essay on moral conflict

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By Michelle Maiese

Originally Published July, 2003; Current Implications section added by Heidi Burgess in April 2017.

What Is Moral Conflict?

Current implications.

The 2016 Presidential election in the United States was a "wake up call" for many people. Many of us were not aware of the depth of the distributional--and moral--divide in this country. More...

Protracted conflict sometimes results from a clash between differing world-views. One group's most fundamental and cherished assumptions about the best way to live may differ radically from the values held by another group.[1] Parties may have different standards of rightness and goodness and give fundamentally different answers to serious moral questions.[2] When groups have different ideas about the good life, they often stress the importance of different things, and may develop radically different or incompatible goals. This can lead to conflict.

Because values and morals tend to be quite stable, people are often unwilling to negotiate or compromise with respect to these topics. Indeed, if the basic substantive issues of the conflict are deeply embedded in the participants' moral orders, these issues are likely to be quite intractable.[3]

A group's moral order is related to its practices, its patterns of thinking, and its patterns of language. As they are socialized, group members learn to center their judgments on values and procedures fundamental to their own common culture.[4] Their moral order provides the set of meanings through which they understand their experience and make judgments about what is valuable and important.[5] These patterns of meaning shape the way that individuals understand facts and issues and help them to develop a sense of identity . Social reality also dictates what counts as appropriate action and sets boundaries on what people are able to do.[6] It even affects the way in which emotions are labeled, understood, and acted upon. Thus, an individual's beliefs, sayings, and actions must be understood within the context of a particular social world.

People from the same culture have more or less equivalent realities and mindsets. Their values, assumptions, and procedures become part of "common sense" for them. However, when two parties that do not share norms of communication [customary patterns and rules of communication] and expectations about behavior must interact, they often clash.[7] Each party may believe that its ways of doing things and thinking about things is the best way and come to regard other ways of thinking and acting as inferior, strange, or morally wrong.[8]

Moral conflict occurs when disputants are acting within different social worlds, according to different meanings.[9] Indeed, one of the reasons groups in conflict have trouble breaking the pattern of interaction between them is that each is caught in its own moral order. When two groups have radically different ways of making sense of human life, it is likely that actions regarded by one side as good and prudent will be perceived by the other as evil or foolish.[10] This is because an action that one moral order deems perfectly acceptable may be regarded as an abomination by a different moral order.

For example, sometimes people distinguish between moral orders built on rights and those built on virtues.[11] Each one is associated with particular forms of society and ways of being human. While a rights -based approach is associated with the Enlightenment and modernity, a virtues-based approach emerges from traditional society. When modernists carry out acts regarded as obligatory or good within their own moral order, "these very acts offend traditionalists."[12] Inter-racial or inter-religious marriages, for example, are seen by many as one outgrowth of inclusivity and tolerance . The freedom to marry anyone is a "right." Traditionalists, however, would see it as evil -- harming their race or religion. Likewise, some traditional religious and political activities, for instance, limiting women's dress, freedom of movement, education, and/or public involvement is seen as abhorrent to modern, Western societies. The freedom to wear what one wants, and do what one wants, with no limitations, is seen as a woman's right. Yet the freedom that women exhibit in Western societies is abhorrent to some very traditional Muslim cultures, in which women's modesty is seen as a virtue. In short, the two groups have clashing conceptions of moral value.

In many cases, culture has a powerful influence on the moral order. Because systems of meaning and ways of thinking differ from one culture to another, people from different cultures typically develop different ideas about morality and the best way to live. They often have different conceptions of moral authority, truth, and the nature of community.[13] For example, some cultures place great moral emphasis on the family, while others stress the importance of individual autonomy. These cultural differences become even more problematic when groups have radically different expectations about what is virtuous, what is right, and how to deal with moral conflicts.[14] Thus, culture wars are often driven by moral conflict.

In some cases, one group may come to view the beliefs and actions of another group as fundamentally evil and morally intolerable. This often results in hostility and violence and severely damages the relationship between the two groups. For this reason, moral conflicts tend to be quite harmful and intractable.

Features of Moral Conflict

To further understand moral conflict and deal with it effectively, it is helpful to be aware of its common features.

Misunderstandings

The first general feature is the tendency for each side to misunderstand the words and actions of the other. People from incommensurate traditions may have trouble communicating because they rely on different systems of meaning, norms of communication, and behavioral expectations.

One possibility is that the participants use the same vocabulary but define and use these key terms differently. For example, the word "honor" might mean martial excellence to one party and economic success to the other.[15] But it is also possible that the groups simply rely on radically different vocabularies that stress the importance of different values. If one party regards the key terms used by the other as unimportant, communication between them will be quite strained. All of this contributes to misunderstanding and makes it very difficult for participants to "articulate the logic of the other sides' social world in ways that the other side will accept."[16]

Further misunderstanding and erroneous perceptions may arise because groups often perceive, define, and deal with conflict in different ways.[17] Because of differing cultural frames , many of the words used to describe appropriate behavior during conflict do not reflect the same content from one culture to another. For example, the terms "conflict," "aggression," "peace," "time," and "negotiation" are not value-free. They carry judgments with them and may be used differently in different cultures.[18] Aggression, usually defined as intentionally hurting another person, is a reflection of norms of conduct, and what hurts in one society may not be what hurts in another society. Thus, indicators of aggression may vary.[19] In the Middle East, for example, a direct refusal is considered a hostile gesture. But in other cultures, raising an objection is customary and well accepted. Ideas about fairness and images of justice can also vary among different groups.

The second general feature of moral conflict is that group members tend to develop feelings of mistrust and suspicion toward the other group -- even a sense that the other group poses a danger to their very survival. Given the groups' different values and systems of meaning, actions taken by one side to defuse or resolve the conflict may often be perceived as threatening by the other party.[20] This second party is likely to be stunned and offended by the other's action, and to respond in a negative way. This serves to perpetuate and/or intensify the conflict. Thus, the groups' different conceptions of morality lead to misunderstanding, which in turn contributes to conflict escalation .

Strained and Hostile Communication

Another general feature of moral conflicts is the hostility characteristic of the relationship and the communication between the parties. While sophisticated rhetoric consists of exchanging reasons in a quest to form shared beliefs, the patterns of communication in moral conflicts consist primarily in personal attacks, denunciations, and curses.[21] Slogans and chants replace arguments intended to persuade and inform, and the discourse between the two groups involves many statements about what is wrong with the other group. Thus, opportunities for opposing groups to converse intelligibly and reason together are diminished. When one group is denounced, its members are likely to become defensive, which can contribute to more negative emotions and behavior.

Thus, discourse often moves to sweeping generalizations and abstract principles.[22] For example, groups may appeal to abstract ideals of religion, patriotism, liberty, or "what America is all about" to point out why the actions of another group are morally wrong. In many cases, groups rely on rigidly held social or political beliefs, or ideology, to indicate why their position is morally superior. Such ideology is often accompanied by a sense of urgency about the need for pursuing those ideals.[23]

Negative Stereotyping

Discourse often involves sweeping generalizations about members of the other group. People in moral conflicts tend to invidiously categorize and denounce the personalities, intelligence, and social manners of those with whom they disagree.[24] They may form negative stereotypes and attribute moral depravity or other negative characteristics to those who violate their cultural expectations, while they ignore their own vices and foibles, perceiving their own group to be entirely virtuous. This is what social psychologists call the attribution error.

For example, disputants may attribute the "strange" behavior of foreigners to undesirable character traits, such as moral depravity or lack of intelligence, rather than realizing that their seemingly inappropriate acts are simply a matter of cultural difference.[25] Because parties are typically unable to give rich accounts of the moral order of the opposing group, they are likely to attribute whatever the group does to its stupidity, evil nature, and overall moral depravity. Groups with radically different conceptions of morality may feel stunned and offended by the actions or words of the other group and denounce those actions or the group as a whole.[26]

Non-negotiability

These belief systems pull together fundamental assumptions and global viewpoints that are in general not up for compromise .[27] Strict adherence to ideology can make it particularly difficult for individuals to approach those with differing worldviews with an open mind. They come to see the conflict entirely in win-lose terms. They may even get to the point that the goal of harming the other becomes more important than helping oneself.[28]

Effects of Moral Conflict

Not surprisingly, moral conflict often has harmful effects. Participants in moral conflict often behave immorally, even according to their own standards of behavior, because they believe the actions of their enemies force them to do so.[29] If a group is regarded as morally depraved, its members may come to be regarded as less than human and undeserving of humane treatment. The demonization or dehumanization of one's opponent that often occurs in moral conflict paves the way for hateful action and violence . It often leads to human rights violations or even attempts at genocide , as parties may come to believe that the capitulation or elimination of the other group is the only way to resolve the conflict.[30]

Why Moral Conflict is Intractable

Because of its deep-roots, moral conflicts tend to be intractable and long-lasting.[31] Parties to such conflict often have great difficulty in describing the substantive issues in shared terms. Because they are arguing from different moral positions, they disagree about the meaning and significance of the important issues.[32] This makes negotiation or compromise extremely difficult in and of itself.

Resolution becomes even more difficult when parties disagree not only about substantive issues, but also about which forms of conflict resolution are morally right, aesthetically preferred, and politically prudent.[33] Parties may have very different ideas about how to gather information , arrive at a conclusion, make a decision, and deal with uncertainty .[34]

Over the course of conflict, the original issues often become irrelevant and new causes for conflict are generated by actions within the conflict itself. This is because in moral conflict, when groups try to act consistently with what they believe is morally good and just, they "prove" to the other side that they are fools or villains.[35] Thus, the means by which the parties seek resolution often just provoke further conflict. As the conflict continues, substantive issues are largely forgotten and "the other side's means of dealing with the conflict is itself the force that drives the interactions among the various conflicted parties."[36] Thus, moral conflicts are self-sustaining.

Parties involved in moral conflict also tend to have great difficulty in imagining a win-win resolution of the conflict at hand. The substantive issues are often a matter of rigidly held moral beliefs, based in fundamental assumptions that cannot be proved wrong.[37] These fundamental moral, religious, and personal values are not easily changed, and people who adhere to a particular ideology may very well be unwilling to compromise their world-view. Instead, as noted earlier, they may engage in diatribe, a rhetorical strategy that discredits adversaries by characterizing them as evil or morally inferior.[38] Such characterizations often lead to subversion, repression, and violence. Because rational discourse has become useless, each party may try to force the other side into compliance.[39] The conflict is likely to escalate and become more protracted as a result.

Also, those involved in moral conflict may regard perpetuation of the conflict as virtuous or necessary. They may derive part of their identity from being warriors or opponents of their enemy and have a stake in the continuation of the conflict because it provides them with a highly desirable role.[40] In addition, because struggles over values often involve claims to status and power, parties may have a great stake in neutralizing, injuring or eliminating their rivals. They may view any compromise about their most cherished values as a threat to their very identity and a grave evil. Indeed, moral conflicts often stem from a desire to safeguard basic human needs such as security and social recognition of identity. On some occasions, the continuation of a conflict may seem preferable to what would have to be given up if the other party were accommodated.[41]

Unfortunately, those enmeshed in moral conflict may be unable to discern the effects of conflict, even if those effects themselves threaten the basic human needs that were at issue. Because moral conflicts tend to be intractable and have great potential for violence, we must search for new ways to manage them.

Dealing With Moral Conflict

What can be done when parties are faced with moral differences that seem to be intolerable?

Changing the Stories

In some cases, each party can heighten its understanding of the other's world-view through new forms of communication. Some suggest that moral conflict be viewed as a particular form of communication and pattern of interaction. At various points in a moral conflict, people have the ability to handle their conflict differently.[42] One way in which people can change the pattern of conflict is by telling different stories about what they are doing. By using narratives and story-telling to communicate they can enrich the views that each side has about the other, often revealing commonalities in the midst of all the differences.

Third parties can sometime help the disputants to redefine or reframe their conflict, focusing more on attainable interests and less on non-negotiable positions or negative stereotypes. They can also help parties to seek mutually beneficial outcomes rather than competitive, win-lose outcomes. Even if the moral differences cannot be eliminated, sometimes the parties share interests or needs. All sides, for example, have a need for security, and increasing the feeling of security of one side does not diminish the security of the other side, as is commonly believed. Rather the opposite is generally true: the more secure one side feels, the less it feels a need to attack the other side; hence the more secure the other side is likely to feel. Therefore, reframing the conflict as a problem (at least in part) of security can sometimes help to get the parties to focus on something they can achieve together rather than on their non-negotiable differences.

Similar to story-telling, dialogue is a process of in-depth communication that allows parties to get to know each other better and to find commonalities with the other side. Although there are many forms and contexts of dialogue, all seek to replace the ubiquitous "diatribe" of moral conflicts with respectful communication, empathic listening, improved understanding, and respect. In some cases, these new forms of communication may help parties to see that their moral disagreements are less deep and fundamental than they previously thought. However, in other cases, the substantive issues will truly be beyond compromise.

Some suggest that in these sorts of cases, parties must strive to develop a space for citizenly public discourse.[43] Even though the parties have radically different world-views and do not agree about the relevant issues, they can nevertheless reach an agreement about how to contend with moral and political differences in a constructive way. In other words, they can come to an agreement about how to disagree. They can thereby find a way to manage their conflict in a way that minimizes the costs to both parties.

The 2016 Presidential election in the United States was a "wake up call" for many people. Many of us were not aware of the depth of the distributional--and moral--divide in this country.  While there are undoubtably many reasons why the election came out as it did, some observers believe that the past political successes of the left in forcing their moral views on the entire country was at least in part (perhaps in large part) responsible for the backlash that put Donald Trump in power. Fundamentalist Christians chaffed at being told that they had to issue marriage licences for gay couples (and at least one, who made the news, refused to do so). Christian bakers didn't want to bake "gay cakes." And Christian hospitals and businesses didn't want to be forced to provide abortions or birth control pills.

The left, meanwhile, assumed that they were "right" (meaning correct) and that the rest of the country was "coming around."  This election shows, I think, that the country didn't "come around" as much as we thought it did.  Morals, as this article argues, are very strong, very stable.  And when a conflict involves such issues, it tends to become intractable.

As I re-read this article to write this "current implications" note, I was particularly struck with Maiese's list of "Features of Moral Conflict."

1 - Misunderstandings

2 - Mistrust

3- Strained and Hostile Communication

4- Negative Stereotyping

5- Non-negotiability. 

All of these are rampant between the right and the left right now.  We don't understand each others' worldviews, nor do we even try to talk to the other side to try to learn about their views.  We "know" we are right, they are wrong, and we have no interest in compromising or even listening to the other side. 

All of this contributes to intractability.  But note! This article lists some positive things that can be done to address such issues...and these suggestions are very valid in this case.  

First, people can change their stories--they can explain who they are and why they believe what they do in different and sometimes more compelling ways.  When I listened to Trump voters explain why they voted for him, I was surprised and in some sense sympathetic.  I maybe wouldn't have made the same choice had I been in their shoes. But I could understand and empathize with their struggles much more than before when I hadn't heard those stories.

2.  Reframe.  To the extent we can reframe the dialogue to be about "all of us" instead of "us-versus-them," the better off we could be.  I too, actually, want to "make America great again."  So let's talk about what that means and how we can do it.  Many of my friends believe it's about going backwards--going back to the 50s and its anti-women, anti-minority attitudes.  That may be part of it, yes, but it is also about fundamental things such as security, jobs, and hope.  We all want those.  So if we can reframe the conversation about how we can all get those, we might be able to move away from the intractable moral conflict.

3.  Lastly dialogue.  This is a very effective way to get (willing) people to listen and learn from "the other."  It has been used successfully in many contexts and goes a long way toward ameliorating moral conflicts.  However, it is a "table-oriented process"  meaning it is small scale, usually involving between 10-20 people.  We need to figure out how to "scale dialogue up" so that its benefits can be experienced by 1000s or hundreds of 1000s of people.  That's a serious challenge!

Heidi Burgess, May 2017.

Back to Essay Top

[1] W. Barnett Pearce and Stephen W. Littlejohn. Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide . (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Inc., 1997), 49.

[2] Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr. Using Conflict Theory . (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 41.

[3] Pearce and Littlejohn, 50.

[4] Paul R. Kimmel, "Culture and Conflict," in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice , eds. Morton Deutsch an Peter T. Coleman. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000), 456.

[5] Pearce and Littlejohn, 51.

[6] ibid, 54.

[7] Kimmel, 453.

[8] ibid, 457.

[9] Pearce and Littlejohn, 55.

[10] ibid, 50.

[11] ibid, 59.

[12] ibid, 60.

[13] ibid, 70.

[14] ibid, 62.

[15] ibid, 68.

[16] ibid, 68.

[17] Guy Oliver Faure, "Conflict Formation: Going Beyond Culture-Bound Views of Conflict," in Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice , eds. Morton Deutsch, Barbara Bunker, and Jeffrey Rubin. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 39.

[18] Faure, 41.

[19] ibid, 42.

[20] Pearce and Littlejohn, 68.

[21] ibid, 75.

[22] ibid, 70.

[23] David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel. Peace and Conflict Studies . (California: Sage Publications, 2002), 233.

[24] Pearce and Littlejohn, 74.

[25] Kimmel, 457.

[26] Pearce and Littlejohn, 73.

[27] Barash and Webel, 234.

[28] Pearce and Littlejohn, 73.

[29] ibid, 73.

[30] ibid, 68.

[31] ibid, 68.

[32] ibid, 71.

[33] ibid, 69.

[34] Kimmel, 459.

[35] Pearce and Littlejohn, 69.

[36] ibid, 69.

[37] Barash and Webel, 234.

[38] Pearce and Littlejohn, 118.

[39] ibid, 119.

[40] ibid, 70.

[41] ibid, 70.

[42] Pearce and Littlejohn, 77.

[43] ibid, 104.

Use the following to cite this article: Maiese, Michelle. "Moral or Value Conflicts." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/intolerable-moral-differences >.

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• Value Conflict: What It Is and How to Resolve It

A value conflict over sacred issues can be one of the most difficult challenges to overcome in negotiation and conflict resolution. Research on value conflict offers strategies for moving beyond entrenched positions.

By PON Staff — on August 13th, 2024 / Conflict Resolution

Some of our most heated negotiations and disputes involve value conflict over our core values, such as our personal moral standards, our religious and political beliefs, and our family’s welfare.

Consider these value conflict examples :

• Business partners clash over the ethical standards they expect each other to uphold.
• A negotiator refuses to do business with a potential counterpart she deems unsavory on moral grounds.
• Parents bar their teenager from attending an event they think might be dangerous.

These types of value conflict , which highlight our norms, beliefs, and identities, can be incredibly difficult to resolve. When our most deeply held beliefs and principles are at stake, we often ratchet up value conflict out of a desire to be heard, refuse to make any concession that would appear to compromise our values, or categorically refuse to negotiate. Drawing on new research, we present three strategies for negotiating value-based conflict.

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1. Assess Whether the Value Is Truly Sacred

Value conflict often arises because one or more of the parties involved consider a value to be sacred and nonnegotiable. In some cases, our values truly are sacred and not open to compromise. In other situations, however, our values turn out to be “pseudo-sacred”—that is, we are willing to negotiate them under certain conditions, notes Harvard Business School professor Max H. Bazerman.

For example, in one study, negotiators with little power were more likely to compromise on a seemingly sacred issue than were negotiators with greater power, Notre Dame University professor Ann E. Tenbrunsel and her colleagues found in their research . A lack of alternatives led low-power negotiators to become more flexible.

Before refusing to budge on an issue you deem sacred, try to envision an outcome that would allow you to abide by the  spirit  of your values even as you make concessions on the specifics. Similarly, if a counterpart insists a particular issue is sacred, you might make a proposal that honors their values while also bringing you closer to agreement.

This doesn’t mean putting price tags on your most cherished beliefs; rather, it means thinking creatively about how to meet broader goals. Imagine, for example, that you adamantly oppose your sibling’s intention to sell some of your late parents’ possessions. But what if you donated your share of the proceeds from the sale to a charity your parents supported? You might prefer this outcome and avoid a protracted value conflict.

2. Offer a Concession on a Core Value

You may be able to induce cooperation from a reluctant counterpart in a value conflict by making a difficult but symbolic concession on a key principle.

In a 2007 study , Jeremy Ginges of the New School for Social Research and his team presented various proposals for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to citizens residing in the West Bank and Gaza: Jewish-Israeli settlers, Palestinian refugees, and Palestinian student supporters of Hamas. All three groups rejected proposals that would require their group to make a concession on a core issue in exchange for peace. And when each side was also offered significant economic aid, they were repulsed by the idea of trading their sacred values for cash.

However, when asked whether they would accept the peace deal if accompanied by a significant concession from the opposing side on one of  its  sacred values, all three groups became willing to negotiate. The Israeli settlers agreed to make concessions if Hamas accepted Israel’s right to exist. The Palestinian refugees grew more flexible if Israelis would relinquish their claim to the West Bank. And the Palestinian students became ready to bargain if the Israelis were willing to officially apologize for Palestinian suffering in the conflict.

When sacred values are at stake, we are likely to be offended by the suggestion that our support can be “bought.” Proposing a meaningful sacrifice on one of your own core values may demonstrate your seriousness, inspire reciprocation, and avoid a value conflict.

3. Affirm the Other Side’s Positive Qualities

In a value conflict, thinking about qualities you appreciate in your counterpart, such as trustworthiness or deep convictions, can help parties create value, researchers Fieke Harinck of Leiden University in the Netherlands and Daniel Druckman of George Mason University found in their research .

