essay about islamic law

Islamic Law Blog

Content and Context on Islamic Law

What Is Islamic Law? How Should We Study It?

By Joseph Lowry (University of Pennsylvania)

I study the legal doctrine and legal theory, broadly construed, found mostly in formal written works produced by qualified Muslim jurists ( ʿulamāʾ , fuqahāʾ ), that may or may not have been practiced, enacted, or enforced. Other literary and documentary evidence may shed light on that body of doctrine and theory and on practices derived from them. [1] Khaled Abou El Fadl has referred to such materials as “juristic discourses.” [2]

When did pious speculation by individual Muslims evolve into the formal, organized production of Islamic legal knowledge? Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. ca. 139/757), in his Risāla fī al-ṣaḥāba, highlights one negative consequence of that evolution—legal disagreement—as an impediment to efficient imperial administration. So the very late 1st/early 8th centuries seems like a reasonable starting point, but determining precisely how and why that process commenced will require painstaking study of compilations such as the Muṣannaf s of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 211/827) and Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849) with careful attention to individual doctrinal complexes, critical scrutiny of pathways of transmission, and appropriate contextualization relative to neighboring legal traditions (West Arabian, South Arabian, Roman, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian). Marion Katz and Kecia Ali have provided model studies of early Islamic legal doctrine, studies that are sensitive to the logics of the early sources and contexts while employing productive and modern critical lenses. [3] Harald Motzki and others have pursued a method for dating early legal dicta that is defensible and potentially fruitful for reconstructing that early history, but the history of the emergence and early development of individual areas of doctrine remains to be written. [4]

The appearance toward the end of the 2rd/8th century of law books that share similar principles of organization and extensive presentations of doctrine (Mālik’s (d. 179/795) al-Muwaṭṭaʾ and the works of al-Shaybānī (d. 198/804-5) and al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), for example) signals an advanced state of sophisticated and self-conscious legal expertise and thus the emergence of jurists and their legal literature as institutions in their own right. In addition to jurists and doctrine, Wael Hallaq would require a judiciary and a clearly articulated legal theory before we can speak of Islamic law as fully formed. [5] Legal theory is evidence of the jurists’ consciousness of being involved in an enterprise governed by rules (in this case, rules of interpretation, broadly construed), so that may be a useful criterion, but I am not sure a judiciary is required before we can speak of Islamic law. On the one hand, the histories of early judges by al-Kindī (d. 350/961) and Wakīʿ (d. 306/918) can be illuminating for studying the early evolution of doctrine. [6] The early judges’ activities provide a window onto what Schacht famously labeled “Umaiyad administrative practice.” [7] On the other hand, there is something to Norman Calder’s point that much of what is distinctive about Islamic law—conceived of as juristic discourses—may remain distinctive in the complete absence of real-world application. [8] Perhaps the jurists’ pious speculation about norms is sufficient for Islamic law to exist.

It may be instructive to compare the modern study of premodern Islamic law with the modern critical study of Rabbinic law in its Palestinian and Sasanian-Babylonian settings. Recent studies of the Rabbis suggest that their own self-presentation may vastly overstate their social importance and thus the social footprint of Rabbinic law in the Jewish communities of those two areas. [9] If Rabbinic law were not actually applied and enforced in Roman Palestine and Sasanian Babylonia in the ways implied by the Mishna and the Talmuds and related texts, would we think, as a result, that there was no such thing as Rabbinic law?

One consequence of locating the “beginnings” of Islamic law in the decades of the late 1st/early 8th centuries may be that legal materials datable to a time before the rise of jurists and doctrine require separate handling and conceptualization. Qur’anic legal material, considered in its original Meccan and Medinan setting, emerged in Arabia as part of the Biblical literature of Late Antiquity. Likewise, the Prophet’s acts, such as ransoming rather than executing prisoners of war, belong to the law of early 7th-century Medina (in this case, the law of armed conflict). [10] Early jurists’ efforts to accommodate Qur’anic doctrines and formally collected Prophetic precedents ( ḥadīth ) represent the inception of a distinctively Islamic legal hermeneutics. We should not assume that Islamic law was an inevitable outcome of the early Qur’anic-Prophetic community in Mecca and Medina.

Some will probably find my working definition (and that’s all it is) of Islamic law too narrow; no doubt there are other valid ways of conceptualizing and studying Islamic law. The most important thing is to explain, when we write, what we mean by Islamic law, what sources we study and why, and why we hold the views we do. That is how we signal the bodies of evidence to which our conclusions may validly be applied. Of course we should argue about definitions, about what counts as evidence, and about our assumptions, language, conclusions, method, theoretical orientation, and so on. Everyone’s views are contestable, which quality may be what makes everyone’s views valuable (in this or any other field of humanistic inquiry).

Can ‘law’ be defined so narrowly—as the literary output of private scholars—without reference to the state? Knut Vikør, in his Islamic law textbook, begins by suggesting that there may be no such thing as Islamic law. [11] He says this because he recognizes that, in regard to doctrine, Islamic law is multi-vocal (as Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ complained), but also because he assumes that ‘law’ must always be state law and therefore uni vocal. It is definitely possible to make the case for an Islamic legal system, in which doctrine and public law are equally relevant, and equally ‘Islamic’ in some sense. [12] But is every decisory or administrative action of a Muslim holder of executive or administrative authority, in a political context in a premodern Muslim society, an Islamic act such that it deserves to be deemed a part of Islamic law?

That would be one way to understand the question posed by the 7th/13th-century jurist Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) in his work on adjudication and legal opinions, recently translated by Mohammad Fadel. [13] I worry about this question for reasons different than those that drove al-Qarāfī to grapple with it. I worry that public discourse (including academic discourse) often threatens to impute religious motives, sensibilities, or doctrines to Muslims in a way that makes them paragons of unrelenting religiosity—exoticized, hyper-religious actors who serve as foils for an ideologically driven picture of secular modernity. (As an aside, and back to the topic of “beginnings,” a noteworthy trend in the historiography of Late Antique Arabia proposes accounting for Arab political domination of Western Asia without assuming that religious ideology played a primary role. [14] )

For some, even defining ‘law’ as necessarily including power and enforcement is too narrow. Wael Hallaq makes Islamic law stand, metonymically, for premodern Muslim societies. Doing so allows him to argue that the dismantling of Islamic legal institutions by European colonizers should be understood as the wanton destruction of whole societies. Hallaq’s approach is politically attractive in some respects, but it flattens out the Islamic legal tradition and robs actors of agency and the capacity to innovate. The Ottomans, for example, with their codified administrative law and routinization of penal law, might have been portrayed, in a Foucauldian vein, as modernizers. [15] Hallaq’s critical stance toward modernity and the state seems also to preclude considering elements of modern legal systems that draw on the tradition of fiqh as authentic. [16]

The humanistic study of pre-modern Islamic legal thought in the present moment presents a dual challenge. Careful examination of the rich Islamic legal tradition through the lens of current travails will reveal familiar injustices, to be sure, and perhaps illuminate important aspects of this moment of social and political turmoil and upheaval. But we must also take care not to reduce our sources to a mirror of our own pressing predicaments, howsoever urgent.

[1] There is much to study outside the literature of fiqh , uṣūl al-fiqh , and related genres, such as Ottoman court records, the madhhab s’ own prosopographical literature, to say nothing of the recent, important work on documentary evidence (including that drawn from the Cairo Geniza, as in Uriel Simonsohn’s A Common Justice: The Legal Allegiances of Christians and Jews under Early Islam (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011)). I cannot cite all the new and exciting scholarship in these and many other areas, so I have limited myself to a few representative works (not all of them recent) to illustrate the limited number of points I am trying to make in this short, informal essay.

[2] Abou El Fadl distinguishes between Islamic law, Muslim law, and juristic discourses. He uses “Muslim law” for “the way in which the political and legal order actually dealt with” specific legal issues, as “qualified by specific historical and social practices.” By “Islamic law” he seems to mean an authoritative rule presented as capable of actualization in response to certain facts—a univocal rule of the kind that juristic discourse does not really produce. By “juristic discourses” he means the totality of the products of the jurists’ intellectual efforts and imaginations, which include their expressions of commitments to moral, political, or theological principles. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2–3.

[3] Marion Katz, Body of Text: The Emergence of the Sunnī Law of Ritual Purity (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002); Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[4] Harald Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools , tr. Marion Katz (Leiden: Brill, 2002). In his short “Afterword” (at p. 299), Motzki notes that the history of early Islamic legal doctrine remains to be written. For some relevant reservations about Motzki’s methodological assumptions, see Paul Gledhill, “Motzki’s Forger: The Corpus of the Follower ʿAṭāʾ in Two Early 3rd/9th-Century Ḥadīth Compendia, Islamic Law and Society (2012) 19:1/2, 160–193. A recent study exploring techniques for dating early legal ḥadīths is Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, Studies in Legal Hadith (Leiden: Brill, 2019). A geographically oriented method for dating early traditions is offered by Behnam Sadeghi, “The Traveling Tradition Text: A Method for Dating Traditions,” Der Islam 85.1 (2008), 203–42. Patricia Crone’s learned attempt to locate the Islamic patronate in Roman Provincial Law yielded only ambiguous results. Patricia Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law: The Origins of the Islamic Patronate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[5] Hallaq requires these “essential attributes” to be in place before the “formation” of Islamic law can be called complete. Hallaq understands the madhhab s, not merely the jurists, as an essential component. Wael Hallaq, Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

[6] Matthieu Tillier’s many studies of the early judiciary are important. See, for example, his translation of al-Kindī’s history of judges, Histoire des cadis égyptiens: Aḫbār quḍāt Miṣr (Cairo: IFAO, 2012).

[7] Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), esp. 190–213. On Islamic tort law as product of the administration of the garrison cities, rather than a survival of pre-Islamic Arabian custom, see Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 202–08. Al-Kindī’s portrayal of the activities of judges in early Islamic Egypt seems to support Calder’s suggestion.

[8] Norman calder referred to works on positive law, fiqh , as “a literary tradition, abstracted from reality” and held that the jurists exhibited, in their writings, “a literary purpose [that does] not include reference to the contingent world of social events.” Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era , ed. C. Imber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 35, 47.

[9] It has been argued that the Rabbis were “neither the political nor the religious leaders of the Jews… [the Rabbis were] little more than a marginal sect, with little or no constituency or influence” [83] and that their texts were “propagandistic fictions composed to serve the interests of later rabbis” that sought “to create a fictive sense of reality for polemical purposes.” Seth Schwartz, “The Political Geography of Rabbinic Texts,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature , ed. C. Fronrobert, M. Jaffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75–96 (quotations from pp. 83 and 86). Another author in the same volume describes Rabbinic depictions of instruction as “exaggerated or utopian projections of Rabbinic ideals.” Jeffery Rubinstein, “Social and Institutional Settings of Rabbinic Literature,” 58–74, at 58.

[10] Lena Salaymeh shows that Islamic legal doctrine deviated from the Prophet’s practice on this point. Lena Salaymeh, The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late Antique Islamicate Legal Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), ch. 2, 43–83. I borrow the useful term “beginnings” from the title of her provocative book. She refers to “Islamicate” law, which is a good way to avoid an over-theologization of the wide range of legal practices attested in premodern Muslim societies and to leave space for, among other things, non-Muslim legal practices. I reviewed Salaymeh’s book in Marginalia <https://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/breaking-law-criticizing-modern-study-islamic-law/>.

[11] Knut S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1.

