, including any subsequent appeals, modifications, or overrulings. They can help you assess a case’s current precedential value and relevancy.
• Review Digests or Case Summaries : Consider consulting legal digests or case summaries. These resources provide brief summaries and categorization of cases by legal issues, making it easier to identify relevant case law. Digests can be found within legal research databases or in print formats.
• Search Official Court Websites : Many courts make their decisions available on their official websites. If you are researching case law from a specific court, visiting the court’s website can provide access to relevant decisions.
• Check Secondary Sources : Secondary legal sources such as legal textbooks, treatises, law review articles, and legal encyclopedias often discuss and analyze key cases. They can provide valuable insights, explanations, and commentary on relevant case law.
• Shepardize/KeyCite : Use Shepard’s Citations or KeyCite (depending on the database) to verify the validity and currency of the case law you have found. These services indicate if the case has been overturned, modified, or criticized, ensuring that you are relying on up-to-date and reliable precedents.

Remember to critically evaluate the relevancy, authority, and context of the case law you find.

Consider the jurisdiction, precedential value, and the specific facts and legal principles of each case in relation to your research question.

Legal research can be complex, and it may be helpful to consult with a legal librarian or seek guidance from experienced legal professionals to ensure thorough and accurate research.

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The first amendment, 10 important supreme court cases about education.

October 30, 2015 | by Jonathan Stahl

Education is a hallmark of civic life in America, so it’s no surprise that it’s been at the center of many landmark controversies over the years. Here are 10 Supreme Court cases related to education that impacted both constitutional law and the public school experience.

10.  Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Arguably the most well-known ruling of the 20 th century, Brown overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and established that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” The Warren Court’s unanimous decision explained that the separate-but-equal doctrine violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th Amendment , and ordered an end to legally mandated race-segregated schools. While the Brown decision marked only the beginning of a prolonged struggle to achieve actual integration, its impact cannot be understated.

9.  Engel v. Vitale (1962) and 8. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

This pair of cases shaped the modern understanding of how the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment constrains prayer in public schools. In Engel, the Court struck down a New York State rule that allowed public schools to hold a short, nondenominational prayer at the beginning of the school day. The Court decided that these prayers amounted to an “official stamp of approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause.

The reasoning in Engel was also applied in Schempp , in which the Court struck down a Pennsylvania policy that required all students to read 10 Bible verses and say the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each day. While a student could get an exemption with a parent’s note, the Warren Court decided that this still amounted to an unconstitutional government endorsement of a particular religious tradition.

7.  Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)

This case adjudicated a different sort of Establishment Clause challenge, where the controversy dealt with a statute providing financial support for teacher salaries and textbooks in parochial schools. The Burger Court unanimously decided that this financial aid scheme violated the Establishment Clause and delineated the governing precedent for Establishment Clause cases known as the Lemon test. Under Lemon , statutes (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have primary effects that neither inhibit nor advance religion; and (3) cannot foster an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that this scheme violated the third prong of the Lemon test.

6.  Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)

Among the litany of public school cases from the Warren and Burger eras is the landmark Free Exercise Clause decision in Yoder . Wisconsin mandated that all children attend public school until age 16, but Jonas Yoder, a devoutly religious Amish man, refused to send his children to school past eighth grade. He argued that his children didn’t need to be in school that long to lead a fulfilling Amish life of farming and agricultural work, and that keeping his children in school for such a length of time would corrupt their faith. The Court unanimously agreed, saying that the values of public school were in “sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion.” It carved out an exception for Yoder and others similarly situated.

5.  San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1972)

Like most U.S. public schools, the San Antonio Independent School District in Texas was funded in part by local property taxes. The District sued the state on behalf of the students in its district, arguing that since property taxes were relatively low in the area, students at the public schools were being underserved due to the lack of funding compared to wealthier districts. They argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th Amendment mandates equal funding among school districts, but the Court ultimately rejected their claim. It held that there is no fundamental right to education guaranteed in the Constitution, and that the Equal Protection Clause doesn’t require exact “equality or precisely equal advantages” among school districts.

4.  Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)

At the height of the Vietnam War, students in the Des Moines Independent Community School District in Iowa wore black armbands to school as an expression of their dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy. The district passed a rule prohibiting the armbands as part of a larger dress code, and students challenged the ban as a violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . The Court agreed with the students and struck down the ban, saying that the school has to prove that the conduct or speech “materially and substantially interferes” with school operations in order to justify the ban. This case is notable for its impact on First Amendment jurisprudence regarding distinctions between conduct and speech, as well as for its extension of free speech protections to students.

3.  New Jersey v. TLO (1985)

After a student (“TLO”) was caught smoking cigarettes in school, she was confronted by the school’s vice principal, who forced the student to hand over her purse. The vice principal then searched her purse, found drug paraphernalia and called the police; the student was eventually charged with multiple crimes and expelled from the school. Her lawyer argued that the evidence should not have been admissible in court because it violated the student’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court decided that the Fourth Amendment does constrain the actions of school officials, and that students have a legitimate expectation of privacy when in school. Yet TLO’s sentence was ultimately upheld because the particular search in question was found to be “reasonable.”

2.  United States v. Lopez (1995)

In 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which prohibited the possession of firearms in designated school zones. Lopez, a 12 th -grade student at a Texas high school, was caught carrying a gun at his school and was charged under the statute. He challenged his conviction and the Gun-Free School Zones Act, saying that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to ban guns in school zones. In one of the narrowest readings of the Commerce Clause since the Lochner era , the Court struck down the law and ruled that Congress had exceeded its authority. They explained that the possession of a gun does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that these sorts of regulations could only be passed by state governments.

1.  Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2007)

In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger that race-based classifications, as used in affirmative-action policies, must be “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling government interest,” like diversity. In light of this, the Seattle School District established a tiebreaker scheme for admission to competitive public schools in the district, in which racial diversity played a role in the ultimate decision. The policy was challenged, and the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding if the Equal Protection Clause had any bearing on the case. It determined that its earlier decisions for college affirmative action do not apply to public schools and that racial diversity is not a compelling government interest for public school admission. Furthermore, they held that the denial of admission to a public school because of a student’s race in the interest of achieving racial diversity is unconstitutional.

BONUS: Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (Pending)

The Court made the decision to hear this case in June, and will hear oral arguments this term. Friedrichs is a First Amendmen t challenge to the practices of public unions. The Court will determine whether requiring teachers to pay for union activities that are not explicitly political speech violates the First Amendment. While the Court has previously held such “fair share” fees to be constitutional, some commentators think that the Roberts Court may be willing to reverse the precedent. If they rule that the scheme is permissible, the Court must also decide whether an opt-out system for political activities is constitutional.

Jonathan Stahl is an intern at the National Constitution Center. He is also a senior at the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in politics, philosophy and economics.

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Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

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Brown v. Board of Education  (1954) was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down the  “Separate but Equal” doctrine  and outlawed the ongoing segregation in schools. The court ruled that laws mandating and enforcing racial segregation in public schools were unconstitutional, even if the segregated schools were “separate but equal” in standards. The Supreme Court’s decision was unanimous and felt that " separate educational facilities are inherently unequal ," and hence a violation of the  Equal Protection Clause  of the  Fourteenth Amendment  of the  U.S. Constitution . Nonetheless, since the ruling did not list or specify a particular method or way of how to proceed in ending racial segregation in schools, the Court's ruling i n  Brown II (1955)  demanded states to desegregate “ with all deliberate speed .”

Background :

The events relevant to this specific case first occurred in 1951, when a public school district in Topeka, Kansas refused to let Oliver Brown’s daughter enroll at the nearest school to their home and instead required her to enroll at a school further away. Oliver Brown and his daughter were black. The Brown family, along with twelve other local black families in similar circumstances, filed a class action lawsuit against the Topeka Board of Education in a federal court arguing that the segregation policy of forcing black students to attend separate schools was unconstitutional. However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas ruled against the Browns, justifying their decision on judicial precedent of the Supreme Court's 1896 decision in   Plessy v. Ferguson , which ruled that racial segregation did not violate the  Fourteenth Amendment 's  Equal Protection Clause  as long as the facilities and situations were equal, hence the doctrine known as " separate but equal ." After this decision from the District Court in Kansas, the Browns, who were represented by the then NAACP chief counsel Thurgood Marshall,  appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's ruling in Brown overruled  Plessy v. Ferguson  by holding that the  "separate but equal" doctrine  was unconstitutional for American educational facilities and public schools. This decision led to more integration in other areas and was seen as major victory for the Civil Rights Movement. Many  future litigation cases used the similar argumentation methods used by Marshall in this case. While this was seen as a landmark decision, many in the American Deep South were uncomfortable with this decision. Various Southern politicians tried to actively resist or delay attempts to desegregated their schools. These collective efforts were known as the “ Massive Resistance ,” which was started by Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd. Thus, in just four years after the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed its ruling again in the case of  Cooper v. Aaron , holding that government officials had no power to ignore the ruling or to frustrate and delay desegregation. 

[Last updated in July of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team ]

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Case Law Definition and Legal Meaning

On this page, you'll find the legal definition and meaning of Case Law , written in plain English, along with examples of how it is used.

What is Case Law?

(n) Case Law is the decisions, interpretations made by judges while deciding on the legal issues before them which are considered as the common law or as an aid for interpretation of a law in subsequent cases with similar conditions. Case laws are used by advocates to support their views to favor their clients and also it influence the decision of the judges

History and Meaning of Case Law

Case Law (also known as common law) refers to the collection of legal decisions made by judges in appellate courts. These decisions are based on the interpretation of laws and legal principles and can be used as precedents for future cases. Case law is a critical component of the legal system in many countries, including the United States, England, and Canada. Case law is an essential tool for lawyers, judges, and legal scholars as it provides guidance and clarity on the interpretation of laws and legal principles.

Historically, case law became an essential part of the legal system in England following the Norman Conquest in 1066. At the time, the legal system was decentralized, and there were no centralized courts to interpret laws or settle legal disputes. Different regions of the country had their own legal customs and laws, leading to confusion and inconsistency. Over time, a more centralized legal system emerged, with judges relying on previous decisions to guide their judgments. By the 18th century, case law had become a fundamental part of the English legal system and was widely viewed as a source of common law.

Examples of Case Law

• In the United States, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education is an example of case law. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, overturning the previous precedent established by the Plessy v. Ferguson case.
• In Canada, the case R. v. Oakes established a test for determining the constitutionality of laws that infringe on individual rights and freedoms.
• In England, the case Donoghue v Stevenson established the principle of negligence in tort law. This case established that individuals have a duty of care to avoid causing harm to others.
• In Australia, the case Mabo v Queensland overturned the previous legal doctrine of terra nullius, recognizing the traditional land rights of Indigenous Australians.
• In New Zealand, the case R v. He Kawaka Te Hemara established the principle of Crown's fiduciary duty towards Maori cultural and intellectual property.

Legal Terms Similar to Case Law

• Precedent - a legal decision that serves as a rule or guide for future cases
• Stare decisis - the principle that courts should follow precedent and make decisions in a consistent and predictable manner
• Common law - the body of law derived from judicial decisions rather than from statutes or constitutions
• Appellate court - a court that has the power to review and overturn the decisions of lower courts
• Judicial review - the power of courts to invalidate laws or administrative actions that violate the constitution or other legal standards.

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Definition of case law

Examples of case law in a sentence.

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'case law.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

1731, in the meaning defined above

Dictionary Entries Near case law

Cite this entry.

“Case law.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/case%20law. Accessed 4 Aug. 2024.

Legal Definition

Legal definition of case law.

called also decisional law

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What is Case Law? Meaning and Origins Explained

The meaning of case law, or judge-made law, comes from the principle of stare decisis; an age-old idea that’s included in the U.S. Constitution . Basically, stare decisis means that courts must use prior cases to decide current cases. So, case law is basically non-legislative law. More on that below.

Judge-made law is also interpretational law. Courts also have a duty to review statutory laws and determine their meaning. Sometimes, politicians intentionally pass vague laws, because, well, they’re politicians. 

Bankruptcy and student loans is a good example. Congress revised the Bankruptcy Code in 1976, requiring student loan debtors to show “good cause” before the court discharged these loans. Lawmakers intentionally didn’t define this phrase, and its meaning has been debated ever since.

During civil and criminal trials, and also during pretrial settlement negotiations, attorneys use judge-made law to support their legal arguments. Prior cases, and the arguments based on them, prompt judges to make favorable decisions.

What’s the Definition of Case Law?

The Constitution only established one court, the Supreme Court, to make case law. This document also gave federal lawmakers the authority to create additional courts, which they did in 1789. 

Today, the federal court system consists of trial courts (district courts), appellate courts (circuit courts), and the Supreme Court. Most states have similar systems, but the names vary. For example, in New York, trial courts are called Supreme Courts.

Only appellate courts and Supreme Courts issue written decisions. So, these are the only courts that can make case law, at least in most situations.

How Does Judge-Made Law Affect My Legal Claim?

All judge-made law is important in legal arguments, but not all case law is created equally. The effect on individual cases usually varies as follows.

Informative

Appeals court decisions from other states, both circuit courts and Supreme Courts, are informative. Cases from other countries and prestigious law review articles are also informative.

Informative cases aren’t precedential cases that invoke the stare decisis rule. We know that’s a lot of Legalese. Basically, judges must look at the way these courts approached problems, say “that’s interesting,” and follow or ignore their findings.

Influential

The federal system has twelve circuit courts. If Tina has a federal case in Nevada (9th Circuit), she may cite a similar decision from the 5th Circuit, which covers Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The judge in Tina’s case can ignore that 5th Circuit case, but the judge must usually distinguish it (explain why s/he’s not following that precedent).

The same thing applies in state court. If Tina, who is an appellate lawyer, had a case in the 5th Circuit of Texas (Dallas), she can cite a case from the 2nd Circuit (Ft. Worth) to support her position. The 5th Circuits judge must distinguish the 2nd Circuit case if s/he doesn’t follow it.

U.S. Supreme Court opinions are binding on all U.S. cases. Federal circuit court cases are binding in that circuit.

Likewise, state Supreme Court opinions are binding in that state and circuit court opinions are binding in that circuit. Additionally, a senior trial court judge’s opinion is binding on any magistrate or associate judges in that court. 