This result dovetails with findings from University of California at Los Angeles professor Corinne Bendersky showing that negotiators can soften their counterpart’s firm stance on a seemingly sacred value by making statements that affirm the counterpart’s status, such as “I have a lot of respect for people like you who stand by their principles.” It seems an opponent’s affirmation of our status buffers us against the identity threat we’d suffer if we compromised on a core issue and makes us more open to value creation in the process.

What other strategies have you found to be effective in resolving value conflict?

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Introduction

• Published: July 1996
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Moral conflict has long been recognized as a fundamental fact of moral life, but the full implications of the possibility of conflict within the moral consciousness of a conscientious person exhibited in a moral dilemma have only recently engaged moral philosophers. The perspicuous specification of a moral dilemma is a matter of philosophical controversy, but generally speaking, a person can be said to face a dilemma in a situation in which compelling moral considerations favor each of the courses of action open to him. Suppose that a person in a position of responsibility must decide how to respond to terrorists holding a number of hostages. If he deals with them, he may win the release of the hostages but encourage the practice; if he refuses to deal with them, he may risk the lives of the hostages. Or suppose that a military commander must either withdraw air support from an exposed unit under his command or risk substantial losses to the balance of his troops. Whatever he does he will bear some responsibility for the attendant loss of life, and he may in retrospect carry the burden of that responsibility whatever course of action he might have taken. Not all dilemmas are as dramatic as these. Dilemmas take many forms, arise in a wide variety of circumstances, and appear to arise in the context of widely differing moral and ideological systems.

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Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays

Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays , Cambridge University Press, 2004, 344pp, $27.99 (pbk), ISBN 0521012104.

Reviewed by Terrance McConnell, University of North Carolina, Greensboro

This volume consists of an introductory essay by the editors and thirteen single-authored articles, including one by each of the editors. The title, Practical Conflicts , may lead one expect that the focus will be on conflicting moral obligations, as is the case in other well-known anthologies [for example, Christopher Gowans (ed.), Moral Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 1987), and H.E. Mason (ed.), Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory (Oxford University Press, 1996)]. But the scope of these papers is broader. Only one of the contributions, Christine Korsgaard's "The Myth of Egoism," has been previously published.

The editors explain that many different reasons for actions can conflict. The list of potentially conflicting items includes desires, preferences, emotions, goals, commitments, virtues, and obligations. "Because all these different reasons are action-guiding claims, we call conflicts between them 'practical conflicts'" (p. 1). As a result, the articles collected here discuss not only moral dilemmas, but also Kant's rationalism, egoism, deliberating about conflicting desires, aspects of decision theory, inevitable agent regret in conflict situations, whether virtues can conflict, weakness of will, dilemmas in transitional justice, and moral responsibility in conflict situations. This breadth of topics is, ironically, both a strength and a weakness of this book, I think. In a review of this length, it is not feasible to summarize each of the contributions. I will restrict myself to a selected few, and then discuss the unity - or lack thereof - of the collection. It should be stated at the outset, however, that each essay in this book is philosophically astute, challenging, and interesting on its own.

David Velleman's essay discusses what he calls "concessive Kantianism." According to Velleman, Kant is committed to (i) that wrongdoing entails irrationality in the agent, and (ii) that wrongdoing entails irrationality in the action. "Concessive Kantianism" affirms claim (i) but denies (ii). Velleman utilizes a case of Bernard Williams. A particular husband, we are told, should be nicer to his wife. But given this husband's own motivational profile (his own desires, preferences, etc.), he may not have a reason to be nicer to his wife. If a husband no longer has reasons to be nicer to his wife, he normally will have lost reasons for remaining married. So the man is committed to conflicting projects - his particular desires versus his staying in the marriage. In practical reasoning, the reasons with which agents must deal are served up by their own personalities and circumstances, for which they are partly responsible. So the husband should get himself out of this bind. The irrationality in the agent, his "immoral identity," is his commitment to conflicting projects. But, Velleman argues, as long as the agent tolerates this, according to concessive Kantianism he may have insufficient reasons for acting morally.

Henry Richardson tells us that conflicts of desires are pervasive and mundane. Richardson calls the current understanding of desires dyadic functionalism; desires are distinguished in that they have different objects and different strengths . Richardson does not object to the functionalism, but rather to its two-dimensionality. He argues that we can only understand how agents cope with conflicts of desires by adding a third dimension (from Aristotle), "place" - the location of the desire's object within the agent's values or ends (p. 103). The simpler, dyadic functionalist account may be adequate to explain human action from the outside; but it is inadequate from the point of view of the deliberator. An Aristotelian account, from the deliberator's perspective, suggests three states: a belief that I can X, a perception that X-ing is good in some respect, and a desire to X because of the respect in which it is good. It is perception that differentiates the dyadic account from the one favored by Richardson. When an agent experiences conflicting desires, it is the dimension of place that indicates how she will resolve the conflict.

Ruth Chang addresses conflicts between moral and prudential values, between morality and well-being. Such conflicts raise issues about the normativity of morality and the scope of practical reason. According to the standard picture, moral and prudential values issue from two fundamentally distinct points of view. And if there is no more comprehensive point of view, it is difficult to see why an agent should do anything other than what makes her life go best (p. 118). Chang argues that a rational resolution of this type of conflict requires that "values from fundamentally distinct points of view can be put on the same normative page" (p. 119). Chang proposes an approach for putting together morality and well-being, one that invokes a more comprehensive value. Chang suggests that there is a more comprehensive value V with m and p as parts that accounts for the reason-giving force of m in the face of conflicts with p and which determines the rational resolution of the conflict. Chang dubs this "the nameless value approach" to putting together morality and well-being. She gives two arguments for this approach (pp. 144-147): one is an argument from analogy; the other, an argument from circumstances. Chang argues ingeniously that conflicts between morality and well-being are resolvable only if there is this more comprehensive nameless value that has the conflicting values as parts. This is the most original contribution to this collection.

Joseph Raz distinguishes two questions. Is there a right answer in conflict situations? Is there something unfortunate about conflicts? His focus is on the latter. Normative conflict involves a plurality of irreducibly distinct concerns supporting various options. The "unfortunate" aspect of conflict is a common result of pluralism, but pluralism doesn't always lead to conflict. Moreover, there are single-value conflicts. Conflicts are unfortunate when, no matter what the agent does, there will be an unsatisfied reason left behind (p. 181). Raz's core definition of practical conflicts is in terms of "the impossibility of complete conformity" (p. 186). The impossibility of an agent's conduct conforming completely with reason is what is distinctive about practical conflicts. Raz advances what he calls the conformity principle: "One should conform to reason completely, insofar as one can. If one cannot, one should come as close to complete conformity as possible" (p. 189). Not being able to conform with reason completely provides occasions for regret, the need to compensate aggrieved parties, and the appropriateness of apologizing to affected individuals. Highlighting what is unfortunate about conflicts shows that "what matters is what we do, how we live, and whether we respond to reason, and not what we intend" (p. 193).

Monika Betzler focuses on regret that follows even after a seemingly justified choice between conflicting options. Much has been made of this moral residue in the debate about moral dilemmas. It is "rationalists" (those who believe that practical conflicts can be completely resolved) who must bear the most weight in explaining why regret after an apparently correct decision is nevertheless rational. Betzler thinks that the appropriateness of regret in these situations has not been adequately explained. She argues that regret is reason-responsive in ways that have been overlooked. Forgoing one of our commitments, even when done for better reasons, still leaves intact what we consider valuable. Regret is an evaluative attitude responsive to what we have reason to value even though we cannot appropriately act on it (p. 202). Commitments forgone can engender multiple kinds of regret, depending on the sort of loss that has occurred.

Peter Baumann argues for what he calls a "preface paradox for goals" (p. 244). Based on the very concept of a goal, Baumann derives the claim, "An agent does not have an indefeasible reason not to want that all his goals will be realized" (p. 247). But he also argues that the following should be accepted: "An agent has an indefeasible reason not to want that all his goals will be realized." The two claims are contradictory. But the latter claim is defended by imagining what the world would be like if one always, inevitably accomplished all of one's goals. In a word, he says, it would be "boring." Though the contradiction cannot be eliminated, Baumann tries to lessen the pain by saying that it is based on a conflict between two perspectives that people take on their actions: the "involved" perspective of the agent and the "detached" perspective of the reflective person (p. 249). Baumann concludes by arguing that moves available for escaping the "preface paradox for beliefs " will not help to avoid the preface paradox for goals (pp. 256-257).

Peter Schaber most directly discusses moral dilemmas. Schaber takes as a paradigm of a moral conflict Bernard Williams's famous case of Jim, Pedro, and the Indians. Is this an insolvable moral conflict? Schaber argues that a small subset of conflicts are insolvable. In particular, he argues that conflicts of moral reasons are insolvable only if the reasons are theoretically incommensurable, practically incommensurable (they should not be compared), and symmetrical (neither reason is dominated by the other). Williams's case fits the bill, he thinks, and so is an insolvable moral conflict. But, Schaber argues, neither accepting nor not accepting Pedro's "offer" would be wrong (pp. 288-289). Thus those who say that insolvable moral conflicts involve "inescapable wrongdoing" are mistaken.

"Moral Dilemmas of Transitional Justice" is Jon Elster's contribution to this volume. Here Elster is concerned with how regimes come to terms with the past in a transition to democracy. How should officers of a democratic government deal with persons from a past, unjust regime? Elster highlights the conflict between a desire for substantive retributive justice (punishing perpetrators of injustice) and a desire to follow procedurally correct principles (not engage in retroactive legislation). Numerous other practical problems are discussed.

In order to demonstrate the breadth of topics discussed, let me just mention contributors not discussed above. Christine Korsgaard writes about egoism. Isaac Levi discusses aspects of decision theory. Nicholas White addresses the possibility of conflicting virtues. Alfred Mele's essay is about akrasia . And Barbara Guckes discusses the possible connection between practical conflicts, free will, and responsibility.

I said earlier that I think this breadth is a source of both a strength and a weakness of this book. The contributors are all outstanding philosophers and in most cases the essays are quite interesting. Deleting any of them would have been a loss. But it is a real strain to say that these essays are unified. When contributions range from akrasia , to free will and responsibility, to transitional justice, to moral dilemmas, to decision theory, to Kant's ethics, to egoism, and to Aristotle, it takes acute vision to see commonality. It is true that what the editors count as practical conflicts are conflicts among different reasons for action, including "desires, preferences, emotions, interests, goals, plans, commitments, values, virtues, obligations, and moral norms" (p. 1). But then what is excluded? Under this guise, one could include so-called "applied" topics (such as the pros and cons of legalizing voluntary active euthanasia, or various aspects of whistle-blowing), or very abstract topics, such as the adequacy of fundamental principles in deontic logic.

So for whom will this book be useful? While there is probably no one scholar who will find all of the articles pertinent to his or her work, each contribution is significant in its area. So, for example, those who work on the topic of moral dilemmas will find useful the articles by Betzler, by Raz, and by Schaber. And those interested in the question "Why be moral?" will certainly benefit from the piece by Chang. Could one reasonably use this book in the classroom? I can imagine a graduate seminar on "Practical Reason" where this would be an apt text. Even there, most would use selected essays, depending on what aspects of practical reason they wished to emphasize. This, of course, is not much of a weakness; most anthologies used in graduate seminars are used selectively.

While it would not be fair to say of this book that the whole is less than the sum of its parts, it is, I think, accurate to say that this collection of outstanding essays is unified only in a weak sense.

Moral conflict and moral dilemma

What is this about, why is this important.

Research integrity can involve a situation of moral conflict. This means that two courses of action are possible, which exclude one another. If one goes for one action, the alternative cannot be realized. Moreover, one has to choose between both actions; a third option, such as not making a choice, is not possible. An example is the choice between adding a person as an author to an article or not. There is no third option: either the person is made author, or not.

A moral conflict implies two conflicting values. In the case of authorship, these values might be gratitude (for a – albeit small - contribution) versus righteousness (acting in line with the authorship guidelines). Sometimes, moral conflicts can be resolved because one of the values clearly overrides the other. Thus, from a research integrity perspective, authorship requirements are more important than gratitude. In order to do justice to the value of gratitude, the person can be mentioned in an acknowledgement.

However, there are examples of situations in research where conflicts can be irresolvable, because the person who has to choose feels the obligation to do justice to two incompatible values. In such cases, one is confronted with a moral dilemma . [1] [2] A moral dilemma is a conflict situation in which the choice one makes causes a moral harm, which cannot be restlessly repaired. Take the example of how to respond when a fellow researcher needs help, but refuses your assistance. In light of the value of care, you should at least try to convince them that support is needed. On the other hand, the value of autonomy might indicate that you should not impose yourself upon them. Whatever you decide to do, you do harm to one of the two values involved. If you choose to try and get them to accept support, they might feel being treated as an incompetent researcher. If you choose to let go, they might get in serious difficulty with their research.

• ↑ Tessman, L. (2017). When doing the right thing is impossible. Oxford, New York: OUP
• ↑ Nussbaum M (1986). The fragility of goodness. OIxford: Oxford University Press

For whom is this important?

What are the best practices.

Reflection on moral conflicts, and especially on moral dilemmas, is an important element of responsible research practice. Take for example Phase I trials that involve novel therapies for patients (so-called First-In-Human (FIH) Trials). [1] These trials involve a high degree of uncertainty in intervention development and possible outcomes. Although this step, hopefully, in turn, will make a Phase-III clinical trial in compliance with the basic epistemological and ethical requirement of therapeutic trials possible, it is a fact that so far no widely accepted standards for judgments of uncertainty, safety, and value of FIH trials have yet been formulated. Consequently, no selection of patients to be included in such trials can be said to be fully satisfactory, i.e. without the possibility of moral failure. Through acknowledging the possible existence of irresolvable moral conflicts in research, researchers will learn modesty, and thereby also protect themselves from being infected by the vice of hybris .

Reflection on moral dilemmas can be fostered by organizing Moral Case Deliberation (MCD). [2] In MCD, a morally troublesome situation is investigated by a group, guided by a facilitator. During the investigation, the conflicting values in the situation are examined in dialogue. This enables participants to become aware of, and reflect on the moral conflict involved. MCD specifically focuses on moral conflicts that cannot be restlessly solved, that is on moral dilemmas. The aim is to investigate different values of stakeholders in practice, and become aware that in making a choice, certain values will be harmed. This may result in the awareness that, although a choice is unavoidable, one should be open to the negative consequences of and take responsibility for them.

• ↑ Solbakk JH, Zoloth L. The Tragedy of Translation: The Case of ‘‘First Use’’in Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Cell Stem Cell, 2011, 8: 479-481.
• ↑ Stolper M., Molewijk B., Widdershoven G. (2016). Bioethics education in clinical settings: theory and practice of the dilemma method of moral case deliberation. BMC Medical Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1186 (0)6 -016 25 -0125 -1

The Embassy Editorial team, Ružica Tokalić, Iris Lechner, Guy Widdershoven, Jan Helge Solbak contributed to this theme. Latest contribution was Mar 25, 2021

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• DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2013-0002
• Corpus ID: 96458531

Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory

• J. Timmermann
• Published 1 March 2013
• Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie

45 Citations

Kant on moral dilemmas, moral rationalism and demandingness in kant, autonomy, progress and virtue: why kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection, the 'ought' and the 'can', on kant’s duty to speak the truth, degrees of responsibility in kant’s practical philosophy, kant's criticism of common moral rational cognition, kant’s contextualism, kant and moral demandingness.

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On moral dilemmas: winch, kant and billy budd.

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Nussbaum, Kant and Conflicts between Duties

Kant's metaphysics of morals: interpretative essays, moral dilemmas, genuine and spurious: a comparative anatomy, kant and the antigone: the possibility of conflicting duties, moral conflicts: what they are and what they show, instituting principles: between duty and action, moral dilemmas and consistency, acting on principle: an essay in kantian ethics, related papers.

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Decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations: Development and validation of a new measure

Roles Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Software, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

* E-mail: [email protected]

Affiliation Department of Medical Psychology, Psychological Diagnostics and Research Methodology, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany

Roles Formal analysis, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

Roles Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Writing – review & editing

Affiliations Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany, Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Munich, Germany

Affiliation Institute of Experimental Psychology, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany

Roles Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

• Nina Singer, 
• Ludwig Kreuzpointner, 
• Monika Sommer, 
• Stefan Wüst, 
• Brigitte M. Kudielka

• Published: April 1, 2019
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747
• Reader Comments

In everyday life, we are often confronted with morally conflicting social interaction situations. Therefore, the main objective of the present set of studies was the development and validation of a new measure to assess decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations. All vignettes required a decision between an altruistic versus an egoistic behavioral response alternative. In three independent surveys ( N = 200), we developed a 40-items measure with preferable mean rates of altruistic decisions (Study 1), clear representation of altruistic and egoistic response classes (Study 2), unambiguousness of social closeness classifications (socially close vs. socially distant protagonists; Studies 1 and 2), and high similarity to reality ratings (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, we developed two parallelized item sets for future use in within-subjects design studies and investigated the measurement properties of our new scale (Studies 1 and 3). Results of Rasch model analyses and classical test theory fit indices showed unidimensionality and confirmed the appropriateness of the fragmentation into two parallelized item sets. Notably, in our data, there were neither effects of social closeness nor gender on the percentage of altruistic decisions. In sum, we propose the Everyday Moral Conflict Situations (EMCS) Scale as a promising new measurement tool that may facilitate further research in different research areas due to its broad applicability.

Citation: Singer N, Kreuzpointner L, Sommer M, Wüst S, Kudielka BM (2019) Decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations: Development and validation of a new measure. PLoS ONE 14(4): e0214747. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747

Editor: Valerio Capraro, Middlesex University, UNITED KINGDOM

Received: December 19, 2018; Accepted: March 19, 2019; Published: April 1, 2019

Copyright: © 2019 Singer et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability: All relevant data are within the manuscript and its Supporting Information files.

Funding: This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the funding programme Open Access Publishing and by grant number DFG-KU 1401/10-1 assigned to BMK, MS, and SW. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Introduction

For humans and most animals, the social interaction with conspecifics is a common everyday life activity [ 1 ]. Thereby, we humans are often confronted with morally conflicting social interaction situations. According to Christensen and colleagues [ 2 ], moral conflicts are situations in which someone is pulled in contrary directions by rival moral reasons. They can, amongst others, occur when deciding between a personal interest versus an accepted moral value.

In experimental studies, decision-making in moral conflict situations is typically investigated by moral dilemmas presented as short stories about situations involving moral conflicts (see [ 2 ] for review). To date, most studies in various research areas (e.g., judgment and decision-making, cognitive neuroscience, social psychology, or stress research) have applied abstract moral dilemmas. The trolley problem, for instance, prompts the participant to decide whether or not one person should be actively sacrificed in order to save a greater number of people (e.g., [ 3 – 7 ]). Such abstract moral dilemmas with utilitarian versus deontological response alternatives were once inspired by thought experiments of famous historical moral philosophers like Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and experimental studies of developmental psychologists like Jean Piaget (1896–1980) or Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987). Over the last decades, abstract moral dilemma research has provided us many important and fascinating insights into the processes involved in moral judgment (e.g., regarding the interplay between cognition and emotion; [ 3 , 4 , 8 , 9 ]) using very different paradigms and scales (see for example [ 10 ] for a recently developed abstract moral decision-making scale, which has been successfully applied by [ 9 ]). Nevertheless, methodological concerns about the interpretation of the results of abstract moral dilemma research have been raised in the last years (e.g., [ 11 , 12 ]). Additionally, despite of recent attempts to transfer trolley-style moral dilemmas to real life situations (e.g., [ 13 ]), such sacrificial dilemmas lack external and ecological validity [ 14 , 15 ] and can only hardly be transferred to situations experienced in everyday life [ 16 ].

Thus, current moral dilemma research comprises no longer only abstract reasoning about moral dead-or-life situations (e.g., [ 3 , 4 ]) but also research on moral decision-making in a variety of daily life situations (e.g., [ 17 , 18 ]). Applying ecological momentary assessment in a large study sample ( N = 1.252 participants), Hofmann et al. [ 18 ] repeatedly assessed moral or immoral acts and experiences in everyday life. The authors were able to confirm five areas of human morality (care/harm, fairness/unfairness, loyalty/disloyalty, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation) as originally proposed by the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; [ 19 , 20 ]). Moreover, honesty/dishonesty was the third most frequently mentioned dimension regarding morality in everyday life and, thus, emerged as another important category [ 18 , 21 ].

With regard to research in laboratory settings, several scholars (e.g., [ 16 , 22 , 23 ]) recently developed everyday moral dilemmas. Everyday moral dilemmas are short vignettes describing hypothetical everyday life situations. The vignettes require decisions between the fulfilment of a moral standard or social obligation towards another person versus a personal-oriented hedonistic behavior that would explicitly not cause serious bodily harm or legal consequences [ 16 ]. The given response alternatives are typically altruistic (e.g., helping an old woman who is in distress) versus egoistic (e.g., catching the waiting bus home; see [ 23 ] or [ 24 ] for further examples).

However, to date, there is a paucity of validated everyday moral decision-making paradigms. To the best of our knowledge, only Starcke et al. [ 23 ] and Rosen et al. [ 22 ] reported validation studies of their everyday moral conflict scenarios as supplementary material to their manuscripts. Both Starcke et al. [ 23 ] and Rosen et al. [ 22 ] subdivided their items into high- versus low-emotional dilemmas, but many of their high-emotional dilemmas do not describe common everyday life situations (e.g., deciding about leaving your partner who is suicidal), which is a potential constraint of these paradigms. By contrast, the scenarios developed by Sommer and colleagues [ 16 ] do rather reflect very typical daily life situations and proved useful in several experimental studies [ 16 , 24 , 25 ]. However, a more comprehensive validation of such everyday moral conflict situations would be highly desirable. Furthermore, all of the above-mentioned vignettes were only developed for use in between-subject design studies. Thus, to date, no parallelized item sets of everyday moral decision-making paradigms for use in within-subjects design studies are available (e.g., to be applied before and after an experimental manipulation like acute stress induction). Such material would enable researchers to control for potential effects due to interindividual variability in trait variables (e.g., personality traits; see [ 26 ]) and, thus, help to achieve more statistical power [ 27 ]. Moreover, the availability of parallelized item sets would be of high advantage as simple retesting with identical stimulus material is not advisable because memory effects could confound the findings.