[12] For a study conceived and executed along such lines, in which public law figures prominently, see Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a complementary study in which the connectedness of fatwā -giving and litigation is explored in an exemplary manner, see David Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300–1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Noah Feldman makes a convincing case for a pre- and early-modern Islamic constitutional order in which Muslim jurists played a key role. Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[13] Mohammad Fadel, tr., The Criterion for Distinguishing Legal Opinions form Judicial Rulings and the Administrative Acts of Judges and Rulers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

[14] See Robert Hoyland , In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and Greg Fisher, ed., Arabs and Empires Before Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[15] In his important history of Islamic law, Hallaq studiously avoids viewing pre-colonial Muslim societies through a Foucauldian lens. Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[16] The modern claim, made recently in Egypt and elsewhere, that dissolution of marriage through the doctrine of khulʿ is a wife’s right under Islamic law rather than something that requires a husband’s agreement certainly draws on fiqh doctrine. See, for example, Nadia Sonneveld, Khul‘ Divorce in Egypt: Public Debates, Judicial Practices, and Everyday Life (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2012). However, the criminalization of polygamy in the Tunisian law of personal status, which obviously has Islamic law in mind, is something I would be hesitant to include as part of Islamic law (see Tunisian Code of Personal Status ( Majallat al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyya ) of 1956, Art. 18, as amended). The seriousness with which Islamic law was discussed as an element in modern legal systems in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is well illustrated by Leonard Wood in his monograph Islamic Legal Revival: Reception of European Law and Transformations in Islamic Legal Thought in Egypt, 1875–1952 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

(Suggested Bluebook citation: Joseph Lowry, What is Islamic Law? How Should We Study It? , I slamic L aw B log (Dec. 31, 2020), https://islamiclaw.blog/2020/12/31/what-is-islamic-law-how-should-we-study-it/)

(Suggested Chicago citation: Joseph Lowry, “What is Islamic Law? How Should We Study It?,” Islamic Law Blog , December 31, 2020, https://islamiclaw.blog/2020/12/31/what-is-islamic-law-how-should-we-study-it/)

Understanding Sharia: The Intersection of Islam and the Law

Friday prayers at the Wazir Khan mosque in Lahore, Pakistan.

Sharia is the ideal form of divine guidance that Muslims follow to live a righteous life. Human interpretations of sharia, or fiqh, are the basis of Islamic law today.
About half the world’s Muslim-majority countries have sharia-based laws, and most Muslims worldwide follow aspects of sharia in their private religious practices.
Debate continues to flare over sharia’s place in the modern world, particularly with regard to its teachings relating to criminal justice, democracy, and social equality.

Introduction

Most of the world’s nearly fifty Muslim-majority countries have laws that reference sharia, the guidance Muslims believe God provided them on a range of spiritual and worldly matters. Some of these nations have laws that call for what critics say are cruel criminal punishments, or place undue restrictions on the lives of women and minority groups. However, there is great diversity in how governments interpret and apply sharia, and people often misunderstand the role it plays in legal systems and the lives of individuals.

What is sharia?

Sharia means “the correct path” in Arabic. In Islam, it refers to the divine counsel that Muslims follow to live moral lives and grow close to God. Sharia is derived from two main sources: the Quran, which is considered the direct word of God, and hadith—thousands of sayings and practices attributed to the Prophet Mohammed that collectively form the Sunna. Some of the traditions and narratives included in these sources evolved from those in Judaism and Christianity , the other major Abrahamic religions. Shiite Muslims include the words and deeds of some of the prophet’s family in the Sunna. However, sharia largely comprises the interpretive tradition of Muslim scholars.

Middle East and North Africa

Rule of Law

The Prophet Mohammed is considered the most pious of all believers, and his actions became a model for all Muslims. The process of interpreting sharia, known as fiqh , developed over hundreds of years after he died in the seventh century and as the Islamic empire expanded outward from Mecca and Medina, where he lived and died, in modern-day Saudi Arabia.

Sharia isn’t the same as Islamic law. Muslims believe sharia refers to the perfect, immutable values understood only by God, while Islamic laws are those based on interpretations of sharia. Interpreting sharia requires deep knowledge of the Quran and Sunna, fluency in Arabic, and expertise in legal theory. However, modern Islamic seminaries have not standardized the level of competency nor the length of study necessary to qualify as a jurist, says Khaled Abou El Fadl , a Muslim jurist and law professor at the University of California, Los Angeles. Also, interpretations of sharia can conflict depending on who is interpreting them. “On any legal issue, there are ten different opinions,” Abou El Fadl says.

“On any legal issue, there are ten different opinions.”

Islamic law varies by country, is influenced by local customs , and evolves over time. Sharia is also the basis of legal opinions called fatwas, which are issued by Muslim scholars in response to requests from individual Muslims or from governments seeking guidance on a specific issue. In Sunni Islam, fatwas are strictly advisory; in Shiite Islam, practitioners are obligated to follow the fatwas of the religious leader of their choosing.

Why is it so controversial?

Sharia is a source of debate among both Muslims and non-Muslims. Among the many reasons sharia generates controversy is that it’s often contrasted with modern legal regimes in predominantly secular countries. “If sharia is being compared to premodern legal systems, there’s hardly anything controversial about it,” Abou El Fadl says.

Sharia can also be seen as problematic depending on who is interpreting it. Many observers view sharia as a rigid legal system that can’t evolve to reflect modern, Western values. Debates over sharia tend to center on certain topics:

Corporal punishment . For certain crimes, such as theft, blasphemy, and adultery, traditional interpretations of Islamic law prescribe punishments that are considered draconian compared to those in most modern legal systems. Among them are the hudud punishments, which include stoning, lashing, and amputation. (The Quran never mentions stoning, which is a punishment derived from the Book of Deuteronomy in both the Hebrew and Christian Bibles.) However, applying such punishments requires meeting extensive evidentiary thresholds, so scholars say they are largely meant to serve as a deterrent rather than have a punitive effect through application.

Today, most Muslim-majority countries don’t administer physical punishments, though about a dozen of them have the authority to do so under state laws. Local and international backlash often dissuades authorities from following through with such sentences. However, Indonesia, Iran, the Maldives, and Qatar are among the countries where flogging is still conducted ; and Iran, Mauritania [PDF], Nigeria , Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have in recent decades punished convicted thieves with amputations. Additionally, the Taliban implemented public executions and amputations when they ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s and have said these punishments will return under their new government.

Jihad. Many non-Muslims assume that this word, which means “ to strive ,” only refers to an armed struggle by Muslim extremists against non-Muslims. However, as a tenet of sharia, it refers to the effort to achieve a moral aim, which could be an armed struggle against injustice, the desire to better oneself morally, or the pursuit of knowledge, for example.

Religious tolerance . Some critics say that Muslim-led states that follow sharia are particularly intolerant of nonbelievers or those who practice other religions. Scholars say that this intolerance largely stems from premodern restrictions applied to non-Muslim minorities in Muslim lands, which were supported by certain hadiths later introduced into the Muslim canon that recommend the death penalty for Muslims who commit apostasy. Nigeria and Pakistan have carried out capital punishment for blasphemy and apostasy, as did Sudan for many years.

Additionally, religious minorities in some Muslim countries have fewer rights under modern laws and are otherwise discriminated against. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, only Muslims can construct places of worship and pray in public. And other countries that claim to allow religious freedom—particularly authoritarian states—don’t do so in practice (and routinely deny their citizens rights regardless of their faith).

Democracy . Though scholars say sharia doesn’t recommend a specific system of government, it is used by different groups to argue both against and in favor of democracy. Some Muslims say democracy is a purely Western concept imposed on Muslim countries. Others say that democracy has a basis in the Quran, since “mutual consultation” among the people is commended (42:38 Quran). For example, during the so-called Arab Spring, Egypt’s Al-Azhar University issued a statement saying sharia promotes a transition to democracy . Moderate Islamist groups such as Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement party also espouse democracy as the preferred form of government. Meanwhile, the leaders of Iran and Saudi Arabia insist that sharia requires nondemocratic governance.

Women’s rights . The Quran states that women are morally and spiritually equal to men but also indicates that wives and mothers have specific roles in the family and society. Certain sharia guidance applies specifically to women, and some governments use Islamic law to significantly restrict women’s rights , dictating how they dress and barring them from or segregating them in certain spaces.

For example, Iran and Saudi Arabia have Islamic law–based regulations that require women to wear veils and be accompanied by male guardians [PDF] in public places. Some Afghans and Western observers fear that Afghan women will face similar restrictions under the Taliban . Critics say these modesty rules create inequality, including by limiting education and employment opportunities for women. Other laws prevent women from initiating divorce and marriage on their own, contributing to child marriages and gender-based violence. Even in some places where sexist laws have been abolished, attitudes and practices are slow or resistant to change.

LGBTQ+ rights . All major schools of Islamic thought say that practicing homosexuality is a sin (even though same-sex attraction has long been accepted ), and laws in most Muslim-majority countries discriminate against LGBTQ+ people. In the extreme, same-sex behavior is punishable by death under Islamic law in ten countries. In others, it is often harshly punished, as it is in some more conservative Christian-majority countries .

How much room is there for reform?

Some Muslim scholars say the religious tenet of tajdid allows for practices under sharia to be modified or eliminated. The concept is one of renewal, an idea suggesting that Islamic societies should be reformed constantly to remain pure. At the same time, others consider the purest form of Islam to be the one practiced in the seventh century.

Moreover, there is significant debate over what the Quran sanctions versus what practices come from local customs. For example, Muslim feminists have long argued that sexist interpretations of sharia stem from social norms, not from Islam itself. Other scholars take that principle more broadly: “The reality of it is that Islamic principles or Islamic laws can accommodate many things, so there’s actually very little that Islamic law requires or dictates,” says Intisar Rabb , a professor of Islamic law at Harvard University.

“A lot of the rules that are called Islamic are often local, culturally inflected preferences that come to have an Islamic veneer.”

Modern governments have been known to alter laws considered to be Islamic. Saudi Arabia cited Islamic law when it granted women the right to drive in 2018. “If it’s truly Islamic, shouldn’t that not change? But it changed a few years ago,” Rabb says. “It’s just yet another example that a lot of the rules that are called Islamic are often local, culturally inflected preferences that come to have an Islamic veneer.”

How do governments in the Muslim world interpret and enforce sharia?

About half of the world’s Muslim-majority countries have some sharia-based laws, typically governing areas such as marriage and divorce, inheritance, and child custody. Only about a dozen Muslim countries apply sharia to criminal law, in part or in full. Governments tend to favor one of the major schools, or madhhabs, of Islamic law, although individual Muslims don’t usually adhere to one school in their personal lives. Each school is named after the scholar who founded it, and they differ in their methods of interpreting Islamic law:

The Hanafi school is regarded as the most liberal and the most focused on reason and analogy. It’s favored by Sunnis in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and large parts of the Arab world.
The Hanbali school, Islam’s most conservative and focused on select texts, spawned the Wahhabi and Salafi branches. Saudi Arabia embraces this school.
The Jaʽfari school, the main Shiite madhhab, is preferred by Shia-majority Iran, Iraq, parts of Lebanon and South Asia, and eastern Saudi Arabia. It places great significance on the fatwas of early jurists and emphasizes reason over analogy.
The Maliki school dominates in North and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in parts of the Arab Gulf. It is the only school that considers the consensus of the people of seventh-century Medina as a source of law, out of the belief that the people of Medina best preserved the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed, who lived there.
The Shafiʽi school prevails in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Yemen, and some areas in the Middle East. This was the first school to systematize the sources of Islamic law in order of authority, with the Quran as superior, followed by the Sunna, the consensus of Muslim scholars, and analogy.

European-style law also influences legal systems in Muslim countries, even in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which claim to only follow Islamic law. This owes in part to the effects of colonialism, the requirements for economic modernization, and the fact that many of the elite who built the legal systems in Muslim-majority countries had Western educations. Opinions on the best balance of Islamic law and secular law vary, but political systems tend to incorporate sharia-based laws in three ways:

Dual legal system . In some countries with large Muslim populations, such as Malaysia and Nigeria, the government has a secular judicial system but Muslims can choose to bring certain matters to Islamic courts . The exact jurisdiction of these courts varies by country but usually includes marriage, divorce, inheritance, and guardianship.

Government under God . In countries where Islam is the official religion , the constitution designates sharia as “a source,” or sometimes “the source,” of the law. Examples of the former include Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, while Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are among those that apply Islamic law in personal but not civil or criminal matters. In Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, among others, it is forbidden to enact legislation that is antithetical to Islam. Non-Muslims are not expected to obey sharia, and, in most countries, they are under the jurisdiction of special government committees and adjunct courts.

Secularism . Muslim countries where the government is formally secular include Azerbaijan, Chad, Senegal, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Turkey. Still, Islamist parties run for office and occasionally take power in these countries. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is one such example.

How do extremist groups interpret sharia?

Daily news brief, a summary of global news developments with cfr analysis delivered to your inbox each morning. weekdays., the world this week, a weekly digest of the latest from cfr on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. every friday., think global health.

A curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide. Weekly.