Usually, judges must follow these decisions whether they like it or not. However, that’s not always the case.

What’s an Example of Judge-Made Law?

To illustrate these principles, we could look at abortion, gun control, or something else in today’s headlines. Instead, let’s take a trip in the way-back machine and look at a slightly less controversial example.

In 1896, the Supreme Court decided Plessy vs. Ferguson. This case established the separate but equal doctrine, ushering in a slew of laws, called Jim Crow laws, that required or allowed racial segregation in most public places.

Court cases of this era produced unusual results, to say the least. We mentioned Texas above. In 1946, a Black student was denied admission to the all-White University of Texas Law School. The student sued. To avoid a trial, the state set up a special law school for this one student, which later became Texas Southern University in Houston. Today, TSU has almost 10,000 Black and White students.

1954’s Brown vs. Board of Education reversed Plessy. In Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that separate facilities were inherently unequal. Ten years later, the 1964 Civil Rights Act converted nondiscrimination from case law to statutory law.

What’s the Difference Between Case Law and Statutory Law?

To go back to the Constitution, statute law is law passed by Article 1 (legislative branch) and Article 2 (executive branch). All states have a similar setup.

Frequently, judge-made law is here today and gone tomorrow. Lawyers, including judges, are very adept at crafting legal arguments that distinguish other cases, as outlined above.

Legislative law, or statutory law, is a little more permanent. A single lawyer, or a small panel of lawyers, can change case law. But the majority of people in a state or federal legislature create statute law. Convincing 270 people (a majority in the House of Representatives, a majority in the Senate, and the President) to vote a certain way is a lot harder than convincing three or four people to vote a certain way.

Constitutional law is the next level of statutory law. Once a law is in the federal or state constitution, it’s almost impossible to change it.

Statutory law has the same effect on criminal and civil cases as state law. Statute law could be informative, influential, or binding, depending on what state or federal legislature made that law.

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Special Education Action

Children are our priority. Ensuring their needs are met is our goal.

Case Law They Use: IEPs & FAPE

Studying case law cited by your State Education Agency (SEA) and Local Education Agency (LEA) in response to parents’ state complaints, and studying case law cited by LEAs, LEA lawyers, and hearing officers during due process hearings is a good way to prepare yourself to 1) understand special education law, 2) understand the different ways it can be interpreted and inappropriately manipulated, and 3) how to use special education-related case law to argue your own case.

This article starts with Schaeffer v. Weast and will be updated with additional case law.

Schaeffer v. Weast

In a May 29, 2018, Notice of Complaint (NOC), the Virginia Department of Education (VDOE) cited Schaeffer v. Weast to counter a parent’s state complaint that stated an IEP proposed by Fairfax County Public Schools (FCPS) was not reasonably developed to confer FAPE:

Additionally, Parent cites subsequent evaluations and revisions to Student’s IEP as evidence of the insufficiency of Student’s 2016- 2017 IEPs. We note that in Schaeffer v. Weast, 554 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2009) , the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals found that student’s 10th-grade IEP did not prove that a previous IEP was inappropriate. The Court stated that “[t]o interpret the 10th-grade IEP as an admission of fault as to the 8th-grade IEP would discourage [the district] and other school systems from reassessing and updating IEPs out of fear that any addition to the IEP would be seen as a concession of liability for an earlier one.”

Beyond VDOE’s use of Schaeffer v. Weast

In this case, VDOE changed the parent’s complaint to infer that the parent was using a new IEP to discount a previous IEP. If you’ve ever submitted a complaint to VDOE, you’re aware of its practice of changing parents’ complaints to fit VDOE’s arguments.

This was not a case of a parent using a new IEP to prove fault with a previous IEP.

FCPS failed to do a comprehensive initial evaluation of the student, which meant the student’s initial IEP was not based on his present levels of performance, even though – per Section §1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I) – and IEP must include “a statement of the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance”. Instead, the initial IEP was based on cherry-picked tests done by FCPS. This is evident in the fact that within three weeks of presenting its initial evaluation to the parent, FCPS re-evaluated the student and found additional areas of need. Then, a year later, FCPS re-evaluated the student again, and again found more areas of need. The areas of need identified a year after the initial evaluation weren’t new. For years, the parent had expressed concerns about these areas of need and FCPS chose to ignore the parent’s concerns and place a limit on its evaluation of the student. This behavior was in line with FCPS denying an evaluation to the student three times between 1st and 6th grades, only to later find (via a private evaluation) that the student had Dyslexia and was reading on a high third grade level in 6th grade (while also getting good grades and passing state exams). From the start, FCPS made it clear that it didn’t believe the student had Dyslexia and its evaluations mirrored that stance.

Key Point about Schaeffer v. Weast

This case was argued in 2009. The parents wanted what was best. Per case law, all the school had to do was provide an IEP the provided some educational benefit. It didn’t have to provide educational benefit it all areas, or to the highest degree possible. Per Circuit Judge Michael Wilkinson’s opinion:

In the end, the ALJ recognized the primary flaw in the Schaffers’ arguments and the testimony of their experts: the Schaffers sought more than the IDEA requires. As the ALJ observed, the Supreme Court has held that an IEP need not provide the best possible education; instead, it need only provide “ some educational benefit ,”[emphasis added] or a “basic floor of opportunity.”  Rowley,  458 U.S. at 200-01,  102 S. Ct. 3034 ;  see also MM,  303 F.3d at 526. The ALJ realized, however, that the Schaffers and their experts were seeking small classes for Brian in order to maximize his potential. For example, the ALJ observed that Dr. Spodak’s written evaluation of Brian prior to the hearing stated that Brian would “do best” in small classes, not that they were necessary to provide him an educational benefit. Although the ALJ recognized that Brian might have received a greater educational benefit at McLean than from the IEP, the Schaffers failed to persuade him that the eighth-grade IEP was not reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit to Brian. Granting due weight to the proceedings before the ALJ, we agree that the eighth-grade IEP would have provided Brian a free appropriate public education.

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The Law Dictionary

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CASE LAW Definition & Legal Meaning

Definition & citations:.

A professional name for the aggregate of reported cases as forming a body of jurisprudence ; or for the law of a particular subject as evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases ; in distinction to statutes and other sources of law.

This article contains general legal information but does not constitute professional legal advice for your particular situation. The Law Dictionary is not a law firm, and this page does not create an attorney-client or legal adviser relationship. If you have specific questions, please consult a qualified attorney licensed in your jurisdiction.

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Due Process Supreme Court Cases

A Due Process Clause appears in both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. These provide that nobody may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have developed two branches of due process doctrine: procedural due process and substantive due process.

First, procedural due process involves the steps that must be taken before someone is deprived of an interest involving life, liberty, or property. These vary depending on the situation but typically include notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as an unbiased decision-maker. Sometimes procedural due process also may entail a right to present evidence, a right to cross-examine opposing witnesses, and an opportunity to be represented by counsel, among other protections.

Meanwhile, substantive due process involves certain fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in American history and tradition. Notable areas in which this doctrine has arisen include reproductive rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and end-of-life decisions. A court usually applies strict scrutiny to government actions that affect fundamental rights, which means that the government must show that its action furthered a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Earlier in its history, the Supreme Court reviewed some economic regulations through the lens of substantive due process, but it has largely abandoned this approach.

Below is a selection of Supreme Court cases involving due process, arranged from newest to oldest.

Author: Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey are overruled, and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.

Author: Elena Kagan

Due process does not require a state to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant's ability to recognize that their crime was morally wrong.

Author: Ruth Bader Ginsburg

The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is an incorporated protection applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Author: Anthony Kennedy

The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed outside the state.

The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.

Author: John Paul Stevens

Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law if it fails to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits, or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

Author: William Rehnquist

A “right” to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Thus, a state law banning physician-assisted suicide does not violate due process.

Author: Anthony Kennedy , David Souter , Sandra Day O’Connor

An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.

The Constitution does not forbid a state from requiring that evidence of an incompetent person's wishes as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a suspect's confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. More generally, the sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion.

Author: Byron White

While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in public employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.

A due process violation does not arise from the unauthorized failure of state agents to follow established state procedure when the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

Author: Lewis Powell

When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the usual deference to the legislature is inappropriate, and a court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation. More generally, appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines, but from careful respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.

The Due Process Clause does not require notice and a hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment in public schools as that practice is authorized and limited by the common law.

Identifying the specific dictates of due process generally requires considering three factors: the private interest that will be affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. (An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Social Security disability payments.)

Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause.

Strict judicial scrutiny is reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. (Poverty is not a suspect class, and education is not a fundamental right.)

Author: Harry Blackmun

The Due Process Clause protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Although the state cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a compelling point at various stages of the woman's approach to term.

Author: Potter Stewart

The Fourteenth Amendment does not require an opportunity for a hearing prior to the non-renewal of a non-tenured state teacher's contract unless they can show that the non-renewal deprived them of an interest in liberty, or that they had a property interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract.

From the standpoint of due process, it is immaterial that a deprivation of property may be temporary and non-final.

Author: William Brennan

A pre-termination evidentiary hearing is necessary to provide a recipient of welfare benefits with procedural due process. The interest of an eligible recipient in the uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the state's interest in not erroneously terminating their payments, clearly outweighs the state's competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens.

Author: Earl Warren

A statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Author: William O. Douglas

A state law forbidding the use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy, which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.

Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused who has requested it violates due process when the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.

Author: John Marshall Harlan II

Particularly when dealing with a withholding of a non-contractual benefit under a social welfare program, the Due Process Clause interposes a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking rational justification.

The Due Process Clause no longer should be used to strike down state laws regulatory of business and industrial conditions because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.

Author: Felix Frankfurter

Involuntary verbal confessions are inadmissible in a criminal trial under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.

Author: Robert H. Jackson

A fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding that is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

Author: Harlan Fiske Stone

Regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not unconstitutional unless it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that the law rests on a rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislature. (Footnote 4 laid the foundation for heightened scrutiny in certain situations involving fundamental rights, the political process, and racial, national, or religious minorities.)

Author: Charles Evans Hughes

A restraint or regulation of the liberty to contract is due process if it is reasonable in relation to its subject and adopted for the protection of the community against evils menacing the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Also, in dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the legislature has a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to ensure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression.

Author: Owen Josephus Roberts

The Due Process Clause conditions the exertion of regulatory power by requiring that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process, that the regulation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.

Author: George Sutherland

The right of the accused, at least in a capital case, to have the aid of counsel for their defense is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This includes the right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare a defense.

Author: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

A state may provide for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions supported by the state who are found to be afflicted with a hereditary form of insanity or imbecility.

Author: James Clark McReynolds

The fundamental theory of liberty on which all governments in the U.S. rest excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.

A state law forbidding the teaching of any modern language other than English to a child who has not successfully passed the eighth grade invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take into account the physical differences between men and women, but the doctrine that women of mature age require (or may be subjected to) restrictions on their liberty of contract that could not lawfully be imposed on men in similar circumstances must be rejected.

A trial for murder in a state court in which the accused are hurried to conviction under mob domination without regard for their rights is without due process and void.

Author: David Josiah Brewer

The regulation of the working hours of women falls within the police power of the state, and a statute directed exclusively to such regulation does not conflict with the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.

Author: John Marshall Harlan

It is not within the power of Congress to make it a criminal offense against the United States for a carrier engaged in interstate commerce to discharge an employee simply because of their membership in a labor organization. A provision to that effect is an invasion of personal liberty and the right of property and is unenforceable under the Due Process Clause.

Author: Rufus Wheeler Peckham

The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the state in the legitimate exercise of its police power.

A judgment of a state court, even if authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for public use without compensation made or secured to the owner, is wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, must be embraced the right to make all proper contracts in relation to it.

Author: Joseph Bradley

It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.

Author: Samuel Freeman Miller

The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are those that arise out of the nature and essential character of the national government, the provisions of the Constitution, or federal laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof. (The main holding of this case addressed the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause. However, it is significant for due process doctrine because it made the Due Process Clause the foundation for most Fourteenth Amendment claims involving fundamental rights. This function otherwise might have been served by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.)

Author: Roger Taney

An act of Congress that deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property merely because he came or brought his property into a particular territory of the United States could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.

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50 Landmark Judgments on Education Law by the Supreme Court and High Courts in 2022 [Part I]

by Siddharth R. Gupta† and Pushp Sharma†† Cite as: 2023 SCC OnLine Blog Exp 9

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This two-part compendium comprises judgments of the Supreme Court of India and High Courts across the country that laid down one or the other important propositions of law, that became a benchmark in themselves. This compendium has been prepared after making an earnest effort in searching available judgments on online research portals, journals, etc. especially in the case of those of the High Courts.

Part I of this dual part compendium includes judgments in chronological datewise order from January to June 2022, whereas Part II which shall follow after a fortnight will be having judgments from July to December 2022. If the reader feels that any judgment has been left out, in our limited researching capabilities, may so provide the soft copy of the judgment at our official e-mail. 1 The same shall be picked up in Part II of the compendium, even though missed out in Part I.

(1) Kshetrimayum Maheshkumar Singh v. Manipur University 2

(Delivered on January 5, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Hima Kohli

Authored by: HM Justice Hima Kohli

The issue that arose before the Supreme Court was about the extent of reservation for SC category candidates post amending Act of Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Amendment Act, 2012 to the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 (for short the “CEI Reservation Act”) and whether the Manipur University (that got converted from State to a Central University) was required to follow its own reservation hitherto followed prior to the introduction of the amendment for admissions to the University.

The Manipur University, which was a State University was converted to a Central University w.e.f. 13-10-2005, by virtue of which the CEI Act came to be applicable. The Manipur University prior to the applicability of the CEI Reservation Act, 2006 followed the reservation norm of 2% for SCs, 31% for STs, and 17% for OBCs, after the implementation of which, w.e.f. 2006 the reservation pattern as provided under Section 3 of the Act of 2006 came to be implemented viz. 15% for SCs, 7.5% for STs and 27% for OBSs. However, w.e.f. from the year 2012, in light of the amendment to the CEI Act, the reservation pattern was reverted to that previously followed of 2% for SCs, 31% for STs, and 17% for OBCs, which was put to assail before the High Court of Manipur and the dispute travelled to the Supreme Court. The principal contention of the appellant was that Manipur University was bound by the reservation pattern provided under Section 3, as was made applicable between 2006 and 2012, and that reversion to the original norm of reservation existing prior to 2006 of reserving 31% seats for STs was unconstitutional.