Therefore, the main objective of the present studies was the development and validation of a new measure with two parallelized item sets assessing decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations. We operationalized everyday moral decision-making as the readiness to act altruistically, defined as the degree of following accepted moral values instead of fulfilling personal interests (see [ 16 ]). Based on the MFT [ 19 – 21 ] and the results of a recent ecological momentary assessment study [ 18 ], we developed the Everyday Moral Conflict Situations (EMCS) Scale, a new set of everyday moral dilemmas with the dimensions of care/harm, fairness/unfairness, loyalty/disloyalty, and honesty/dishonesty. We decided against including items referring to authority/subversion in order to avoid potential confounding influences of legal consequences [ 16 ]. Moreover, the dimension of sanctity/degradation was considered as inappropriate for our new scale because in our view, religious standards cannot be clearly assigned to altruistic versus egoistic behavior.

In addition to scale development and validation, we aimed at investigating if everyday moral decision-making depends on the social closeness of the protagonists. As revealed in a recent review, the relatedness of the participant to the story characters is an important experimental design parameter in moral dilemma research [ 2 ]. Therefore, social closeness could be one further potential modulating factor of everyday moral decision-making (apart from the emotionality of a situation, which has already been examined in previous studies; see [ 22 , 23 ]). Consistently, several studies have shown that both abstract and everyday moral decision-making differ depending on the closeness of the relationship with the target person (e.g., [ 5 , 17 , 28 – 31 ]). With regard to everyday moral decision-making in laboratory settings, so far only Zhan and colleagues [ 31 ] investigated the impact of the social closeness of the protagonists. They observed that participants made less altruistic decisions, took more time for their decisions, and rated the situations as emotionally more negative if the moral conflicts involved strangers versus friends and acquaintances. Presuming that altruistic decisions are some kind of generous acts, this finding is also in line with studies in social psychology on social discounting, showing that generosity decreases hyperbolically with increasing social distance between the donor and the recipient [ 32 – 37 ]. Thus, we experimentally varied the social closeness of the protagonists in our scenarios (socially close vs. socially distant) and hypothesized a lower percentage of altruistic decisions for scenarios involving socially distant protagonists as compared to stories involving socially close target persons.

Furthermore, several studies reported gender differences in abstract moral decision-making (e.g., [ 7 , 38 – 41 ]). Historically, this line of research can be traced back to Gilligan [ 42 ], who proposed that males differ from females in their approach to moral reasoning (justice focused vs. care focused; see [ 43 ]). Moreover, in related research disciplines, it has been demonstrated that females are more honest [ 44 , 45 ] and also more altruistic than males regarding generosity in the Dictator Game (see [ 46 ] and [ 47 ] for two recent meta-analyses). We therefore hypothesized gender differences in everyday moral decision-making as well. Thus, we equally recruited males and females for participation in our surveys and counterbalanced our new vignettes in terms of the gender of the protagonists.

In sum, we conducted three independent validation surveys in order to (a) develop and evaluate the psychometric properties of our new 40-items EMCS Scale (20 items with socially close and 20 items with socially distant protagonists; Studies 1 and 2), (b) develop two parallelized item sets for future use in within-subjects design studies (Studies 1 and 3), and (c) evaluate the measurement properties of our new scale and its different subsets (Studies 1 and 3). In addition to scale development and validation, we examined two research questions regarding the impact of the social closeness of the protagonists as well as potential gender differences in everyday moral decision-making. As a supplementary analysis, we finally examined if the answers to items with socially close protagonists differed depending on the actual existence of the target persons (e.g., partner, brother, sister) in the real lives of the participants. The rationale behind this supplementary investigation was to rule out the possibility that the actual (non-)existence of the respective target persons in the lives of participants might be a confounding factor that influences everyday moral decision-making. It should be of note that this exploratory question had no direct empirical foundation yet.

Materials and methods

Participants.

Altogether, N = 200 volunteers (100 males, 100 females, mainly students) aged 18–43 years (mean age ± SD = 22.55 ± 4.22 years), participated in three separate surveys, which took place at the University of Regensburg. The study protocols were approved by the local ethics committee of the University of Regensburg, Germany and performed in line with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave written informed consent to their participation in the surveys and received a monetary compensation of 4 €, chocolate, or course credit, respectively.

Everyday moral conflict situations

Initially, a pool of 60 hypothetical everyday moral conflict situations with two forced-choice response alternatives (altruistic vs. egoistic) was created. For that purpose, we modified the 28 everyday moral dilemmas originally developed by Sommer et al. [ 16 ], and developed 32 additional new scenarios with the contents of care/harm, fairness/unfairness, loyalty/disloyalty, and honesty/dishonesty [ 18 , 19 ]. We aimed at creating only everyday moral conflict situations that could easily occur in daily life in order to achieve high external and ecological validity of our new measure.

All stories were constructed in first-person narrative and followed a three-sentence structure. We systematically varied the social closeness of the protagonists (two categories: socially close vs. socially distant), so that in half of the stories, the protagonist was a socially close person (e.g., father, partner, friend), and in the other half he or she was socially distant (e.g., cashier, barkeeper, stranger). Moreover, the conflict situations were counterbalanced in terms of the gender of the target persons (for examples see Table 1 ; the complete final item set is provided in S1 Table ). Using Research Randomizer [ 48 ], a fixed random presentation order of the 60 (Studies 1 and 2) or 40 (Study 3) scenarios was created before application. This order was then realized for all participants.

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Examples of the everyday moral conflict situations with corresponding response alternatives (altruistic vs. egoistic) subdivided into scenarios with socially close and socially distant protagonists.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.t001

In all our surveys, the items were originally presented in German language. However, for the purpose of presentation in the manuscript, the items were in a first step translated into English language by four independent persons (including NS and BMK). In a second step, a consentaneous version was reached by discussion. In a third step, the obtained English translation was thoroughly reviewed by an English native speaker for colloquial speech and concordance with the German original (AP; see Acknowledgments).

General procedure.

Depending on study assignment, participants had to fill out one of four different paper-pencil questionnaires, which all took about 15–30 minutes to complete. The questionnaires consisted of 60 (Studies 1 and 2) or 40 (Study 3) everyday moral conflict situations. Before responding to the everyday moral conflict situations, all participants provided demographic information (age, gender, occupation). Prior to the tasks, participants were given a standardized written instruction that reminded them to put themselves into the positions of the protagonists described in the conflict stories and to answer all questions spontaneously.

In Study 1, the complete set of 60 stories was given to n = 50 participants (25 males, 25 females; aged 23.38 ± 4.47 years). After every conflict situation, the question “What do I do?” as well as the altruistic and the egoistic response alternatives were presented in a counterbalanced order. For every item, participants first had to indicate their decision. Subsequently, they were asked to rate the social closeness of the protagonist on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very socially distant to 7 = very socially close and the similarity to reality of the presented situation on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very far from reality to 7 = very close to reality . For the purpose of analysis, altruistic decisions were coded as “1” and egoistic decisions as “0”; then the percentage of altruistic decisions was calculated. The ratings of social closeness and similarity to reality were each aggregated to calculate their arithmetic means.

In order to examine if the answers to the items with socially close protagonists differed depending on the actual existence of the target persons in the real lives of the participants, subjects additionally had to indicate at the end of the survey if they currently were in a partnership, and if they had a father, mother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, grandfather, or grandmother who they knew or had known in the past.

In Study 2, n = 50 participants (25 males, 25 females; aged 24.08 ± 4.44 years) were confronted with the same 60 everyday moral conflict situations as in Study 1. However, differing from Study 1, where we assessed the item difficulties of the everyday moral conflict scenarios via binary decisions between given altruistic versus egoistic responses, the main aim of Study 2 was to validate the a priori defined altruistic and egoistic response alternatives of the stories. Therefore, in Study 2, we replaced the answer options at the end of the stories in two different ways. First, every story was finished by a statement that indicated altruistic behavior of the acting person (e.g., “My decision: I help the woman”) and second, each story was ended by a description of the actor behaving egoistically (e.g., “My decision: I take the bus”). We then created two different versions of the survey, each with 30 given altruistic and 30 given egoistic responses, and randomly assigned n = 25 participants (12 males, 13 females) to one version of the questionnaire (Study 2A) and n = 25 participants (13 males, 12 females) to the other version (Study 2B). In both subversions, we asked the participants to judge the given responses on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = egoistic to 7 = altruistic . Altruistic and egoistic response options were presented in a counterbalanced order. Similar to Study 1, participants subsequently had to rate the social closeness of the protagonists on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very socially distant to 7 = very socially close as well as the similarity to reality of the presented situations on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very far from reality to 7 = very close to reality . Furthermore, at the end of the survey, participants also had to indicate if they currently were in a partnership, and if they had a father, mother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, grandfather, or grandmother who they knew or had known in the past.

For the purpose of analysis, the ratings of the altruistic and egoistic responses, social closeness, and similarity to reality were each aggregated to calculate their arithmetic means. As the ratings for social closeness and similarity to reality were part of the Studies 1 and 2, we merged these data resulting in a total sample of n = 100 participants (50 males, 50 females; aged 23.73 ± 4.45 years) for respective analyses.

In Study 3, n = 100 participants (50 males, 50 females; aged 21.36 ± 3.64 years) were confronted with 40 everyday moral conflict situations (20 items with socially close and 20 items with socially distant protagonists), which were selected based on the results of Studies 1 and 2. Since one aim of Study 3 was the development of two parallelized item sets (set A and B), which could then be used in repeated-measurement design studies, participants were only confronted with the question “What do I do?” and the two possible response alternatives (altruistic vs. egoistic) in the fixed random order.

For the purpose of analysis, altruistic decisions were coded as “1” and egoistic decisions as “0”; then the percentage of altruistic decisions was calculated. As the type of decision (altruistic vs. egoistic) was assessed in Studies 1 and 3, we also merged the data of these surveys. Thus, we developed the two parallelized item sets for future use in within-subjects design studies and assessed the test and measurement properties of our new scale based on a total sample of n = 150 participants (75 males, 75 females; aged 22.04 ± 4.04 years).

Statistical analyses

Statistical analyses were performed using the IBM SPSS (version 25.0) statistical software package and R (version 3.5.1; [ 49 ]) with the packages psych [ 50 ], eRm [ 51 ], foreign [ 52 ], and psychometric [ 53 ]. The significance level was set at α = .05; all testing was two-tailed. Results in the text are given as mean ± standard deviation ( M ± SD ). For all between- and within-group comparisons, Cohen's d is reported as a measure of effect size.

The results section is structured into two main parts. In the first main part, we present analyses concerning the development and validation of our new 40-items EMCS Scale as well as the development of two parallelized 20-item sets (each ten scenarios with socially close and socially distant protagonists) for future use in within-subjects design studies. For the two parallelized sets A and B, we used Wilks L mvc tests to demonstrate parallelism [ 54 ]. The procedure by Wilks tests the hypothesis that the means are equal, the variances are equal, and the covariances are equal. The test statistic is based on the weighted differences of the subsample means with the grand mean and the ratio of subsample and complete sample (co)variances, which are shown to be chi 2 -distributed when the data meets hypothesis (see [ 54 ], formula 1.4). Moreover, we report the measurement qualities based on Rasch model analyses and classical test theory fit indices of the complete 40-items EMCS Scale and its two subsets A and B.

The second main part presents first content-related analyses regarding our newly developed EMCS Scale. We used Welch-tests [ 55 ] to examine the effects of the social closeness of the protagonists and the gender of our participants on everyday moral decision-making. Furthermore, we explored possible effects of the actual existence of a socially close protagonist in the lives of the participants on response tendencies in everyday moral conflict situations. We also ran Welch-tests to analyze between-group mean differences in the percentage of altruistic decisions, social closeness ratings, and similarity to reality ratings.

Development and scale characteristics of the EMCS Scale

Scale development..

The new EMCS Scale was developed in a six-step procedure. Overall, we selected 40 out of initially 60 items (20 items with socially close and 20 items with socially distant protagonists) based on four criteria: (1) preferable mean rate of altruistic decisions, (2) clear representation of altruistic and egoistic response classes, (3) unambiguousness of social closeness classifications, and (4) high similarity to reality ratings.

In a first step, we calculated the item difficulties of all 60 items. This analysis was based on the data of Study 1. In order to avoid ceiling or floor effects as much as possible, we excluded 16 items (ten items with socially close and six items with socially distant target persons) due to a relatively high (≥ 0.8) or low (≤ 0.2) percentage of altruistic decisions.

In a second step, we validated the a priori defined behavioral response classifications. We therefore analyzed if altruistic decisions were clearly perceived as altruistic and egoistic decisions as egoistic. This analysis was based on the data of Study 2. All of the 44 remaining items provided acceptable mean altruistic and egoistic response ratings (i.e., for altruistic responses above and for egoistic responses below the average scale value of 4).

In a third step, we checked the a priori defined social closeness classifications, that is, if socially close protagonists were clearly perceived as socially close and socially distant target persons as socially distant. This analysis was based on the data of Studies 1 and 2. All items showed social closeness ratings in the expected direction: the means of items with socially close protagonists were above the average scale value of 4, and the means of items with socially distant protagonists below 4.

In a fourth step, we checked the similarity of the stories to everyday life situations. This analysis was based on the data of Studies 1 and 2. One item with a socially distant protagonist showed a somewhat lowered mean similarity to reality rating of 3.43 and was therefore excluded. The similarity to reality ratings of the remaining items reached at least a mean rating above 3.5 (range: 3.57 to 5.74).

In a fifth step, we excluded three further items with socially distant protagonists that showed the least favorable combination of the four aforementioned criteria in order to reach a final 40-items set with 20 socially close and 20 socially distant protagonists.

In a sixth step, the final 40 items were adjusted in terms of the gender of the protagonists. For that purpose, the gender of eight target persons (five socially close and three socially distant) was changed to achieve an equal gender distribution.

Scale characteristics.

Regarding our final 40-items EMCS Scale, participants chose the altruistic response alternative in an average of 59.70% (± 14.59%, with 0.40% missings) of the everyday moral conflict situations, which was significantly higher than 50% ( t (149) = 8.15, p < 0.001). The item statistics for all final 40 items of the EMCS Scale on single item basis (subdivided into items with socially close and socially distant protagonists) can be found in S1 and S2 Tables.

Development of two parallelized item sets for use in within-subjects design studies

In order to develop two parallelized item sets for future use in within-subjects design studies, we took the complete 40-items EMCS Scale and generated item pairs based on social closeness, gender of the protagonists, and story content in a first step. In a second step, the 20 item pairs were split into two different item sets (each ten scenarios with socially close and socially distant protagonists). In a third step, the allocation of the items was pairwise interchanged until we achieved two parallelized item sets regarding item difficulty (percentage of altruistic decisions) and their properties (social closeness ratings and similarity to reality ratings).

In the final version, the items 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 20 (socially close protagonists) and 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40 (socially distant protagonists) were assigned to set A; the items 1, 3, 4, 6, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 (socially close protagonists) and 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 36 (socially distant protagonists) became part of set B (see last column in S1 Table ).

Regarding the percentage of altruistic decisions, the comparison of the means and standard deviations of the sets A and B showed a very close to one value of L mvc = 0.997 ( p = 0.78), indicating that there were no significant differences between set A (59.38% ± 16.47) and set B (60.03% ± 15.95). The Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability was 0.77. Moreover, the same results arose for the comparison of the sets A and B including only the items with socially close protagonists (set A 60.30% ± 18.21, set B 60.83% ± 17.79; L mvc = 0.999, p = 0.90) or the items with socially distant protagonists (set A 58.51% ± 20.66, set B 59.23% ± 20.98; L mvc = 0.998, p = 0.88), respectively. The mean social closeness ratings for the items with socially close protagonists (set A 5.84 ± 0.49, set B 5.85 ± 0.52; d = -0.002) and for the items with socially distant protagonists (set A 1.76 ± 0.80, set B 1.78 ± 0.75; d = -0.03) also hardly differed between the two constructed item sets. Moreover, there was no relevant difference between the mean similarity to reality ratings in set A (4.67 ± 0.89) and set B (4.66 ± 0.85; d = 0.004).

Test and measurement properties of the EMCS Scale and its two item sets A and B

We tested the measurement qualities of our new scale by fitting a one-parameter logistic Rasch model (1 PL IRT; e.g., [ 56 , 57 ]) for the complete EMCS Scale and its two subsets A and B. The model fit was tested with the Andersen LR-test [ 58 ] based on a median split and a graphical model check. We used the defaults of the eRm packages reducing the R code to: eRm::LRtest(eRm::(data[,items])). For testing the unidimensionality of the EMCS Scale and the appropriateness of the fragmentation into the two item sets A and B, we used the Martin-Loef LR-test [ 59 ]. With the Martin-Loef LR-test, the likelihood of the unidimensionality assumption is compared with the likelihood of two or more (in this study up to four) dimensions. A unidimensional interpretation of the measure is more appropriate, the lesser the enhancement of a more specific structure (multiple dimensions; R code: eRm::MLoef(eRM::RM(data[,items])). Thereby, the complete 40-items set was in a first step split into two parts based on a median split regarding the items’ raw scores. In a second step, we checked the fit for dividing the items into the sets A and B. Moreover, we split the items into four parts depending on their belonging to set A or B and the social closeness of the protagonists (set A socially close, set A socially distant, set B socially close, set B socially distant).

The Andersen test indicated a proper fit for the complete EMCS Scale ( LR (39) = 45.49, p = 0.22), showing that there was one latent trait variable underlying our measures. Additionally, the graphical model test did not give hints for items, which fell out of line (see Fig 1 ). The item furthest away from the diagonal was item 24. However, this item still had an adequate mean-square outlier-sensitive fit of 0.82 [ 60 ], and it did also not show other striking item characteristics (see S2 Table for all item statistics and results of Rasch model analyses on single item basis).

Graphical model check plotting the item values estimated for participants with EMCS scores less or equal than the median against the item values estimated for participants with EMCS scores above the median. The results indicated a proper fit for all 40 items.

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There were neither indications against unidimensionality nor the valid fragmentation into the subsets A and B nor the further subdivision into socially close or socially distant protagonists (10 items each) in subsets A versus B (see Table 2 ). Moreover, the classical test theory fit index Cronbach’s alpha indicated a reasonable internal consistency for the total scale score as well as acceptable values for the subsets A and B. However, the additional split of set A and B into the 10-items parts depending on the social closeness of the protagonists showed rather low Cronbach’s alpha values, speaking against an uncoupled use of only these 10-items parts.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.t002

The descriptives of the inter-item correlations ( n = 780, M = 0.11, SD = 0.15, Min = -0.34, Max = 0.75, skewness = 0.51, kurtosis = 0.99; for all details see S3 Table ) and the item discriminations based on the complete EMCS Scale ( n = 40, M = 0.23, SD = 0.08, Min = 0.09, Max = 0.43, skewness = 0.29, kurtosis = -0.61; for all details see S2 Table ) indicated that the bivariate linearity of the items was not as strong as normally expected for dichotomous performance tests [ 61 ]. This might explain the somewhat lower values of Cronbach’s alpha, although the assumptions of the Rasch model were fulfilled.

Effects of social closeness and gender on everyday moral decision-making

Concerning the social closeness of the protagonists, there were no significant differences in the percentage of altruistic decisions (Studies 1 and 3) and the ratings of altruistic responses (Study 2) between the items with socially close protagonists and the items with socially distant protagonists (see Table 3 ). However, there was a significant difference in the ratings of social closeness (Studies 1 and 2) in the expected direction with a very large effect size ( d = 7.49), which additionally confirmed our a priori defined social closeness classifications.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.t003

Additionally, the items with socially close protagonists differed from the items with socially distant protagonists regarding the ratings of egoistic responses (Study 2) and similarity to reality ratings (Studies 1 and 2; see Table 3 ). Egoistic responses of items with socially distant protagonists were rated as significantly more egoistic than egoistic responses of scenarios with socially close protagonists, indicating that fulfilling a personal desire towards strangers was perceived as slightly more egoistic than towards family and friends. Furthermore, the similarity to reality ratings were significantly higher for the items with socially distant protagonists, suggesting that our participants were more likely to encounter everyday moral conflict situations with strangers than with family or friends.

With regard to potential gender effects, there were no significant differences in the percentage of altruistic decisions between females (59.75% ± 15.53) and males (59.66% ± 13.68; t (145.67) = 0.04, p = 0.97, d = 0.01; see Fig 2 ), indicating that everyday moral decision-making did not differ depending on the gender of our participants.