Islamist militant groups are notorious for embracing puritanical interpretations of sharia. Al-Qaeda, al-Shabab , and the self-declared Islamic State, among others, want to establish what they call fundamentalist regimes. Such organizations rely on violence and terrorism to push their extreme versions of Islamic law, establish and expand their influence, and persecute their opponents. They have been known to mete out gruesome punishments rarely used by governments in Islamic history, such as stoning, and others that traditional Islamic law expressly prohibits, such as crucifixion.

Leaders of such groups often have little to no training in interpreting sharia. Many insurgent groups see the imposition of an extreme version of Islamic law as a way to rebuke Western influence and hearken back to when Muslims ruled powerful empires. “They focus on the power and not on the interpretation or on law as a sophisticated discipline or area of expertise,” Rabb says. “With these organizations, you have all of the trappings and benefits of claiming religious commands, but none of the substance or procedure that came along with the complex system of Islamic law through informed and changing interpretations over time.”

How do Muslim-minority countries approach sharia?

Some governments let independent religious authorities apply and adjudicate their faith’s laws in certain situations. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) allows Islamic tribunals governing marriage, divorce, and inheritance to make legally binding decisions if both parties agree. Similar mechanisms exist for Jewish and Anglican communities. In Israel, Christians, Jews, and Muslims can adjudicate matters of family law in religious courts, as can members of a few other faiths . Additionally, Muslim-minority countries such as Australia, Japan, the UK, and the United States allow Islamic banking , or sharia-compliant banking.

Conversely, officials in certain Muslim-minority countries seek to block sharia from influencing state law or practice. Some have prohibited behaviors encouraged under sharia, such as veil wearing for women or ritual slaughter to make meat halal. The ban on wearing veils or headscarves exists in France, for example, where secularism is part of the national identity and conspicuous religious symbols are banned in certain public spaces. Supporters of such laws say they promote women’s empowerment and social harmony, while critics say they ignore individual freedoms and unfairly target Muslims.

Recommended Resources

In this meeting, George Mason University’s Heba F. El-Shazli discusses religious freedom in the Middle East with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Dwight Bashir and authors Janine di Giovanni and Daniel Philpott.

Harvard University’s Islamic Law Blog provides expert analysis on issues relating to Islamic law.

Harvard Professor Intisar Rabb discusses the purpose of doubt in Islamic criminal law and explains why premodern jurists rarely sentenced criminals to harsh physical punishments.

University of California, Los Angeles, Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl and other scholars debate the relationship between Islam and democracy for the Boston Review .

Leiden University’s Maurits S. Berger explores the role of sharia in the West for the Journal of Law, Religion and State .

The Washington Post ’s Andrew Jeong, Jennifer Hassan, and Sarah Pulliam Bailey lay out the Taliban’s view of sharia .

Toni Johnson, Mohammed Aly Sergie, and Lauren Vriens contributed to this article. Will Merrow and Michael Bricknell created the graphic.

How do governments in the Muslim world use sharia?

More From Our Experts

How Will the EU Elections Results Change Europe?

In Brief by Liana Fix June 10, 2024 Europe Program

Iran Attack Means an Even Tougher Balancing Act for the U.S. in the Middle East

In Brief by Steven A. Cook April 14, 2024 Middle East Program

Iran Attacks on Israel Spur Escalation Concerns

In Brief by Ray Takeyh April 14, 2024 Middle East Program

Nature and significance of Islamic law

Development of different schools of law
Later developments
Law of transactions
Law of succession
Procedure and evidence
Scope and mode of administration
Reform of sharia law

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

Library of Congress - What is Sharia Law?
Muslims for Progressive Values - Sharia Law
Teach Democracy - The Origins of Islamic Law
GlobalSecurity.org - Sharia
BBC News - What is Sharia law? What does it mean for women in Afghanistan?
Corporate Finance Institute - Sharia Law
Pew Research Center - Muslim Beliefs About Sharia
Shariʿah - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
Shariʿah - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)
Table Of Contents

sharia , the fundamental religious concept of Islam —namely, its law .

The religious law of Islam is seen as the expression of God’s command for Muslims and, in application, constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent upon all Muslims by virtue of their religious belief. Known as the sharīʿah (literally, “path leading to the watering place”), the law represents a divinely ordained path of conduct that guides Muslims toward a practical expression of religious conviction in this world and the goal of divine favour in the world to come.

In classical form, the sharia differs from Western systems of law in two principal respects. In the first place, the scope of the sharia is much wider, since it regulates the individual’s relationship not only with neighbours and with the state, which is the limit of most other legal systems, but also with God and with the individual’s own conscience . Ritual practices—such as the daily prayers ( ṣalāt ), almsgiving ( zakāt ), fasting ( ṣawm ), and pilgrimage ( hajj )—are an integral part of sharia law and usually occupy the first chapters in legal manuals. The sharia is concerned as much with ethical standards as with legal rules, indicating not only what an individual is entitled or bound to do in law but also what one ought, in conscience, to do or to refrain from doing. Accordingly, certain acts are classified as praiseworthy ( mandūb ), which means that their performance brings divine favour and their omission divine disfavour, and others as blameworthy ( makrūh ), which has the opposite implications . However, in neither case is there any legal sanction of punishment or reward, nullity or validity. The sharia is thus not merely a system of law but also a comprehensive code of behaviour that embraces both private and public activities.

The second major distinction between the sharia and Western legal systems is a consequence of the Islamic concept of the law as the expression of the divine will. With the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, direct communication of the divine will to human beings ceased, and the terms of the divine revelation were henceforth fixed and immutable. The overall image of the sharia is thus one of unchanging continuity , an impression that generally holds true for some areas of the law, such as ritual law. However, revelation can be interpreted in varying ways, and, over time, the diversity of possible interpretations has produced a wide array of positions on almost every point of law. In the premodern period the ʿulamāʾ (Muslim religious scholars) held a monopoly over interpretation of the law, but since the 19th century their monopoly has been challenged by Westernized elites and laypeople. The question of which interpretations become normative at any given time is complex. Early Western studies of Islamic law held the view that while Islamic law shaped Muslim societies, the latter had no influence on Islamic law in return. However, this position has become untenable . Social pressures and communal interests have played an important role in determining the practice of Islamic law in particular contexts—both in the premodern period and to an even greater extent in the modern era.

Historical development of sharia law

For the first Muslim community , established under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad at Medina in 622, the Qurʾānic revelations laid down basic standards of conduct. But the Qurʾān is in no sense a comprehensive legal code: only about 10 percent of its verses deal with legal issues. During his lifetime, Muhammad, as the supreme judge of the community, resolved legal problems as they arose by interpreting and expanding the general provisions of the Qurʾān, thereby establishing a legal tradition that was to continue after his death. With the rapid expansion of the Islamic realm under Muhammad’s political successors , the Muslim polity became administratively more complex and came into contact with the laws and institutions of the lands that the Muslims conquered. With the appointment of judges, or qadis , to the various provinces and districts, an organized judiciary came into being. The qadis were responsible for giving effect to a growing corpus of administrative and fiscal law, and they pragmatically adopted elements and institutions of Roman -Byzantine and Persian-Sasanian law into Islamic legal practice in the conquered territories. Depending on the discretion of the individual qadi , judicial decisions were based on the rules of the Qurʾān where these were relevant, but the sharp focus in which the Qurʾānic laws were held in the Medinan period was lost with the expanding horizons of activity.

Muslim jurisprudence , the science of ascertaining the precise terms of the sharia, is known as fiqh (literally, “understanding”). Beginning in the second half of the 8th century, oral transmission and development of this science gave way to a written legal literature devoted to exploring the substance of the law and the proper methodology for its derivation and justification. Throughout the medieval period the basic doctrine was elaborated and systematized in a large number of commentaries, and the voluminous literature thus produced constitutes the traditional textual authority of sharia law.

Islamic Legal Theory

Living reference work entry
First Online: 28 July 2023
Cite this living reference work entry

Chibli Mallat 3 , 4

Introduction

Philosophy tends to be “the mother of sciences” in the West since Plato put it at this meta-level in the disciplines of the intellect. In classical Islam, intellectual primacy finds in law its characteristically dominant discipline as the chief exponent of religion. Within law, the tradition developed its own philosophy in a sophisticated theoretical reflection on legal categories. This is the self-contained discipline known as usul al-fiqh , literally the principles or sources of law. The closest Western rendition of the genre would be jurisprudence in its widest Anglo-American acceptation as a theory of law.

There is nothing closer to legal theory in the Islamic tradition than usul . “Although it would be rash to suppose that usul al-fiqh subsumes everything that may be regarded as Muslim legal theory in the broadest possible sense of that term, nonetheless there can be no denying that it constitutes, or came over time to constitute, the mainstream of legal-theoretical...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Arminjon C (2017) Les Droits de l’homme dans l’islam shi’ite. Confluences et lignes de partage. Cerf, Paris

Google Scholar

Astarābādī M (1426/2005) Al-Fawāʾed al-madaniyya wal-shawāhed al-makkiyya (ed. Raḥmatullāh Raḥmatī Arākī). Mu’assasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, Qum

Behbehānī W (1424/2003) Al-Fawā’ed al-hā’iriyya. Sharī‘at, Qum

Brunschvig R (1970) Les uṣūl al-fiqh imamites à leur stade ancien. In: Brunschvig R, Fahd T (eds) Le Shi‘isme Imamite. Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, Paris, pp 201–214

Corbin H (1971–3) En Islam Iranien: Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques, 4 vols. Gallimard, Paris

Ḥakīm M (1963) Al-Uṣūl al-‘āmma lil-fiqh al-muqāran (General principles of comparative law). Dār al-Andalus, Beirut

Hallaq W (1997) A history of Islamic legal theories: an introduction to Sunni usul al-fiqh. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Book Google Scholar

Hegel GWF (2003) Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie ii, vol 19, 4th edn. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt

Jokisch B (2007) Islamic Imperial law. Harun al-Rashid’s codification project. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin

Kamali MH (1991) Principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge

Khadduri M (1961) Islamic jurisprudence: Shafi’i’s Risala. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

Khaldun I (1978) Al-Muqaddima (Prolegomena). Dār al-Ᾱfāq al-Jadida, Beirut

Khallāf AW (1942) Ilm uṣūl al-fiqh (Science of usul al-fiqh). Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo

Makdisi G (1997) Ibn ‘Aqil: religion and culture in classical Islam. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Mallat C (1993) The renewal of Islamic law, Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi‘i international. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Mallat C (2007) On the philosophy of Islamic law. In: Mallat C, Tramontini L (eds) From Baghdad to Beirut: festschrift in honor of John Donohue. Ergon-Verlag, Würzburg, pp 50–70

Mallat C (2007) Introduction to Middle Eastern Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Rifā‘i AJ (ed) (2001) Falsafat al-fiqh wa maqāṣed al-sharī‘a (Philosophy of law [fiqh] and meanings of law [shari‘a]). Dār al-Hādī, Beirut

Ṣadr MB (1964) al-Ma‘ālem al-jadīda fil-uṣūl (The new configuration of usul ). Dār al-Ta‘āruf, Beirut

Ṣadr MB (1971) Buḥūth fi sharḥ al-‘urwa al-wuthqā, (Studies in the commentary of [Muhsin al-Hakim’s] al-‘urwa al-wuthqa ), 3 vols. Maṭba‘at al-Ᾱdāb, Najaf

Ṣadr MB (1977) Ta‘āruḍ al-adilla al-shar‘iyya (Contradiction of legal evidence) (ed: al-Hashimi M). Dār al-Ta‘āruf, Beirut

Ṣadr MB (1978–1980) Durus fi ‘ilm al-uṣūl (Studies in ‘ilm al-usul ), 4 vols. Dār al-Ta‘āruf, Beirut

Ṣadr MB (1987) Mabāheth al-uṣūl (Research in usul ) (ed: al-Ḥā’irī K). Dār al-Bashīr, Qum

Sadr MB (2003a) Lessons in Islamic jurisprudence (trans: Mottahedeh RP). Oneworld, Oxford

Sadr MB (2003b) Principles of Islamic jurisprudence according to Shi‘i Law (trans: Hussein AA, Algar H). ICAS Press, London

Schacht J (1950) Origins of Muhammadan jurisprudence. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Schacht J (1964) Introduction to Islamic law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Shāfi‘ī MI (1939) al-Risāla (ed: Shāker I). Ḥalabī, Cairo

Shāṭibī AI (1997) Al-Muwāfaqāt, 6 vols. Dār ibn ‘Affān, Khubar

Shīrāzī Ṣ (1982) Al-Ḥikma al-muta‘āliya fil-asfār al-‘aqliyya al-arba‘a (The transcendental wisdom in the four rational voyages), 9 vols. Dār iḥyā’ al-turāth al-‘arabī, Beirut

Ṭūṣī AJ (1387/1967) Al-Mabṣūṭ fi fiqh al-imāmiyya (Treatise in the law of the Imamis), 8 vols. Ḥaydariyya, Tehran

Ṭūṣī AJ (1417/1996) Al-‘udda fi uṣūl al-fiqh (The [intellectual] equipment in usul al-fiqh ), 2 vols. Sitāra, Qum

Weiss BG (1992) The search for God’s law. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City

Weiss BG (2002) Introduction. In: Weiss BG (ed) Studies in Islamic legal theory. Brill, Leiden, pp xvii–xxxi

Chapter Google Scholar

Zysow A (2013) The economy of certainty: an introduction to the typology of Islamic legal theory. Lockwood Press, Atlanta

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

Chibli Mallat

Ecole de Droit à Sciences-Po, Paris, France

You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chibli Mallat .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Regents Professor of the University System of Maryland and Director of the University of Baltimore Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, Baltimore, USA

Mortimer Sellers

Professor for Legal and Social Philosophy, Department of Legal Theory, International and European Law, University of Salzburg, Austria, Churfurststrasse 1, 5020 Salzburg, Austria

Stephan Kirste

Section Editor information

Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Patricia Mindus Ph.D

Charles III University, Madrid, Spain

Triantafyllos Gkouvas

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this entry

Cite this entry.