The court referred to Statements of Objects and Reasons of the amendment as also the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on HRD (for short the “Standing Committee”) in its 234th report that had suggested resolution of practical difficulties faced by CEIs situated in the North-Eastern States. Holding that reports and recommendations made by Parliamentary Standing Committees can always be resorted as “external aids” for interpreting any statutory provision and the background behind its enactment, Court held that for CEIs situated in tribal areas, especially the North-Eastern States, the reservation of SCs and STs was contemplated to be definite, with the OBC reservation varying from State to State. For reconciling the 50% ceiling for constitutional reservations, the purpose and object of Amending Bill was to remove existing ambiguities and difficulties for accommodating the aspirations of large tribal populations in the Sixth Schedule States, including the North-Eastern States, that included Manipur also. It was thus held that the purpose of Amending Act of 2012 must be given full effect and the prescription under Section 3 of definite percentage for SCs, STs, and OBCs cannot come in the way of its implementation but has to be interpreted harmoniously. The reservations for STs may vary and may be increased beyond the threshold provided under Section 3, whilst reducing correspondingly and proportionately the percentage of seats meant for OBCs candidates. Thus, the reference point for determining reservation quota for OBCs candidates must be the same as that of SCs and STs candidates for working out the reservation. A special arrangement was held to have been made by the Amending Act of 2012 for CEIs established in States falling under the definition of “Specified North-Eastern Region”. Thus, in view of the large STs population of Manipur, the Court held that reservation to the extent of 31% for STs, 2% for SCs, and 17% for OBCs was clearly justified and in consonance with the larger object, purpose, and spirit of Amending Act of 2012.

(2) Neil Aurelio Nunes (OBC Reservation) v. Union of India 3

(Delivered on January 20, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Dr D.Y. Chandrachud and A.S. Bopanna

Authored by: HM Justice Dr D.Y. Chandrachud

The challenge in the batch of Article 32 writ petitions was reservation introduced for OBC and EWS in the all India quota seats (hereinafter referred as “AIQ seats”) for both UG as well as PG medical courses. In this regard, the notice issued by the Union of India dated 29-7-2021 providing 27% OBC reservation and 10% EWS reservation was put to challenge. Multiple issues arose before the court, broadly with the three principal ones as follows:

• Legality of EWS and OBC reservation per se in the AIQ seats, which were argued to be free from reservation and based only on merit, especially the PG courses.
• The reservation was introduced midway after commencement of the admission process for 2021-2022 and thus, introduction of reservation amounted to changing the rules of the game post its commencement.

In AIQ seats of PG courses, there could not be reservation for SC, ST and OBC to such a large extent, which was against the mandate of a longline of judgments in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, 4 , Jagadish Saran v. Union of India 5 .

The Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the binary concepts –“merit” and “reservation”; their correlation with each other. Relying upon the history of corelation between Articles 15(1), 16(1) with their corresponding Articles 15(4) and 16(4) respectively, the Court held that

Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are not exceptions to Articles 15(1) and 16(1) respectively, but are another facet of equality mentioned under Articles 15(1) and 16(1) therein. It would be a negation of constitutional precept and vision to read them as exceptions to the general principles of merit. The Court referred to the Constituent Assembly Debates (hereinafter referred as “CAD”) that went behind the drafting of Articles 15 and 16 as also the development of law of substantive equality over law relating to principles and concept of substantive equality over formal equality. Referring to a longline of judgments that started from the majority view of Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, 6 the Court held that Articles 15 and 16 are an extension of and give effect to the larger doctrine of equality of treating unequals differently. Thus, “merit” and “reservation” cannot be treated as opposed to each other, but are relatable in the larger canvas of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India . The court then examined the role and nature of common competitive-cum-entrance examinations as a basis and index of merit. It held that assessment must be in the larger social background, disadvantages and handicaps faced by the candidate concerned, for which reservation has been introduced. Scores in any examination are not the sole determinant of excellence or capability, but merit must be examined in the backdrop of equalisation of opportunities for candidates coming from different social backgrounds. The court traced the development and concept of AIQ seats starting from the judgments of Pradeep Jain v. Union of India 7 , Dinesh Kumar (1) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College 8 and Dinesh Kumar (2) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College 9 , and the series of judgments that followed, mentioning that AIQ seats were introduced for providing opportunities to students to compete on a national level and take admission nationally in any State or college of their choice.

The court then examined whether the judgments of Pradeep Jain v. Union of India 10 and the following judgments placed any restriction on reserving the seats for OBC and EWS category candidates and held that all these judgments were rendered in the backdrop of reservation for domicile/local resident candidates and cannot be treated as precedents for restricting the implementation of reservation on the AIQ seats.

On the aspect of changing of rules of the game midway, with the introduction of reservation, after holding of entrance examination, the Court held that as per Clause 11 of the brochure, the process of admission was formally to commence after notification of seat matrix by the counselling authority (GoI) and not before. Since, before the announcement of results itself, the notice under challenge dated 29-7-2022 was issued, therefore it could not be said that rules of the games were changed. In this regard, the law occupying the field right from the judgment of K. Manjusree v. State of A.P. 11 was traced, to hold when it can be considered that rules of the game have been changed to the prejudice of participants and when they cannot be so inferred.

Accordingly, the challenge to the implementation of notice and the reservation in the AIQ seats of 2021-2022 was repelled by the court in view of the aforesaid findings.

(3) Abha George v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences 12

(Delivered on February 2, 2022)

Coram: Single Judge Bench of HM Justice Prateek Jalan

Authored by: HM Justice Prateek Jalan

Challenge in the petition was made to the cancellation of admissions to PG nursing courses of the petitioner by the respondent Authorities. The petitioner applied for admission pursuant to the prospectus, in pursuance of which they were granted admission to AIIMS. After 2 months on the ground that discrepancies were found in the admissions, all the admissions were cancelled, including the ground of discrepancy relating to the eligibility of the candidates concerned. The students then knocked on the doors of the Delhi High Court. The question that arose was whether the eligibility was under the cloud of all the petitioners whose admission were cancelled and whether the cancellation of admission orders was valid and legal after the admissions were affected. Referring to the longline of judgments deprecating cancellation of admissions post-admission of the candidate concerned, even though ineligible at the onset, the Court held that the approach of the respondents was not proper and legal. The court in the process referred to the judgments of Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University 13 , Ashok Chand Singhvi v. University of Jodhpur 14 , including the judgments of the Coordinate Benches of the Delhi High Court, on the principal that even if the student is ineligible or not entitled to take admission, but given admission by the authorities due to some oversight, having been once admitted, their admission should not be disturbed and that they should not be thrown out after having commenced their studies. Accordingly, the cancellation of admission orders was set aside by the High Court.

(4) Jagathy Raj V.P. v. Rajitha Kumar S. 15

(Delivered on February 7, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka

Authored by: HM Justice Ajay Rastogi

The challenge was put to the judgment of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge, through which appointment of HoD was set aside on the ground that appellant being a senior Professor was ignored in consideration for the appointment to the said post. Under Section 39(1) of the University Act, the Government of Kerala framed Statute 18, describing the procedure for appointment of Director/HoD, to be appointed by the syndicate. The appellant when he became due for consideration for appointment as HoD being the seniormost Professor, which used to happen through the process of nomination by rotation, expressed his unwillingness to take up the said assignment in the first turn. Accordingly, the next Professor, immediately junior to him was nominated as Director/HoD for a period of three years. However, when the term of Dr Mavoothu D. (the one who was appointed in place of the appellant) expired, the appellant staked claim to the said post being the seniormost professor and showed interest to participate in the selection in the appointment process which was overlooked, not taken into consideration and junior professor to the appellant was appointed. The State Government justified the said decision on the ground that since the appellant had expressed his unwillingness once, therefore he had waived his right to be considered for appointment as HoD/Director and could not have been taken into consideration again,. It was argued that once the relinquishment was made, the appellant had forgone his right of consideration for all times to come and thus, the next seniormost Professor was picked up for the appointment. The Single Bench quashed the appointment being against the provisions of Statute 18, which judgment was set aside by the Division Bench.

The Supreme Court held that since every round of appointment is a fresh round of appointment, based and premised on seniority, therefore Statute 18 cannot be interpreted to read in any right or any possibility of waiver or relinquishment of any right by any professor, like in the case of the appellant. It was further held that since in the past, on multiple occasions professors who had shown their unwillingness at one point of time earlier were considered by the University in the subsequent second process of appointment when they got interested, the said benefit cannot be denied to the appellant. It was held that under Statute 18, there is no prohibition depriving the professor from consideration for appointment as HoD, when the second rotational term becomes due, only because he had shown his disinterest previously for the same. Seniority is the thumb rule, which has to be considered every time and cannot be waived. Relying on the judgment of N. Suresh Nathan v. Union of India 16 , the Court held that any past practice followed for a long time by a statutory authority, if not contrary to law but in consonant with the statutory provisions, gives it a colour of precedence and should not be lightly departed from by the authority. It should also be ordinarily respected by the courts and not interfered lightly in the exercise of powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the appellant was directed to be appointed on the said post.

(5) Shekhawati Shikshak Parsikshan Sansthan v. NCTE 17

(Delivered on February 10, 2022)

Coram: Single Judge Bench of HM Justice Rekha Palli

Authored by: HM Justice Rekha Palli

Challenge was laid to the decision of the National Council for Teacher Education (for short “NCTE”) returning the application submitted by petitioner Institutes in 2008-2009 for grant of permission/recognition for various teacher training courses like B Ed, etc., in light of the ban that was imposed by the State of Rajasthan in the year 2009-2010. The ban was quashed and set aside initially by the Rajasthan High Court in January 2009 directing the NCTE to take a fresh final decision considering all the relevant factors for accepting and processing of applications. In a second round of challenge to this decision of ban, Rajasthan High Court again directed the NCTE to process the applications for the subsequent Academic Session of 2011-2012, since the session had been over by the time the writ petitions came to be decided. In the meanwhile, the NCTE processed the recognition applications of all those colleges, whose inspections were conducted, and show-cause notices issued for various deficiencies, relating to the year 2009-2010. Thus, the ban came to be relaxed for a certain category of institutions by the NCTE itself. However, one batch of writ petitions came to be dismissed in October 2018, holding that a subsequent State ban, imposed after returning of applications by the NCTE can be relevant criteria in consideration for rejecting the applications. This matter travelled up to the Supreme Court previously, wherein, the Supreme Court in Saraswati Deep College of Education v. NCTE 18 , in which it relied upon its earlier decisions of Kanya Gurukul College of Education v. NCTE 19 and Gyan Deep College of Education v. NCTE 20 , held that rejection of applications based on the subsequent ban on new educational institutes by the NCTE fell foul of its earlier decisions, and thus NCTE was directed to process the applications on merits. This judgment of the Supreme Court, however, pertained to a specific category of colleges, whose applications were returned prior to the imposition of the ban.

The Court broadly held that applications for opening of new institutions received prior to a negative recommendation (for the imposition of the ban) from the State Government to the NCTE have to be considered on their own merits and cannot be returned unactioned on account of the subsequent State ban, imposed post receipt of the application. Since the admitted position was that applications in all the cases were filed and received prior to the imposition of the ban in the State of Rajasthan on the opening of new institutions, therefore they were entitled to be processed. Repelling the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches, the Court held that the longline of judgments by the Delhi High Court as also the Supreme Court of India on the same issue w.r.t. similar subject-matters, made it clear that applications received prior to subsequent State ban cannot be rejected relying on the ban. Thus, there cannot be a plea of delay and latches, taken by the NCTE, in the case of similar circumstanced institutions, in which a proposition of law in rem was laid down, binding on the NCTE for all prospective applications pending before it. Even the NCTE itself had been in a large number of cases taking the stand that applications received prior to issuance of subsequent State ban must be considered on merits and actually issued the approval in the said regard. Even the Supreme Court in Saraswati Deep College of Education v. NCTE 21 had taken the very same view of the processing of applications on merits. Though for subsequent years, since the NCTE itself had accepted the aforesaid judgment and had selectively applied it to several institutions processing their applications and granting them approval, therefore, the judgments of the Supreme Court in Saraswati Deep College of Education 22 ought to have been treated as binding law. Referring to the judgment of State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava 23 , the Court held that the exception to a particular set of petitioners being benefitted by the directions of the Supreme Court only will not apply in those cases where judgment pronounced by the court is a judgment in rem with the intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approach the court or not. If through any pronouncement an obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all the similarly situated persons, then the judgment in its applicability should not be restricted only to the parties before it, but to all similarly circumstanced. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid judgment, the High Court directed the NCTE to process the pending applications on merits for the grant of approval of teacher training courses.

(6) Kamni Tripathi v. State of M.P. 24

(Delivered on March 30, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judges Bench of HM Justices Sujoy Paul and Dwarka Dhish Bansal

Authored by: HM Justice Sujoy Paul

Writ petitions were filed challenging the cancellation of allotted seats under the second round of counselling to various students of nursing course. The said allotment was cancelled on the ground that the reservation roster was not properly followed in the allotment of seats. The grievance of the petitioner was that, after allotment of the seat, it cannot be cancelled unilaterally, without hearing the student concerned as it is also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India , petitioners possessing the right to livelihood. Reference was made to the judgment of Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University 25 , that allotment of seats cannot be cancelled post-admission on the same and that the principle of estoppel applies. Reliance was made on the MP Online Counselling and Admission Procedure Rules and Government BSc Nursing College Selection Rules, to contend that the cancellation is contrary to the statutory provisions provided under the said Rules. This was all the more when the petitioner had prosecuted studies for a few months, and this would affect their prospects. The court relied upon a beautiful saying quoted in Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal 26 by the Supreme Court, which read thus:

“…even God himself did not pass [a] sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. Adam (says God), where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?….”

The Court referring to a longline of judgments, specifically Rule 17 of the Counselling Procedure Allotment Rules held that the mandatory procedure to be followed prior to cancellation of any admission has not been followed in its letter and spirit, and thus, even though the reservation roster was not followed, it was no ground to have cancelled the admission of the candidate unilaterally and arbitrarily. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the cancellation order and restored the admissions of all the candidates.