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Supplementary analysis: Influence of the actual existence of socially close protagonists in the lives of participants

As a supplementary analysis, we finally investigated the impact of the actual existence of a respective socially close protagonist (i.e., partner, father, mother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, grandfather, grandmother) in the lives of the participants on the percentage of altruistic decisions, social closeness ratings, and similarity to reality ratings. The performed analyses showed that there were no significant between-group differences in the percentage of altruistic decisions, social closeness ratings, or similarity to reality ratings (see Table 4 ), indicating that the actual existence of a respective socially close protagonist in the lives of participants had no impact on altruistic versus egoistic decision-making, social closeness ratings, or similarity to reality ratings in everyday moral conflict situations. It should be noticed that for the father and mother item, we were unable to perform between-group comparisons because all participants reported to have a father and mother who they knew or had known in the past. Moreover, for the uncle, aunt, grandfather, and grandmother item, we refrained from computing these analyses due to the partially very small and unequal sample sizes.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.t004

Despite the growing field of moral psychology [ 62 ], there is still a paucity of validated everyday moral decision-making paradigms for use in laboratory settings. Therefore, we conducted three independent studies to develop and validate a new measure to assess decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations. To sum up, our new EMCS Scale, which can be applied both as paper-pencil questionnaire and as computer task, comprises 40 everyday moral conflict scenarios with high similarity to everyday life situations. Concerning the content of our scenarios, we got inspired by the MFT [ 19 – 21 ] as well as the empirical results of a large ecological momentary assessment study [ 18 ]. Instead of varying the emotionality of the stories as done in previous research (e.g., high vs. low emotionality; [ 22 , 23 ]), we varied the social closeness of the protagonists (socially close vs. socially distant) in order to investigate the impact of the relatedness of the participants to the story characters as a further potential modulating factor of everyday moral decision-making [ 2 ]. Additionally, we counterbalanced our new measure in terms of the gender of the protagonists and equally recruited males and females for participation in our surveys to explore potential gender differences. For the first time in everyday moral dilemma research, we additionally developed and validated two parallelized item sets for future use in within-subjects design studies. This offers the opportunity to control for potential effects of interindividual differences in trait variables (e.g., personality; see [ 26 ]).

During the process of scale development, we selected 40 out of 60 items with preferable mean rates of altruistic decisions in order to avoid ceiling or floor effects. This is in contrast to earlier studies (e.g., [ 22 ]), where especially high-emotional dilemmas came along with a very high percentage of altruistic decisions (up to 96%). Moreover, we only selected items with a clear representation of altruistic and egoistic response classes, unambiguous social closeness classifications, and high similarity to reality ratings. Regarding our final 40-items set, all items provided satisfactory psychometric parameters (percentage of altruistic decisions between 17% and 83%, altruistic response ratings above and egoistic response ratings below the mean scale value of 4, social closeness ratings for items with socially close protagonists above and for items with socially distant protagonists below the mean scale value of 4, and relatively high similarity to reality ratings; see Tables 3 and S1 ). Additionally, using Wilks L mvc tests [ 54 ], we successfully developed two parallelized 20-items sets A and B.

With regard to the test and measurement properties, our results showed that both the EMCS Scale and its two subsets A and B fitted the Rasch model, which implied that there was one underlying latent trait variable. Furthermore, the classical test theory fit index Cronbach’s alpha indicated reasonable internal consistencies for the total EMCS Scale as well as the two item sets A and B (0.60 ≤ α ≥ 0.84). Even the fragmentation into four parts still resulted in a sufficient estimation by the Rasch model, although Cronbach’s alpha results spoke against an uncoupled use of only these 10-items parts. Thus, both the complete EMCS Scale and its two parallelized subsets A and B can be utilized as valid measures for decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations.

In our data, we did not observe that the percentage of altruistic decisions differed depending on the social closeness of the protagonists. This is in contrast to the results of Zhan and colleagues [ 31 ], the only study so far that investigated the impact of social closeness on everyday moral decision-making. Contrary to Zhan et al. [ 31 ], we only observed a slightly, but not significantly lower percentage of altruistic decisions for the items with socially distant protagonists than for the items with socially close protagonists, and this difference only reached a very small effect size ( d = 0.12). Additionally, Rasch model analyses indicated that there was one underlying latent trait variable, which further speaks against a significant impact of social closeness on everyday moral decision-making in our surveys. This divergent finding could possibly be explained by methodological differences. Since Zhan et al. [ 31 ] did not provide concrete examples of their stimulus material in their manuscript, it remains unclear whether their vignettes represented everyday moral conflict situations. Furthermore, our data also appear to be in contrast to several abstract moral decision-making studies, which showed that social closeness is an important experimental design parameter in moral dilemma research ([ 5 , 28 – 30 ]; see also [ 2 ]). One potential explanation could be that abstract moral dilemmas describe dead-or-alive situations, whereas the consequences of the response alternatives in our everyday moral dilemmas are less grave. Therefore, one might be more willing to accept the costs of an egoistic response option not only for socially distant others, but also to some degree for socially close persons.

Somewhat unexpectedly, we found that the egoistic responses of items with socially distant protagonists were rated as significantly more egoistic than the egoistic responses of items with socially close protagonists. We also observed this group difference for the altruistic response ratings, at least on a descriptive level and with a medium effect size ( d = 0.36; i.e., altruistic responses of items with socially distant protagonists were rated as slightly, but not significantly more altruistic than altruistic responses of items with socially close protagonists). These interesting results could be potentially traced back to the fact that the similarity to reality ratings were also significantly higher for the scenarios with socially distant protagonists, indicating that our participants are more likely to encounter everyday moral conflict situations with strangers than with family or friends. This is in line with the results of a recent ecological momentary assessment study about morality in everyday life, where the most frequent type of victim categories were “no concrete person/other entity” or “stranger” [ 17 ]. Taken together, these findings combined with our data raise the hypothesis that participants might be better able to evaluate more frequently experienced everyday moral conflict situations, namely conflicts with socially distant than with socially close others, and consequently are more confident to choose the more extreme response categories.

As a supplementary analysis, we further examined if the responses to the items with socially close protagonists differed depending on the actual existence of the respective target persons in the real lives of the participants. The rationale behind this investigation was to rule out the possibility that the actual existence, respectively non-existence, of the socially close protagonists in the lives of participants might be a potential confounding factor that influences decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations. This appeared not to be the case, since we did not observe any between-group differences in the percentage of altruistic decisions, social closeness ratings, and similarity to reality ratings (as far as the analyses were feasible; for details see the results section). Thus, our results provide evidence that the EMCS Scale can be broadly applied independently of the actual existence of the respective persons in participants’ lives.

Interestingly, we also did not observe gender differences in our surveys, which, on the one hand, is not uncommon for hypothetical moral dilemmas [ 43 ], but, on the other hand, is in sharp contrast to early moral reasoning research [ 42 ] and current abstract moral decision-making studies [ 7 , 38 – 41 ]. This inconsistent result could potentially be explained by the fact that our new EMCS Scale measures altruistic and egoistic response tendencies, which are behavioral measures that rather reflect outcomes of morality, but not moral attitudes itself [ 43 ]. Altogether, in combination with the social closeness results, our data therefore point to the idea that everyday moral decision-making with altruistic versus egoistic response options seems to be quite a different construct than abstract moral decision-making with utilitarian versus deontological response alternatives.

One obvious limitation of our new measurement tool is that the EMCS Scale, which was developed for use in laboratory settings, cannot reach external and ecological validity as high as ecological momentary assessment (e.g., [ 17 , 18 ]). However, the similarity to reality ratings achieved in our surveys showed that all selected stories may at least potentially occur in everyday life, thus indicating relatively high ecological validity of our new scale. Moreover, our participants chose the altruistic response alternatives in almost 60% of all cases, which is in accordance with the fact that a remarkable facet of human behavior is that people often decide to help others even when it comes at personal cost, and when there is no expectation of receiving any material returns [ 63 ]. It should also be considered that research regarding morality in everyday life is still in its infancies in many application fields (e.g., regarding the impact of stress and stress hormones on everyday moral decision-making; see [ 24 ]). Hence, in a first step, controlled laboratory studies with measures like the EMCS Scale are important to achieve higher internal validity.

Furthermore, we did not explicitly control for socially desirable responding in our surveys. Nevertheless, we tried to keep the potential impact of social desirability as low as possible by ensuring strict anonymity to all our participants. Moreover, we excluded all items with extremely high percentages of altruistic decisions. For the remaining items, we observed statistical variance both within participants and across items, which probably speaks against highly socially desirable responding.

Additionally, it has to be acknowledged that we did not achieve an equal distribution of the four moral dimensions (namely care/harm, fairness/unfairness, loyalty/disloyalty, and honesty/dishonesty) as introduced by MFT. However, to date, it is still a question of debate whether morality is a unified construct or can be deconstructed into several factors [ 62 , 64 ]. Our data seem to provide support for the assumption of unidimensionality (one latent trait variable). For future studies, a much larger data base would be necessary to perform a further in-depth analysis of the potentially underlying factoral structure. In this regard, we would expect a bifactor structure (i.e., loadings on both a global and several specific factors), since in the EMCS Scale, a clear distinction of different moral dimensions (as for example realized by [ 65 ]) had to stand back from the aim of high criterion validity for the everyday life situations. Indeed, explorative factor analysis of the present data suggested at least six factors, thus underscoring the idea that there might be a somewhat more complicated underlying measurement structure. But, as Reise et al. [ 66 ] summarized, there would be a need of much bigger sample sizes to perform such analyses. Moreover, for future research, it would be interesting to examine gender differences in the response behavior to the EMCS Scale in more detail (e.g., regarding the impact of the gender of the participants depending on the gender of the protagonists; see [ 67 ] or [ 68 ] for examples in other research areas). Additionally, it would be conceivable that social closeness as an important experimental design parameter in everyday moral decision-making may only emerge in combination with certain experimental manipulations, like the induction of acute psychosocial stress (e.g., [ 33 ]; for a potential theoretical explanation see [ 69 ]). Therefore, we highly encourage researchers to use the EMCS Scale to explore the impact of social closeness on everyday moral decision-making in combination with different experimental paradigms and tasks. More generally, future studies should also try to develop measures for the investigation of other types of moral conflicts in everyday life situations (e.g., conflicts between different duties or between sets of apparently incommensurable values; see [ 2 ]), since the EMCS Scale covers only one particular sort of moral conflicts, namely accepted moral values versus self-interests.

In conclusion, our new EMCS Scale appears to be a promising new measurement tool for the investigation of the manifold determinants of decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations. In particular, we developed and validated a measure that is composed of two parallelized item sets A and B. Therefore, it can be utilized both in between- and within-subjects design studies. In between-subjects design studies, the EMCS Scale offers the opportunity to realize more than one point of measurement (e.g., at different time points before and after an experimental/control manipulation). In within-subjects design studies, the parallelized item sets provide the advantage of controlling for interindividual variability in trait variables affecting everyday moral decision-making. Altogether, the EMCS Scale may prove useful in many areas of application, as for instance in individual differences research, social psychology, psychobiological stress research, clinical psychology, or occupational and organizational psychology.

Supporting information

S1 table. the emcs scale..

S1 Table shows the finally selected 40 items (everyday moral conflict situations) of the EMCS Scale with corresponding response alternatives (altruistic vs. egoistic), mean item difficulties (Studies 1 and 3), altruistic and egoistic response ratings (Study 2), social closeness and similarity to reality ratings (Studies 1 and 2), and respective assignment to the two parallelized item sets A and B.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.s001

S2 Table. Item statistics and results of Rasch model analyses.

S2 Table shows the item statistics and results of Rasch model analyses on single item basis for the final 40 items of the EMCS Scale.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.s002

S3 Table. Inter-item correlations.

S3 Table shows the inter-item correlations (tetrachoric correlations) of the final 40 items of the EMCS Scale.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.s003

S1 File. SPSS data of Studies 1 and 2.

Based on this data set ( n = 100), we selected 40 out of the initially 60 items with a preferable mean rate of altruistic decisions, a clear representation of altruistic and egoistic response classes, unambiguousness of social closeness classifications, and high similarity to reality ratings.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.s004

S2 File. SPSS data of Studies 1 and 3.

Based on this data set ( n = 150), we developed the two parallelized item sets for future use in within-subjects design studies and assessed the test and measurement properties of the EMCS Scale.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214747.s005

Acknowledgments

We thank April Points, Katharina Spannruft, and Marina Weber for their assistance with the translation of the everyday moral conflict situations.

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The Conflict Between Aestheticism and Morality in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray

Patrick Duggan

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Oscar Wilde prefaces his novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray, with a reflection on art, the artist, and the utility of both. After careful scrutiny, he concludes: “All art is quite useless” (Wilde 4). In this one sentence, Wilde encapsulates the complete principles of the Aesthetic Movement popular in Victorian England. That is to say, real art takes no part in molding the social or moral identities of society, nor should it. Art should be beautiful and pleasure its observer, but to imply further-reaching influence would be a mistake. The explosion of aesthetic philosophy in fin-de-siècle English society, as exemplified by Oscar Wilde, was not confined to merely art, however. Rather, the proponents of this philosophy extended it to life itself. Here, aestheticism advocated whatever behavior was likely to maximize the beauty and happiness in one’s life, in the tradition of hedonism. To the aesthete, the ideal life mimics art; it is beautiful, but quite useless beyond its beauty, concerned only with the individual living it. Influences on others, if existent, are trivial at best. Many have read The Picture of Dorian Gray as a novelized sponsor for just this sort of aesthetic lifestyle. However, this story of the rise and fall of Dorian Gray might instead represent an allegory about morality meant to critique, rather than endorse, the obeying of one’s impulses as thoughtlessly and dutifully as aestheticism dictates.

In the novel, Lord Henry Wotton trumpets the aesthetic philosophy with an elegance and bravado that persuade Dorian to trust in the principles he espouses; the reader is often similarly captivated. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the novel as a patent recommendation of aestheticism. To the aesthete, there is no distinction between moral and immoral acts, only between those that increase or decrease one’s happiness; yet, Dorian Gray refutes this idea, presenting a strong case for the inherent immorality of purely aesthetic lives. Dorian Gray personifies the aesthetic lifestyle in action, pursuing personal gratification with abandon. Yet, while he enjoys these indulgences, his behavior ultimately kills him and others, and he dies unhappier than ever. Rather than an advocate for pure aestheticism, then, Dorian Gray is a cautionary tale in which Wilde illustrates the dangers of the aesthetic philosophy when not practiced with prudence. Aestheticism, argues Wilde, too often aligns itself with immorality, resulting in a precarious philosophy that must be practiced deliberately.

Dorian Gray is often read as an explicit proclamation of the worthiness of living life in accordance with aesthetic values. This is due in part to the flourishing Aesthetic Movement of Victorian England at the time of the novel’s publication, as well as Oscar Wilde’s association with the movement itself (Becker 660). The Aesthetic Movement, which coincided with the Industrial Revolution at the end of the nineteenth century, emphasized the artistic aspect of a man’s work in producing a variety of goods, from furniture to machines to literature (Becker 660). Oscar Wilde, however, proposed that the principles of the Aesthetic Movement extend beyond the production of mere commodities. In Joseph Pearce’s biography, The Unmasking of Oscar Wilde , Pearce recalls Wilde’s own perspective on the popular movement. Speaking of aestheticism, Wilde is quoted:

It is indeed to become a part of the people’s life . . . I mean a man who works with his hands; and not with his hands merely, but with his head and his heart. The evil that machinery is doing is not merely in the consequence of its work but in the fact that it makes men themselves machines also. Whereas, we wish them to be artists, that is to say men. (qtd. in Pearce 144)

In his exposition of aestheticism, Wilde applies the philosophy in a more universal sense, stressing the positive influences of aestheticism in one’s life beyond mere craftsmanship. Just as the machines that mass-produce materials with the intervention of human thought are labeled “evil,” Wilde similarly condemns men who act as metaphorical machines, programmed to behave in accordance with society’s ideas of propriety rather than allowing themselves to act freely and achieve the greatest amount of happiness. Wilde’s eloquent advocacy of an aesthetic lifestyle is paralleled in his depiction of Lord Henry in Dorian Gray . Lord Henry lectured to the impressionable Dorian, “We are punished for our refusals. Every impulse that we strive to strangle broods in the mind, and poisons us. . . . Resist it, and your soul grows sick with longing for the things it has forbidden itself” (Wilde 9). Wilde, through Lord Henry, laments the stifling nature of his contemporary Victorian society and how the supposed morality it boasts necessitates self-denial and rejection of life’s most beautiful aspects. Lord Henry warns that without an enthusiastic embrace of aestheticism, one will perpetually anguish with the desire of precisely what he must deny himself, all for the sake of propriety. This philosophy espoused by Wilde and Lord Henry often leads, not surprisingly, to the conclusion that Dorian Gray is a declaration of Wilde’s, promoting the adoption of purely aesthetic lives without qualification. This, however, is too shallow of an interpretation.

Opponents of a purely aesthetic lifestyle will certainly cite what they consider an inevitability: one’s desires and impulses, though when acted upon result in a more pleasurable life, will at times be undeniably immoral. It is at these times that the virtues of the wholly aesthetic life become questionable. The ruination of Dorian Gray, the embodiment of unbridled aestheticism, illustrates the immorality of such a lifestyle and gravely demonstrates its consequences. Wilde uses Dorian Gray not as an advertisement for aestheticism, but rather, he uses Dorian’s life to warn against aestheticism’s hostility toward morality when uncontrolled. Wilde himself admits, in a letter to the St. James’s Gazette, that Dorian Gray “is a story with a moral. And the moral is this: All excess, as well as all renunciation, brings its own punishment” (Wilde 248). Aestheticism does well to condemn the renunciation of desires, but it is an excessive obedience to these desires that is subversively dangerous. Therefore, in the practice of Wilde’s aestheticism, forethought and constraint are necessities, yet too often lacking, and without them, one is doomed to suffer the same fate as Dorian Gray.

The character of Dorian Gray and the story of his profound degeneration provide a case study examining the viability of purely aesthetic lives. Dorian lives according to what Lord Henry professes without hesitation, and what Lord Henry inspires Dorian, through persuasive rhetoric, is an attitude indifferent to consequence and altogether amoral. As Wilde writes, Dorian’s newfound position is “never to accept any theory or system that would involve the sacrifice of any mode of passionate experience. Its aim, indeed was to be experience itself, and not the fruits of experience, sweet or bitter as they may be” (Wilde 125). Under Lord Henry’s mentorship, Dorian, once the epitome of wide-eyed youth, behaves with no regard for the ramifications of his actions, diligently pursuing instant gratification without thought of its implications, whether they be “sweet or bitter.”

Dorian’s relationship with the actress Sibyl Vane plainly illustrates this marked change in personality. Dorian pursues Sibyl from first sights, intent on acquiring her before he ever attempts to truly know her. Indeed, Dorian’s love for Sibyl is overtly superficial, as evidenced by Dorian’s own description of his infatuation with Sibyl: “I loved you because you were marvelous, because you had genius and intellect, because you realized the dreams of great poets and gave shape and substance to the shadows of art” (Wilde 101). Dorian is not attracted to Sibyl’s character of personality, but rather her acting talent and enthralling performances; this is what enchants the aesthetically inclined Dorian. When Sibyl leaves the stage, then, she no longer serves a purpose in Dorian’s aesthetic life, and thus, Dorian abandons her unceremoniously. Dorian does not regret informing Sybil that, “Without your art, you are nothing” (Wilde 101). The tragedy of Sybil’s later suicide, brought about by utter despair at her desertion, is lost on Dorian, who instead enjoys the dramatic intrigue of the occasion. For Dorian, whose uncontrolled aestheticism rejects the concept of morality, the immorality of his actions goes unrecognized. In fact, Dorian declares excitedly, “It seems to me to be simply like a wonderful ending to a wonderful play. It has all the terrible beauty of a Greek tragedy, a tragedy in which I took a great part, but by which I have not been wounded” (Wilde 114). Here, the adverse consequences of aestheticism surface in Dorian’s life. In his pursuit of his own pleasures, a distinctly narcissistic attitude emerges, and the incompatibility of morality and unconditional aestheticism becomes all the more apparent.

The emergence of narcissism in Dorian and its correlation with his newly adopted aesthetic philosophy is integral to Wilde’s novel as it emphasizes the frequent hostility between aestheticism and morality that Wilde cautions against. Dorian Gray exposes the immorality of self-absorption, as Dorian’s portrait becomes more disfigured with each one of Dorian’s selfish acts. This self-absorption, then, appears to be an inevitable consequence of aestheticism. Only a more deliberate practice of aestheticism may harness this egotism and avoid the immorality Dorian embodies. Interestingly, in his essay “Come See About Me: Enchantment of the Double in The Picture of Dorian Gray ,” Christopher Craft recognizes a mirroring of the Greek myth of Narcissus in the life of Dorian Gray. According to mythology, Narcissus, upon catching a glimpse of his reflection in a pool, becomes so enraptured by it that he stood and admired it endlessly, unmoving for the rest of his life. As Craft notes, this self-absorption “is a commitment that, like Dorian’s, graduates fully until death” (Craft 113). Narcissus becomes so infatuated with himself that the rest of world effectively ceases to exist or affect him and, as Craft argues, “it is into precisely this silent delirium that Dorian unwittingly steps” when he allows Lord Henry’s aesthetic philosophy to so dominate him (Craft 113). Dorian enjoys a life of eternal youth, with only his portrait aging in parallel with Dorian’s immorality; so, as Dorian sinks into the depths of narcissism, he maintains his external beauty, and his portrait degenerates instead. Eventually, as in the myth of Narcissus, such egotism has its consequences. When Dorian, disgusted with the decrepit picture of the supposedly “real” him, destroys it in a fit of anger, Dorian too is destroyed. Wilde writes that after Dorian’s death, “it was not till they had examined the rings that they recognized who it was” (Wilde 220). In the end, as a testament to the purely aesthetic life, the only legacy Dorian leaves behind—everything that identifies him as who he was—is his superficial jewelry.