Mallat, C. (2023). Islamic Legal Theory. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1148-1

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1148-1

Received : 20 May 2023

Accepted : 25 May 2023

Published : 28 July 2023

Publisher Name : Springer, Dordrecht

Print ISBN : 978-94-007-6730-0

Online ISBN : 978-94-007-6730-0

eBook Packages : Springer Reference Law and Criminology Reference Module Humanities and Social Sciences Reference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Find a journal
Track your research

Brill | Nijhoff

Brill | Wageningen Academic

Brill Germany / Austria

Böhlau

Brill | Fink

Brill | mentis

Brill | Schöningh

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

V&R unipress

Open Access

Open Access for Authors

Transformative Agreements

Open Access and Research Funding

Open Access for Librarians

Open Access for Academic Societies

Discover Brill’s Open Access Content

Organization

Stay updated

Corporate Social Responsiblity

Investor Relations

Policies, rights & permissions

Review a Brill Book

Author Portal

How to publish with Brill: Files & Guides

Fonts, Scripts and Unicode

Publication Ethics & COPE Compliance

Data Sharing Policy

Brill MyBook

Ordering from Brill

Author Newsletter

Piracy Reporting Form

Sales Managers and Sales Contacts

Ordering From Brill

Titles No Longer Published by Brill

Catalogs, Flyers and Price Lists

E-Book Collections Title Lists and MARC Records

How to Manage your Online Holdings

LibLynx Access Management

Discovery Services

KBART Files

MARC Records

Online User and Order Help

Rights and Permissions

Latest Key Figures

Latest Financial Press Releases and Reports

Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

Share Information

Specialty Products

Press and Reviews

Share link with colleague or librarian

Stay informed about this journal!

Get New Issue Alerts
Get Advance Article alerts
Get Citation Alerts

Qurʾanic Ethics and Islamic Law

The issue of Islamic law and morality has for the most part received scant attention in the modern age. This essay contributes to the exploration of possible ways of understanding the relationship of ethics to Shariʿah and Islamic law. The author’s objective in this essay is largely normative. While he makes every effort to root his arguments in the fabric of the Islamic tradition, this essay is not descriptive, but aspirational in the sense that he seeks to persuade readers of the desirability of specific understandings of the meaning of Shariʿah and the relationship between Islamic law and ethics. As a point of departure, the author accepts that the Qurʾan and the laws of God are binding, and that an Islamic theory has to be expressed within the framework of Islamic principles. He maintains that the dynamism and vitality of Islamic law must be preserved in the contemporary age, and that such a result is not possible without maintaining the liberty and innovative capacities of the individual.

* Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl is the Alfi Distinguished Professor in Islamic Law at the ucla School of Law, where he teaches International Human Rights, Islamic Jurisprudence, Law and Terrorism, Islam and Human Rights, Political Asylum and Refugee Law, Political Crimes and Legal Systems, and The Trafficking of Human Beings: Law and Policy. He is also the Deputy Chair of the Islamic Studies Program at ucla . His latest book is entitled, Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari’ah in the Modern Age. I am very grateful to Dana Lee, Valentina Khan, and my wife, Grace Song, for their invaluable feedback and assistance.

The question of how the law becomes known has occupied the minds of Muslim scholars for a long time. In the early centuries, the heated debates, and at times even hostilities, centered around the place and role of ethical principles and reason in the development of the religious tradition. Numerous reports in the Islamic tradition described the very mission of the Prophet Muhammad as part and parcel of an ethical project—a project that builds upon and develops people’s natural ethical being. This was only bolstered by the text of the Qurʾan in which God praises Muhammad for his moral rectitude and ethics. (Qurʾan 68:4.) 1 Moreover, there are numerous Prophetic traditions that emphasized the inextricable relationship between ethics and Islam. One such report states: “The most beloved among you to me are those who are of the noblest character.” 2 At the very roots of Islamic theology is the demanding and inspiring Qurʾanic exhortation that Muhammad was sent but as a mercy to humankind. (Qurʾan 21:107). 3

Considering the central role of the imperative of ethics ( akhlāq ) in early Islamic theological dogma, it is not surprising that the early generations of Muslims quickly inherited and hotly debated the Greek philosophical discourses on the sources and nature of moral obligations. In the classical heritage, there were the archetypal and opposing camps: at one pole was the Muʿtazila , who argued that justice and virtue are knowable through human reason; and at the other pole, the traditionalists ( Ahl al-Ḥadīth ), who argued that reason is necessarily whimsical and capricious, and that justice and virtue are only realized through revelation. In the first centuries of Islamic jurisprudence, the debates about the very nature of justice, ethics, and the role of reason and revelation were formative and dynamic. 4 However, in modern times, these debates have formally subsided. While there are reformers, like Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), who sought to give rationality and reason a far greater role in the articulation of Islamic law, there are also fundamentalists, like Abū al-ʿAlāʾ Mawdūdī (d. 1979), who treated positive legal rules as the source of all morality and justice. Whatever the nature of the debates that exist between reformers and traditionalists today, it is usually not phrased in terms of morality and law. The issue of Islamic law and morality has for the most part received scant attention in the modern age. This essay contributes to the exploration of possible ways of understanding the relationship of ethics to Shariʿah and Islamic law. My objective in this essay is largely normative. While I make every effort to root my arguments in the fabric of the Islamic tradition, this essay is not descriptive, but aspirational in the sense that I seek to persuade readers of the desirability of specific understandings of the meaning of Shariʿah and the relationship between Islamic law and ethics. I am here motivated by two considerations. As a point of departure, I accept that the Qurʾan and the laws of God are binding, and that an Islamic theory has to be expressed within the framework of Islamic principles. I maintain that the dynamism and vitality of Islamic law must be preserved in the contemporary age, and that such a result is not possible without maintaining the liberty and innovative capacities of the individual. I do not believe in the desirability or reasonability of ignoring or dismissing the entire Islamic juristic heritage. It would be intellectually irresponsible and pedagogically incoherent to do so. In my view, the Islamic juristic heritage has an important instructive and demonstrative role, but also a critical anchoring role to play for contemporary Muslims. I do believe that, as many contemporary Muslim reformers have argued, the classical juristic tradition must be examined and interrogated through the probative lens of ethical and moral theory. The issue I focus on in this essay is the ethical and moral impulse embedded in the Qurʾanic revelation and its normative capacity to transform articulations of Islamic law in the modern age.

Justice as the Path of Divinity: The Nature of Islamic Jurisprudence

“Lo, We offered the trust unto the heavens and the earth and the hills, but they shrank from bearing it and were afraid of it. And man assumed it. Lo! He hath proved a tyrant and a fool.” (Qurʾan 33:72). The message conveyed by this verse is that humans accepted God’s trust, and with it, they accepted a laborious test. Humans are to be held accountable for their decisions and actions here and in the final life. God’s choice to trust humans was elicited by our gift of rationality but, at the same time, it created a burden of accountability . The failings of humanity are its own and the successes are its rewards.

This burdensome privilege is not confined to the trust God placed in humans. God also made human beings God’s viceroys. “We appointed you viceroys on the earth—that We might see how you behave.” (Qurʾan 10:14). Humans in general, and Muslims in particular, must meet God’s expectations. The purpose of humans in life is to realize the righteous path of God, but this entails an everlasting moral struggle to attain that Divine path. The Qurʾan speaks of this moral and righteous path—the path of Divinity itself—as an existing objective fact. It is as if the genuinely and truly moral and righteous are co-extensive and inseparable from the Divine.

The Qurʾan often uses terms such as ẓulm (injustice), ʿ adl (justice) or al-ṣāliḥ (the good) in an objective fashion, as if they are ontological realities—independent and objective. The Divine is the very embodiment of all that is moral, ethical, good and right, and therefore, the presence of the Divine as an objective reality necessarily means the existence of ethical values such as justice and goodness as an objective reality. Accordingly, it is meaningless for one to claim that God in fact does exist but that justice or goodness does not. Partial justice or partial goodness could be contextual, contingent, and relative, but absolute and perfect justice or goodness is not. Absolute and perfect justice and goodness are attributes of the Divine because the Divine embodies all that is right and good. The Qurʾan makes repeated references to the fact that God embodies all the names of beauty ( lahu al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā ), and it is fair to say that God embodies all that is beautiful and good. (Qurʾan 7:180; 17:110; 20:8; 59:24.) 5 These Divine embodiments are objective and not subjective realities. The objective entails the absolute and Divine, as the Divine is non-contingent and objective. Critically, God knows the righteous path, but humans do not—they need God’s guidance and revelation to reach out towards what the Qurʾan describes as al-sirāṭ al-mustaqīm (the righteous path). In the surah that introduces the Qurʾan, God exhorts Muslims to say, “[God], show us the righteous path; the path of those upon whom You have bestowed Your grace …” (Qurʾan 1:6–7.) But, ultimately, God alone knows what the right path is: “God knows who has wandered from God’s path, and God knows better who is rightly guided.” (Qurʾan 16:125).

As is well known, there is no formal church or priesthood to guide people in Islam. Muslim historical practices did produce a class of experts in theology and law, commonly known as the fuqahāʾ , imams, or mullahs, who claim to be authoritative on religious matters. However, especially in Sunni Islam, the authority of these experts is entirely contingent on personal deference, or the willingness of individuals to place their confidence in the opinions and claims of such experts. Regardless of their expertise or knowledge, no religious scholar can claim sacred authority or claim to be immune from error. Quintessentially, other than the Qurʾan and the teachings of the prophets, humans must rely on their own faculties in realizing the true moral path. Furthermore, according to the Qurʾan, humans cannot escape responsibility or accountability by relying on customary practices or the teachings of their forefathers as an excuse for failing to seek the righteous path. They will not be excused for deferring to the commands of their superiors or for blindly adhering to the prevailing social mores or inherited religious beliefs and practices.

This does not mean that the technical rulings of Islamic law are to be known intuitively or that any conceited person with a delusional sense of jurisprudential acumen may pontificate as to the details of the law. We are not yet talking about Islamic law; we are only addressing the relationship of the individual vis-a-vis the righteous path as an objective reality. In other words, we are talking about the basic moral and ethical precepts and the responsibility of individuals to seek to live an ethical and moral life. The Qurʾan insists that a person may not cite the moral irresponsibility or the immorality of others as an excuse for his or her own moral failures.