(7) Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat 27

(Delivered on March 3, 2022)

Coram : 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna

Authored by : HM Justice M.R. Shah

The petition was filed under Article 32 seeking a writ of quo warranto challenging the appointment of Respondent 4 as Vice Chancellor of Sardar Patel University (for short “SPU”) and setting aside of notification appointing him so. The writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court as the previous appointment of the very same petitioner on being challenged before the Gujarat High Court was repelled and direction was issued to the University to State to make suitable amendments to the Act and the Rules framed thereunder providing for to bring them in conformity with the UGC Regulations 2010/2018 for incorporating the eligibility pertaining to the appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the University.

Section 10 of the SPU Act, 1955 did not provide any qualification whatsoever for appointment to the post of Vice-Chancellor and the question arose whether the UGC Regulations, 2018 are binding at all upon the University (SPU) for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor.

Answering the issue of maintainability, the Court held that the writ of quo warranto lies and can be issued only when the appointment is contrary to the statutorily framed rules. If the rules of statutory provisions are silent on the aspect of eligibility, then the writ of quo warranto cannot be issued. Referring to the judgments of Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal 28 and Armed Forces Medical Assn. v. Union of India 29 , Court held that the strict requirement of locus standi stands relaxed in quo warranto proceedings, which afford a judicial remedy to any person for challenging the appointment or holding of office by its incumbent. However, at the same time, the writ of quo warranto is an extremely limited one, that can be issued only when the person does not fulfil the eligibility criteria for holding any office.

The question thus arose was that, in the absence of any statutory provisions prescribed in eligibility under the SPU Act, whether the provisions of Section 26(1) of the UGC Act, 1956 read with UGC Regulations 2010/2018 can be resorted to for testing the eligibility of the VC of SPU. The UGC Regulations are specific and strict about the eligibility for the appointments to the post of Vice-Chancellor and since the financial assistance was being offered by the Central Government to the extent of 80% in lieu of the scheme adopted by the State of Gujarat for payment of salaries to the teaching faculty in view of the Sixth Central Pay Commission (“CPC”), therefore the State of Gujarat was bound by the UGC Regulations. Relying upon Section 12( b ) of the UGC Act, Court held that in view of the fact that SPU was receiving central financial assistance, despite being the State University and having adopted the UGC scheme, it automatically got bound by the UGC Regulations, 2010 and thus eligibility laid down therein was binding on the State University for appointment of Vice-Chancellor. The State Government failed to incorporate necessary amendments to the enactment adopting and imbibing the eligibility of admissions for appointment to the post of Vice-Chancellor, which was lamented being extremely unfortunate by the Supreme Court. However, in view of UGC Regulations, 2018, the appointment of Respondent 4 (Vice-Chancellor) was held to be illegal, being subject to the issuance of a writ of quo warranto in the said regard. The provisions of the State of the SPU Act as well the rules framed thereunder were held to be repugnant to Section 26(1) of the UGC Act read with the UGC Regulations, 2018 and thus repugnant in view of Article 254 of the Constitution of India . Accordingly, the appointment of Vice-Chancellor was struck down by the court.

Paras 55 and 56 of the judgment are worth quoting, which read as follows:

“55. Discussing the situation in the backdrop of principle of governance quoted by Chanakya in his Nitishastra ‘Yatha Raja Tatha Praja’, the sense of morality must begin from the door of the leader who preaches it.” 30

“56. Thus, universities are autonomous, and the Vice-Chancellor is the leader of a higher education institution. As per the norm, he/she should be an eminent academician, excellent administrator and someone who has a high moral stature. The aforesaid reports of the Radhakrishnan Commission, Kothari Commission, Gnanam Committee and Ramlal Parikh Commission, have highlighted the importance of the role of Vice-Chancellor in maintaining the quality and relevance of universities, in addition to its growth and development, keeping in view, the much-needed changes from time to time. Further, these committees have also made suggestions and recommendations for identifying the right person for the said position. At this stage, it is correct to say that a Vice-Chancellor is the kingpin of a university’s system and a keeper of the university’s conscience.” 31

(8) Mandeep Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh) 32

(Delivered on March 9, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari

Authored by: HM Justice J.K. Maheshwari

The appellants were all waitlisted candidates, who had approached the court for filling up of unfilled posts of elementary trained teachers (for short “ETT”), from the waitlist, instead of being re-advertised again for filling of the same through the fresh round of selection. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the employer is always entitled to go for a fresh round of selection after exhausting the main list and not compelled to resort to or exhaust the waitlist. The appellants belonged to reserved OBC category candidates, who were staking claim over the posts belonging to SCs/STs category remaining unfilled on account of non-availability of SCs/STs category candidates, which would have been surrendered to the OBCs category as per the applicable policy of the reservation/interchangeability of the posts from SCs/STs category to OBCs category in the event of non-availability of the category candidates concerned. The State took a specific stand that they were not inclined to interchange or dereserve the vacant post of SC/ST category to the OBC category, for that reason fresh advertisement with a fresh selection process was initiated.

The court referring to Section 7 of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 held that the satisfaction of the State Government not to dereserve/interchange the seat belonging to SC/ST to OBC was duly demonstrated in the matter to be existing in larger public interest against dereservation. In such circumstances, even though the interchangeability/dereservation of the vacant unfilled posts of SC category may be statutorily permissible and possible, but if the State Government had demonstrated to be not desirable, the fresh selection process and the fresh advertisement for filling up all the vacant SC/ST posts of ETT is not liable to be interfered. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

(9) Santosh Trust v. National Medical Commission 33

(Delivered on March 15, 2022)

The petition was filed challenging the disapproval letters issued by National Medical Commission (for short “NMC”) rejecting the grant of permission for an increase in seats of the MBBS course as also the PG courses in the petitioners’ medical college. The rejection order was issued essentially on two grounds; first, the insufficient number of patients in the hospital; second, the pendency of criminal cases and recovery proceedings at the instance of secured creditors and lenders/financial partners to the society/trust running the medical college.

The rejection orders were challenged on the fundamental ground that the assessing-cum-inspection team during inspection had not found any deficiency or shortcoming in the institution, but the same was brought on record by way of counter-affidavit before the court, which was originally neither mentioned in the rejection letter nor in the inspection report prepared by the inspecting team. The rejection order was further challenged on the ground that the FIRs and criminal proceedings were stayed by the High Court, in relation to which, without hearing the petitioners, the rejection letters were issued. The medical college hospital was a COVID hospital for serving COVID patients during the pandemic duration, owing to which the other patients of other ailments were not allowed to be hospitalised, for which the college was even awarded by multiple authorities on different occasions.

The Court held that the general principle is that the reasons for the rejection must be spelled out and discerned in the rejection letter itself in view of the landmark judgments of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commr. 34 However, the exception to this general principle exists as laid down in All India Railway Recruitment Board v. Shyam Kumar 35 and Prp Exports v. Govt. of T.N, 36 that subsequent facts can be relied upon and referred to by the court for adjudicating the rejection order so pleaded in the counter-affidavit if public interest is involved and demonstrated to be existing.

On the aspect of insufficient and inadequate number of patients, the Court held that since the petitioner’s hospital was a COVID notified hospital, therefore they were restrained from giving admissions to patients with other ailments, and for this, they cannot be saddled with adverse consequences when other patients could not have been treated alongside COVID patients. 37

On the other ground of rejection, the Court held viz. pending criminal cases, and recovery proceedings against the medical college, the Court held that the college has been running for almost two decades and was one of the oldest colleges in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The criminal proceedings were stayed by the High Court, a fact which was never before the NMC, as, no opportunity of hearing or show cause was given nor the material being used against the petitioner was not provided to them. Such criminal cases and complaints could not have been considered, more so when all the FIRs were stayed. The recovery proceedings were pending and there was no final outcome of the same, for which the statutory remedies were available before the higher forums to the management of the medical college, and mere pendency of such recovery proceedings cannot lead to or be a ground per se to infer that institution is not meeting the eligibility criteria under Section 29 of the NMC Act. This was even more important when the institution was not seeking fresh permission but only an increase in the number of seats on the basis of available infrastructure, which was to be found satisfactory in the inspection carried out by the assessing-cum-inspecting team of the NMC itself. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the NMC and directed the NMC to issue the approval letter granting approval for the aforesaid MBBS courses and inclusion of the said seats in the ongoing counselling process for medical admissions.

(10) North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institution of Health and Medical Sciences v. Bisakha Goenka 38

(Delivered on March 25, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Sanjib Banerjee and W. Diengdoh

Authored by: HM Justice W. Diengdoh

The challenge was placed to the order passed by the Single Judge through which the petitioner was permitted to participate in the counselling process for admissions to MBBS course, who was denied the same on the ground that she did not participate in the initial counselling, which was an e -counselling process. The case of the petitioner was that the e-mail sent by the counselling authority viz. North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institution of Health and Medical Sciences (for short “NEIGRIHMS”) was sent through e-mail, that landed in the spam box of her e-mail, which she discovered late. Due to the e-mail landing into the spam box, she could not participate in the counselling. The Division Bench held that since the counselling authority had sent the intimation timely through e-mail to the candidate, the candidate was at fault of not being more vigilant and diligent in discovering the e-mail. However, the Division Bench disagreed with the view taken by the Single Bench but held however that element of interference with the discretion already exercised when a plausible view seems to have been taken and that substitution of view by the Division Bench is extremely restricted. It further held that a right always inheres in a waitlisted candidate for the candidature to be considered if the original list is not filled up or somebody opting out from the original list midway. Thus, in the case of the writ petitioner, the possibility was extremely scant, that she would have deliberately acted to her prejudice by ignoring the e-mail sent to her by the counselling authority, especially when the admission process was e-counselling, the possibility of the candidate waving off the intimation and the chance to participate in the counselling to her detriment. Thus, the judgment of the Single Bench was affirmed by the Divisional Bench, albeit with reservations on the finding given by the Single Judge. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of.

(11) State of Kerala v. C. Sreenivasan 39

(Delivered on March 28, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Alexander Thomas and Viju Abraham

Authored by: HM Justice Viju Abraham

Applicants before the court were all Assistant Professors (for short “AP”) of Mathematics in various Government institutions, (originally nomenclature as lecturers), appointed on the advice of the Kerala Public Service Commission. The issue agitated before the High Court was about inclusion of the period of service rendered by them in self-financing colleges not taken into consideration for the grant of said benefit of career progression under the UGC Scheme. Thus, the court was called upon to decide whether the prior service rendered in the self-financing unaided colleges could be reckoned as eligible service for being considered for career advancement promotion, which was decided by the Kerala Administrative Tribunal in favour of the APs. The primary contention of the Government, which had challenged the KAT order before the High Court was that since the Government and the State Universities have no administrative financial control over the unaided self-financing institutions, therefore the services rendered in the said cannot be treated as eligible service for the said benefit of career progression. However, the court referring to various Government orders and resolutions, held that there is no nexus between the classification of the services rendered in Government colleges and the self-financing private colleges, when the career advancement scheme does not make any such distinction so issued by the UGC. When the said benefit was extended even to teachers working in autonomous, Government-aided institutions, there was no reason why the said should not include within its ken the self-financing private institutions as well. Accordingly holding the said classification to be unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India , the High Court affirmed the judgment of KAT holding all the original applicants as entitled to the benefit of the career advancement/progression scheme.

(12) M.K. Shah Medical College & Research

Centre v. Union of India 40

(Delivered on April 1, 2022)

Coram: HM Justice Rekha Palli

Challenge was laid to the communications issued by the National Medical Commission (for short “NMC”), through which the approval/permission for various PG courses was declined by the NMC and Government of India (for short “GoI”). The approval was denied on the ground of non-production of an essentiality certificate from the State Government concerned to start a new medical college, as also on the ground that the existing PG courses of the petitioner were yet to be recognised. The permission for other courses was allowed in part, meaning thereby that only half of the seats out of the full applied intake were approved, and the full applied intake was denied on a presumptive suspicious ground that the principal of the college must have produced exaggerated disclosures.

The court initially dealt with the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition, in the face of an alternative remedy of statutory appeal under Sections 28(5) and 28(6) of the National Medical Commission Act 2019, not being exhausted prior to approaching the writ court.

On the aspect of preliminary objection,the Court held that since the counselling process was underway and there were purely legal questions involved, the court writ petition without availing the alternative remedy is maintainable.It further held that the petitioner was denied the opportunity of hearing and principles of natural justice were violated in the case, where the assessors/inspectors’ report was completely in favour of the petition institution, but the NMC acted contrary to the same, without hearing the institution concerned. Thus, on this Court also the writ petition was maintainable.

The court in the process of reasoning relied upon the judgment of Index Medical College Hospital & Research Centre v. Union of India 41 , holding that where the counselling process had already commenced by the time the final order came to be passed by the NMC, the remedy of appeal can be treated as an efficacious one. Accordingly, the preliminary objection was overruled. The Court further held that since no deficiency was found in the inspection report prepared by the assessors/inspectors who had physically inspected the medical institution, and that everything was found in order in the said inspection, without giving due opportunity of hearing and compliance of principles of natural justice, or pointing out new deficiencies or shortcomings in the institution, the petitioner’s application could not have been rejected or lesser applied intake approved instead of the actual applied intake. When no discrepancies were found in the inspection report, and the petitioner was not given any opportunity to explain the same, merely on presumptive apprehensions and suspicions, the seats could not have been reduced whilst granting approval to the medical college concerned against the actual intake applied for by them. It was further held that the Medical Assessment and Rating Board (“MARB”) under the NMC Act, 2019 is expected to prima facie show some justification for its decision, whenever the impugned orders are assailed before the court, especially when assessors found the requisite criteria prescribed under the regulations to have been duly met. Relying on the judgment of Medical Council of India v. Vedanta Institute of Academic Excellence (P) Ltd. 42 , the courts cannot question the inspection report issued by an expert team of assessors or sit an appeal of the same. The said logic shall apply to the NMC as well, which cannot arrive at its own arbitrary conclusions. Thereafter referring to the judgments of Rajiv Memorial Academic Welfare Society v. Union of India 43 and Santosh Trust v. National Medical Commission 44 , Court held that no fruitful purpose would be served in remanding the matter back to the NMC, when admittedly there are no deficiencies in the inspection report of the petitioner accordingly. The petitioner was granted permission to participate in the ongoing counselling for admissions instead of being remanded back for issuance of a fresh letter of approval/permission by the NMC by the court. The petition was accordingly allowed.