There is an argument, then, made by Wilde for a new aestheticism, approached with more constraint than Dorian employs. This argument is based not only in the moral obligation of the individual, but with the betterment of all of society in mind. Matthew Arnold, in his essay “Culture and Anarchy,” provides reasoning against the ethos of Lord Henry’s aestheticism and an unconditional application of it. Arnold focuses on its detrimental effects on society and the possibility for societal improvement when aesthetic tendencies are properly controlled. There appears to be agreement, then, between Wilde and Arnold; Wilde’ novel provides a failed example of the purely aesthetic life, and when scaled to a larger society, a similar result is understandably expected. As Arnold views his contemporary society, it is arranged hierarchically, dividing the aristocrats, the middle-class, and the working-class, all of which, Arnold laments, are inclined to live hedonistically, pursuing pleasure and only what is comfortable and easy. Dorian Gray embodies just his defect in Arnold’s society. Arnold argues, however, that “there are born a certain number of natures with a curiosity about their best self with a bend for seeing things as they are . . . for simply concerning themselves with reason and the will of God, and doing their best to make these prevail;—for the pursuit, in a word, of perfection” (Arnold 277). Arnold is optimistic that some may pursue beyond the immediately pleasurable and act to perfect themselves both morally and intellectually. This pursuit of perfection, however, is likely an arduous and uncomfortable task, and is therefore incompatible with pure aestheticism. Some concessions must be made for the absolute aesthete, then, for such transcendence occur.

Dorian Gray, for much of Wilde’s novel, fails to embody Arnold’s ideal, as in his hedonistic life he is seen “creeping at dawn out of dreadful houses and slinking in disguise in the foulest dens in London,” despite being once too honorable for such debauchery (Wilde 118). Dorian exemplifies a regression in social intellect from his beginnings rather than the kind of transcendence hoped for by Arnold. Dorian displays no such pursuit of intellectual perfection as he is slowly corrupted and in turn corrupts others, luring them with him into the slums and opium dens of London. Arnold refers to those able to transcend social classes in society as “aliens,” hinting at their rarity to the point of foreignness and to their almost mythical quality (277). The mere existence of these aliens, however, provides hope that the utter hedonists of society may learn to harness their damaging tendencies, and in doing so, better the intellectual and moral state of humankind.

Wilde, too, recognizes this ability to control the hedonistic temptations associated with aestheticism, as demonstrated by the last stages of Dorian’s life. Mitsuharu Matsuoka, in his essay “Aestheticism and Social Anxiety in The Picture of Dorian Gray ,” notes that, as Dorian’s death approaches, “Dorian ultimately reacts against his lifestyle, choking on his New Hedonism,” at which point “a great sense of doom hangs over Dorian” (Matsuoka 78). Indeed, Dorian appears to realize the consequences of his unbridled aestheticism; however, he is much too far gone to salvage. Dorian reveals his epiphany to Lord Henry: “The soul is a terrible reality. It can be bought, and sold, and bartered away. It can be poisoned or made perfect. There is a soul in each one of us. I know it” (Wilde 211). Unfortunately for Dorian, this realization comes too late to save his soul from its degradation, long-nurtured by a purely aesthetic life, and he is destroyed. The realization itself, however, is indicative of Wilde’s argument woven throughout Dorian Gray . Despite Wilde’s publicly advocating the principles of aestheticism, Dorian’s demise illustrates Wilde’s recognition that aestheticism needs to be properly controlled. While the pursuit of beauty and happiness in life is always Wilde’s ideal, he also implies that the consequences of one’s actions must be thought out and the impact of one’s decisions, beyond oneself, must also be carefully considered before acting on any impulse.

The Aesthetic Movement in fin-de-siècle England, as interpreted by Oscar Wilde, revolved around the ideal that the utility of one’s actions should be to create the maximal amount of beauty and pleasure in one’s life, and nothing more. Wilde’s Dorian Gray appears, at first glance, to promote this philosophy unequivocally. Indeed, a lifestyle based on this aestheticism is espoused in Wilde’s opening preface as well as throughout Lord Henry’s professorial lectures. Upon closer inspection, however, Wilde’s novel is not as wholly embracing of aestheticism as this implies. Wilde realized and depicted in the life of Dorian Gray, a need for a more controlled and deliberate approach to aestheticism, without which morality will inevitably be elusive. The adoption of unrestrained aestheticism, as exhibited by Dorian, results in a lack of remorse, self-absorption, and intellectual regression. For the sake of preserving morality, a concept proven incompatible with pure aestheticism, more deliberation is necessary from the aesthete in deciding upon action. If, in the pursuit of one’s desires and of the beautiful aspects of life, the condition of others’ or of one’s own intellect is jeopardized, the enjoyment garnered must sometimes be sacrificed for the greater good. As Wilde makes clear, it is only through a more restrained philosophy that aestheticism and morality may eventually align.

Works Cited

Arnold, Matthew. “Culture and Anarchy.” The Picture of Dorian Gray . Ed. Andrew Elfenbein. NY: Pearson Longman, 2007. 276–279.

Becker-Leckrone, Megan. “Oscar Wilde (1854–1900): Aesthetic and Criticism.” The Continuum Encyclopedia of Modern Criticism and Theory 20 (2002): 658–665.

Craft, Christopher. “Come See About Me: Enchantment of the Double in The Picture of Dorian Gray .” Representations 91 (2005): 109–136.

Matsuoka, Mitsuharu. “Aestheticism and Social Anxiety in The Picture of Dorian Gray. ” Journal of Aesthetic Education 29 (2003): 77–100.

Pearce, Joseph. The Unmasking of Oscar Wilde . NY: Ignatius Press, 2004.

Wilde, Oscar. The Picture of Dorian Gray . Ed. Andrew Elfenbein. NY: Pearson Longman, 2007.

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• > MORALITY, LAW AND CONFLICTING REASONS FOR ACTION

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Morality, law and conflicting reasons for action.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2012

In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart suggested that four formal features of morality distinguish it from law: importance, immunity from deliberate change, the nature of moral offences and the form of moral pressure. On closer examination, none of these supposed features clearly distinguishes morality from law, at least in the broad sense of ‘morality’ that Hart adopted. However, a fifth feature of morality mentioned by Hart – namely the role that morality plays in practical reasoning as a source of ultimate standards for assessing human conduct – does illuminate the relationship between law as conceptualised by Hart and morality variously understood. Because morality has this feature, law is always subject to moral assessment, and moral reasons trump legal reasons. It does not follow, however, that law is irrelevant to moral reasoning.

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1 A.W.B. Simpson, Reflections on The Concept of Law (Oxford 2011), 1.

2 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961). References are to the 2 nd edition, edited by P. Bulloch and J. Raz and published in 1994. The 2 nd edition reprints the 1 st edition with the addition of a posthumous Postscript based on material written but by Hart but not published in his lifetime. The book has been translated into 17 languages, and more than 50,000 copies of the 2 nd edition have been sold since 1998.

3 The separation thesis must be distinguished from the thesis that there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality. Hart did not subscribe to the “no necessary connection” thesis. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the separation thesis, which entails that state law is necessarily subject to moral evaluation. Hart also believed that there is a “naturally” necessary connection between law and morality, which is found in the minimum content of natural law ( CL ch. 9). To mark the difference between the separation thesis and the “no necessary connection” thesis, some scholars now associate Hart with the “separability” thesis to the effect that law and morality are “separable” rather than separate. Concerning Hart's motivation in adopting the separation thesis see CL 207–212; see also Soper , P. , “ Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds ” ( 1986 ) 4 Philosophy and Social Policy 32 CrossRef Google Scholar ; F. Schauer, “Fuller on the Ontological Status of Law” in W.J. Witteveen and W. van der Burg (eds.), Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam 1999); L. Murphy, “The Political Question of the Concept of Law” in J. Coleman (ed.), Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford 2001).

4 The leading modern exponent of this approach is John Finnis: J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights , 2 nd edn. (Oxford 2011).

5 E.g. N. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford 2007); L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven 1964).

6 E.g. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (London 1986), 93: “the most abstract and fundamental point of legal practice is to guide and constrain the power of government. Law insists that force not be used or withheld … except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified.”

7 According to Martin Stone, it is the first, rather than the second, of these assumptions that distinguishes the separation thesis from soft natural law: “Legal Positivism as an Idea about Morality” (2011) 61 University of Toronto L.J. 313. He argues that (to the extent that law and morality share common concerns) soft natural lawyers think of law as a “part of” ( ibid ., p. 341) or, perhaps, an extension or realisation or concretisation of morality; whereas separationists conceive of it as an instrument or application of morality. See also R Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass. 2011), ch.19; concerning Kant's similar view see A. Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass. 2009), 223–5, 255–6. In Stone's account, for soft natural lawyers, morality is incomplete without law. By contrast, for separationists, morality is self-sufficient or, as he puts it, “self-standing” ( ibid ., p. 319). Stone particularly associates the separationist view of morality with the development of utilitarianism as a comprehensive moral theory and decision-procedure. The idea that morality can be fully understood without taking account of law pervades modern moral philosophy.

8 The topic falls between two stools: most philosophers who discuss the nature of morality are uninterested in law while legal theorists are typically more concerned with the normative relationship between law and morality than with the descriptive relationship.

9 Hart actually refers to “secondary” rules that empower the officials rather than to officials. But the significance of secondary rules is that they create and empower the institutions that administer the regime of primary rules.

10 Of course, there are many types of social institutions in addition to those identified by Hart as characteristic of law. In this paper, the terms “institutional” and “institutionalised” refer only to characteristically legal institutions. Ironically, Hart showed very little interest in actual legal institutions and how they operate in practice: Lacey , N. , “ Analytical Jurisprudence versus Descriptive Sociology Revisited ” ( 2006 ) 84 Texas Law Review 945 Google Scholar ; “Out of the ‘Witches’ Cauldron'? Reinterpreting the Context and Reassessing the Significance of the Hart-Fuller Debate” in P. Cane (ed.), The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford 2010).

11 For a suggestive discussion of the relationship between habit, custom and law see J.B. Murphy, “Habit and Convention at the Foundation of Custom” in A. Perreau-Saussine and J.B. Murphy, The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge 2007). For the criticism that Hart's account of custom is purely structural see A.W.B. Simpson, Reflections on The Concept of Law, p. 175.

12 Hart contrasted ideals with duties ( CL 182), aspiration and supererogation with obligation. It is not clear why he thought it important to include personal ideals in his account of morality since they have no clear analogy in his account of law, which is social, not personal, and rooted in obligation, not aspiration. Nor is it clear why he limited idiosyncratic, personal morality to ideals. An individual might, for instance, consider vegetarianism an obligation for themselves but not for others. Perhaps more importantly for present purposes, it is not clear whether or to what extent personal morality shares with positive and critical morality the four characteristics listed later in this paragraph – more especially, the last two. Social ideals have an important place in some concepts of law and certain accounts of the normative relationship between law and morality. See, e.g., the work of Simmonds and Fuller cited note 5 above. See also C.A.J. Coady, Messy Morality: The Challenge of Politics (Oxford 2008), 67–70.

13 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London 1977), 53–58. See also G.J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London 1971), ch. 5.

14 See also R.B. Brandt, A Theory of the Right and the Good (Oxford 1979), 172. It does not follow, of course, that social practices and institutions do not play a part – indeed, a very important part – in the formation of individuals' convictions and even their “personal ideals” (see e.g. P.F. Strawson, “Social Morality and the Individual Ideal” in G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker, The Definition of Morality (London 1970)).

15 See also N. Cooper, “Two Concepts of Morality” in The Definition of Morality , esp. pp. 84–88. According to James Wallace, the philosopher John Dewey considered customary morality to be prior to critical morality: J.D. Wallace, Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (Ithaca 1988), 73–6.

16 In Hart's revised view, the “social rule” or “practice” account of norms fails to provide “a sound explanation of morality, either individual or social” ( CL 256). The extent to which “morality” consists of “rules” is an ongoing topic of debate amongst philosophers that Hart does not address.

17 See P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford 1965) (the Maccabaean Lecture is reproduced in Chapter 1); H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford 1963).

18 As Bob Goodin neatly puts it: Goodin , R.E. , “ An Epistemic Case for Legal Moralism ” ( 2010 ) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 615 CrossRef Google Scholar .

19 According to Hart, Devlin later reverted to the view that “the law [on homosexuality] ought to be altered”: Sugarman , D. , “ Hart Interviewed: HLA Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman ” ( 2005 ) 32 Journal of Law and Society 267, 285 CrossRef Google Scholar .

20 Following Hart's lead, in most jurisprudential discussions of the concept of law, morality is identified by its “form” as opposed to its “substance”. The substance of morality plays a larger role in theoretical discussions of particular areas of the law, such as criminal law and contract law.

21 Hart said much about what he called “the minimum content of natural law” ( CL ch 9). He argued that as a matter of “natural necessity”, both morality and law address certain obstacles to successful social life. The claim that morality is partly a function of human physical and mental characteristics and the natural environment in which we live is, no doubt, relatively uncontroversial; but how much of morality can be explained in this way certainly is not. For an expansive view see J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights , 2 nd edn (Oxford 2011). This is a key question in contemporary evolutionary and cognitive science. See e.g. R.A. Hinde, Why Good is Good: The Sources of Morality (London 2002); J. Mikhail, “Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face: Jurisprudence and HLA Hart” (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 733.

22 E.g. T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass. 1998), 171–2.

23 “[I]t would be absurd to deny the title of morality to emphatic social vetoes” such as sexual taboos: CL 175. See also CL 182.

24 But not Devlin: Law, Liberty and Morality (note 17 above), pp. 19–20.

25 Ibid ., pp. 22–4.

26 Taking Rights Seriously (note 13 above), p. 255.

27 Ibid ., p. 248.

28 Ibid ., pp. 248, 250.

29 C. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement: A Theory of Political Morality (Cambridge 2009), 9.

30 E.g. Simpson, Reflections , note 1 above, pp. 157–60.

31 B.Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford 2001).

32 For a suggestive comment by Hart along similar lines see Sugarman, “Hart Interviewed” (n 19 above), 291. For a related point see Krygier , M. , “ The Concept of Law and Social Theory ” ( 1982 ) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155, 159 –61 CrossRef Google Scholar . By adopting a concept of morality as autonomous judgment, Neil MacCormick is able to establish a “conceptual” distinction between law and morality: N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford 2007), ch. 14.

33 For an extended argument along these lines see J. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge, Mass. 1986), 39–64.

34 There are many versions and varieties of both moral realism and moral constructivism. My only concern here is with Hart's unwillingness to commit himself to any version of either. Christopher McMahon develops a view he calls “moral nominalism”, “intermediate” between realism and constructivism, to explain the important phenomenon of reasonable moral disagreement, to which Hart paid little or no attention and which, McMahon says, neither realism nor constructivism can adequately explain: McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement (note 29 above). Central to nominalism is the idea that moral ideas evolves and can change.

35 Because this phrase appears in the Postscript to The Concept of Law , I assume that by “moral principles” Hart means personal moral convictions as opposed to conventional morality. Hard positivists need not and do not reject Hart's view that conventional norms can be part of the law if the rule of recognition so provides: CL 44–8.

36 I assume for the sake of the argument that freedom of speech, equality, due process and so on are “moral” issues. However, it is arguable that framing the debate between hard and soft positivists in terms of the relevance of “morality” to the validity of law raises the stakes unnecessarily. Instead, the difference between the two positions might be said to concern whether the content of a law (as opposed to its source) can affect its validity. This reading of the debate is consistent with the argument made in the next paragraph below. In this light, a provision of the type we are considering would authorise judges, in assessing its validity, to take account of the content as well as the source of a law without raising any issue about the “status” of the relevant “substantive values”, for conformity with which the law is to be tested.

37 Hart may have been attracted to soft positivism because it seems descriptively superior to hard positivism. As a matter of legal doctrine, when legislation is held unconstitutional it is invalidated with retrospective effect, not deprived of effect prospectively. On the other hand, hard positivism is likely to be normatively attractive to those who distrust judicial power or who think that citizens should be able to identify what the law is without recourse to substantive moral reasoning.

38 Matthew Kramer is a soft positivist who commits himself to the view that there are objective moral truths and that it is such truths that the sort of provision we have been discussing incorporates into the law: M.H. Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet (Oxford 2004), ch 2. However, he also accepts, of course, that judges are morally fallible. His view is that a judge who makes a mistake about what morality requires changes the pre-existing law while a judge who correctly identifies what morality requires applies the pre-existing law. Kramer argues that the interpretation of soft positivism I suggest here “can very easily be extended into an audacious form of rule-scepticism” in relation to the application as opposed to the ascertainment of law ( ibid ., 119). This conclusion seems to me to confuse moral reasoning with textual interpretation or, at least, to rest on a highly formal, rule-based understanding of morality.

39 J. Waldron, “The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity” in Law and Disagreement (Oxford 1999). MacCormick apparently makes a similar point when he argues that for realists, autonomy is morally rather than metaphysically relevant to their moral lives (MacCormick, note 32 above, p. 250). Unlike Hart, MacCormick appears to have committed himself to some version of constructivism.

40 See e.g. Balcombe , Lord Justice , “ Judicial Decisions and Social Attitudes ” ( 1994 ) 84 Proceedings of the British Academy 209, 229 Google Scholar ; Bingham , Lord of Cornhill, “ The Judges: Active or Passive ” ( 2006 ) 139 Proceedings of the British Academy 55 Google Scholar , 70. For an extended scholarly argument to this effect see M.A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1988).

41 Cane , P. , “ Taking Disagreement Seriously: Courts, Legislatures and the Reform of Tort Law ” ( 2005 ) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 393 CrossRef Google Scholar .

42 Johnson , C.D. , “ Moral and Legal Obligation ” ( 1975 ) 72 Journal of Philosophy 315, 329 –31 CrossRef Google Scholar argues, with particular reference to promising, that in both law and morality importance is related to the level of abstraction and, conversely, specificity, at which their respective “requirements” are stated – the more abstract the more important, the more specific the less important.

43 Note 17 above, p. 22.

45 “Throughout the history of philosophy, by far the most popular candidate for the position of the moral point of view has been self interest”: K. Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, NY 1958), p. 187. See also, e.g., S. Scheffler, Human Morality (New York 1992), ch. 2; Leiter , B. , “ Nietzsche and the Morality Critics ” ( 1997 ) 107 Ethics 250, esp. pp. 259 –60 CrossRef Google Scholar , 272.

46 See, e.g., M. Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction (Lanham, MD 2002), 134–5.

47 Hart treats this criterion inconsistently, in one place offering it as a point of similarity between law and morality, not difference: CL 172, where he summarises five “striking similarities between moral and legal rules of obligation”.

48 For the suggestion that the legal principle that promises should be kept is just as immune to deliberate change as its moral analogue see Johnson, “Moral and Legal Obligation” (note 42 above), pp. 322–4. In Johnson's view, the important distinction is not between law (changeable) and morality (immune to change) but between fundamental principles (immune to change) and specific rules and obligations (changeable).

49 Indeed, G.E.M. Anscombe famously argued that the concept of morality only makes sense within a religious framework: Ethics, Religion and Politics: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Volume Three (Oxford 1981, ch 4 (“Modern Moral Philosophy”). For a discussion of the role that authority might play in secular morality see S. Fleischacker, The Ethics of Culture (Ithaca, NY 1994), esp. chs. 3 and 4.

50 G. Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York 1977), 112.

51 Of course, judicial reasoning is substantively constrained by institutional factors in a way that the moral reasoning of individuals is not.

52 To similar effect: Warnock, The Object of Morality (note 13 above), pp. 49–50.

53 More generally, this tendency may explain why philosophers deny the possibility of strict moral liability: Watkins , J. , “ Responsibility in Context ” ( 2006 ) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 593 CrossRef Google Scholar , 606.

54 Wallace, Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (note 15 above), p. 12. Wallace argues that solving moral conflicts requires active interpretation and adaptation of moral rules and principles in a way that changes existing rules and principles and generates new ones. Morality, he asserts, is “an intellectual and cultural achievement” ( ibid , 53) and a matter of “learned dispositions” ( ibid ., p. 55).

55 To similar effect: C.E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge 1987), 149–50.

56 T. Honoré, “Can and Can't” (1964) 73 Mind 463; reprinted in T. Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford 1999). I am leaving aside the issue of causal determinism. Whatever the truth may be at the micro-level of physical processes, at the meso-level of practical reasoning and action there is no good reason to ignore the lived experience of freedom and control.

57 Fuller's famous list of pathologies of rules includes “requiring conduct beyond the powers of the affected party”: L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law , revised edn. (New Haven 1969), 39.

58 At any rate, accounts of the morality of obligation as opposed to the morality of aspiration: see n 12 above. One exception that I know of is Bernard Gert's account of “common morality”, which he defines as “the moral system that most thoughtful people use, usually implicitly, when they make moral decisions and judgments”: B. Gert, Common Morality: Deciding What to Do (Oxford 2004), v. In Gert's scheme, the ultimate normative standard is “rationality” ( ibid ., pp. 91–5); and (he says) while it is never irrational to act morally, it may be rational to act immorally. Gert's view is explained by the fact that “common morality” is a substantive, not a formal concept. According to Gert, the basic principle of common morality is to “do no harm”. This understanding of morality also leads him to draw a distinction between religious principles about right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice on the one hand, and moral principles on the other ( ibid ., p. 4).

59 Cf Scheffler, Human Morality (note 45 above), p. 12: “a shared reference point for the formulation and adjudication of challenges to existing institutions and practices more generally”.

60 Or even that it is male or female: Criscuoli , G. , “ Is the Common Law Masculine or Feminine? ” ( 1981 ) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 305 CrossRef Google Scholar .

61 For this reason, amongst others, Hart resisted classification of international “law” as (international) morality: CL 227–32.