Ethical Obligations in Islamic Law

In this context, it is critical to differentiate between responsibility or obligation and accountability or liability. Each and every human being has a moral obligation or responsibility to seek out and recognize al-sirāṭ al-mustaqīm (the righteous path) or objective ethical precepts, which are inseparable from divinity itself. The Qurʾan describes the realization or recognition of the path, which includes believing in God, as an act rising out of rational cognition or a matter of common sense. The Qurʾan describes itself as a book of remembrance ( dhikr ), and maintains that its most essential function is to remind people of the reality of Divinity—a reality that includes the presence of God and all that this presence implies. The Qurʾan emphasizes repeatedly that the instruments for realizing or recognizing the truth is cognition ( fikr ), reason ( ʿaql ), and remembrance ( dhikr ). In this context, the truth is Divinity and Divinity is the truth, but recognition of Divinity necessitates the recognition of the values that attach themselves to the Divine—values such as justice, fairness, compassion, mercy, honesty, and goodness. 6 As al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502/1108) asserted, the duty to do good amounts to an obligation to adopt Godly virtues ( al-takhalluq bi-khulqi ʾllāh ). 7

The Qurʾan intimates that many elements of the sirāṭ , but not the whole integrated sum of the righteous path, are an innate part of the human mind. As God created humans, he inspired unto them an intuitive liking for the path of righteousness: “And so, set thy force steadfastly towards the [one ever-true] faith, turning away from all that is false, in accordance with natural disposition intuition ( fiṭrah ) which God has instilled unto humans …” (Qurʾan 30:30). The righteous path of Godliness is embedded in the very nature of human beings. It is the natural intuition ( fiṭrah ) woven into the very fabric of human consciousness that aids people in differentiating between what is Godly ( rabbānī ) and good ( ḥasan ), and what is ungodly and bad ( qabīḥ ). (Qurʾan 30:30; Abou El Fadl 2014a , 366–73; idem 2014b , 109–23; Rahman 2009 , 3, 12–24; Sachedina 2001 , 26–27, 43–44, 70–101; idem 2009 , 46–53, 58–61, 92–114.)

The Qurʾan continuously prompts people to think, reflect and ponder as a way of reaching out towards the truth of God and God’s path. The necessity of such thought and reflection is affirmed by the Prophet’s saying, “One hour spent acquiring knowledge is better than the prayers of a whole night.”(al-Dārimī 2013, 207, hadith no. 658; al-Khaṭīb al-Tabrīzī 1979, 85, hadith no. 256.) Elements of the righteous path—or, in other words, basic moral precepts—are accessible to human beings through the act of diligent remembrance and reflection, or even by an honest willingness to open one’s heart to the reprimands of a critical intuitive conscience. It is possible that a person might seek to realize elements of the righteous path while neglecting to pursue the righteous path in its entirety. It is possible to seek to be merciful, for instance, but neglect to properly reflect upon the demands of justice. But more importantly, it is possible that a person might seek to realize moral and ethical precepts while failing to seek out the Divine. The righteous path in its fullness is woefully incomplete and inadequate without believing in God. The Qurʾan does appear to emphasize that although many elements of the righteous path can be sought out through intuitive and rational faculties, the realization of the righteous path in its entirety and fullness needs something extra—it needs an added power: it needs Divine bliss or grace. To be possessed of true wisdom ( ḥikma ), where one fully understands the balance ( al-mīzān ) or how all the elements fall into place to form the integrated whole requires spiritual and physical exertion and moral diligence, which in turn is rewarded by an act of grace ( hidāya ) that allows such a fortunate soul to realize the sirāṭ al-mustaqīm in its fullness. (al-Basṭī 2004, 10–13.) 8

The Qurʾan describes the Divine as pure and unadulterated light, and it insists that those who deny God’s existence are spiritually blind. Recognizing or believing in the Divine is as if making a decision to remove the blindfolds, and if one does so, he enables himself to see the light that has been there all along unaffected by the heedlessness of the blind. Moreover, this Divine light has qualities and attributes that exist completely unaffected by the denials of the blind or the incredulity of the obstinate. The precepts and values of ethics and morality are what I have been describing as the qualities or attributes of the Divine. Metaphorically, moral and ethical precepts are like luminous supernal elements within the light of God. It is possible to seek out and recognize these luminous elements while denying that the Divine or its light exists. From a theological perspective, this means that a person who does so is partially blind—he can see particular luminous substances but does not see the full celestial light.

All human beings have an affirmative individual responsibility and obligation to see or recognize as much of the light as possible. Effectively, this means that each person is obligated to be as religiously pious and devout and as moral and ethical as possible. However, accountability for the realization of this responsibility is an entirely different matter than the obligation itself. Conceptually, the fact that human beings are obligated to seek the path does not necessarily mean that they are accountable for failing to realize the path or even accountable for failing to seek it in the first place. In Islamic theology, temporal accountability is entirely separable from Divine accountability. Divine accountability is something that is in the sole discretion of God—no one can tell God who to forgive or punish. Muslims are asked to believe that God is just in the most perfect sense. Therefore, while Muslims may believe that God, being perfectly just, will give each person his due, no one can presumptuously claim to know what the application of Divine justice will ultimately entail.

For instance, it might be that being treated cruelly by one’s parents or that as a child one has suffered a cruel upbringing will be considered as mitigating factors when judging a person who has failed to realize the ethical precept of mercy. But other than believing that God will judge people with impeccable justice, human beings cannot pretend to know what God’s judgment will be in the end. Temporal, as opposed to Divine, accountability is investigated through the instruments of Islamic jurisprudence.

Fundamentally, Islamic jurisprudence is concerned with investigating and establishing the obligations ( takālīf al-ḥalāl wa-al-ḥarām ) and also the temporal accountabilities or liabilities of Muslims ( al-masʾūliyyāt al-jināʾiyya wa-al-madaniyya ). Another way of understanding the functions of Islamic jurisprudence is to state: the quintessential role of Islamic jurisprudence is to search and establish the methodological tools for the exploration and realization of “rights” ( ḥuqūq )—whether these rights belong to God or to humans. Rights, however, exist objectively—their existence is not contingent or conditioned on human recognition. Furthermore, if human beings recognize a particular right ( ḥaqq ), it does not necessarily follow that people have the power to hold individuals liable for violating both the rights of human beings and God.

Shariʿah as Ideology and Practice

The historical practice of Shariʿah was invariably complex and nuanced. Historically, Shariʿah was manifested as a complicated socio-legal practice that negotiated and weaved together textual determinism with political whim and social and customary habit with judicial interpretive discretion into a rich and intricate historical tapestry. But the historical manifestation of Shariʿah was also idealistically doctrinal, creedal, and aspirational. In other words, Shariʿah was not just an instrumental historical practice but also an ideology that interrogated and challenged socio-political realities.

According to Muslim legal theory, the purpose of Islamic law is to seek after the righteous path—to try to come as close as possible to it and in doing so, achieve the welfare of the people. In Islamic law, achieving the welfare of the people ( taḥqīq maṣāliḥ al-ʿibād ) is a term of art that is intended to acknowledge that the pursuit of abstract values, such as justice, compassion and mercy, is supposed to translate into concrete and tangible benefits to be enjoyed by human beings. Muslim and non-Muslim writers often refer to Islamic law as Shariʿah , which is not entirely accurate. Linguistically, the word sharīʿa literally means the fountainhead that quenches the thirst of living beings or the way to goodness. Jurisprudentially, the Shariʿah is the revealed guidance of God—perfect, complete, incorruptible, immune, and immutable. In a sense, the Shariʿah provides the skeletal ethical and moral norms of the Islamic legal system.

The main, but not exclusive, source of the Shariʿah is the Qurʾan, which focuses on general ethical and moral principles and a few specific laws. Roughly, there are eighty verses in the Qurʾan that might be seen as laws in the strict sense, but the Qurʾan is mainly a book of ethical and moral teachings. The specific laws that are considered a part of the immutable Shariʿah must fulfill two criteria: they must be stated by the Divine in a clear, specific, and unambiguous fashion; and the specific law must by its very nature fully embody the ethical principle that it is intended to articulate. Examples of such laws would include the command to pray five times a day, fast during the month of Ramadan, or give alms, and the prohibitions against extra-marital sex, slander, or the consumption of alcohol and pork. Another example would include the Qurʾanic command that all contracts be consensual and free from coercion, fraud, deception or misrepresentation, and also that parties to a contract must in good faith make every effort to honor their promises. Muslim jurists argued that laws clearly mandated by God such as these are stated in an unambiguous fashion in the text of the Qurʾan in order to stress that the laws are in and of themselves ethical precepts that by their nature are not subject to contingency, context, or temporal variations.

It is important to note that the specific rules that are considered part of the Divine Shariʿah are a special class of laws that are often described as Qurʾanic laws ( aḥkām al-Qurʾān ), but they constitute a fairly small and narrow part of the overall system of Islamic law. In addition, although these specific laws are described as non-contingent and immutable, the application of some of these laws may be suspended in cases of dire necessity ( ḍarūra ). Thus, there is an explicit recognition that even as to the most specific and objective Shariʿah laws, human subjectivity will have to play a role, at a minimum, in the process of determining correct enforcement and implementation of the laws.

Some modern writers have argued that Shariʿah law, not just human interpretation of Shariʿah law, may be suspended if it is in the public interest to do so ( al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma ). Effectively, these writers erroneously equate public interests with individual cases of necessity and treat the two as having the same effect upon Shariʿah law. The problem, however, is that this logic implies that public interest, however it may be defined, on a scale of Shariʿah values is the highest possible value that trumps all others. If public interest is equated with political interests or the greater attainment of happiness, this means that Shariʿah promotes a strictly utilitarian value system. The claim of an exception based on necessity is of an entirely different nature than the suspension of Shariʿah laws on the basis of public interests. A claim of necessity is but a tool invoked in order to protect a moral principle or ethical value. But a claim of public interest is premised on the idea of the greater good or preserving the overall welfare of people. An overriding utilitarian exception would be inconsistent with the objectivity of the Shariʿah and to its claim of any absolute moral values.

There is no indication that the Qurʾan intended to endorse unmitigated subjectivism or moral relativism as the foundation of Shariʿah law. I am not claiming that Islamic law does not recognize the incorporation of public interests in limited cases where such a reference does not conflict with the higher moral values of Shariʿah.

I am also not claiming that Islamic law limits itself to the recognition of cases of individual necessity or that Islamic law does not recognize cases of public necessity. In fact, because Islamic jurisprudence does recognize exceptions to the law in cases in which the necessity claimed is of a public nature, some contemporary jurists conclude that the difference between necessity and public interest is only a matter of degree—not fundamental in nature. This, however, is not correct: necessity suspends the application of the law in order to preserve a higher value, but claims that all laws could be altered in order to serve a general public interest ( maṣlaḥa ʿāmma ) renders the law subject to an overarching and overriding principle of general welfare or well-being. With such an overarching utilitarian commitment, it becomes difficult to defend the objectivity and absoluteness of any ethical or moral value. Every ethical or moral value becomes contingent on its ability to serve the general welfare or well-being of people, otherwise it is rendered invalid. This is exactly why modern jurists who relied on the concept of public interest as the save-all measure for Islamic legal reform have tended to create an unprincipled legal system that was made to endorse a very wide range of individualized and even idiosyncratic preferences.

The Example of the Ḥudūd Punishments

The invocation of public interests as a way of creating legal exceptions became a rather visible issue in modern times because of the nature and role of the so-called Qurʾanic law, which is supposed to be a part of the immutable Shariʿah. Qurʾanic laws or the special class of specific ethical commandments, although a small and narrow part of the legal system, are of considerable symbolic significance. This particular set of laws includes a group of criminal sanctions that are known as the ḥudūd punishments. Underscoring the significance of the ḥudūd punishments is the fact that most of these laws implicate the mixed rights of God and human beings ( ḥuqūq mukhtalaṭa ).

The so-called ḥudūd punishments—which include lashing, stoning to death, and the severing of hands—are the most controversial aspect of Shariʿah law in the modern age. For many Muslims, they have become the indisputable proof of the unique identity of the Islamic legal system and also the symbol for Muslim cultural and political autonomy. For many non-Muslims, however, ḥudūd punishments are considered medieval, draconian, and barbaric. Furthermore, many non-Muslim and Muslim scholars and writers, who are poorly informed about Islamic jurisprudence, treat these laws as if they are the very heart and core of the Islamic legal system. Consequently, many have come to the rather inescapable conclusion that Shariʿah law is fundamentally incompatible with modern conceptions of human rights.