(13) Preethika C. v. State of T.N. 45

(Delivered on April 7, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices M.N. Bhandari and D. Bharatha Chakravarthy

Authored by: HM Justice D. Bharatha Chakravarthy

The challenge in the writ petition was to the reservation/preference made for the students of the government schools to the extent of 7.5% made in admissions to undergraduate medical/dental courses, as also challenge to constitutionality of various provisions of the Tamil Nadu Admissions to Undergraduate Courses in Medicine, Dentistry, Indian Medicine and Homeopathy on Preferential Basis to Students of Government Schools Act, 2020. The grounds of assailing were broadly as follows:

• The reservation was outside the purview of Articles 15 , 16 , and 21 of the Constitution of India .
• The amended provisions excluded the students of Government-aided schools in Tamil Nadu for being provided preference at power with the students of Government schools and thus the distinction between the two classes was unintelligible.
• The overall reservation is crossing the upper limit of 50% and thus violative of the ceiling of 50% as let down in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 46 .
• There is already horizontal reservation for certain communities in the SC quota as also the backward classes and the most backward classes.

There was a legitimate expectation amongst all the students at the time of appearing for the senior secondary examination the percentage for the reservation is fixed and thus the percentage of reservation cannot be altered to their prejudice, till and until the student are known in advance. Thus, the legitimate expectation of students was shattered, resulting in a violation of Article 14.

Referring to the judgments of Sejal Garg v. State of Punjab 47 , Nupur v. Punjab University 48 , and Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India 49 , Court held that there cannot be a legitimate expectation as to the continuity of the same scheme and state of things in the matter of admission on the part of students. The principle of just expectation cannot be invoked when public interest demands a change of policy, which can never be barred by principles of promissory estoppel. Thus, since the matter relates to admissions to professional courses and the impugned enactment is an outcome of legislative policy made in consideration of overriding public interest, principles of legitimate public interest under Article 46 of the Constitution of India , the same could not have been challenged.

The Court relied upon the expert reports to state that economic backwardness combined with rural, and social backwardness can be criteria for students for being given preference/reservation in medical admissions. The court found that the State had followed the process of appointing a Commission to study the relevant factors, data, and statistics, and only based on the same had the impugned legislation been enacted. Impugned legislation toward ensuring “proportional equality” is being enacted.

Relying on the recent most judgment of Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India 50 , Court held that on account of the socioeducational economical background, the cognitive gap shall always be there, which requires positive discrimination by the State. Accordingly, the amended provisions were held to have a nexus with the objective of providing opportunities to government students with a socially and economically weaker background to make them overcome disadvantages for the full utilisation of their physique, character, and intelligence and thus not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India . The Court held that the impugned legislation is not including any person in the quota provided but introducing a new criterion altogether by way of horizontal reservation. Thus, since the nature of reservation was horizontal, one being dealt with extensively in the earlier judgments of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 51 , the argument of ceiling of 50% would not apply and it becomes a permissible reservation provided to “socially and educationally backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 15(5) read with Article 46 of the Constitution of India .

The challenge therefore was to the constitutionality of various amended provisions of the Government Schools Act, 2020 and the official memorandums issued on the basis thereof was repelled by the High Court in the given circumstances and constitutionality affirmed.

(14) Central Council for Indian Medicine v. Karnataka Ayurveda Medical College 52

(Delivered on April 11, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judges Bench of HM Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.R. Gavai

Authored by: HM Justice B.R. Gavai

The question arose before the court about the permission for new course of study of Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery (for short “BAMS”) course and whether the said benefit of such permission would enure in respect of previous year also. The Karnataka High Court took the view that if recognition/permission for the previous academic year was not granted, but subsequently in the next academic year the said approval has been issued, then the said permission would relate to the previous academic year as well.

Examining the scheme of Sections 13-A , 13-B of the Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 (for short “IMCC Act, 1970”), Court held that approval/permission on a scheme from the Central Government is a precondition for starting Ayurveda course and that no scheme can be started dehors the same. Specific factors as laid down under Section 13-A Clause 8 are to be taken into consideration prior to grant of approval of this scheme, which is a complete proposal in itself, for commencement of the Ayurveda course. The legislature itself has taken care of Ayurveda medical colleges established prior to the commencement of the IMCC (Amendment) Act, 2003 and thus the High Court was held to have failed to take into consideration the entire scheme under Section 13-A of the IMCC Act. In order to be eligible for grant of permission for undertaking admissions in any particular academic year, the institution must fulfil the requirements of minimum standards as on 31st December of the previous year. In such circumstances, the finding that permission granted for subsequent academic year would also enure to the benefit of earlier academic year is totally erroneous and the view of the Karnataka High Court was accordingly set aside. The court in the process of reasoning adopted the law laid down by it in Ayurved Shastra Seva Mandal v. Union of India 53 , to hold that such a conclusion is clearly impermissible, and the judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

(15) Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti 54

(Delivered on April 12, 2022)

The Rajasthan High Court had quashed and declared the provisions of Regulation 6(2)( h ) of the DCI (Establishment of New Dental Colleges, Opening of New or Higher Course of Study or Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in Dental Colleges) Regulations, 2006 as unconstitutional, as amended by 2012 Notification. Through Regulation 6(2)( h ), a condition was imposed for all new dental colleges for having exclusive affiliation with a private/Government medical-cum-dental hospital situated within a periphery of 10 Kms (subsequently increased to 20 Kms) which do not have any medical or dental colleges affiliated to them. Rajasthan High Court declared the said provision to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and unconstitutional on three essential grounds which are as follows:

• That it is violative of Article 19(1)( g ) of the Constitution of India .
• That it is beyond the scope of the powers of the Council to make delegated legislation as provided under sub-section (7) of Section 10-A of the said Act.

That it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India , inasmuch as the dental colleges established prior to impugned notification would be permitted to run without attachment with medical colleges, whereas the dental colleges established after the impugned notification will be compelled to have such an attachment with the medical colleges.

The Supreme Court setting aside the said judgment held that subordinate legislation can always be tested on the grounds of unreasonablity, arbitrariness or proportionality, but the same must be “manifestly arbitrary/unreasonable”. Relying on the judgments of State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy 55 , Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India 56 , Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 57 , the Court held that mere perception of unreasonability or arbitrariness is not enough, but something more must be forthcoming on the ground of challenge as not meeting the essential and basic parameters of reasonableness. If the rulemaking authority is able to demonstrate a differential treatment for differential classes with sound and plausible justification for the same, then the rule shall not be manifestly arbitrary. Accordingly, after examining the justification offered by the Central Government and Dental Council of India, Court held that reason for not permitting more than one dental college to be attached to existing recognised medical college within the prescribed radius is that if one dental college is permitted to be attached to a recognised medical college, which is already having 500-750 students, then it will lead to overcrowding of students in the medical hospital, which may affect their clinical studies. Thus, the amended Regulation cannot be said to be manifestly arbitrary, so as to warrant interference by the court. Accordingly, the judgment of Rajasthan High Court was set aside, holding the amended Rules 6(2)( h ) to be intra vires.

(16) NCTE v. Om College of Education 58

(Delivered on April 20, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Vipin Sanghi and Navin Chawla

Authored by: HM Justice Navin Chawla

The letters patent appeal before the Division Bench was preferred was against the judgment of the Single Bench, through which National Council for Teacher Education (for short “NCTE”) was directed to process and decide the pending applications for grant of approval of the teacher training courses, like D El Ed. The State of Rajasthan took a policy decision of not permitting the opening up of new colleges in the State of Rajasthan and declined to nominate an expert to participate in the Screening Committee on the ground that, in the year concerned there was a ban operative on the opening up of new colleges. The court examining the longline of judgments on the specific role of the State Government in declining to grant permission/NOC/consent for opening of new institutions held that if the Central Government has the power and authority to decide upon the grant of approvals to private unaided teacher training institutions, then the State cannot decline the same and has a very limited role to play. In the said regard, the Court referred to the judgments of Bhartia Education Society v. State of H.P. 59 , Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya v. State of U.P. 60 , wherein the court specifically referred to Regulation 7(13) of the NCTE Regulations, to hold that the State Government cannot refuse to appoint an expert in the Selection Committee for appointment of an expert member creating hindrances in the consideration of application of the institutions for grant of recognition/permission. If the State refuses to nominate any expert in the Selection Committee, then NCTE cannot wash off its hands, but must proceed without any nomination by the State. NCTE must proceed with the application of the applicant institution concerned in exercise of powers available under Section 12 (power to relax) of the regulations, being unhindered by the refusal of the State Government to participate in the selection process. The power to relax in such a situation is to be invoked and that the role of the State is extremely limited to bring forth its concerns and considerations before the NCTE, so that they can be adequately addressed and redressed. The State must forward its report supported by entire material justifying the imposition of ban in the State, which the NCTE is duty-bound to consider, but the NCTE cannot withhold the consideration and processing of applications, just because the State declines to do so. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of with directions to the NCTE for processing the applications so filed by various private applicants, to their logical conclusion within a time-bound period.

(17) Apurv Shankar v. Union of India 61

Coram: Single Judge Bench of HM Justice V. Kameswar Rao

Authored by: HM Justice V. Kameswar Rao

The petitioner had approached the High Court challenging the decision of denying them the permission to appear in the screening test conducted by Respondent 1 (National Medical Commission), for the fundamental reason that the petitioner had obtained only 47.83% in Physics, Chemistry, and Biology taken together in the 10+2 examination and would have never been granted the eligibility certificate at the outset. The petitioner contended that the B.P. Koirala Institute of Health Sciences, Dharan, Nepal, from where he had completed his MBBS is a recognised institution under Section 12 read with Schedule II of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (for short “IMC Act, 1956”).

The court traced the statutory history of Sections 12 and 13 of the IMC Act, 1956, whereunder Sections 13, 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C were inserted, providing about the requirement of clearing a screening test and obtaining an eligibility certificate for students, who have obtained medical qualification from outside India, for enrolment as a medical practitioner in any State of the country. Various regulations were framed under the enactment in pursuance thereof by the MCI, titled as Foreign Medical Institution Regulations, 2002, (hereinafter, “Eligibility Regulations”) and Screening Test Regulations, 2002 (hereinafter, “Screening Test Regulations”) mandating the requirements of clearing of screening test as a precondition for registration as a medical practitioner.

The question arose about the interpretation of the press note issued by MCI in October 2008, about the applicability of the aforementioned screening test regulations and eligibility regulations to the case of the petitioner. The Court held that the amending provisions and the regulations framed thereunder must be interpreted purposively in the background of which they were introduced and incorporated. The said Acts and Regulations were traced to have been necessitated, owing to medical scams of illegalities and irregularities that took place in admissions and passing out of students from such foreign medical institutions, thereby not meeting the domestic standards in the country. Thus the press note of October 2008 clarifying the applicability of screening test and eligibility was fully applicable to the petitioners and the petitioner was expected to possess atleast 50% marks in aggregate of Physics, Chemistry, and Biology for being issued eligibility certificate to sit in the screening test of a foreign medical institution to get himself registered in India under the provisions of the IMC Act, 1956. Referring to the judgment of Yash Ahuja v. Medical Council of India 62 , Court held that the very same issue was already settled by the Supreme Court therein. The Court held that even dehors the press note, the amended provisions of Section 13 and various regulations framed thereunder on their own are applicable on the institutions and thus, the press note cannot change the position any further. Accordingly, the petitioners were held to be ineligible for want of possessing appropriate minimum benchmark of marks in Physics, Chemistry, and Biology taken together for being issued eligibility certificate for sitting in the screening test and the petition was dismissed.

(18) Ashutosh Singh v. University of Delhi 63

(Delivered on April 21, 2022)

The challenge was made to the rejection of “spot admission” round to be held for admissions to the LLM programme for the Session 2021-2022 on account of the non-production of OBC caste certificate of the current financial year by the petitioner before the counselling authorities. Spot admission/college level counselling.

The petitioner approached the High Court challenging the rejection of his participation and admission in the university, on the fundamental ground that he was not given the time to procure the OBC non-creamy layer caste certificate for the Financial Year 2021-2022, which he was admittedly issued later but for at the time of counselling. Thus, the eligibility and entitlement of the petitioner for the admission against the OBC quota seat was not under any kind of dispute or doubt, despite which the same was rejected. On the question of delay in the procurement of the caste certificate on the ground of a few days delay and last-minute procurement of the caste certificate by the petitioner, Court held that the petitioner must have reasonable and sound anticipation of being granted admission against the OBC quota seats, which arose only when the seats were going vacant in the third round of counselling, otherwise there was no anticipation of admission for him. It was only when the reasonable anticipation and probability of admission arose, that the petitioner proceeded to apply for the said certificate and took the same. Thus, the delay in applying or procurement of the said caste certificate cannot be a ground for rejecting the admission.

Court held that the respondent Authorities never placed any condition of not accepting undertakings relating to production of caste or any reservation related certificates, then respondents cannot take the plea of not permitting candidates like the petitioner who produced the eligibility certificates later.

It was further held that insofar as benefits of reservation to the reserved categories like OBC, SC/ST are concerned, the authorities must always facilitate the candidates to take the advantage of reservation by being accommodative of production of the certificates, if otherwise, the candidate makes a claim that he is eligible for the entitlement of said certificate. By adopting a hypertechnical approach, reservation benefits to eligible meritorious candidates should not be denied.

On the question of granting relief after the commencement of academic session, the Court observed that the delay in disposal of the writ petition had occurred because of time and adjournments being sought repeatedly by the respondent University/admission granting authority and the petitioner had approached the court immediately well in point of time. Since there was no delay on part of the petitioner in approaching the court, even though the academic session had commenced, if the petitioner was entitled for grant of relief, then the court may pass appropriate orders directing for admission of the petitioner to the course in question if the seats are vacant. Accordingly, the writ was allowed.