62 In the philosophical literature there is much discussion of a different question of whether and the extent to which moral reasons for action override or, on the contrary, accommodate reasons of self-interest (and, perhaps, some other types of “non-moral” reasons). See note 45 above. There is a similar debate about the relationship between moral reasons and reasons of public interest: P. Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford 2002), 276–7; see also Hart's discussion of the relationship between “justice” and “social/public/common good” ( CL 166–7). The point I am making in the text assumes that the question of what reasons are moral reasons has already been answered. Under a theory that allows reasons of self-interest to trump moral reasons, legal reasons would presumably trump reasons of self-interest. One view of moral reasons for action is that they are “all-things-considered” reasons. So understood, morality would trump law as a matter of definition: Alexander , L. and Schauer , F. , “ Law's Limited Domain Confronts Morality's Universal Empire ” ( 2007 ) 48 William and Mary Law Review 1579 Google Scholar .

63 This way of presenting the issue will not appeal to those who think that all genuine reasons for action are moral. They might prefer a formulation in terms of a conflict of the moral reasons provided by the law and moral reasons apart from the law. See note 6 above.

64 Remember that this statement refers to the function of morality in individuals' practical reasoning. In a moral theory that distinguishes between conventional, positive morality on the one hand and individual, critical morality on the other, critical morality provides ultimate standards for assessing positive morality as much as other conventional normative systems.

65 Honoré , T. , “ The Dependence of Morality on Law ” ( 1993 ) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 CrossRef Google Scholar .

66 Even legal norms that are morally “arbitrary” in the sense that the norm chosen (e.g. drive on the left) is no more or less acceptable than some alternative (e.g. drive on the right) so that the choice between them is of “no intrinsic importance” ( CL 229–30) may provide moral reasons for action. Hart believed that morality “logically” cannot be arbitrary in this sense ( CL 229). However, if morality is understood not only to require and prohibit conduct but also to permit conduct that it neither requires nor prohibits, it is logically possible that in any particular situation several courses of conduct may be of equal moral value so that none is morally preferable to any alternative.

67 I hope that this account of the relationship between law and moral reasoning, both “everyday” and “philosophical”, is an improvement on the account I gave in Responsibility in Law and Morality , which was fairly criticised by Watkins , Jeremy , “ Responsibility in Context ” ( 2006 ) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 593 CrossRef Google Scholar .

68 I am not sure whether Alexander and Schauer (note 62 above) go quite as far as this.

69 Finnis, op. cit. note 4 above, p. 14.

70 Simmonds, op. cit. note 5 above.

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• Volume 71, Issue 1
• Peter Cane (a1)
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197312000207

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Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory

Abstract : This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.

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The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law Report (Assessment)

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The dilemmatic nature of the argument and the contrast which is created by the personas of Creon and Antigone, characters of the famous Greek myth about Oedipus, are particularly interesting for their potential for interpretation. The narrative is exceptional for its propagation of the ideals held by Antigone and the messages about the inevitable nature of fate. This classic tale and, in particular, the questions that it raises remain relevant as familial values are speedily losing their popularity among the younger generation.

The character of Creon is a distinct example of an individual with an idea of power and his own potential. This statement is partially true, as the characters are, indeed, juxtaposed to one another, and thus, their characteristics are exaggerated. This is especially traceable in the pair of Creon and Antigone. Both Creon and Antigone stand for a set core of principles, by which the distinction is made between their roles in the narrative – Creon stands for egotism, and Antigone clearly emphasizes familial values. These familial inclinations of Antigone, in particular, make her a very likeable character. A young woman for whom an honorable death ceremony for her brother is more important than her own life – and for that, Antigone deserves immense respect and it is what the author personally agrees with.

In Antigone , Creon appears as a strong leader, whose leadership becomes borderline tyrannical at vital points in the story. Such tendencies are fueled by the desire to prove himself – the inclination that arouses another very important theme of this myth – the prevalence of human laws over the divine law. Creon says to his son, “Do you want me to show myself weak before the people — or to break my sworn word?”, continuing that if he allows even for small “weakness”, he will not be respected as a ruler (Sophocles 520). Clearly, his strong adherence to the illegitimacy of Antigone’s actions stems not from a genuine belief that her behavior was somehow immoral – but directly from his self-assurance as a lawmaker. Perhaps unknowingly, he exposes himself as quite egocentric, expressing that “whoever is chosen to govern should be obeyed — just and unjust” (Sophocles 525). Moreover, he shows no signs of understanding his own son – willing to judge his son’s bride with full severity, as if blind to his suffering. In particular, such a stance – in which Creon exhibits himself as a blindly ambitious and avaricious person whom it becomes extremely hard to stand by.

On the contrary, Antigone represents – and upholds – completely different values that prove to be much more sincere than those of Creon’s. Mainly, Antigone acts out of a very emotional state, which in turn, is produced by her fervent belief in the divine order – “the final Justice that rules the world makes no such laws” as does the king (Sophocles 360). Her principled position on the matter is as concrete as Creon’s decision to punish her publicly in order to reinforce his leadership – however, Antigone’s ideals are far superior to his.

The woman’s desire to bury her brother properly arises from her very strong subconscious belief in the integral goodness of familial values, which is not specifically just another type of law – but the traditions that hold sacred meaning. Her reason is not supported by a rigid system, like the one Creon, by the right of kingship, improvised when judging Antigone. Instead, she acts out of a place of inherently knowing – and willing to die for her principles, with this idea encapsulated in these simple words, “I knew I must die” (Sophocles 365). She speaks of her death as if it is the least of her concerns, “the Death of mine is of no importance” (Sophocles, 370). One’s family is deeply ingrained in one’s identity, and it is important to stay principled when protecting them, even if it is already “too late.”

While Antigone’s bravery and selflessness are enough to admire her deed, there is also a third principle that justifies it. It is closely related to the idea that Antigone bases her stance upon the idea of intuitive righteousness – the sincere familial love she has for her deceased brothers. From here, it becomes clear that this righteousness, this natural law, is preserved and transmitted as a tradition. In a sense, the tradition’s counterpart becomes a fleeting law set up by one ruler. The tradition holds the wisdom and experience of hundreds of generations and thus holds immense value and meaning. Perhaps, she seems detached and unaffected by the fate Creon decides for her – Antigone’s act abides by the timeless rules of tradition, of natural law.

Thus, for the reasons established above, Antigone’s actions can be considered quite honorable, as they are fueled by her innermost desire to uphold her principles in regard to her family, as she believes family to be one of the most important things in a person’s life. She is compassionate, principled, and altruistic – while not only respecting the traditions but being fully conscious of the consequences. Antigone rises against the tyranny of a one man’s law, and personally, I consider this to be an act of bravery that deserves respect and appreciation. My personal values coincide with Antigone’s to a significant degree, and therefore, I support her act of selflessness and staying true to her principles in the face of adversity.

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IvyPanda. (2022, December 6). The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-moral-conflict-in-antigone-the-familial-values-against-the-law/

"The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law." IvyPanda , 6 Dec. 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/the-moral-conflict-in-antigone-the-familial-values-against-the-law/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law'. 6 December.

IvyPanda . 2022. "The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law." December 6, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-moral-conflict-in-antigone-the-familial-values-against-the-law/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law." December 6, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-moral-conflict-in-antigone-the-familial-values-against-the-law/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Moral Conflict in Antigone: The Familial Values Against the Law." December 6, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-moral-conflict-in-antigone-the-familial-values-against-the-law/.

Greater Good Science Center • Magazine • In Action • In Education

How to Help Students Think in Morally Complex Ways

Consider this moment in history from a teenager’s perspective. The world inflamed by wars, hatred, and conflict. Social media platforms that encourage individuals to affirm one correct answer to every problem and assume a posture of aggressive self-righteousness in response to every challenge. No one believes anything can really change, and time seems to be running out.

What’s missing from this dire picture is what psychologist Darcia Narvaez calls “ moral complexity ,” or mature moral functioning. This includes practicing emotional regulation to allay reactivity and avoid impulsive judgments; holding multiple, often competing viewpoints in mind while deliberating between them; and, over time, developing head-and-heart expertise through ethical engagement with a specific community or cause.

In other words, being a complex moral agent means being resilient, flexible, pragmatic, and kind. As Narvaez notes, citizenship scholars agree that the skills needed in the 21st century include “critical thinking, cooperation, tolerance, conflict resolution,” and “the skills of a positive, mature moral functioning.” Practiced collectively, these skills could change our world for the better.

Yet it goes without saying that there aren’t enough adult exemplars of these skills visible today. In countless ways, adolescents are led to believe that what’s on offer is what moral maturity looks like. So the cycle repeats, cynicism deepens, and little does change.

Can educators help change that situation? Yes, but the first step is to take students seriously as moral agents.

Learning to “stay human”

Young people are naturally interested in the future they will inherit. For several years at the Millennium School of San Francisco, I co-led an eighth-grade capstone project in which students chose real-world problems to research and ultimately offer some contribution to addressing. We spent about seven weeks developing topics before culminating presentations, where family members, teachers, and fellow students got to see eighth graders share their work and raise awareness about important social issues. Some version of a capstone project can fit within eighth or ninth grade English, Social Studies, or STEM classes, and encouraging students to think in interdisciplinary terms helps broaden opportunities for engagement.

In my capstone classes, we started by watching Michael Franti’s terrific documentary, Stay Human . In the film, Franti, a long-time musician and activist, travels the world and profiles ordinary people struggling with poverty, systemic racism, and environmental devastation. For students, this global survey builds empathy and makes distant others feel more relatable. The throughline that unifies each story is the search for hope and resilience amid the world’s many diverse challenges. Yet Franti himself wrestles with his own inner tension between optimism and cynicism, which presents students with an all-too-human model of moral maturity.

As we watched, I periodically paused the film to ask students to reflect on their own identities, values, and how they connect to the people Franti interviews. As an English and humanities teacher, I find journaling one of the best ways to prompt thinking beyond immediate assumptions. In the context of any class in any discipline, it’s also a great way to explore and clarify the moral dilemmas we all face every day.

According to Narvaez, “moral self-reflection is similar to moral imagination but turned inward.” For example, encountering the history of Apartheid in South Africa, as students do in Stay Human , can prompt them to reflect on how racism still affects their own neighborhoods, as well as what solutions might be possible today. Ideally, Narvaez writes, this kind of thinking and writing evokes “a self-critical attitude that seeks to avoid self-deception and distortions of facts and events,” so that a truer picture of reality emerges.

Looking inward to look outward

At their best moments, students are clearly capable of this kind of self-reflection. And as with other skills, it helps to have regular chances to practice. Daily journal prompts encourage writing proficiency and the development of metacognitive skills , all of which contribute to moral maturity.

I want to share one particular journal prompt I used, which Lindsay Berk and the late great Stephen Lessard developed in earlier iterations of the capstone class we taught:

• Are you more of an optimistic person or more of a cynical person? How do you know?
• Provide an example that illustrates which way you (typically) lean.

This came soon after we started watching Stay Human , in response to Michael Franti posing these same questions to himself. As an opening mindfulness practice at the start of class, students wrote silently in their journals then shared out with their peers. The movement from individual writing to organized sharing and listening works well with middle and high school students, and making this an everyday routine fosters a classroom culture where self-reflection and group deliberation are respected and valued.

I remember a class in the fall of 2021, soon after my school resumed full in-person learning, when the prompt above took us in an unexpected direction. After their share-out, I usually call on a few students to reflect back something they heard at their tables, then we move into a wider discussion or the next activity. But that day students quickly fell into a debate about the meaning of our two key terms. We used Google to establish some definitions: Optimism is “hopefulness and confidence about the future or the successful outcome of something,” while cynicism is “an inclination to believe that people are motivated purely by self-interest.”

To provide a further common reference point, I drew a glass on the whiteboard with a water line at the midpoint. After apologizing for my poor drawing skills, I asked if they saw the glass as half empty or half full. Again, the room was divided. Several students pointed out that optimism is often unrealistic, and they identified as more cynical because its definition seems closer to reality. In their view, the glass wasn’t full; that’s what mattered.

With this distinction in mind, I asked students if a cynical outlook makes hope for the future futile, and some said yes. To push this line of reasoning further, I picked up a globe and asked them to think of another real-world example: global warming.

“We know our species is in peril,” I said to dramatize the dilemma. “Scientists offer different estimates of how long we have, and what we can do, to limit the worst effects of human-caused climate change. So, do you take the optimistic view that we can and should do something to try and save our natural habitat, or do you take the cynical view that nothing can be done because people are too self-centered to make the effort worthwhile?”

At this point, just about every student said they were willing to do something to limit climate change, but they didn’t trust the rest of humanity to join in. Earlier, I’d introduced the terms egoism and altruism, and a lively discussion sprung up about whether it’s possible to do good for others without trying to benefit oneself. As we moved into our next discussion, this same question resurfaced in the context of global warming.

Greater Good Educators Program (Winter/Spring): Bridging for Belonging

Explore the science of empathy, humility, forgiveness, and hope to develop skills for bridging differences in schools

Conceived at Phillips Exeter Academy, the Harkness method makes the whole classroom into a student-centered space for listening and discussion. Typically the teacher or another student tracks participation using a variety of data gathering devices, which they share with the class during a debrief following the discussion. The purpose of Harkness is to promote student leadership and peer learning as well as accountability and self-reflection, so that one’s participation in discussions grows more thoughtful over time.

On that particular day, I sat outside the circle and let students talk freely. Speaking politely through their masks of different shapes and colors, these pandemic-era eighth graders seemed to have a genuine thirst for moral knowledge. They clearly wanted to know what was true, and within the Harkness container, they engaged each other respectfully. Instead of jumping toward judgment and yelling at each other, as can happen with adolescents in less structured contexts, this group had practiced well enough to regulate their emotions and deliberate carefully.

Think of the contrast here to the discussions that happen on cable news, talk radio, and social media. As Narvaez notes, “truncated moral metacognition occurs when a person follows an ill-informed gut reaction” and takes that as their final conclusion “with little reflection, commitment, or responsibility.”

Too many adults follow that pattern, and they consciously or unconsciously model it for the young. Yet Harkness and other deliberative discussion frameworks create a form of community dialogue that builds moral metacognition and encourages deeper reflection. Particularly for adolescents, doing so collaboratively with peers is one of the best means of inching toward moral maturity. Over the years of discussions that followed watching Stay Human , students often said they came away from it feeling less cynical. They got to work on capstone projects related to climate change and the environment, antiracism, food justice, political polarization, and many other topics. By beginning to study and ground themselves in these issues and the communities they affect, these eighth graders learned to think in morally complex ways. I hope they also touched on a formative experience that will shape their actions for many years to come.

As Narvaez emphasizes, the skills of moral maturity “can be marshaled for moral innovation and moral actions that transform lives for the better, increasing flourishing among the underprivileged, and improving equality and well-being of society as a whole.”


About the Author

Michael Fisher

Michael Fisher, Ph.D. , teaches English at Pacific Ridge School in Carlsbad, C.A. He has taught writing and humanities to middle school through college students since 2010 with an emphasis on making students’ voices and choices central to the learning process.

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Moral Dilemmas

Moral dilemmas, at the very least, involve conflicts between moral requirements. Consider the cases given below.

1. Examples

2. the concept of moral dilemmas, 3. problems, 4. dilemmas and consistency, 5. responses to the arguments, 6. moral residue and dilemmas, 7. types of moral dilemmas, 8. multiple moralities, 9. conclusion, cited works, other worthwhile readings, other internet resources, related entries.

In Book I of Plato's Republic , Cephalus defines ‘justice’ as speaking the truth and paying one's debts. Socrates quickly refutes this account by suggesting that it would be wrong to repay certain debts—for example, to return a borrowed weapon to a friend who is not in his right mind. Socrates' point is not that repaying debts is without moral import; rather, he wants to show that it is not always right to repay one's debts, at least not exactly when the one to whom the debt is owed demands repayment. What we have here is a conflict between two moral norms: repaying one's debts and protecting others from harm. And in this case, Socrates maintains that protecting others from harm is the norm that takes priority.

Nearly twenty-four centuries later, Jean-Paul Sartre described a moral conflict the resolution of which was, to many, less obvious than the resolution to the Platonic conflict. Sartre (1957) tells of a student whose brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940. The student wanted to avenge his brother and to fight forces that he regarded as evil. But the student's mother was living with him, and he was her one consolation in life. The student believed that he had conflicting obligations. Sartre describes him as being torn between two kinds of morality: one of limited scope but certain efficacy, personal devotion to his mother; the other of much wider scope but uncertain efficacy, attempting to contribute to the defeat of an unjust aggressor.

While the examples from Plato and Sartre are the ones most commonly cited, it should be clear that there are many others. If a person makes conflicting promises, she faces a moral conflict. Physicians and families who believe that human life should not be deliberately shortened and that unpreventable pain should not be tolerated face a conflict in deciding whether to withdraw life support from a dying patient.

What is common to the two well-known cases is conflict. In each case, an agent regards herself as having moral reasons to do each of two actions, but doing both actions is not possible. Ethicists have called situations like these moral dilemmas . The crucial features of a moral dilemma are these: the agent is required to do each of two (or more) actions; the agent can do each of the actions; but the agent cannot do both (or all) of the actions. The agent thus seems condemned to moral failure; no matter what she does, she will do something wrong (or fail to do something that she ought to do).

The Platonic case strikes many as too easy to be characterized as a genuine moral dilemma. For the agent's solution in that case is clear; it is more important to protect people from harm than to return a borrowed weapon. And in any case, the borrowed item can be returned later, when the owner no longer poses a threat to others. Thus in this case we can say that the requirement to protect others from serious harm overrides the requirement to repay one's debts by returning a borrowed item when its owner so demands. When one of the conflicting requirements overrides the other, we do not have a genuine moral dilemma. So in addition to the features mentioned above, in order to have a genuine moral dilemma it must also be true that neither of the conflicting requirements is overridden (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, Chapter 1).

It is less obvious in Sartre's case that one of the requirements overrides the other. Why this is so, however, may not be so obvious. Some will say that our uncertainty about what to do in this case is simply the result of uncertainty about the consequences. If we were certain that the student could make a difference in defeating the Germans, the obligation to join the military would prevail. But if the student made little difference whatsoever in that cause, then his obligation to tend to his mother's needs would take precedence, since there he is virtually certain to be helpful. Others, though, will say that these obligations are equally weighty, and that uncertainty about the consequences is not at issue here.

Ethicists as diverse as Kant (1971/1797), Mill (1979/1861), and Ross (1930, 1939) have assumed that an adequate moral theory should not allow for the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. Only recently—in the last sixty years or so—have philosophers begun to challenge that assumption. And the challenge can take at least two different forms. Some will argue that it is not possible to preclude genuine moral dilemmas. Others will argue that even if it were possible, it is not desirable to do so.

To illustrate some of the debate that occurs regarding whether it is possible for any theory to eliminate genuine moral dilemmas, consider the following. The conflicts in Plato's case and in Sartre's case arose because there is more than one moral precept (using ‘precept’ to designate rules and principles), more than one precept sometimes applies to the same situation, and in some of these cases the precepts demand conflicting actions. One obvious solution here would be to arrange the precepts, however many there might be, hierarchically. By this scheme, the highest ordered precept always prevails, the second prevails unless it conflicts with the first, and so on. There are at least two glaring problems with this obvious solution, however. First, it just does not seem credible to hold that moral rules and principles should be hierarchically ordered. While the requirements to keep one's promises and to prevent harm to others clearly can conflict, it is far from clear that one of these requirements should always prevail over the other. In the Platonic case, the obligation to prevent harm is clearly stronger. But there can easily be cases where the harm that can be prevented is relatively mild and the promise that is to be kept is very important. And most other pairs of precepts are like this. This was a point made by Ross in The Right and the Good (1930, Chapter 2).

The second problem with this easy solution is deeper. Even if it were plausible to arrange moral precepts hierarchically, situations can arise in which the same precept gives rise to conflicting obligations. Perhaps the most widely discussed case of this sort is taken from William Styron's Sophie's Choice (1980, see Greenspan 1983). Sophie and her two children are at a Nazi concentration camp. A guard confronts Sophie and tells her that one of her children will be allowed to live and one will be killed. But it is Sophie who must decide which child will be killed. Sophie can prevent the death of either of her children, but only by condemning the other to be killed. The guard makes the situation even more excruciating by informing Sophie that if she chooses neither, then both will be killed. With this added factor, Sophie has a morally compelling reason to choose one of her children. But for each child, Sophie has an apparently equally strong reason to save him or her. Thus the same moral precept gives rise to conflicting obligations. Some have called such cases symmetrical (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, Chapter 2).

We shall return to the issue of whether it is possible to preclude genuine moral dilemmas. But what about the desirability of doing so? Why have ethicists thought that their theories should preclude the possibility of dilemmas? At the intuitive level, the existence of moral dilemmas suggests some sort of inconsistency. An agent caught in a genuine dilemma is required to do each of two acts but cannot do both. And since he cannot do both, not doing one is a condition of doing the other. Thus, it seems that the same act is both required and forbidden. But exposing a logical inconsistency takes some work; for initial inspection reveals that the inconsistency intuitively felt is not present. Allowing OA to designate that the agent in question ought to do A (or is morally obligated to do A , or is morally required to do A ), that OA and OB are both true is not itself inconsistent, even if one adds that it is not possible for the agent to do both A and B . And even if the situation is appropriately described as OA and O ¬ A , that is not a contradiction; the contradictory of OA is ¬ OA . (See Marcus 1980 and McConnell 1978, p. 273.)