There is no question that most medieval Muslim jurists considered the ḥudūd punishments to be part of the immutable and eternal Shariʿah and, therefore, they rendered the ḥudūd punishments not subject to change, modification, or abrogation. Whether intentionally or not, most medieval Muslim jurists created the impression that it is not possible to implement Shariʿah law without enforcing the ḥudūd punishments and that, in general, the ḥudūd are integral to the Islamic legal system. Interestingly, however, ḥudūd punishments were hardly ever implemented in Islamic legal history, for the most part because Muslim jurists made the evidentiary requirements and the technical pre-conditions for the enforcement of the ḥudūd practically impossible to fulfill or because they admitted so many mitigating factors to the point that only a criminal who was most determined to be punished could be made to suffer the ḥudūd penalties. (See Rabb 2015 ; idem 2010 ; idem 2011 .)

Whether the so-called ḥudūd crimes ought to be considered an immutable and permanent part of Shariʿah warrants rethinking. I think it is erroneous to treat the ḥudūd punishments as part of the ideology of Shariʿah, and thus aspirational and necessarily desirable. As mentioned earlier, generally, the Shariʿah embodies the characteristics and attributes of Divinity, which consist of general ethical and moral teachings. However, Muslim jurists treated specific laws, which are explicitly commanded by God, to be a part of the eternal Shariʿah as if these laws are in and of themselves ethical precepts that by their nature are not subject to contingency, context, or temporal variations. Dealing with the ḥudūd , Muslim jurists focused on the punishments and not on the behavior or conduct that warranted the penalties. In doing so, they erroneously rendered some of the punitive measures mentioned in the Qurʾan and Prophetic traditions sacrosanct and eternal. But there is no plausible reason to believe that the attributes or characteristics of Divinity or that the ethical precepts of Islam are embedded in specific punishments—whatever these punishments may be. If the Divine Will was to safeguard the ḥudūd punishments, either as embodying the attributes and characteristics of God or essential ethical and moral values, it would be incongruous for such punishments to be contingent, contextual, or subject to mitigation.

In my view, the classical approach, which tended to sanctify particular punitive measures and treat them as if part of the immutable and eternal Shariʿah, is quite unfortunate. What ought to be considered immutable and eternal are the ethical values that the punitive measures were intended to safeguard and not the punitive measures themselves. The severity of the punishments mentioned in the sources is an indication of the importance of a particular value to the Shariʿah. Therefore, the punishments prescribed for fornication or stealing are powerful indicators of the value that the Shariʿah places on chastity and on not stealing. The punishments themselves, however, are contextual—they depend on a variety of factors such as mitigation; evidentiary certitude; the intent and purpose of the individual perpetrator; the reliability and accountability of the judicial system at a particular time and place; community standards; sociologically dependent and shifting notions of cruelty, barbarity and mercy; and the possible deterrence value of such punishments within the context of a certain age and place.

As already noted, the classical jurists were keenly aware that to the extent possible, an Islamic judicial system ought to avoid applying the ḥudūd punishments. In fact, in a well-known set of traditions, the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have taught that in criminal matters, any doubt must be construed in the light most favorable to a defendant. Moreover, in the case of ḥudūd , the Prophet instructed that Muslims ought to seek out the shadows of doubt in order to avoid having to inflict a ḥadd (singular of ḥudūd ) punishment against a defendant. According to the Prophet, if a person knows that someone has committed a ḥadd crime, it is better to help the criminal repent than to expose the criminal by turning him in to the authorities. Furthermore, bringing ḥadd charges against a suspect that the accuser is ultimately unable to prove might in some circumstances subject the accuser to punishment, and sneaking and spying is not a valid way of proving a ḥadd crime. 9

This principled recalcitrance and the various safeguards against a wide application of the ḥudūd are a clear indication that the ḥudūd punishments themselves do not embody an ethical or moral value. The value is in the unethical and immoral behavior that the ḥudūd are intended to deter. Therefore, for instance, it is the ban against the consumption of alcohol that is immutable and eternal and a part of the Shariʿah, and not the punitive measure prescribed in the text for the commission of such an offense. I do realize that accepting this argument would constitute nothing short of a radical paradigm shift in the way that Muslims think about the so-called ḥudūd punishments. Nevertheless, I believe that this paradigm shift is critically important for the internal coherence of the Shariʿah system. It is reasonable to deal with the ethical and moral values of the Shariʿah as immutable, eternal, and absolute, but the positive and context-based laws are temporal and changeable.

The Pursuit of the Truth of Divinity

Beyond ethical and moral principles and the specific set of laws that inherently embody an ethical or moral principle, there is an archetypal sense to Shariʿah law. Shariʿah is the Divine law as it exists in God’s Mind, known with thoroughness and perfection only to God. The Shariʿah is Divine because it emanates from God and it exists only through God. Any human legal system sets in motion certain potentialities—a potential, for instance, for achieving justice, equity, fairness, security, safety, and stability—but the ability of a legal system to pursue, leave alone achieve, any of these potentials is highly contingent.

The pursuits of a legal system are dependent on a set of complex socio-political and economic conditions as well as the sincerity, knowledge, intelligence, and diligence of the typically large number of human beings who grease and turn the wheels of a legal system. The Shariʿah, however, is not only a possibility or potential; it is the fully realized and fulfilled just order possible only from and through God. The Shariʿah is Divine only because it is not contingent on the human element, but it is a utopian reality existing only in the realm of the Divine. Shariʿah in its true sense is Divine verity—a utopian inspiration and the perfected ideal. Like the achievement of immaculate justice and consummate ethical existence, these are aspirations and ideals that are unattainable and unachievable, but the fact that they are impossible to realize should not in any sense dissuade human beings from pursuing them as ideals. Similarly, Shariʿah is but an inspirational ideal that gives purpose and meaning to the lives of those who traverse in the path to and from God.

As God’s viceroys entrusted with the preservation and caretaking of God’s earth ( khulafāʾ fi al-arḍ ), human beings have been commanded not to corrupt the earth, to strive to follow the Divine path, and to act as witnesses on God’s behalf by calling for what is moral and good and by resisting what is immoral and depraved ( al-amr bi-ʾl-maʿrūf wa-ʾl-nahy ʿan al-munkar ): “You are the best nation created [as an example] for mankind. You command what is good and forbid what is evil and believe in God.” (Qurʾan 3:110.) The obligation to command the good and forbid the evil is fundamental to honoring God’s trust and covenant with human beings as God’s viceroys and agents on the earth. 10

The elements of the Divine covenant or trust also identify the nature of the obligation owed by Muslims towards the Shariʿah. In order to discharge God’s covenant or trust, human beings are commanded to engage in a process—the process mandates that there be a conscientious and diligent search or investigation for what is good and what is bad, and then engaging in the process of teaching, counseling, and enforcing. If Muslims had unobstructed and total access to God and God’s knowledge, there would be no need to engage in the process of searching because the good and evil would become fully transparent. As Muslim jurists have emphasized, although God is the perfect embodiment of goodness and the exact antithesis of all that is evil, human beings do not have access to God’s knowledge; the most that human beings can claim on any specific problem, after a conscientious and diligent search, is a probability of belief that they have succeeded in finding the truth ( ghalabat al-ẓann ). (Juwaynī 1987, 50–51. Also, see Abou El Fadl 2001 , 145–49.) Hence, human knowledge cannot be equated with the truth of Divinity, but the very process of searching is morally praiseworthy, and an ethical imperative, even if human beings are capable only of approximating and coming close to the truth. Moreover, human beings may attain parts of the truth, but they can never embody the whole truth of Shariʿah. In my view, if a government, group, or people arrogantly claim that they are capable of representing the Divine Truth or Will, then they have committed a grievous moral offense by associating partners with God ( shirk ).

Qurʾanic Ethical Imperatives in the Age of Cosmopolitanism

As noted above, the Qurʾan recognizes certain ethical principles as universally applicable and pertinent. (Hourani 1985 ). The Qurʾan states, for instance: “And God does not desire for human beings to suffer injustice.” (Qurʾan 3:108.) Indeed, the Qurʾan often upholds moral universals in an unequivocal and imperative fashion. So, for instance, the Qurʾan asserts: “O you who believe, be persistent and stand firm in justice, bearing witness for God, even if it be against yourselves or your parents or your close ones. Whether rich or poor, God is their sustainer. Refrain from following your whims and desires lest you fail to be just, for if you fail to uphold justice, God is fully aware of what you do.” (Qurʾan 4:135.) 11 On the basis of this and other similar Qurʾanic articulations, it is reasonable to conclude that, from an Islamic perspective, Muslims are encouraged to search for moral universals that could serve as shared and common goals with humanity at large. (See my essays in Abou El Fadl et al. 2002 ). Moreover, this seems to me to be an essential characteristic of a universal religion that is addressed to humanity at large, and not to an exclusive cultural, social, or ethnic group. The Qurʾan insists that it is the bearer of a message to all humankind and not to a particular tribe or race. (Qurʾan 38:87.) Moreover, the Qurʾan asserts that the Prophet Muhammad, and in fact the Qurʾan itself, was sent to all peoples as a blessing and mercy. (Qurʾan 7:52, 203; 17:82; 21:107.) The Qurʾan also persistently emphasizes the ethical quality of mercy as a core attribute of God and as a fundamental and basic pursuit of Islam. (Qurʾan 12:111.) The Qurʾan informs human beings that God has decreed and mandated mercy even upon God’s self, and therefore, is bound to extend it to human beings. In the Qurʾanic discourse, mercy and peace are inextricably linked—peace is a Divine mercy, and mercy is the bliss of peace. To comprehend and internalize God’s mercy is to be in a blissful state of peace. (For instance, see Qurʾan 6:54; 27:77; 29:51; 45:20.) This is at the very essence of the state of Divine beatification and of being filled with the goodness of the Divine, and having this quality manifest outwardly in everything a person does is known as iḥsān. Taʿāruf (knowing the other) and taʾāluf (amicability between people) is a great gift of Divine mercy that leads to the grace of enjoying peace. But knowledge of the other is not possible without the grace of iḥsān , which calls upon people to approach one another, not just with mercy and sympathy, but with empathy and compassion. This has become all the more critical in an age in which advances in communications has united the consciousness of human beings into an ever more shared epistemological awareness. It is as if the urbanized populations of the world, regardless of their cultural and historical particularities, have been forced into a porous epistemological consciousness in which different societies cannot avoid gazing upon one another. In such a world, Islamic law cannot afford to be interpreted on the basis of legal rulings and precedents of the past alone. Rather, Islamic law must be reconstructed on the basis of the moral momentum of the Qurʾan, or in other words, the ethical trajectories and potentialities set in motion by the Qurʾan.

In my view, the Qurʾanic moral momentum has always manifested itself by limiting abusive conditions. The prevalent logic of the Qurʾan is that people ought to strive and struggle to obtain God’s blessings, but God’s blessings are not limited to rewards in the Hereafter alone. God’s blessings include social progress, more rights and entitlements to human beings, and a fuller expression of beauty in the social institutions and laws that govern people. Although God’s blessings are not normally thought of in this way, the reality is that the Qurʾan consistently speaks about socially advantageous conditions, such as peace, tranquility and safety, a secure homeland, adequate shelter, financial success, thriving commerce, and lack of oppression, as blessings from God that are contingent on the efforts of human beings. Importantly, however, the enjoyment of socially advantageous conditions cannot be based on coercive dynamics. In fact, coercive dynamics are often portrayed in the Qurʾan as leading to oppression and to the corruption of the earth. The Qurʾan teaches that calling to the path of the Lord should be done with wisdom and a beautiful demeanor, and that one should reason with people in a gracious fashion. “For your Lord knows who strays from the path, and God knows those who are rightly guided.” (Qurʾan 16:125.) It is contrary to the prerequisites of goodness to coerce people to be good or beautiful. Rather, there is no alternative to seeking what might be called an overlapping consensus according to which, through advocacy and persuasion, Muslims are convinced to move closer to conditions of goodness and beauty by pursuing the moral and ethical lessons taught by God.

Reading Islamic texts, especially the Qurʾan, in order to derive moral and ethical lessons requires a major epistemological shift in understanding the way that God affirms a moral and ethical principle and then illustrates the lesson by responding to and treating abusive situations. Especially among modern Muslims, the Qurʾanic methodology in dealing with what it calls situations of istiḍʿāf (oppression by rendering the other weak and dependent) has been a largely neglected field of study. In fact, one way of understanding Qurʾanic moral and ethical trajectories, and also understanding the dynamics of the Qurʾan in dealing with the establishment of foundational rights as well as derivative and contingent rights, is by analyzing the Qurʾanic efforts to put an end to situations of istiḍʿāf within the historical context of early Islam. Put simply, istiḍʿāf is the existence of social conditions that made certain groups or classes of people weak and dependent in relation to others. Because of this relationship of istiḍʿāf , the ideal of submission to God is rendered more difficult due to the fact that people in this condition find themselves vulnerable to the demands and whimsies of others. In effect, the weak and dependent are rendered submissive to other human beings, and because of this, their submission to God is compromised by their powerlessness before other human beings.