(19) Sumandeep Vidyapeeth v. Union of India 64

(Delivered on April 22, 2022)

The application of the petitioner for starting of new ayurveda college with Bachelor of Ayurveda Medicine and Surgery (for short “BAMS”) degree from Academic Year 2021-2022 was rejected, which was affirmed by the appellate orders dated 24-2-2022 and 31-3-2022. The Letter of Intent was issued to the petitioner after a plenary inspection and issuance of essentiality certificate by the State Government in their favour. However, the final approval was denied to the college essentially on the grounds of non-availability of teaching staff, functioning hospital with proper OPD and IPD and the hospital staff. The court examined the inspection report to discover that teaching and non-teaching staff was found to be fully present during physical inspection by the assessing inspecting team. However, the AYUSH denied their employment on the ground that in the same academic session, the teachers were previously engaged in other institutes of the academic session and had joined the institution recently as full-time salaried teachers.

The court repelled the contention of AYUSH about teachers being fake teachers on the ground that there is no statutory bar over teachers changing their place of employment in the same academic year or joining a new one after leaving the previous institution of employment and that merely because in the same session, a teacher leaves previous employment to join a new institution, he gets debarred from being counted in the regular faculty of the new institution. Therefore, the plea of AYUSH was rejected on the legality of teachers working in the said institution. Referring to the judgments of Medical Council of India v. Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences, 65 and Medical Council of India v. S.R. Educational & Charitable Trust 66 , Court held that since there was admittedly no deficiency in the teaching staff of the institution, therefore, plea of AYUSH is untenable. Holding further that it is need of the hour to encourage AYUSH institutions, the Court held that it would be against public interest to deny permission to such ayurveda colleges. The AYUSH was directed to issue letter of permission to the petitioner for participating in the remaining rounds of counselling of the BAMS course for Session 2021-2022.

(20) Srinivasan Medical College & Hospital v. Union of India 67

(Delivered on April 29, 2022)

Coram: Single Judge Bench of HM Justice Dr Anita Sumanth

Authored by: HM Justice Dr Anita Sumanth

The issue that arose before the High Court was about the requirement of affiliation of a private university imparting MBBS and medical education courses (UG and PG) with the State University (TNMGR Medical University, Chennai) as a precondition for granting admissions in its medical courses. The private university was established under Tamil Nadu Private Universities Act, 2019 (for short “TNPU Act, 2019”). The petitioner University was granted approval for 150 seats of the MBBS course by the National Medical Commission. When the admission process was to commence, a notification was issued mandating all the private, self-financing medical and dental colleges of the State to get themselves affiliated with the State Medical University, and the petitioner, being the private university itself, was denied participation in the State counselling for want of affiliation from the State university. The writ proceedings were initiated for twin purposes, firstly, for the inclusion of the 65% seats in the State counselling and secondly, for the inclusion of 35% seats in the centralised counselling conducted by the Directorate General of Health Services (for short “DGHS”).

The court whilst examining the provisions of the TNPU Act, 2019 held that the act is an expression of the State’s interest in promoting private players in the field of university education and that the Act ensures appropriate, adequate, and proper control and supervision on the management of private universities at the behest of the State authorities. In the said view of the statutory arrangement, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to require the petitioner, being a private university to claim affiliation from a third State university. The purpose of seeking affiliation from the State medical university is to retain and maintain appropriate control over the examinations of the medical college concerned, which control is indirectly maintained by the Government over the private university, especially through the establishment of a regulatory body viz. private University Regulatory Commission. Referring to the judgment of Maharishi Markandeshwar University v. State of H.P. 68 of the Supreme Court of India, the Court held that it is only the constituent colleges of the State university that would require affiliation, and not the private universities established under the private university enactment of the State. Imposing the condition for affiliation on such a university is clearly an inroad into the autonomy of the institution concerned, which cannot be permitted. Accordingly, the notification of the State insofar as it mandated the university concerned to procure affiliation from State medical university was quashed qua the private universities established under TNPU Act, 2019.

On the second issue of inclusion of 35% seats in the all India counselling process, Court held that referring to Regulation 3 of the Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 1997 (GME Regulations), the Court held that a university established under the State enactment viz. the TNPU Act, 2019 shall be deemed to be a University established by the State enactment, referring to a longline of judgments of S.S. Dhanoa v. MCD 69 . When the colleges affiliated to TNMGR medical University can be included in the all India counselling, there is no hindrance for ingredient colleges of the private university of the petitioners being covered by Clause 3 of the GME Regulations. However, the court lamented the absence of any mechanism or framework through which all AIQ counselling can be extended and convened for private Universities in the State of Tamil Nadu, for which purpose the center and the State authorities were directed to immediately come out with such a framework. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed, and the seats approved by the NMC of the medical course of the petitioner institution were directed to be included in the counselling process.

(21) National Medical Commission v. Pooja Thandu Naresh 70

Coram: 2-Judges Bench of HM Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian

Authored by: HM Justice Hemant Gupta

The challenge was laid to the judgment of Madras High Court, which quashed the circular issued by Tamil Nadu Medical Council, that imposed the requirement of compulsory rotatory residential internship, followed by one year of internship before granting permanent registration under IMC in India. It was argued on behalf of the candidate that since she was declared qualified by the foreign institute after undertaking online teaching courses during the COVID-19 Pandemic, no additional requirement could be imposed by either the State Medical Council or the National Medical Commission as a precondition for registration as a medical practitioner. The only requirement that could be imposed is qualifying and clearing the screening test, imposed vide Screening Test Regulations of 2002.

The court extensively referred to eligibility regulations and screening regulations published in the GoI Gazette on 18-2-2002, which required the candidate concerned to undergo and clear the screening test. The admitted fact before the court was that the student had not undergone the practical and clinical training in the physical form, but only through online mode for the entire duration. Referring to Regulation 4(3), the Court held that since the candidate had not completed the mandatory clinical training as part of a curriculum, the course cannot be said to have been completed properly. The necessity of completing the entire duration of the course, including the clinical training is mandatory when the eligibility eegulations are read along with Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 1997. The candidate concerned may be eligible and entitled to practice in a foreign country, but he/she cannot be allowed to practice in India. Referring to the judgment of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro 71 , the Court held that practicals and clinicals form the backbone of the education with a hands-on approach involving actual application of principles taught in theory and thus without practical training, there cannot be any doctor expected to take care of the citizens of our country. Further screening examination is no proof of the clinical experience gained by the students, nor can it be its substitute. Accordingly, the decision of the High Court was held to be improper as an interference with expert opinion. Directions were issued to the NMC for providing one-time relaxation to all such students who were not able to complete their clinical training during the COVID pandemic.

(22) Aravinth R.A. v. Union of India 72

(Delivered on May 2, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian

Authored by: HM Justice V. Ramasubramanian

Challenge was made to the constitutionality of various provisions of National Medical Commission (Foreign Medical Graduate Licentiate) Regulations, 2021, (for short “Licentiate Regulations”) and the provisions of National Medical Commission (Compulsory Rotating Medical Internship) Regulations, 2021, (for short “CRMI Regulations”), published in November 2021. The provisions were challenged by various students, who had undertaken their studies from various foreign universities and were unable to complete the course during the pandemic years of 2020, 2021 and 2022. The provisions of Licentiate Regulations provided for a minimum duration of the medical course being undertaken abroad; minimum duration of internship so undertaken abroad; registration with the regulatory body, etc. in the same vein, the provisions of CRMI Regulations provided for compulsory internship in recognised medical colleges as a precondition for permanent registration as a medical practitioner in India; undertaking of national exit test; registration with the regulatory body both prior and post commencement of the medical course with the competent regulatory authority in the countries where the course is being undertaken, as also in India. The challenge was mounted on various grounds, fundamentally being arbitrary, and violative of Part III rights of the Constitution of India . However, the court repealed the challenge, quoting many past experiences (mostly in the form of scams), that dropped the medical education sector in the late 1990s and early decade of 2000 on fake doctors completing education courses from abroad and then seeking registration in India. The necessity of “time”, which warranted the experts in the field of education to introduce rigorous, protective, and stringent measures for verification of all those students undertaking medical education abroad, so that those who do not undertake the course genuinely are segregated from those who have undertaken it so.

In its reasoning, the court traced the origin of statutory provisions governing foreign medical education right from the year 1916, when such provisions were being introduced, especially under Medical Degrees Act, 1916 , followed by Indian Medical Council Act, 1933 . The Court held that pre-admission and post-completion of the medical course concerned, the expert body has full authority to determine the eligibility of any candidate who wants to study abroad, as he shall be utilising the skill obtained abroad to the citizens of the country, for the purposes of which the checks and restrictions can be imposed. The court also referred to a longline of judgments, which was delivered by the Supreme Court in the petitions filed by students who had pursued medical education from abroad seeking regularisation of their degrees from time to time and how courts were constrained to grant them relief in the absence of appropriate regulatory restrictive provisions. Reference in this respect was made to Medical Council of India v. Indian Doctors from Russia Welfare Associations 73 , Sanjeev Gupta v. Union of India 74 , Rohit Naresh Agarwal v. Union of India 75 .

Thus, accordingly referring to Sections 15, 35 and 36 of the NMC Act, Court held that no unreasonability or arbitrariness can be attributed to the Licentiate or CRMI Regulations, affirming the constitutionality of the same in view of the existence of laudable objectives behind it attending to the public health concerns of the country.

(23) K. Ragupathi v. State of U.P. 76

(Delivered on May 12, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.R. Gavai

The appellant challenged the termination order issued by Gautam Buddha University, Greater Noida, U.P. without holding an enquiry submitting that he could not have been suddenly relieved, which in effect was a punitive termination and passed in a mala fide manner. The appellant was appointed following the same mode and manner, which was being followed for appointment of permanent and regularly employed teaching employees but on a purely contractual basis. The appointment was affected from amongst the applicant candidates by the Selection Committee and thus even though the nomenclature of the appointment was contractual, for all intended purposes, they were required to undergo the entire selection process, which was born out from the affidavit of the university itself filed before the High Court. The terms and conditions are almost like a regular employee, including maintenance of annual performance assessment report (APAR) and grading of performance of the employee in the same including his reputation and integrity.

The High Court had dismissed the writ petition holding the appellant to be a contractual employee, setting aside which direction, the Court held that since the employment was partaking the character of a regular employee, he could not have been terminated without following the due principles of natural justice, especially when the services were discontinued plausibly on account of stigmatic allegations made against him by the Dean of the said University relating to his performance in the services. Accordingly, the termination order was set aside with due reinstatement of the appellant.

(24) Dr.Vikas R.S. v. State of Kerala 77

(Delivered on May 26, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices S. Manikumar and Shaji P. Chaly

Authored by: HM Justice Shaji P. Chaly

Challenge was put to the judgment of a learned Single Judge, through which dismissed the writ petitions of the petitioners, who were all government doctors holding that the provisions of Regulation 9 (IV) of the Medical Council of India Postgraduate (for short “MCIPG”) Medical Education Regulations, 2000 do not confer any right on the Government Medical Officers serving in rural areas to get weightage in the marks as incentive for the services rendered by them. The State of Kerala had a service quota in the PG medical course seats. Vide this service quota, the Government doctors, who had served in rural, remote, and difficult areas were entitled for being included in the said service quota along with grant of incentive marks. However, doctors working in rural areas were demanding to be given special reservations in the PG degree seats. The Single Judge held that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued for providing incentives or reservation to the Government medical doctors, nor can the existing provisions of the prospectus/brochure be challenged as arbitrary and violative under Article 14 of the Constitution of India . The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the Single Bench, holding that no such directions can be issued and that splitting up of seats between the three departments viz. medical education service, health service, and insurance medical service in the ratio of 45:45:10 of the service quota cannot be treated as unjustifiable. No right is conferred on medical officers in the services of Government/public authorities to get weightage in the marks as an incentive for service in notified rural areas in such circumstances. Therefore, the court was handicapped in issuing any such direction to the government for incorporating the said provisions to the advantage of the appellants. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed.

(25) Pranati Aguan v. State of W.B. 78

(Delivered on June 10, 2022)

Coram: Single Judge Bench of HM Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya

Authored by: HM Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya

The petitioners who were all aspiring to be appointed on the post of headmaster/headmistress challenged the amendments made to the West Bengal School Service Commission (Selection for Appointment to the Posts of Headmaster/Headmistress in Secondary or Higher Secondary and Junior High Schools) Rules, 2016, through which enhanced qualifications for selection on the post of headmaster/headmistress in schools were imposed. The qualifications were enhanced from 45% to 50%, which were challenged essentially on two grounds; firstly, on treating equals as unequals and creating a class between the existing appointed headmaster/headmistress serving the institutions (with lower qualification) and those to be appointed subsequently. Secondly, that the other departments of the State running schools are following and adhering to the qualification requirement of 45% and not 50% within the State and thus employees of one department are being unfairly treated by being subject to higher qualifications, after having served continuously for more than 10 years at various schools on the post of teachers/assistant teachers.

Court held that the petitioner cannot have any legitimate expectation, much less any vested right of being recruited to the post of headmaster/headmistress, which is always subject to eligibility criteria being determined by the employer. Thus, if the employer chooses to adopt the norms and standards laid down by the National Council for Teachers Education (for short “NCTE”), which is the apex authority governing the eligibility qualifications of the teachers, teaching in schools and pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary, and senior secondary education, then such a decision cannot be interfered with. It was further held that even though other departments of the State are following and adhering to lower qualification criteria, it cannot be a ground for striking down the higher qualification imposed by one department as progressive measures towards enhancement and improvement of educational standards must always be respected and revered by the courts. Maybe higher qualifications laid down by one department become a measure worth being emulated by other departments. On the aspects of treating equals as unequals, the Court held that there cannot be any comparison as prospective aspirants for the post of headmaster/headmistress standing on a different footing than existing post holders of headmaster/headmistress. The violation of the guarantee of equality can be alleged only if there is iniquitous treatment of persons falling within the same bracket despite their homogenous characteristics. Thus, the prospective aspirant for the post of headmaster/headmistress cannot be treated at par with those already serving on the said post. Higher educational qualifications are in consonance with Article 21-A of the Constitution of India for ensuring the excellence in academic standards through the excellence of teachers and staff as also pronounced in the landmark judgment of State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty. 79

(26) Bhat Ab. Urban Bin I Aftaf v. UT of J&K 80

(Delivered on June 27, 2022)

Coram: Single Judge Bench of HM Justice Sanjeev Kumar

Authored by: HM Justice Sanjeev Kumar

The challenge was laid by a BDS candidate, who had qualified the Pre-PG NEET entrance examination for admissions to the master of dental surgery course (PG seat). The Court held that denial of seat was unfair, but the question arose about adjustment of the candidate as the counselling process was already over and the last date of admission had expired. In the aforesaid context, Court held that under Article 226, the High Court has plenary powers to do justice for any petitioner candidate, who would be entitled to relief on being treated unfairly and unreasonably by the counselling and admission authorities. Referring to the judgment of S. Krishna Sradha v. State of A.P. 81 , the Court held that if a meritorious candidate has been denied admission by the counselling authorities illegally or irrationally for no fault of his/her, then the court can direct for increasing of seats even after expiry of the deadline for accommodating and effecting admissions to such deserving candidates. Court may also direct the private medical college concerned to keep the equivalent number of seats vacant in the subsequent years to enable them to complete their education timely. Relying on the aforesaid judgment, Court held that since in the present case, the petitioner had been denied unjustly and irrationally the benefit of reservation by the State authorities, therefore he should be accommodated in the current year by increase of one seat and the said seat should be adjusted in the next academic year for the overall intake. Accordingly, using its extraordinary inherent powers available under Article 226, the High Court granted relief to the petitioner.