Similarly rules that generate moral dilemmas are not inconsistent, at least on the usual understanding of that term. Ruth Marcus suggests plausibly that we “define a set of rules as consistent if there is some possible world in which they are all obeyable in all circumstances in that world.” Thus, “rules are consistent if there are possible circumstances in which no conflict will emerge,” and “a set of rules is inconsistent if there are no circumstances, no possible world, in which all the rules are satisfiable” (Marcus 1980, 128 and 129). I suspect that Kant, Mill, and Ross were aware that a dilemma-generating theory need not be inconsistent. Even so, they would be disturbed if their own theories allowed for such predicaments. If I am correct in this speculation, it suggests that Kant, Mill, Ross, and others thought that there is an important theoretical feature that dilemma-generating theories lack. And this is understandable. It is certainly no comfort to an agent facing a reputed moral dilemma to be told that at least the rules which generate this predicament are consistent because there is a possible world in which they do not conflict. For a good practical example, consider the situation of the criminal defense attorney. She is said to have an obligation to hold in confidence the disclosures made by a client and to be required to conduct herself with candor before the court (where the latter requires that the attorney inform the court when her client commits perjury) (Freedman 1975, Chapter 3). It is clear that in this world these two obligations often conflict. It is equally clear that in some possible world—for example, one in which clients do not commit perjury—that both obligations can be satisfied. Knowing this is of no assistance to defense attorneys who face a conflict between these two requirements in this world.

Ethicists who are concerned that their theories not allow for moral dilemmas have more than consistency in mind, I think. What is troubling is that theories that allow for dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding . A theory can fail to be uniquely action-guiding in either of two ways: by recommending incompatible actions in a situation or by not recommending any action at all. Theories that generate genuine moral dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding in the former way. Theories that have no way, even in principle, of determining what an agent should do in a particular situation have what Thomas E. Hill, Jr. calls “gaps” (Hill 1996, 179-183); they fail to be action-guiding in the latter way. Since one of the main points of moral theories is to provide agents with guidance, that suggests that it is desirable for theories to eliminate dilemmas and gaps, at least if doing so is possible.

But failing to be uniquely action-guiding is not the only reason that the existence of moral dilemmas is thought to be troublesome. Just as important, the existence of dilemmas does lead to inconsistencies if one endorses certain widely held theses. Here we shall consider two different arguments, each of which shows that one cannot consistently acknowledge the reality of moral dilemmas while holding selected (and seemingly plausible) principles.

The first argument shows that two standard principles of deontic logic are, when conjoined, incompatible with the existence of moral dilemmas. The first of these is the principle of deontic consistency

Principle of Deontic Consistency ( PC ): OA → ¬ O ¬ A .

Intuitively this principle just says that the same action cannot be both obligatory and forbidden. Note that as initially described, the existence of dilemmas does not conflict with PC. For as described, dilemmas involve a situation in which an agent ought to do A , ought to do B , but cannot do both A and B . But if we add a principle of deontic logic, then we obtain a conflict with PC:

Principle of Deontic Logic ( PD ): □ ( A → B ) → ( OA → OB ).

Intuitively, PD just says that if doing A brings about B , and if A is obligatory (morally required), then B is obligatory (morally required). The first argument that generates inconsistency can now be stated. Premises (1), (2), and (3) represent the claim that moral dilemmas exist.

Line (10) directly conflicts with PC. And from PC and (1), we can conclude:

(11) ¬ O ¬ A

And, of course, (9) and (11) are contradictory. So if we assume PC and PD, then the existence of dilemmas generates an inconsistency of the old-fashioned logical sort. (Note: In standard deontic logic, the ‘□’ in PD typically designates logical necessity. Here I take it to indicate physical necessity so that the appropriate connection with premise (3) can be made. And I take it that logical necessity is stronger than physical necessity.)

Two other principles accepted in most systems of deontic logic entail PC. So if PD holds, then one of these additional two principles must be jettisoned too. The first says that if an action is obligatory, it is also permissible. The second says that an action is permissible if and only if it is not forbidden. These principles may be stated as:

(OP): OA → PA ;

(D): PA ↔ ¬ O ¬ A .

The second argument that generates inconsistency, like the first, has as its first three premises a symbolic representation of a moral dilemma.

(1) OA (2) OB (3) ¬ C ( A & B )

And like the first, this second argument shows that the existence of dilemmas leads to a contradiction if we assume two other commonly accepted principles. The first of these principles is that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Intuitively this says that if an agent is morally required to do an action, it must be possible for the agent to do it. We may represent this as

(4) OA → CA (for all A )

The other principle, endorsed by most systems of deontic logic, says that if an agent is required to do each of two actions, she is required to do both. We may represent this as

(5) ( OA & OB ) → O ( A & B )

The argument then proceeds:

(6) O ( A & B ) → C ( A & B ) (an instance of 4) (7) OA & OB (from 1 and 2) (8) O ( A & B ) (from 5 and 7) (9) ¬ O ( A & B ) (from 3 and 6)

So if one assumes that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and if one assumes the principle represented in (5)—dubbed by some the agglomeration principle (Williams 1965)—then again a contradiction can be derived.

Now obviously the inconsistency in the first argument can be avoided if one denies either PC or PD. And the inconsistency in the second argument can be averted if one gives up either the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ or the agglomeration principle. There is, of course, another way to avoid these inconsistencies: deny the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. It is fair to say that much of the debate concerning moral dilemmas in the last sixty years has been about how to avoid the inconsistencies generated by the two arguments above.

Opponents of moral dilemmas have generally held that the crucial principles in the two arguments above are conceptually true, and therefore we must deny the possibility of genuine dilemmas. (See, for example, Conee 1982 and Zimmerman 1996.) Most of the debate, from all sides, has focused on the second argument. There is an oddity about this, however. When one examines the pertinent principles in each argument which, in combination with dilemmas, generates an inconsistency, there is little doubt that those in the first argument have a greater claim to being conceptually true than those in the second. Perhaps the focus on the second argument is due to the impact of Bernard Williams's influential essay (Williams 1965). But notice that the first argument shows that if there are genuine dilemmas, then either PC or PD must be relinquished. Even most supporters of dilemmas acknowledge that PC is quite basic. E.J. Lemmon, for example, notes that if PC does not hold in a system of deontic logic, then all that remains are truisms and paradoxes (Lemmon 1965, p. 51). And giving up PC also requires denying either OP or D, each of which also seems basic. There has been much debate about PD—in particular, questions generated by the Good Samaritan paradox—but still it seems basic. So those who want to argue against dilemmas purely on conceptual grounds are better off focusing on the first of the two arguments above.

Some opponents of dilemmas also hold that the pertinent principles in the second argument—the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and the agglomeration principle—are conceptually true. But foes of dilemmas need not say this. Even if they believe that a conceptual argument against dilemmas can be made by appealing to PC and PD, they have several options regarding the second argument. They may defend ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, but hold that it is a substantive normative principle, not a conceptual truth. Or they may even deny the truth of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ or the agglomeration principle, though not because of moral dilemmas, of course.

Defenders of dilemmas need not deny all of the pertinent principles, of course. If one thinks that each of the principles at least has some initial plausibility, then one will be inclined to retain as many as possible. Among the earlier contributors to this debate, some took the existence of dilemmas as a counterexample to ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (for example, Lemmon 1962 and Trigg 1971); others, as a refutation of the agglomeration principle (for example, Williams 1965 and van Fraassen 1973). The most common response to the first argument was to deny PD.

Friends and foes of dilemmas have a burden to bear in responding to the two arguments above. For there is at least a prima facie plausibility to the claim that there are moral dilemmas and to the claim that the relevant principles in the two arguments are true. Thus each side must at least give reasons for denying the pertinent claims in question. Opponents of dilemmas must say something in response to the positive arguments that are given for the reality of such conflicts. One reason in support of dilemmas, as noted above, is simply pointing to examples. The case of Sartre's student and that from Sophie's Choice are good ones; and clearly these can be multiplied indefinitely. It will tempting for supporters of dilemmas to say to opponents, “If this is not a real dilemma, then tell me what the agent ought to do and why ?” It is obvious, however, that attempting to answer such questions is fruitless, and for at least two reasons. First, any answer given to the question is likely to be controversial, certainly not always convincing. And second, this is a game that will never end; example after example can be produced. The more appropriate response on the part of foes of dilemmas is to deny that they need to answer the question. Examples as such cannot establish the reality of dilemmas. Surely most will acknowledge that there are situations in which an agent does not know what he ought to do. This may be because of factual uncertainty, uncertainty about the consequences, uncertainty about what principles apply, or a host of other things. So for any given case, the mere fact that one does not know which of two (or more) conflicting obligations prevails does not show that none does.

Another reason in support of dilemmas to which opponents must respond is the point about symmetry. As the cases from Plato and Sartre show, moral rules can conflict. But opponents of dilemmas can argue that in such cases one rule overrides the other. Most will grant this in the Platonic case, and opponents of dilemmas will try to extend this point to all cases. But the hardest case for opponents is the symmetrical one, where the same precept generates the conflicting requirements. The case from Sophie's Choice is of this sort. It makes no sense to say that a rule or principle overrides itself. So what do opponents of dilemmas say here? They are apt to argue that the pertinent, all-things-considered requirement in such a case is disjunctive: Sophie should act to save one or the other of her children, since that is the best that she can do (for example, Zimmerman 1996, Chapter 7). Such a move need not be ad hoc , since in many cases it is quite natural. If an agent can afford to make a meaningful contribution to only one charity, the fact that there are several worthwhile candidates does not prompt many to say that the agent will fail morally no matter what he does. Nearly all of us think that he should give to one or the other of the worthy candidates. Similarly, if two people are drowning and an agent is situated so that she can save either of the two but only one, few say that she is doing wrong no matter which she saves. Positing a disjunctive requirement in these cases seems perfectly natural, and so such a move is available to opponents of dilemmas as a response to symmetrical cases.

Supporters of dilemmas have a burden to bear too. They need to cast doubt on the adequacy of the pertinent principles in the two arguments that generate inconsistencies. And most importantly, they need to provide independent reasons for doubting whichever of the principles they reject. If they have no reason other than cases of putative dilemmas for denying the principles in question, then we have a mere standoff. Of the principles in question, the most commonly questioned on independent grounds are the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and PD. Among supporters of dilemmas, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, Chapters 4 and 5) has gone to the greatest lengths to provide independent reasons for questioning some of the relevant principles.

One well-known argument for the reality of moral dilemmas has not been discussed yet. This argument might be called “phenomenological.” It appeals to the emotions that agents facing conflicts experience and our assessment of those emotions.

Return to the case of Sartre's student. Suppose that he joins the Free French forces. It is likely that he will experience remorse or guilt for having abandoned his mother. And not only will he experience these emotions, this moral residue, but it is appropriate that he does. Yet, had he stayed with his mother and not joined the Free French forces, he also would have appropriately experienced remorse or guilt. But either remorse or guilt is appropriate only if the agent properly believes that he has done something wrong (or failed to do something that he was all-things-considered required to do). Since no matter what the agent does he will appropriately experience remorse or guilt, then no matter what he does he will have done something wrong. Thus, the agent faces a genuine moral dilemma. (The best known proponents of arguments for dilemmas that appeal to moral residue are Williams 1965 and Marcus 1980.)

Many cases of moral conflict are similar to this example. Certainly the case from Sophie's Choice fits here. No matter which of her children Sophie saves, she will experience enormous guilt for the consequences of that choice. Indeed, if Sophie did not experience such guilt, we would think that there was something morally wrong with her. In these cases, proponents of the argument (for dilemmas) from moral residue must claim that four things are true: (1) when the agents acts, she experiences remorse or guilt; (2) that she experiences these emotions is appropriate and called for; (3) had the agent acted on the other of the conflicting requirements, she would also have experienced remorse or guilt; and (4) in the latter case these emotions would have been equally appropriate and called for (McConnell 1996, pp. 37–38). In these situations, then, remorse or guilt will be appropriate no matter what the agent does and these emotions are appropriate only when the agent has done something wrong. Therefore, these situations are genuinely dilemmatic.

There is much to say about the moral emotions and situations of moral conflict; the positions are varied and intricate. Without pretending to resolve all of the issues here, it will be pointed out that opponents of dilemmas have raised two different objections to the argument from moral residue. The first objection, in effect, suggests that the argument is question-begging (McConnell 1978 and Conee 1982); the second objection challenges the assumption that remorse and guilt are appropriate only when the agent has done wrong.

To explain the first objection, note that it is uncontroversial that some bad feeling or other is called for when an agent is in a situation like that of Sartre's student or Sophie. But the negative moral emotions are not limited to remorse and guilt. Among these other emotions, consider regret. An agent can appropriately experience regret even when she does not believe that she has done something wrong. For example, a parent may appropriately regret that she must punish her child even though she correctly believes that the punishment is deserved. Her regret is appropriate because a bad state of affairs is brought into existence (say, the child's discomfort), even when bringing this state of affairs into existence is morally required. Regret can even be appropriate when one has no causal connection at all with the bad state of affairs. It is appropriate for me to regret the damage that a recent fire has caused to my neighbor's house, the pain that severe birth defects cause in infants, and the suffering that a starving animal experiences in the wilderness. Not only is it appropriate that I experience regret in these cases, but I would probably be regarded as morally lacking if I did not. (For accounts of moral remainders as they relate specifically to Kantianism and virtue ethics, see, respectively, Hill 1996, 183-187 and Hursthouse 1999, 44-48 and 68-77.)

With remorse or guilt, at least two components are present: the experiential component, namely, the negative feeling that the agent has; and the cognitive component, namely, the belief that the agent has done something wrong and takes responsibility for it. Although this same cognitive component is not part of regret, the negative feeling is. And the experiential component alone cannot serve as a gauge to distinguish regret from remorse, for regret can range from mild to intense, and so can remorse. In part, what distinguishes the two is the cognitive component. But now when we examine the case of an alleged dilemma, such as that of Sartre's student, it is question-begging to assert that it is appropriate for him to experience remorse no matter what he does. No doubt, it is appropriate for him to experience some negative feeling. To say, however, that it is remorse that is called for is to assume that the agent appropriately believes that he has done something wrong. Since regret is warranted even in the absence of such a belief, to assume that remorse is appropriate is to assume , not argue, that the agent's situation is genuinely dilemmatic. Opponents of dilemmas can say that one of the requirements overrides the other, or that the agent faces a disjunctive requirement, and that regret is appropriate because even when he does what he ought to do, some bad will ensue. Either side, then, can account for the appropriateness of some negative moral emotion. To get more specific, however, requires more than is warranted by the present argument. This appeal to moral residue, then, does not establish the reality of moral dilemmas.

Matters are even more complicated, though, as the second objection to the argument from moral residue shows. The argument assumes that remorse or guilt is appropriate only if the agent believes that he has done something wrong. But this is questionable. Consider the case of a middle-aged man, Bill, and a seven-year-old boy, Johnny. It is set in a midwestern village on a snowy December day. Johnny and several of his friends are riding their sleds down a narrow, seldom used street, one that intersects with a busier, although still not heavily traveled, street. Johnny, in his enthusiasm for sledding, is not being very careful. During his final ride he skidded under an automobile passing through the intersection and was killed instantly. The car was driven by Bill. Bill was driving safely, had the right of way, and was not exceeding the speed limit. Moreover, given the physical arrangement, it would have been impossible for Bill to have seen Johnny coming. Bill was not at fault, legally or morally, for Johnny's death. Yet Bill experienced what can best be described as remorse or guilt about his role in this horrible event (McConnell 1996, p. 39).

At one level, Bill's feelings of remorse or guilt are not warranted. Bill did nothing wrong. Certainly Bill does not deserve to feel guilt (Dahl 1996). A friend might even recommend that Bill seek therapy. But this is not all there is to say. Most of us understand Bill's response. From Bill's point of view, the response is not inappropriate, not irrational, not uncalled-for. To see this, imagine that Bill had had a very different response. Suppose that Bill had said, “I regret Johnny's death. It is a terrible thing. But it certainly was not my fault. I have nothing to feel guilty about and I don't owe his parents any apologies.” Even if Bill is correct intellectually, it is hard to imagine someone being able to achieve this sort of objectivity about his own behavior. When human beings have caused great harm, it is natural for them to wonder if they are at fault, even if to outsiders it is obvious that they bear no moral responsibility for the damage. Human beings are not so finely tuned emotionally that when they have been causally responsible for harm, they can easily turn guilt on or off depending on their degree of moral responsibility. (See Zimmerman 1988, pp. 134–135.) And this is not a bad thing; for it likely makes agents more cautious about their actions, more sensitive about their responsibilities, and more empathetic regarding the plight of others.

All of this suggests that there are situations in which an agent's remorse or guilt is not inappropriate even though the agent has done nothing wrong. Because of this and because in any given situation the appropriate response may be regret and not remorse, opponents of dilemmas have a way to respond to the argument that appeals to the appropriateness of remorse.

It should be noted, however, that there is a complex array of issues concerning the relationship between ethical conflicts and the moral emotions, and the discussion here has been quite brief. (See Greenspan 1995.)

In the literature on moral dilemmas, it is common to draw distinctions among various types of dilemmas. Only some of these distinctions will be mentioned here. It is worth noting that both supporters and opponents of dilemmas tend to draw some, if not all, of these distinctions. And in most cases the motivation for doing so is clear. Supporters of dilemmas may draw a distinction between dilemmas of type V and W . The upshot is typically a message to opponents of dilemmas: “You think that all moral conflicts are resolvable. And that is understandable, because conflicts of type V are resolvable. But conflicts of type W are not resolvable. Thus, contrary to your view, there are some genuine moral dilemmas.” By the same token, opponents of dilemmas may draw a distinction between dilemmas of type X and Y . And their message to supporters of dilemmas is this: “You think that there are genuine moral dilemmas, and given certain facts, it is understandable why this appears to be the case. But if you draw a distinction between conflicts of types X and Y , you can see that appearances can be explained by the existence of type X alone, and type X conflicts are not genuine dilemmas.” With this in mind, let us note a few of the distinctions.

One distinction is between epistemic conflicts and ontological conflicts. The former involve conflicts between two (or more) moral requirements and the agent does not know which of the conflicting requirements takes precedence in her situation. Everyone concedes that there can be situations where one requirement does take priority over the other with which it conflicts, though at the time action is called for it is difficult for the agent to tell which requirement prevails. The latter are conflicts between two (or more) moral requirements, and neither is overridden. This is not simply because the agent does not know which requirement is stronger; neither is. Genuine moral dilemmas, if there are any, are ontological. Both opponents and supporters of dilemmas acknowledge that there are epistemic conflicts.

Another distinction is between self-imposed moral dilemmas and dilemmas imposed on an agent by the world , as it were. Conflicts of the former sort arise because of the agent's own wrongdoing (Aquinas; Donagan 1977, 1984; and McConnell 1978). If an agent made two promises that he knew conflicted, then through his own actions he created a situation in which it is not possible for him to discharge both of his requirements. Dilemmas imposed on the agent by the world, by contrast, do not arise because of the agent's wrongdoing. The case of Sartre's student is an example, as is the case from Sophie's Choice . For supporters of dilemmas, this distinction is not all that important. But among opponents of dilemmas, there is a disagreement about whether the distinction is important. Some of these opponents hold that self-imposed dilemmas are possible, but that their existence does not point to any deep flaws in moral theory (Donagan 1977, Chapter 5). Moral theory tells agents how they ought to behave; but if agents violate moral norms, of course things can go askew. Other opponents deny that even self-imposed dilemmas are possible. They argue that an adequate moral theory should tell agents what they ought to do in their current circumstances, regardless of how those circumstances arose. As Hill puts it, “[M]orality acknowledges that human beings are imperfect and often guilty, but it calls upon each at every new moment of moral deliberation to decide conscientiously and to act rightly from that point on” (Hill 1996, p. 176). Given the prevalence of wrongdoing, if a moral theory did not issue uniquely action-guiding “contrary-to-duty imperatives,” it would be severely lacking.

Yet another distinction is between obligation dilemmas and prohibition dilemmas . The former are situations in which more than one feasible action is obligatory. The latter involve cases in which all feasible actions are forbidden. Some (especially, Valentyne 1987 and 1989) argue that plausible principles of deontic logic may well render obligation dilemmas impossible; but they do not preclude the possibility of prohibition dilemmas. The case of Sartre's student, if genuinely dilemmatic, is an obligation dilemma; Sophie's case is a prohibition dilemma. There is another reason that friends of dilemmas emphasize this distinction. Some think that the “disjunctive solution” used by opponents of dilemmas—when equally strong precepts conflict, the agent is required to act on one or the other—is much more plausible when applied to obligation dilemmas than when applied to prohibition dilemmas.