Interestingly, the idea of istiḍʿāf is not purely physical or material, but it also has a psychological component. The mustaḍʿafun (the victims of istiḍʿāf ) are not just materially weak and dependent, but are also seen as such by their oppressors. In other words, whatever the material conditions that make such a people objectively weak and dependent, they are also seen as subservient and inferior and are treated with a distinct sense of arrogance on the part of those who have power over them. Significantly, if those who find themselves in a condition of istiḍʿāf fail to take action to change their condition, the Qurʾan holds them blameworthy by describing them as unjust to themselves. (Qurʾan 4:97–98). If people meekly accept istiḍʿāf and do not actively attempt to challenge their condition and alter it, they are suborning injustice by allowing it to exist.

Two points follow from the Qurʾanic discourse on istiḍʿāf . First, Qurʾanic reforms were often intended to end conditions of istiḍʿāf and to break the moral arrogance that pervaded these relationships. This meant that the reforms introduced by the Qurʾan were proportional with the need to put an end to conditions of istiḍʿāf , and to alter prevalent attitudes of moral arrogance that existed within the Qurʾanic context. But this also means that under a different set of circumstances, further reforms will be needed to deal with different forms of istiḍʿāf prevalent at a particular time, and that further measures are mandated to challenge new forms of moral arrogance. Second, the connection between istiḍʿāf and moral arrogance is yet another reason that the Qurʾan expects people to strive towards attaining more rights consistent with the foundational rights recognized by God. Furthermore, if people help themselves and God reciprocates their efforts by putting an end to a situation of istiḍʿāf , they have walked in God’s path and they also have earned God’s blessings. The victims of istiḍʿāf need to become empowered not just materially, but emotionally and psychologically as well, and by articulating and pursuing their ethical demands, they need to challenge and deconstruct socially engrained moral arrogance. Perhaps most importantly, Muslims have not yet explored the full implications of the notion that by accepting oppressive situations, acquiescing in relationships of weakness and dependency, and by failing to demand justice, in the sense of a proportional and reciprocal relationship between rights and duties, they are deviating from the Divine Path and committing an offense against themselves. One of the persistent ethical themes of the Qurʾan and Sunna is the treatment of empowering the powerless as a social virtue ( nuṣrat al-mustaḍʿafīn or raf ʿal-qahr ʿan al-mustaḍʿafīn ). In fact, in my opinion, if one would be interested in developing a comprehensive and systematic theory of Islamic justice, such a theory would have to be constructed around the principle of protecting the least privileged. The Islamic tradition is replete with narratives attributed to the Prophet or one of the companions asserting that the rights recognized by the collectivity must be measured in accordance with the needs of the weakest or least privileged in the community.

Shariʿah and the Caliphate of Godliness

Of essence to the very concept of Shariʿah, as an inspiration and also as an aspiration, is to honor and celebrate human beings. Humans are honored and celebrated because they are God-like, capable of doing God-like things. 12 Many narratives in the Islamic tradition emphasize that God created humans in beauty, and that this is sufficient to obligate human beings to act beautifully—to make their external beauty, as bearers of God’s proverbial image, reflective of their inner beauty. (See al-Ghazālī 2010, 3:54). In the Qurʾanic parable of creation mentioned earlier, God is said to have offered the trust ( al-amāna ) to all of creation, but ultimately it was shouldered only by human beings. The Qurʾan then somberly notes that bearing this trust is such an onerous and arduous task. (Qurʾan 33:72) I believe that this weighty trust for which human beings were honored and dignified is the marvel of divinity itself. Human beings are but nuances of the Divine—inexhaustible anecdotes of divinity capable of creating such immeasurable acts of true beauty. 13 As human beings invent and create beauty they move towards the majestic caliphate of Godliness. When human beings no longer seek or create beauty, forget their bonds to the ethereal and sublime, and slump into indolence and despair, human beings drift further away from Godliness into its antithesis. God is the light of the heavens and earth—light upon light! (Qurʾan 24:35). In every act of beauty—in every nuance that commemorates the truth of our Divine nature, and memorializes the caliphate of humanity in the world, we move closer to the Divine light. But in remaining static—in existing without beautification or in false beautification, or in subsisting without service born out of love, mercy, and compassion—i.e. without the attributes and nuances of Divinity—we no longer move towards the light, and in fact, drift from the possibility of Godliness to the darkness of godlessness. 14

Shariʿah should be understood strictly as the equivalent to the virtues of Godliness as the higher ideals of society and humanity at large. When the Qurʾan states, for instance: “Do good for God loves those who do good” (Qurʾan 2:195; 3:134), it uses the plural command form of “ yā aḥsinū ” or all of you people, do “ iḥsān ”—a command form to do acts of beauty (or acts of ḥusn or iḥsān ). In this, the Qurʾan has provided a textual grounding for the rational and natural moral imperative of acting to achieve goodness.

The attributes of God acknowledge the characteristics of goodness, but we human beings are the trustees on this earth and so we, without limitations, possibilities, and potentialities, define the epistemologies and deontological implications of these attributes. So, for instance, I know as a Muslim that among God’s attributes are mercy, compassion, justice, forgiveness, and so on. Furthermore, reason and revelation impose these attributes as obligations in a variety of circumstances, some of which will require that I reflect upon the necessity of balance and proportionality in the application of these attributes. It is the balance and just proportionality that will ultimately allow me to reflect on good character. The perpetual process is to reaffirm goodness, but aspire towards Godliness. If Shariʿah is understood properly, it will not only allow us to empower ourselves with rational morality, but also continue to be inspired and moved by the promise of Divine Beauty. Understanding Shariʿah as a set of natural virtues, and adopting it as a normative guide, represents an affirmation of moral character and identity of a people, the continuity of the Islamic heritage and tradition, and a renewed search for common grounds with humanity at large, which shares the responsibility for the well-being and flourishing of the earth as the collective inheritance of humanity. 15 As Muslims, we adopt principles based on Divine teachings for the simple reason that we affirm the principle that we need God’s grace, and we find dignity in submitting to the Divine guidance. Moreover, in principle, we want to affirm the duality of anchoring our aspirations upon the eschatology of God’s laws, and upon the collective guidance of accumulations of human wisdom. 16

Moral absolutes or universals, like Divinity, are the compass and guiding lights of Shariʿah. The Qurʾan affirms the objective validity of moral and ethical principles as virtues inseparable from goodness, beauty, and Divinity itself. What are known as Qurʾanic laws or rulings are illustrative examples of the pursuit of moral absolutes within the bounds of moderation or reasonableness. What is moderate or reasonable is not defined by law but by contextual relationships of reciprocity and proportionality, epistemological consciousness, and social and cultural processes. Inspired by the Qurʾanic message, earlier generations of jurists created a complex system of interpretations, rulings, and adjudications that we now identify as Islamic law. In doing so, many Muslim jurists sought to fulfill the ethical teachings of God’s revelation (or akhlāq ), but they did so within the bounds of their epistemological understandings and what they considered to be reasonable within the parameters of their circumstances. But the rulings or laws that were deduced by the earlier generations of jurists cannot be seen as the embodiment or as the full articulation of the moral and ethical teachings of the Qurʾan. Doing so would undermine and exhaust the moral and ethical potential of the Divine message. The very nature of the sacred trust of viceroyship that has been given to human beings to bear obligates Muslims to reengage and reconstruct the Islamic legal tradition on a foundation of the epistemological understandings of their contemporaneous moment and within the ever-evolving confines of reasonableness.

1 There is also a famous saying of the Prophet that states: “I was sent to perfect the ethical character of human beings.” See Mālik b. Anas 1985 , 904–5; Ibn Abī al-Dunyā 1990, 21.

2 The report’s terminology is ahsanukum akhlāqan more literally meaning: of the highest or most beautiful ethical character. In a hadith, the Prophet is reported to have said: “I have been sent to perfect the nobility of character.” Another report states: “The best of deeds after faith in God ( īmān ) is benevolent love towards people.” See Chourief 2011 , 1–2, 10. For many Prophetic reports on the centrality of ethics, see al-Ghazālī 2010, 3:48–51.

3 On the treatment of ethics in the Qurʾan and early Sunna, see al-Attar, 2010 , 11–25. Syed Ameer Ali did a very good job in collecting and analyzing some of the authorial enterprises of oral traditions attributed to the Prophet on the question of the central ethics of early Islam, see Ali 1893 , 1–51.

4 Classical jurists discussed the nexus between law and morality most typically in works of uṣūl al-fiqh (jurisprudential theory) under the subheading of ḥusn and qubḥ (goodness and ugliness). However, as is often the case with debates on legal philosophy and the nature of law, the primary concern for classical jurists was to preserve and maintain the integrity and legitimacy of the legal process. This meant that more often than not classical jurists opted to defend the integrity of the legal process over other competing substantive concerns. Effectively, this meant that classical jurists upheld the instrumentalities of procedural justice as the main concern of the law instead of abstract concepts of substantive justice. On the debates between the mukhaṭṭiʾa and the muṣawwiba , see Abou El Fadl 2001 , 148–51.

5 Throughout this essay, I refer to the attributes or qualities of Divinity. This should not be confused with the dogma of the so-called ninety-nine names of God. The authenticity of the ninety-nine names traditions leave alone the relationship of the ninety-nine names to Godliness (or rabbāniyyah ) is beyond the scope of this essay.

6 The jurist Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1350) asserted that the ethics of goodness ( khuluq ) is embodied in the values of justice, wisdom, welfare, and truthfulness, see Ḥilmī 1986, 198.

7 al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 1973, 59. On Godliness and virtue see Maḥmūd 1989 , 229.

8 Among the themes emphasized by the author is that the genuine intellect and true rationality would mandate the love of virtues and abhorrence of its opposite.

9 See Qurʾan 49:12 which prohibits spying on people (“O you who believe, avoid assumption [ āmanū ʿjtanibū kathīran min al-ẓann ]. Indeed, some assumption is sin. And do not spy or backbite each other [ wa-lā tajassasū wa-la yaghtab ]”) and Qurʾan 24:27 which prohibits entry into another person’s home without the owner’s permission. There is an often quoted tradition about ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (the second caliph) entering a man’s house without permission because he heard singing in the home. When ʿUmar entered the house by climbing over the wall, he found the man in the company of women. The man in the house told ʿUmar: “O Commander of the Faithful, do not make haste. If I have disobeyed God once, you have disobeyed [God] three times. God has said: ‘Do not spy,’ and you have spied; God has said: ‘It is not righteous to enter homes from the back’, and you have climbed over my wall; and God has said: ‘Do not enter houses other than yours’, and you have entered my home without my permission …” Then ʿUmar forgave him and left.” See al-Ghazālī 2010, 2:325. Also, see Rabb 2015 , 108; idem 2010 , 63–65, 81–83, 101–08.

10 See my discussion on this in Abou El Fadl 2014a , 391–414, esp. 411–14. For a study on the obligation to command the good and forbid the evil in the Islamic tradition, see Cook 2000.

11 Qurʾan 5:8 states, “O you who believe, be steadfast in your devotion to God, and bear witness justly. Do not allow your hatred towards others to lead you astray from justice. Adhere to justice for that is closer to piety, and be ever mindful of God for God is always aware of all that you do.” Another verse and incident illustrating a similar moral point involves revelation 80:1. The Prophet was meeting with the notables of Mecca when he was approached by a poor and blind man (reportedly, named Ibn Umm Maktūm) with inquiries about Islam. Eager to persuade the unbelieving noblemen, the Prophet turned away from the poor blind man. Thereupon, chapter 80 was revealed reproaching the Prophet for favoring the noblemen over a lowly member of society. See al-Zāyid n.d., 1:449–50.

12 According to the hadith tradition, Adam was reportedly created in God’s image. For a discussion of the topic, see Melchert 2011 . Although, I have serious reservations about the author’s arguments.

13 See the commentary on the reported narrative stating: “God is beautiful and loves beauty!” Chourief 2011 , 188–89.

14 Al-Ghazālī 2010, 3:54 argues that the perfection of ethics elevates one towards the example of the Prophet and towards Godliness. The lack of ethics draws one closer to darkness and the demonic.