†Partner, SVS Attorneys. Expert in constitutional, civil and securitisation laws and practising advocate at the Supreme Court of India.

†† 4th year Student at Dr B.R. Ambedkar National Law University, Sonepat.

1. Readers can send their suggestions about any important judgment [email protected] and [email protected] .

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Compensatory education is not addressed in the United States Code, (IDEA 2004 / Section 504), the Code of Federal Regulations, or state statutes and regulations. You will not read about compensatory education in IDEA or Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act. Compensatory education ("comp ed") was created and developed by case law. To understand how comp ed evolved, you need to know this history. Changes in special education law are caused, in part, by changes in the United States Code. For example, Congress revised the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1997 and changed the name to the Individuals with Disabilties Education Act of 1997 (known as IDEA 97). In 2004, Congress revised the law again. This revised law is referred to as IDEA 2004. Decisions issued by the U. S. Supreme Court and the U. S. Courts of Appeal also cause the special education law to evolve and change. The law about a child's entitlement to compensatory education was influenced by three cases from the U. S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) - Burlington in 1985, this author's Carter case in 1993, and the recent Endrew F. case in 2017 Decisions from the U. S. Courts of Appeal also led to major changes and are the focus of this overview about the law of compensatory education. In 1982, the Eighth Circuit in Miener v. State of Missouri 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.1982) held that "Congress did not create a private cause of action under the EHA for the damage relief requested, including compensatory educational services." In 1985, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) explaining that: "In this Court, the Town repeatedly characterizes reimbursement as 'damages,' but that simply is not the case. Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP." In ordering tuition reimbursement to the parents, the Court held that "The statute directs the court to 'grant such relief as it determines is appropriate.' The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of relief is not further specified, except that it must be 'appropriate.' Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be 'appropriate' in light of the purpose of the Act . . . [and that] means that equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief." In 1986, Miener went back to the Eighth Circuit on a renewed claim for compensatory education. The Court reversed itself explaining that "However, the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington, supra, a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, has altered our understanding of what "damages" includes in the context of the EHA . . . the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory educational services if she prevails on her claim that the defendants denied her a free appropriate education in violation of the EHA." Miener v. State of Missouri 800 F. 2d 749 (8th Cir.1986) Miener was the first U. S. Court of Appeals to uphold an award of compensatory education and continues to be regularly cited by other courts as the legal authority for such an award. Two years later, in Jefferson County (Alabama) v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir.1988), the Eleventh Circuit cited Burlington and Miener as authority that "Compensatory education, like retroactive reimbursement, is necessary to preserve a handicapped child's right to a free education . . . [and] providing a compensatory education should serve as a deterrent against states unnecessarily prolonging litigation in order to decrease their potential liability. We believe that the district court correctly ordered the Board to provide Alice with two years compensatory education." In New York four months later, the Second Circuit, in Burr v. Ambach , 863 F. 2d 1071 (2d Cir.1988), cited Burlington and Miener , in holding that "Administrative and legal proceedings are often lengthy, and a person who prevails at the end of such proceedings should be able to obtain what the proceedings establish he was entitled to when they began. Clifford should not lose the education to which he was entitled at the time his parents requested a hearing under the Act because the hearing was protracted. The Institute was mistaken when it decided that its program was inappropriate for Clifford, as the administrative decisions show, and that mistake should not cost Clifford one and one-half years of education to which he was entitled." Note, after this decision, Burr went back up to the Court a year later on another issue, so that this case is known as Burr I and the other as Burr II . In 1990, in Lester H. v. Gilhool , PA Secretary of Education 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.1990), the Third Circuit upheld a district court ruling that "awarded the plaintiff, Lester H., two and one half years of compensatory education beyond age 21, the statutory maximum specified in the EHA." In Lester H. v. Gilhool , as a result of different schools and home-bound instruction, the child did not receive FAPE for two and a half years. The Third Circuit upheld the District Court, holding that "The injury has been done and although the exact contours of the appropriate remedy may not be ascertainable now, Lester's injury certainly could be, and was, ascertained. Moreover, the court left ample room for the exact contours of the remedy to be shaped by the appropriate authorities at the appropriate time. All the court did was award Lester the number of years needed to restore that which concededly had been denied him and that to which he is entitled . . ." One month later, the Second Circuit addressed compensatory education again in Mrs. C. v. Wheaton (Comm. of Educ, CT) 916 F.2d 69 (2d. Cir.1990). This case is similar to some issues that are presently occuring nationwide related to COVID-19 with special education and related services terminated or not provided. "In light of our determination that the Department was required to follow EHA procedures before terminating J.C.'s educational placement, the complaint clearly alleges violations of the EHA that led to J.C.'s exclusion from his educational placement. Moreover, a comparison of appellant's allegations with the violations we found in Burr I shows that compensable education is an appropriate remedy here. The 'gross violations' we found in Burr I consisted of undue delay in an agency hearing and in administrative review thereafter in violation of the EHA and applicable regulations in a situation where the handicapped child was being deprived of the benefit of the 'stay-put' provision of the EHA because his former school had closed. Thus, in Burr I the school's failure to comply with EHA procedures deprived the student of an educational placement until he was 21. Here, appellant alleges that defendants in effect took advantage of J.C.'s mental infirmities to evade EHA procedures, resulting in J.C.'s complete exclusion from an educational placement until he was 21, with disastrous results. We believe that the complaint states a claim for compensatory educational relief." "As we held in Burr I and Burr II and hold again today, compensatory education is a proper remedy in an appropriate situation for enforcing EHA educational rights. Since § 504 expressly allows for equitable relief, compensatory education is an appropriate remedy when it is used to enforce EHA rights." In 1991, the Sixth Circuit in Hall v. Knott County (KY) 941 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1991) addressed compensatory education as a statute of limitations issue. A blind child "received home instruction from the defendant board of education beginning in 1972, when she was 11 years old. The home instruction was continued beyond her 21st birthday, and she received a high school diploma at the age of 22. This lawsuit was filed five years later, when the plaintiff was 27." "Although the plaintiff had stated a justiciable claim for prospective compensatory education costs, she was estopped to make the claim because she and her parents had failed to assert their rights at a time when the defendants could still have complied with the Act." "The principal issue on appeal, which is linked to the type of relief available, is whether the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Concluding that it was, we shall affirm the dismissal." [ Wrightslaw Note: Hall graduated on May 3, 1983. At that time all case law denied any entitlement to comp ed. This case was filed on on May 26, 1988 and Miener was the only case at that time that authorized entitlement to comp ed.] In 1994 the Second Circuit again addressed comp ed in Garro v. Connecticut Dept. of Educ. 23 F.3d 734 (2d Cir.1994) and held that it "is unavailable to a claimant over the age of twenty-one in the absence of 'gross' procedural violations. " That same year, in a State of Washington case, the Ninth Circuit in Student v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir.1994), found that the student "unquestionably lost time during his eighth and ninth grade years when he was not receiving special services. The plaintiffs argue that ipso facto, he is entitled to an equal amount of compensatory education, without any further analysis. But compensatory education is not a contractual remedy, but an equitable remedy, part of the court's resources in crafting 'appropriate relief.' There was no showing that a general award of unspecified one and one-half years of compensatory education was appropriate." "There is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed. Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA. Student W. was able to graduate from high school, before reaching age 21, without more services than provided for in his annual IEP. The IDEA promises him no more." "To hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying compensatory relief would be to destroy the equitable nature of the district court's charge to fashion 'appropriate relief.' It may be a rare case when compensatory education is not appropriate, but it was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to decide that this case was such a rarity." In 1995, the Third Circuit in Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P. 62 F.3d 520 (3rd Cir.1995) concluded that "We have held that compensatory education is available to respond to situations where a school district flagrantly fails to comply with the requirements of IDEA." The Third Circuit removed the "bad faith / flagrant disregard" standard. "Although we do not believe that bad faith is required, most of the cases awarding compensatory education involved quite egregious circumstances. This case does not appear to be in that category." "The cases from other circuits which recognize compensatory education without explicitly requiring a higher degree of intent by the district have also involved more culpable conduct." "In any event, there was no violation shown here, since the 1991-92 IEP was not challenged and was therefore presumptively appropriate. We must therefore reverse the district court's order insofar as it awarded six months of compensatory education for the purported inappropriateness of the 1991-92 IEP." Until the Third Circuit issued Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P. , to be entitled to an award of compensatory education, there had to be egregious facts against the school district. In 1996, the rulings of the Courts began to shift. In M.C. v. Central Region Sch. Dist. 81 F.3d 389 (3d. Cir.1996) the Third Circuit explained that "Under IDEA, a disabled student is entitled to free, appropriate education until he or she reaches age twenty-one. A court award of compensatory education requires a school district to provide education past a child's twenty-first birthday to make up for any earlier deprivation." "In order to define the correct standard for granting compensatory education, we must delineate the threshold of deficiency in the school board's stewardship necessary to trigger an award. Unfortunately, there is little caselaw or legal commentary to guide us. Likewise there are no New Jersey or federal regulations to direct our inquiry. While this is not the first time we have contemplated this issue, the facts of our previous cases have made our past analyses relatively straightforward." "Our holding can be summarized as follows: a school district that knows or should know that a child has an inappropriate IEP or is not receiving more than a de minimis educational benefit must correct the situation. If it fails to do so, a disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem. We believe that this formula harmonizes the interests of the child, who is entitled to a free appropriate education under IDEA, with those of the school district, to whom special education and compensatory education is quite costly." "Obviously the case against the school district will be stronger if the district actually knew of the educational deficiency or the parents had complained. But a child's entitlement to special education should not depend upon the vigilance of the parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend the problem) nor be abridged because the district's behavior did not rise to the level of slothfulness or bad faith. Rather, it is the responsibility of the child's teachers, therapists, and administrators and of the multi-disciplinary team that annually evaluates the student's progress to ascertain the child's educational needs, respond to deficiencies, and place him or her accordingly." "Thus, J.C.'s educational deprivation appears to have lasted a long time. On remand, the district court should determine when the Central Regional knew or should have known that J.C.'s IEP was inappropriate or that he was not receiving more than de minimis educational benefit; it should also define the reasonable time within which the district should have done something about it. Compensatory education should accrue from that point forward." As the entitlement to compensatory education became clear, the developing issue was how much comp ed and how is it determined. In 2000, the Eighth Circuit (of Miener fame) in Strawn v. Missouri Bd. of Ed. 210 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2000) affirmed the child's entitlement to compensatory education and said that "we think the determination of a remedy for a year of lost education should properly lie with a state administrative panel in the first instance." "However, we note that Lauren may be entitled to more than just one year of compensatory education because, as the resolution conference acknowledged, 'the optimum time for language acquisition is at a younger age than Lauren's present age.' Thus, we remand to the district court with an instruction to refer the matter back to the state panel for a determination of the appropriate compensatory education remedy." In other words, a year lost of special education could require more than a year of compensatory education. In 2003, in Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. and Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.2003) the Court explained that "compensatory education is not an appropriate remedy for a purely procedural violation of the IDEA. In contrast, a substantive violation may give rise to a claim for compensatory relief. Here, the prospective relief that the appellants sought at the commencement of these proceedings was both procedural and substantive. Thus, a claim for compensatory education arguably lies and their case is not moot." Due to the passage of time in a special education appeal, some cases have become moot, in that there was no longer an ongoing controversy. Once deemed moot, some pro-child decision's from the District Court have been vacated and thus the parent's entitlement to recoupment of attorney's fees has become lost. That happened twice in 2019 and the cases are discussed in our 2019 Year in Review book, scheduled for release in June, 2020. In a case involving an Air Force family against the Dept. of Defense Education Authority G. v. Ft. Bragg Dependent Schools, 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir.2003) the Court defined comp ed - "Compensatory education involves discretionary, prospective, injunctive relief, crafted by a court to remedy what might be termed an educational deficit created by an educational agency's failure over a given period of time to provide a FAPE to a student. We agree with every circuit to have addressed the question that the IDEA permits an award of such relief in some circumstances. As we explain below, because the district court's basis for rejection of G's compensatory education claim involved an erroneous legal conclusion, we reverse its rejection of that claim and remand for reconsideration." In 2005, entitlement to comp ed was not an issue, nor did it require bad faith by a school district. However, case law was unclear as to the determination of the remedy and who should make that determination. Most decisions remanded the case back to either the District Court Judge or the Hearing Officer / Administrative Law Judge to make that determination. In some of those cases, it was then sent back to the IEP Team to calculate what was needed in the form of comp ed. The next major landmark comp ed case was Reid v. DC 401 F.3d 516 (DC Cir.2005) which closed the door on the involvement of an IEP Team in the determination of amount of comp ed and an hour for hour calculation. "In this case, although the hearing officer made express findings regarding DCPS's four-and-a-half-year denial of FAPE, he set forth the 810-hour award in a one-sentence ipse dixit. 'At rate of 1 hour for each day of special education services not provided,' he wrote, 'DCPS is to provide 810 hours (4.5 multiplied by 180 school days) of compensatory education services to Mathew as his IEP team directs.' The officer's order contains neither reasoning to support this hour-per-day formula nor factual findings showing that the 810- hour result satisfied Mathew's needs." Nor, regarding the other issue in this case, could the court defer to the hearing officer's decision to delegate authority to the IEP team. The " Rowley standard requires only that schools provide 'some educational benefit,' - a standard that looks to the child's present abilities - an IEP conforming to that standard carries no guarantee of undoing damage done by prior violations. As this case demonstrates, moreover, that damage may be quite severe: according to expert testimony, Mathew not only failed to keep pace with his peers under the school district's IEP, but actually learned 'counterproductive' compensatory techniques that he must now unlearn before he may advance. Consistent with Congress's stated aim of ensuring that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected, we therefore join our sister circuits and hold that compensatory education awards fit comfortably within the 'broad discretion' of courts fashioning and enforcing IDEA remedies." "Accordingly, just as IEPs focus on disabled students' individual needs, so must awards compensating past violations rely on individualized assessments." The "amount of compensatory education appropriate in Mathew's case cannot be determined as a matter of law. Rather, designing Mathew's remedy will require a fact-specific exercise of discretion by either the district court or a hearing officer. As to the school district, although 810 hours certainly seems like a significant award, without grounds for deference to the hearing officer we may conclude at summary judgment that this remedy was correct as a matter of law only if our review of the record reveals that any greater remedy would amount to an abuse of discretion. We cannot reach that conclusion because, drawing all inferences in Mathew's favor, as we must at summary judgment, we have no basis for concluding that 810 hours - barely more than half of a single academic year — would suffice to make up for Mathew's four-and-a-half years without FAPE, especially considering that during that period he developed 'counterproductive' reading habits." "As we have explained, however, whereas ordinary IEPs need only provide 'some benefit,' compensatory awards must do more - they must compensate." "On remand, the district court may solicit additional evidence from the parties and fashion an appropriate compensatory education award based on the principles outlined in this opinion. Alternatively . . . rather than exercising their right to 'request' consideration of additional evidence, the district court may determine that the 'appropriate' relief is a remand to the hearing officer for further proceedings." The Reids' second challenge raises a straightforward question of law: may IDEA hearing officers authorize IEP teams to 'reduce or discontinue' compensatory education awards? Disagreeing with the district court, we answer no. . . . Any modified award may not delegate authority to the IEP team to reduce or discontinue the prescribed compensatory instruction." In 2008, compensatory education took another turn and opened the door to what became called the "Poor Man's Burlington Remedy." Jarron Draper's attorneys, Steven Wyner and Marcy Tiffany, wrote an article for Wrightslaw about the case. The URL is https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/draper.comped.wyner.htm In Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Pub. Sch. 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2008) the Court ordered,as comp ed, four years of private school tuition, to extend well past the youngster's 21st birthday. The Draper case relied on Reid and both cases are frequently cited by courts as they write decisions about unique comp ed remedies. In Draper , the District Court judge heard evidence and developed the remedy. The youngster had been misdiagnosed as being mentally retarded and placed into EMR classes when the youngster was in fact dyslexic. At the time of the initial hearing, Draper was 18 years old and in the eleventh grade, but he was only able to read at the third-grade level. The Court noted that "Draper had been observed writing words, letters, and numbers backwards, a classic symptom of dyslexia, and that he performed much better on verbal tasks, the evaluation performed in June 1998 was spectacularly deficient. The evaluation did not measure Draper's phonological processing levels (which are essential to reading) nor did the evaluator review Draper's receptive and expressive levels. Based on the limited evaluation performed, which essentially included an I.Q. test, the school psychologist concluded that [Draper] had a full scale I.Q. of 63 . . . The persistent refusal of the School System to acknowledge the substantial evidence of its misdiagnosis borders on incredible." "We do not read the Act as requiring compensatory awards of prospective education to be inferior to awards of reimbursement . . . The Act instead empowers the district court to use broad discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief . . . The Act does not foreclose a compensatory award of placement in a private school. The district court was free to award Draper a placement in a private school without regard to the remedy fashioned by the administrative law judge, and Draper was not required to prove that the School System was incapable of providing him an appropriate education." "In our review of Draper's award, we are mindful that an award of compensation for a violation of the Act is different from the educational program ordinarily required by the Act. An educational program must be 'reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits . . . Although ordinary educational programs need only provide some benefit, compensatory awards must do more - they must compensate.' Compensatory awards should place children in the position they would have been in but for the violation of the Act." In addition to the article by Wyner and Tiffany, we have several other articles on Wrightslaw about Draper , including the Complaint that was filed in federal court: https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/pleadings/GA.draper.complaint.pdf https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/07/GA.jdraper.atlanta.htm https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/draper.aps.comped.htm Draper established that educational services to provide compensatory are greater than the services for an IEP. At the time of the Draper decision, the definition of the word "appropriate" in FAPE was based on the 1982 SCOTUS Rowley case. The standard changed to comply with the SCOTUS decision in the Endrew F. case. M.C. v. Antelope Valley 858 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.2017) a Ninth Circuit case issued just after Endrew F. emphasized that "To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances. In other words, the school must implement an IEP that is reasonably calculated to remediate and, if appropriate, accommodate the child's disabilities so that the child can make progress in the general education curriculum, taking into account the progress of his non-disabled peers, and the child's potential. We remand so the district court can consider plaintiffs' claims in light of this new guidance from the Supreme Court." Since the 2008 Draper case, there have been a number of decisions that address comp ed, but relatively few new legal issues. To find the most recent compensatory education cases in your jurisdiction, go to https://scholar.google.com click on "Case law," then select the Courts you wish to search, state and federal, and then enter as your search term the following, with the quotation marks: "individuals with disabilities education act" "compensatory education" Wrightslaw Note: This webpage was created in preparation for a May 19, 2020 webinar related to special education during the pandemic. Three other attorneys participated in the webinar - Piper Paul, Jack Robinson, and Wayne Steedman. The webinar was hosted by Dr. Roseann and is available through her website at: https://drroseann.com/special-education-during-a-pandemic/ As one of four presenters, my role was to discuss the law of compensatory education. To prepare for the webinar, I created a PowerPoint presentation. I converted the PPT to a PDF. The PDF of the PowerPoint presentation is at: https://www.wrightslaw.com/info/comp.ed.law.webinar.powerpoint.pdf Wrightslaw Note: For more about comp ed and the articles on our website, in the far upper right-hand top corner of this page is a blue box with a magnifying glass. To the left of that is a text box to enter your "Google" search term. Insert "comp ed" and you will see many more files. Also, on July 27, 2022, the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) provided a comprehensive 1.25 hour webinar about comp ed. It was recorded. Click here for the link and more information. Date revised: 7/27/2022