As moral dilemmas are typically described, they involve a single agent . The agent ought, all things considered, to do A , ought, all things considered, to do B , and she cannot do both A and B . But we can distinguish multi-person dilemmas from single agent ones. The two-person case is representative of multi-person dilemmas. The situation is such that one agent, P1, ought to do A , a second agent, P2, ought to do B , and though each agent can do what he ought to do, it is not possible both for P1 to do A and P2 to do B . (See Marcus 1980, p. 122 and McConnell 1988.) Multi-person dilemmas have been called “interpersonal moral conflicts.” Such conflicts are most theoretically worrisome if the same moral system (or theory) generates the conflicting obligations for P1 and P2. A theory that precludes single-agent moral dilemmas remains uniquely action-guiding for each agent. But if that same theory does not preclude the possibility of interpersonal moral conflicts, not all agents will be able to succeed in discharging their obligations, no matter how well-motivated or how hard they try. For supporters of moral dilemmas, this distinction is not all that important. They no doubt welcome (theoretically) more types of dilemmas, since that may make their case more persuasive. But if they establish the reality of single-agent dilemmas, in one sense their work is done. For opponents of dilemmas, however, the distinction may be important. This is because at least some opponents believe that the conceptual argument against dilemmas applies principally to single-agent cases. It does so because the ought-to-do operator of deontic logic and the accompanying principles are properly understood to apply to entities about which decisions can be made. To be clear, this position does not preclude that collectives (such as businesses or nations) can have obligations. But a necessary condition for this being the case is that there is (or should be) a central deliberative standpoint from which decisions are made. This condition is not satisfied when two otherwise unrelated agents happen to have obligations both of which cannot be discharged. Put simply, while an individual act involving one agent can be the object of choice, a compound act involving multiple agents is difficult so to conceive. (See Smith 1986 and Thomason 1981.) Erin Taylor has recently argued that neither universalizability nor the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' ensure that there will be no interpersonal moral conflicts (what she calls “irreconcilable differences”; Taylor 2011, pp. 182-186). These conflicts would raise no difficulties if morality required trying rather than acting, but such a view is not plausible (Taylor 2011, pp. 186-188). Still, moral theories should minimize cases of interpersonal conflict (Taylor 2011, pp. 189-190).To the extent that the possibility of interpersonal moral conflicts raises an intramural dispute among opponents of dilemmas, that dispute concerns how to understand the principles of deontic logic and what can reasonably be demanded of moral theories.

Another issue raised by the topic of moral dilemmas is the relationship among various parts of morality. Consider this distinction. General obligations are moral requirements that individuals have simply because they are moral agents. That agents are required not to kill, not to steal, and not to assault are examples of general obligations. Agency alone makes these precepts applicable to individuals. By contrast, role-related obligations are moral requirements that agents have in virtue of their role, occupation, or position in society. That lifeguards are required to save swimmers in distress is a role-related obligation. Another example, mentioned earlier, is the obligation of a defense attorney to hold in confidence the disclosures made by a client. These categories need not be exclusive. It is likely that anyone who is in a position to do so ought to save a drowning person. And if a person has particularly sensitive information about another, she should probably not reveal it to third parties regardless of how the information was obtained. But lifeguards have obligations to help swimmers in distress when most others do not because of their abilities and contractual commitments. And lawyers have special obligations of confidentiality to their clients because of implicit promises and the need to maintain trust.

General obligations and role-related obligations can, and sometimes do, conflict. If a defense attorney knows the whereabouts of a deceased body, she may have a general obligation to reveal this information to family members of the deceased. But if she obtained this information from her client, the role-related obligation of confidentiality prohibits her from sharing it with others. Supporters of dilemmas may regard conflicts of this sort as just another confirmation of their thesis. Opponents of dilemmas will have to hold that one of the conflicting obligations takes priority. The latter task could be discharged if it were shown that one these two types of obligations always prevails over the other. But such a claim is implausible; for it seems that in some cases of conflict general obligations are stronger, while in other cases role-related duties take priority. The case seems to be made even better for supporters of dilemmas, and worse for opponents, when we consider that the same agent can occupy multiple roles that create conflicting requirements. The physician, Harvey Kelekian, in Margaret Edson's (1999/1993) Pulitzer Prize winning play, Wit, is an oncologist, a medical researcher, and a teacher of residents. The obligations generated by those roles lead Dr. Kelekian to treat his patient, Vivian Bearing, in ways that seem morally questionable (McConnell 2009). At first blush, anyway, it does not seem possible for Kelekian to discharge all of the obligations associated with these various roles.

In the context of issues raised by the possibility of moral dilemmas, the role most frequently discussed is that of the political actor. Michael Walzer (1972) claims that the political ruler, qua political ruler, ought to do what is best for the state; that is his principal role-related obligation. But he also ought to abide by the general obligations incumbent on all. Sometimes the political actor's role-related obligations require him to do evil—that is, to violate some general obligations. Among the examples given by Walzer are making a deal with a dishonest ward boss (necessary to get elected so that he can do good) and authorizing the torture of a person in order to uncover a plot to bomb a public building. Since each of these requirements is binding, Walzer believes that the politician faces a genuine moral dilemma (though, strangely, he also thinks that the politician should choose the good of the community rather than abide by the general moral norms). Such a situation is sometimes called “the dirty hands problem.” The expression, “dirty hands,” is taken from the title of a play by Sartre (1946). The idea is that no one can rule without becoming morally tainted. The role itself is fraught with moral dilemmas. This topic has received much attention recently. John Parrish (2007) has provided a detailed history of how philosophers from Plato to Adam Smith have dealt with the issue. And C.A.J. Coady (2008) has suggested that this reveals a “messy morality.”

For opponents of moral dilemmas, the problem of dirty hands represents both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to show how conflicts between general obligations and role-related obligations, and those among the various role-related obligations, can be resolved in a principled way. The opportunity for theories that purport to have the resources to eliminate dilemmas—such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism—is to show how the many moralities under which people are governed are related.

Debates about moral dilemmas have been extensive during the last six decades. These debates go to the heart of moral theory. Both supporters and opponents of moral dilemmas have major burdens to bear. Opponents of dilemmas must show why appearances are deceiving. Why are examples of apparent dilemmas misleading? Why are certain moral emotions appropriate if the agent has done no wrong? Supporters must show why several of many apparently plausible principles should be given up—principles such as PC, PD, OP, D, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and the agglomeration principle. Much progress has been made, but the debate is apt to continue.

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dirty hands, the problem of | Kant, Immanuel | logic: deontic | Mill, John Stuart | Plato | Sartre, Jean-Paul

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I thank Michael Zimmerman for helpful comments on this essay.

Copyright © 2014 by Terrance McConnell < tcmcconn @ uncg . edu >

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Narrative Summary of Limits of Natural Selection

Overview:  

This essay by Chauncey Wright discusses the limitations of Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection as applied to the human mind, particularly in explaining human morality and intellectual capabilities. Wright argues that while Natural Selection can account for many aspects of the biological world, it fails to fully explain the emergence of human consciousness, reason, and morality. He posits that these aspects might be explained by a broader “constitution of nature” that Natural Selection presupposes, or perhaps through other unknown forces.

Main Parts:

• Part 1: Reception and Proof of Natural Selection:  Wright begins by acknowledging the widespread acceptance of Natural Selection despite incomplete proofs, attributing it to Darwin’s skillful presentation and Wallace’s independent observations.
• Part 2: Utility and Adaptation in the Organic World:  Wright explores the principle of utility and adaptation as central to Natural Selection, showcasing how this principle provides explanations for diverse aspects of organic life, such as the brilliant colors of caterpillars, and ultimately proving the theory’s predictive power.
• Part 3: Limits of Natural Selection in Explaining Human Nature:  Wright contends that the human mind, particularly its moral and intellectual capabilities, surpasses the explanatory reach of Natural Selection. He highlights features like the human brain’s size, the absence of hair, and the capacity for abstract thought as examples that defy straightforward explanations by Natural Selection.
• Part 4: The Role of the Will in Human Actions:  Wright engages with the question of the Will and its relationship to physical forces. He argues against the idea that the Will is a physical force, suggesting instead that it is a regulatory force that operates independently of the laws of physics, suggesting that conscious volition might be a purely regulative cause, adding nothing to the physical forces at play.

View on Life:

• Natural Selection:  Natural Selection is a powerful principle that explains a great deal about the biological world, but it has limits, particularly when applied to the human mind.
• Utility:  The principle of utility plays a fundamental role in understanding the adaptations of living beings and how Natural Selection works.
• Metaphysical Views:  Wright’s views suggest a broader “constitution of nature” beyond the realm of Natural Selection, hinting at metaphysical principles that govern the development of life and consciousness.

Scenarios and Situations:

• The Galapagos Islands:  Wright references the unique flora and fauna of the Galapagos as evidence for the transmutation hypothesis, showcasing the role of geographical distribution in shaping life forms.
• The Gaudy Colors of Caterpillars:  This anecdote illustrates how the principle of utility can be used to understand seemingly inexplicable features of living beings.

Challenges:

• The Absence of Hair in Humans:  Wright challenges Natural Selection’s ability to explain this specific feature, arguing that it defies straightforward explanations based on utility or correlated variation.
• The Human Brain’s Size:  Wright questions whether the large size of the human brain, even in primitive humans, is solely a product of Natural Selection, suggesting that it might represent a capacity beyond immediate need.
• Moral Sentiments:  Wright challenges the notion that morality is solely based on utility, suggesting that moral sentiments might stem from more fundamental instincts and social needs.
• Natural Selection vs. Metaphysical Explanations:  The essay’s central conflict revolves around the limitations of Natural Selection in explaining human nature, particularly in light of its intellectual and moral capacities. Wright presents an alternative perspective that embraces a broader “constitution of nature” or other, potentially metaphysical, factors.
• Free Will vs. Determinism:  Wright grapples with the question of free will, suggesting that conscious volition might not be a source of physical energy, but rather a regulative force that operates independently of the physical laws of the universe.

The essay unfolds as a discussion between Wright and the reader, as he examines the arguments for and against Darwin’s theory, highlighting its strengths and limitations. The narrative arc explores the evolution of scientific thought regarding the origin of species, with a focus on the challenges posed by human nature to Darwinian theory.

Point of View:

The essay is written from a first-person perspective, allowing Wright to express his own opinions and insights on the limitations of Natural Selection. He presents his arguments in a reasoned and thoughtful manner, inviting the reader to consider his alternative perspectives.

How It’s Written:

Wright writes in a formal, academic tone, employing a clear and persuasive style. He uses extensive quotations from Darwin and Wallace, engaging with their arguments directly and offering counterarguments. The essay is characterized by its use of precise language, logical reasoning, and a focus on scientific evidence.

The essay maintains a respectful but critical tone towards Darwin’s theory. While acknowledging its strengths and the revolutionary impact it has had on scientific thinking, Wright expresses a sense of cautious optimism about the limitations of the theory and the potential for alternative explanations.

Life Choices:

The essay doesn’t explicitly discuss life choices, but it implicitly raises questions about the relationship between human nature and the choices we make. Wright’s argument that human morality and reason extend beyond the reach of Natural Selection suggests that we possess capacities for ethical action and intellectual pursuit that are not solely determined by our biological instincts.

• Humility:  Wright’s essay highlights the importance of intellectual humility in recognizing the limits of our knowledge and the potential for alternative explanations.
• Open-mindedness:  Wright encourages the reader to engage with diverse perspectives and avoid clinging to pre-conceived notions, even when they are based on popular scientific theories.
• The Complexity of Human Nature:  The essay underscores the complexity of human nature, highlighting how aspects of our being might transcend purely biological explanations and require consideration of broader philosophical and metaphysical principles.

Characters:

• Chauncey Wright:  The author, a philosopher and scientific thinker, who is critical of the limitations of Natural Selection.
• Charles Darwin:  A renowned naturalist whose theory of Natural Selection is the subject of the essay.
• Alfred Russel Wallace:  A fellow naturalist who independently developed similar ideas to Darwin.
• The Nature of Knowledge:  Wright explores the limits of scientific knowledge and the need for ongoing investigation and critical thinking.
• Human Nature:  The essay delves into the complexity of human nature, questioning the extent to which our moral and intellectual capacities can be fully explained by biological processes.
• The Search for Meaning:  Wright’s exploration of the limitations of Natural Selection implicitly raises questions about the search for meaning and purpose in life.

Principles:

• The Principle of Utility:  Wright highlights the importance of understanding the utility and adaptive advantages of features in the biological world.
• The Limits of Scientific Explanation:  He emphasizes the need to recognize the limitations of scientific explanations and the potential for alternative perspectives.
• The Importance of Metaphysical Inquiry:  Wright suggests that an understanding of human nature might require incorporating metaphysical principles beyond the scope of scientific observation.

Intentions:

• Author:  Wright intends to challenge the limitations of Natural Selection in explaining human nature, prompting further exploration of the philosophical and metaphysical dimensions of human existence.
• Reader:  The essay invites the reader to consider the limitations of prevailing scientific theories, to embrace intellectual humility, and to explore the broader questions of human nature and purpose.

Unique Vocabulary:

• Transmutation Hypothesis:  The idea that species change over time, which Darwin and Wallace promoted.
• Final Causes:  The idea that the design and adaptation in the organic world suggest a purpose or intentionality, often linked to theological arguments.
• Correlated Variation:  The concept that the evolution of one trait can influence the evolution of other traits, even seemingly unrelated ones.
• Intuitional Theory:  A school of philosophy that emphasizes the role of innate ideas and instincts in understanding human knowledge.
• Associational Psychology:  A school of psychology that emphasizes the role of association in shaping mental processes and learning.
• The Gaudy Colors of Caterpillars:  Wright uses this anecdote to illustrate how Natural Selection can explain seemingly random or useless traits by demonstrating their adaptive value.
• The Absence of Hair in Humans:  This anecdote highlights a feature of human nature that defies a straightforward explanation by Natural Selection, emphasizing the theory’s limitations.
• The Limitations of Natural Selection:  Wright presents the idea that Natural Selection, while powerful, might not be the sole explanation for the complexity of human nature.
• The Importance of Metaphysical Inquiry:  He suggests that an understanding of human nature might require incorporating metaphysical principles beyond the realm of scientific observation.
• The Nature of the Will:  Wright offers an alternative perspective on the nature of the Will, suggesting that it might be a purely regulative force rather than a source of physical energy.

Facts and Findings:

• Natural Selection’s Widespread Acceptance:  Wright notes the rapid acceptance of Darwin’s theory, despite incomplete proofs, demonstrating its profound impact on scientific thinking.
• Independent Observation:  He highlights the fact that Darwin and Wallace independently arrived at similar conclusions, further reinforcing the theory’s validity.
• The Limits of Variation:  Wright points out that Natural Selection has not significantly impacted human physical evolution in recent times, suggesting that it might be more focused on mental and cultural adaptations.
• The Human Brain’s Size:  He cites evidence that the size of the human brain, even in primitive humans, is not significantly different from modern humans, challenging the notion that brain size is solely a product of Natural Selection.

Points of View:

The text is written from a first-person perspective, allowing Wright to express his own opinions and arguments. This point of view adds a personal and critical dimension to the essay, inviting the reader to consider the limitations of Natural Selection and embrace alternative perspectives.

Perspective:

The essay challenges the prevailing perspective on the origin of species and the development of human nature. Wright offers a more nuanced perspective, highlighting the limitations of Natural Selection and suggesting the need to incorporate broader philosophical and metaphysical considerations into our understanding of human existence.

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What’s behind Russia’s ‘soft power’ moves on Israel-Palestine?

Mahmoud Abbas is the latest Palestinian leader to visit Moscow amid Israel’s continuing onslaught of Gaza.

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas is in Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In their first face-to-face meeting since 2021, the pair are expected to discuss Israel’s war on Gaza.

The Kremlin has maintained relations with both Israel and Palestine, but experts say its actual sway over the conflict is limited and the meeting has more of a symbolic nature.

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“When you’re looking at Russia’s engagement with the Palestine question, it’s about more than just Palestine,” Samuel Ramani, author of Russia in Africa, told Al Jazeera.

“It’s about really cementing themselves within the Arab world, by showing that they have solidarity with Palestinian cause while the Americans are supporting Israel. So that these meetings are not just about Palestine, they’re also about Russia’s soft power in the Middle East.”

Unlike the United States and European Union, Russia has not blacklisted Hamas as a “terrorist” organisation, welcoming the group’s delegates to Moscow shortly after their victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections and treating them as a legitimate political force.

In February, Russia hosted a conference with representatives from Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad, aimed at bridging the sometimes bitter divides between them.

“But nothing ever came of it,” noted Ruslan Suleymanov, an independent Russian expert on the Middle East now based in Baku.

“That’s generally all that Moscow is capable of; it doesn’t have any serious influence over Palestinian factions. Besides its support for Palestine, Moscow also has to criticise Western countries for their support of Israel. Russia today takes an anti-Western, and consequently anti-Israeli position. For example, when the UN Security Council convenes to discuss British-US proposals [on Gaza], Russia has always used its power of veto, which Palestinians appreciate. But this doesn’t convert to any kind of capital.”

Russia’s own motions for a ceasefire in Gaza at the UNSC in October were voted down by the US, UK, France and Japan.

Russia’s emergency ministry has also reportedly dispatched hundreds of tonnes worth of aid, mainly food and hygiene products, to the besieged Palestinian enclave, to be distributed through the Egyptian Red Crescent Society.

“It’s simply important for the Kremlin to show yet again that it’s playing some role, but I don’t think it will amount to anything,” added Suleymanov.

“Abbas will soon be 90 years old. It’s obvious a transition of power in Palestine is imminent. I think the Kremlin understands this as well, and if they aren’t already they will be closely watching who will take Abbas’s place. Maybe this will also be under discussion.”

Russia and Israel

Meanwhile, Israel’s history with Russia is deeply intertwined .

Escaping pogroms and persecution, Jews from the Russian Empire formed the first wave of mass migration from Europe to Palestine.

After World War II, the USSR originally supported the 1947 partition plan, ostensibly on the grounds that Western nations had failed to protect their own Jewish populations, and was the first to recognise the Jewish state.

The fledgling Israeli army even received weapons from communist Czechoslovakia, then subordinate to the Kremlin. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin may have thought Israel a useful wedge against British interests in the Middle East.

But the USSR soon disavowed Zionism, instead arming and equipping neighbouring Arab nations as well as Palestinian liberation movements.

As a student in the 1970s, Abbas earned his doctorate at Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University, writing a controversial thesis on what he argued were shared interests between the early Zionists and the Nazis.

Israeli researchers have even claimed, based on Soviet documents, that Abbas was a KGB agent – a suggestion Abbas has rubbished, accusing the researchers of attempting to derail peace talks.

After the 1967 Six-Day War, the Kremlin cut off diplomatic ties with Israel entirely until the end of the Cold War, only re-establishing contact as communism collapsed in the early 1990s.

Modern Russia has tried to balance its relationship with Israel with support for Palestine.

Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have publicly enjoyed a friendly rapport, even being spotted watching ballet together. Complicating the relationship is Russia’s involvement in Syria where it collaborates with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a sworn enemy of Israel.

“There are things each want from the other,” said Mark N Katz, professor emeritus at George Mason University, adding that at the same time, Israeli officials “fear” that should relations deteriorate, Moscow could harm the Jewish community in Russia.

“Moscow doesn’t want to see Israel doing anything to arm Ukraine, and they have been appreciative that the Israelis have been restrained in this regard. Israelis, for their part, cite the deconfliction agreement between Russian and Israeli forces with regard to Syria, whereby the Israelis pound the Iranians and Hezbollah, but don’t harm the Russians,” said Katz.

According to Ramani, “the Israelis are increasingly acting in a unilateral fashion in Syria, sometimes merely just informing the Russians, instead of consulting with them and engaging with them”.

So far, Israel has refused to sanction Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. But relations have noticeably cooled.

“Remember the openly anti-Semitic comments by Putin about Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots, or [foreign minister Sergey] Lavrov’s comments on Jews’ responsibility for the Holocaust … all this happened long before October 7,” said Suleymanov.

“But after October 7, relations became even more strained. In Israel it’s now completely unacceptable when Russia accepts Hamas. If before October 7, this was understandable because it was assumed Moscow would act as an intermediary, now this is seen completely differently. And when Putin compared the bombardment of Gaza to the siege of Leningrad, this was also taken very poorly in Israel.”

Israel is home to a substantial Russian-born diaspora, and the Kremlin has used its channels with Hamas to facilitate the release of a few Russian-Israelis taken captive on October 7.

“Because Russian-Israeli relations have been so strained over their criticisms of the war and [their relations with] Iran, the Russians now have smaller-scale diplomatic goals, like for example, they were engaging with Hamas to get Russian hostages out from their territory,” explained Ramani.

The Iran factor

In July, Hamas’s political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, for which Iran, Russia’s close ally, has promised retaliation.

Russia’s foreign ministry strongly condemned the killing, casting it as a counterproductive move for ceasefire negotiations and urging all sides to show restraint.

“I think if there’s an Israeli-Iranian conflict, what are the prospects for the US entering such a war, and what can Russia actually do?” said Katz.

“Russian forces [in Ukraine] are fairly stretched: one week it seems they’re on the advance, now of course it seems like they’re on the back foot . Will Russia have the capacity of acting in a way that determines the conflict?”

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Thai Court Ejects Prime Minister, as Old Guard Reasserts Power

Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin was considered a figurehead leader in a behind-the-scenes power struggle. He was ousted on ethics charges.

By Sui-Lee Wee

Reporting from Bangkok

Thailand’s Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin from office on Wednesday, throwing the country into fresh political turmoil just days after the court dissolved the country’s main opposition party.

In a 5-4 verdict, the court ruled that Mr. Srettha, who took office almost a year ago, violated ethics standards after he appointed to his cabinet a member previously convicted of attempted bribery.

Mr. Srettha was seen as a figurehead, closely allied with Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist former prime minister who has long sought to influence the country’s politics even after he was ousted and exiled in a 2006 coup.

The court’s decision is likely to intensify the disillusionment of many Thais, who see the case as the latest proof of intervention by an unelected establishment that is quashing the people’s will. Last week, the same court ordered the disbandment of the Move Forward Party , a progressive party that won last year’s election but was blocked from forming a government.

The constant upheaval in politics has diminished the government’s ability to address pressing issues such as reviving the country’s ailing, tourism-dependent economy.

But this dismissal is unlikely to galvanize angry protests. Mr. Srettha, a mild-mannered 62-year-old billionaire tycoon, was not a popular leader. He was installed only because a military-backed Senate prevented Pita Limjaroenrat , Move Forward’s former leader, from becoming premier. During his short term in office, Mr. Srettha was criticized for traveling abroad frequently with few results to show for it. He has said those trips were necessary to stimulate tourism and foreign investment.

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