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Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District, No. 23-3630 (6th Cir. 2024)

A group of parents, represented by Parents Defending Education (PDE), challenged the Olentangy Local School District's policies that prohibit harassment based on gender identity, including the intentional use of non-preferred pronouns. PDE argued that these policies violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. The policies in question include the Anti-Harassment Policy, the Personal Communication Devices (PCD) Policy, and the Code of Conduct, all of which aim to prevent harassment and bullying within the school district. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied PDE's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of these policies. The court found that PDE had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claims. Specifically, the court held that the policies did not unconstitutionally compel speech, did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, and were not overbroad. The court also determined that PDE had not shown that the policies would likely cause irreparable harm. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that PDE had not met the burden of showing a clear likelihood of success on the merits. The court found that the school district's policies were consistent with the standard for regulating student speech established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which allows schools to regulate speech that could substantially disrupt school activities or invade the rights of others. The court also held that the policies did not unconstitutionally compel speech, as students could use first names instead of pronouns, and that the policies were not overbroad. The court concluded that PDE had not demonstrated that the balance of equities or the public interest favored granting a preliminary injunction.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

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Biden’s Title IX Rule Takes Effect Amid a Confusing Legal Landscape

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The Biden administration’s new Title IX regulation expanding protections for LGTBQ+ students goes into effect Aug. 1—in a confused and patchwork fashion as injunctions have blocked it in 26 states as well as at some schools in other states. It also takes effect as the U.S. Supreme Court weighs an emergency request from the Biden administration to partially limit those injunctions and allow most of the rule to take effect across the country.

The U.S. Department of Education regulation clarifies for the first time that the 1972 federal statute, which bars sex discrimination in federally funded educational programs, protects students based on sexual orientation and gender identity. It also expands protections for pregnant and postpartum students, offers stronger language about retaliation, and sets out new grievance and due-process procedures.

The regulation has been challenged by 26 states as well as individual school districts, students, and private groups. Most of those challenges center on the law’s revised definition of sex discrimination to include gender identity, which the challengers contend is not consistent with the text of Title IX.

Federal district courts have issued preliminary injunctions in recent weeks that block the rule in 22 states. One injunction also blocks it at any school attended by any child of the member of Moms for Liberty or two other challenging groups. Meanwhile, one federal district judge this week rejected the request for a preliminary injunction, in a suit brought by four conservative-leaning states—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina. But late Wednesday, a federal appeals court intervened and blocked the rule in those states at least pending further briefing in the next few days.

A request for emergency relief awaits Supreme Court action

Many educators and legal experts were expecting the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in by the Aug. 1 effective date, but as of late in the day July 31, the court had not acted.

U.S. Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar last week asked the high court to allow most of the Title IX rule to take effect on Aug. 1, even as the Biden administration went along with pausing some challenged provisions that touch on gender-identity discrimination.

In requests that technically stemmed from the challenges involving 10 states, Prelogar said in her two main filings that the Biden administration did not object to pausing two provisions that she characterized as being at the heart of the multiple lawsuits challenging the new regulation. One of those deals with restrooms, locker rooms, and other sex-separated spaces in education. The regulation says, for example, that a school would violate Title IX if it prohibits transgender individuals from using restrooms that align with their gender identity.

The other challenged provision the administration is OK with leaving halted for now involves an update to the definition of “hostile-environment harassment” to include harassment based on gender identity. The challengers assert that language would be used to require teachers and students to refer to transgender students by pronouns that align with their gender identity.

Prelogar said the administration would defend those provisions in the course of the litigation but was not seeking to limit the injunction against them with its emergency request in the Supreme Court.

“Most of the rule does not address gender identity,” Prelogar said, citing among other things the regulation’s protections for pregnant and postpartum students, stronger language about retaliation, and new grievance procedures.

The solicitor general, however, did ask the justices to stay the injunctions with respect to the revised overall definition of sex discrimination in the regulation.

Prelogar argued for allowing the full definition, with its inclusion of gender identity, to go into effect. But as a fallback position, she suggested the reference to gender identity could be blocked while the rest of the definition went into effect.

States challenging the Title IX rule argue that Biden administration is trying to ‘salvage’ it by throwing some provisions ‘overboard’

Louisiana, in a brief responding to the solicitor general’s emergency application, said the U.S. Department of Education “has failed to convince a single court that the rule is likely lawful” and that as its “losses have mounted, the department has tried … to salvage the rule by throwing overboard the provisions that the department finds least defensible.”

Louisiana is defending a June 13 injunction issued by a federal district judge that also applies to Idaho, Mississippi, and Montana. That case is U.S. Department of Education v. Louisiana .

Alliance Defending Freedom, the conservative legal organization heavily involved in several of the challenges to the Title IX rule, filed a brief in the Supreme Court on behalf of its client in the Louisiana case, the Rapides Parish school board.

The brief said a partial stay of the injunction would be harmful because “schools would have to work out how the rule functions without its key provisions, amend their policies, and train their staff accordingly” all in short order and then possibly have to do it again after judicial review of the regulation was complete.

Meanwhile, the other case before the court is Cardona v. Tennessee , in which Tennessee along with Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia is defending a June 17 district court injunction blocking the entire rule. Those states argued in a brief that the Biden administration was inappropriately seeking a “merits preview” from the Supreme Court of the key issue of whether Title IX covers gender identity “to stem the tide of adverse decisions” from lower courts.

“The states challenged the whole rule” and “are injured by the whole rule,” the Tennessee brief said.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in Cincinnati, accepted that argument in a 2-1 panel decision on July 17 that upheld the injunction in the Tennessee-led case. The majority of that panel sought to explain why it believed blocking part or all of the new definition of sex discrimination would be problematic for the rule’s other provisions.

“Each of the provisions that the department wishes to begin enforcing on August 1 implicates the new definition of sex discrimination,” the 6th Circuit said. “It is hard to see how all of the schools covered by Title IX could comply with this wide swath of new obligations if the rule’s definition of sex discrimination remains [blocked].”

One separate injunction also applies to certain schools in a wider swath of states

Only one federal judge has rejected a preliminary injunction. On July 30, U.S. District Judge Annemarie Carney Axon of Birmingham, Ala., an appointee of President Donald Trump, rejected a preliminary injunction sought by Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina to block the regulation. The plaintiffs’ evidence was sparse and their legal arguments were “conclusory and underdeveloped,” she said.

Late on July 31, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta, granted an emergency request by the plaintiffs in that case to block the regulation in those four states.

Several other federal district courts did issue injunctions blocking the regulation in 12 states in addition to the 10 involved in the emergency applications in the Supreme Court. One of those, issued July 2 by a U.S. district judge in Kansas, covers that state plus Alaska, Utah, and Wyoming. It also has a unusual provision covering any school attended by children of members of three groups that joined that challenge, regardless of which state those schools are in. Those groups are Young America’s Foundation, Female Athletes United, and Moms for Liberty.

Judge John W. Broomes on July 19 declined a request from Moms for Liberty, which is represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, to alter his injunction to cover any county where there was a school attended by one of the group’s members, which would have even further expanded the geographic scope. But he did clarify that the groups could enlist new members and add their children’s schools to the list.

That prompted Moms for Liberty last week to launch an effort to enlist new members and have new and existing members add the names of their children’s schools to their profiles.

“In order to give the judge a list of these schools while protecting the names of our members, which could be connected to their minor children, we will submit a list of schools where members opted in to be protected from Title IX through our website,” Moms for Liberty co-founders Tina Descovich and Tiffany Justice said in a July 23 statement.

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