15 On the promising relationship of virtue ethics theory to natural law theory see Martin 2008 . On virtue and natural goodness, see Foot 2001 , 81–82; Adams 2006 ; Annas 2011 .

16 See the interesting discussion, Mouw 1990 , 6–42. Also, see Evans 2013 ; Ritchie 2012 ; Setiya 2012 ; Murphy 2011 .

Bibliography

Abou El Fadl Khaled , Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women , ( Oneworld Publications , Oxford 2001 ).

Search Google Scholar
Export Citation

Abou El Fadl Khaled , Reasoning With God: Reclaiming Shariʿah in the Modern Age , ( Rowman & Littlefield , Lanham, MD 2014a ).

Abou El Fadl Khaled , ' “When Happiness Fails: An Islamic Perspective” ' ( 2014b ) 29 Journal of Law and Religion : 109 - 123 .

Khaled Abou El Fadl , Joshua Cohen & Ian Lague (eds) , The Place of Tolerance in Islam , ( Beacon Press , Boston, MA 2002 ).

Adams Robert Merrihew , A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good , ( Clarendon Press , Oxford 2006 ).

Ali Syed Ameer , The Ethics of Islam , ( Thacker Spink Co , Calcutta 1893 ).

Annas Julia , Intelligent Virtue , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2011 ).

Attar Mariam al- , Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought , ( Routledge , New York 2010 ).

Basṭī Abū Ḥātim b. Hibban al- , Rawḍat al-ʿuqalāʾ wa-nuzhat al-fuḍalāʾ , ( al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya , Beirut 2004 ).

Chourief Tayeb , Fatima Jane Casewit (ed) Edin Q. Lohja (ed) , Spiritual Teachings of the Prophet: Hadith with Commentaries by Saints and Sages of Islam , ( Fons Vitae , Louisville, KY 2011 ).

Dārimī ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān , Kitāb al-Musnad al-jāmiʿ , ( Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya , Beirut 2013 ).

Evans C. Stephen , God & Moral Obligation , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2013 ).

Foot Philippa , Natural Goodness , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2001 ).

Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al- , Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn , ( Dar al-Maʿrifa , Beirut 2010 ).

Ḥanafī Ḥasan , Min al-ʿaqīda ilā al-thawra , ( Maktabat Madbūlī , Cairo 1988 ).

Ḥilmī Muṣṭafā , al-Akhlāq bayna al-falāsifa wa-ḥukamāʾ al-islām , ( Dār al-Thaqāfah al-ʿArabiyya , Cairo 1986 ).

Hourani George F. , Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics , ( Cambridge University Press , Cambridge 1985 ).

Ibn Abī al-Dunyā ʿAbd Allah b. Muḥammad , Makarim al-Akhlaq , ( Maktabat al-Qurʾān , Cairo 1990 ).

ʿImāra Muḥammad , Al-Islāam wa-al-thawra , ( al-Muʾassasa al-ʿArabiyya li-al-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr , Bayrūt 1972 ).

Juwayni Abu Yusuf al- , Kitāb al-Ijtihād min Kitāb al-Talkhīṣ , ( Dār al-Qalam , Damascus 1987 ).

Khatib al-Tabrizi Muhammad b. ʿAbd Allah al- , Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ , ( al-Maktab al-Islāmī , Beirut 1979 ).

Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm , al-Tafkir al-falsafī fī al-islām , ( Dār al-Maʾārif , Cairo 1989 ).

Mālik b. Anas , Al-Muwaṭṭa.ʾ , ( Muṣṭafa al-Bābī al-Halabī , Cairo 1985 ).

Martin Christopher , ' “The Relativity of Goodness: A Prolegomenon to a Rapprochement between Virtue Ethics and Natural Law Theory” ', in Ana Marta Gonzalez (ed) , Contemporary Perspectives on Natural Law , ( Ashgate Publishers , Surrey, UK 2008 ) 187 - 209 .

Melchert Christopher , ' “God Created Adam in His Image” ' ( 2011 ) 13 Journal of Qurʾanic Studies : 113 - 124 .

Mouw Richard J. , The God Who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics , ( Notre Dame University Press , Notre Dame, IN 1990 ).

Murphy Mark C. , God & Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2011 ).

Quṭb Muḥammad , Jāhiliyyat al-qarn al-ʿishrīn , ( Dār al-Shurūq , Cairo 1980 ).

Rabb Intisar A. , ' “Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: Ḥudūd Avoidance in Cases of Doubt” ' ( 2010 ) 17 Islamic Law and Society : 63 - 125 .

Rabb Intisar A. , ' “The Islamic Rule of Lenity: Judicial Discretion and Legal Canons” ' ( 2011 ) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law : 1316 - 1351 .

Rabb Intisar A. , Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law , ( Cambridge University Press , New York 2015 ).

Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī al-Ḥusayn b. Mufaḍḍal al- , Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿd (ed) , al-Dharīʿa ilā makārim al-sharīʿa , ( Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyya , Cairo 1973 ).

Rahman Fazlur , Major Themes of the Qurʾan , ( University of Chicago Press , Chicago 2009 ).

Ritchie Angus , From Morality to Metaphysics: The Theistic Implications of our Ethical Commitments , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2012 ).

Sachedina Abdulaziz Abdulhussein , The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2001 ).

Sachedina Abdulaziz Abdulhussein , Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2009 ).

Setiya Kieran , Knowing Right from Wrong , ( Oxford University Press , Oxford 2012 ).

Sharqāwī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān , ʿAlī, imām al-muttaqīn , ( Maktabat Gharīb , Cairo 1985 ).

Shīrāzī Muḥammad b Mahdī al-Ḥusaynī al- , ' Al-ʿAdāla al-islāmiyya ' ( 1959 ) No place. .

Tūnjī ʿAbd al-Salām , Muʾassasat al-ʿadāla fī al-sharīʿa al-islāmiyya , ( Kulliyyat al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyya , Tripoli, Libya 1993 ).

Zāyid Samīra al- , ( N.d. ) al-Jāmiʿ fī al-Sīra al-nabawiyya No place. .

Al-Ghazālī 2010 , 3:54 argues that the perfection of ethics elevates one towards the example of the Prophet and towards Godliness. The lack of ethics draws one closer to darkness and the demonic.

See the interesting discussion, Mouw 1990 , 6–42 . Also, see Evans 2013; Ritchie 2012; Setiya 2012; Murphy 2011.

	All Time	Past Year	Past 30 Days
Abstract Views	34	0	0
Full Text Views	19470	3108	143
PDF Views & Downloads	20078	3401	137

Content Metrics

Reference Works

Primary source collections

COVID-19 Collection

How to publish with Brill

Open Access Content

Contact & Info

Sales contacts

Publishing contacts

Stay Updated

Newsletters

Social Media Overview

Terms and Conditions

Privacy Statement

Cookie Settings

Accessibility

Legal Notice

[185.80.150.64]
185.80.150.64

Character limit 500 /500

Back to Course Catalog

Fall 2022 • Seminar

Introduction to Islamic Law

Prerequisites: None

Exam Type: No Exam

This course will survey core concepts in Islamic law ( sharia ) in historical and comparative modern contexts. Popular perceptions of this legal system imagine it to be a static code from 7th-century Arabia. By contrast, we explore aspects of Islamic law and society, as a dynamic system, that uncover rich debates about cases historically alongside processes of “legislation” and interpretation analogous to our own. We also explore the substantive rulings and institutional structures that substantially diverge from our own. Those laws and structures evolved over time, with notable changes accompanying the breakup of the Islamic empire in the 10th and 12th centuries, colonial interventions in the 18th and 19th centuries, and independence movements in the 20th and 21st centuries. How and why did Muslim jurists, judges, and political leaders define or operate within the grammar of Islamic law? Did the law impose religious-moral values or reflect cultural and socially constructed ones? What explains the recent appeal of shari’a in the last few decades and how might we understand Islamic law in our times? This course will equip students with tools to examine these questions in the course of conversations about key subjects of Islamic law and methods of interpretation. This term, we will also experiment with data science approaches to both. Students must complete one presentaton and one short paper (10pp); they may opt for a long paper (15pp) and/or data science project with two short writing assignments for an additional credit.* Students need not have prior knowledge of Islamic law.

* The additional credit options allow students to conduct in-depth research on a single issue of Islamic law or legal theory using primary sources -cases, legislation, manuals of legal theory, etc. (in English or any other language with which students are familiar), together with new data science tools in connection with the SHARIAsource Lab. This Lab allows students to workshop papers, receive feedback on their works-in-progress, and the opportunity to publish short papers as posts on the Islamic Law Blog.

Note: This course is cross-listed with the History department (History 2538) at FAS.

Islamic Law

Encyclopedias, dictionaries, a note about translations, the sources, hadith collections, al-jami' al-kabir li-kutub al-turath (digital book collection), a note about books and catalogues, bibliographies, introductory books in english, introductory books in arabic, related books in the harvard libraries, subject-specific and multidisciplinary indexes for articles, topical journals, legal indexes for journal articles and books (multiple jurisdictions), a note about the sources highlighted, regional sources, saudi arabia, muslim law systems, fatawa - religious rulings, islamic law collections and islamic legal studies programs, subject guide, contact us, introductory sources.

The sources recommended in this guide are only a sample of what's available in our collection on Islamic law. If you don't see what you need, contact us using the information to the left! We are available for quick questions or for private research consultation by appointment.

The Encyclopaedia of Islam Available in print and electronic formats with three editions dating back to 1913.
Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an Encyclopedia covering all aspects of the Qur’an including qur’anic terms, concepts, personalities, place names, cultural history and exegesis as well as essays on important themes and subjects within qur’anic studies. more... less... English language encyclopedia covering all aspects of the Qur’ān including qur’ānic terms, concepts, personalities, place names, cultural history and exegesis as well as essays on important themes and subjects within qur’ānic studies. This site also includes 62 Early Printed Western Qur’āns Online and the Electronic Qur’ān. Concordance.
Encyclopaedia of Islam editor-in-chief, M. Mukarram Ahmed
Encyclopaedia of Islamic law and jurisprudence Multi-volume set: v. 1. Basic aspects of Islamic law; v. 2. Dimensions of Islamic law; v. 3. Islamic law and society; v. 4. Islamic law and family; v. 5. Islamic law and marriage; v. 6. Islamic law and divorce; v. 7. Islamic law and security; v. 8. Islamic law and criminology; v. 9. Jurisprudence under Islamic law; v. 10. Islamic law and endowment; v. 11. Islamic law and human rights
Encyclopaedia of Islamic law v. 1. Concepts of Islamic law; v. 2. Foundations of Islamic law; v. 3. Islamic law in practice; v. 4. Civil law in Islam; v. 5. Family law in Islam; v. 6. Law of marriage and divorce in Islam; v. 7. Law of Waqf in Islam; v. 8. Criminal law in Islam; v. 9. Jurisprudence in Islam; v. 10. Law of governance in Islam
Encyclopedia of Islamic law: a compendium of the views of the major schools Based on two main Arabic sources: al-Fiqh alal madhdhab al-arbaah and al-Fiqh alal madhdhab al-khamsa
Oxford Islamic Studies Online This authoritative, dynamic resource brings together the best current scholarship in the field for students, scholars, government officials, community groups, and librarians to foster a more accurate and informed understanding of the Islamic world. Oxford Islamic Studies Online features reference content and commentary by renowned scholars in areas such as global Islamic history, concepts, people, practices, politics, and culture, and is regularly updated as new content is commissioned and approved. more... less... Oxford Islamic Studies Online features articles, biographies, primary texts, Qur'anic materials, and books by scholars in areas such as global Islamic history, concepts, people, practices, politics, and culture. Articles come from The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, The Islamic World: Past and Present, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, The Oxford History of Islam, and What Everyone Needs To Know About Islam. The Koran Interpreted (a verse translation by A.J. Arberry) and The Qur'an (a prose translation by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem) are included, as is the first electronic version of Hanna E. Kassis's A Concordance of the Qur'an.

Restricted Access: HarvardKey or Harvard ID and PIN required

A dictionary of Islam by Thomas Patrick Hughes
Qāmūs al-muṣṭalaḥāt al-dīnīyah = Dictionary of religious terms / ʻIzz al-Dīn Muḥammad Najīb
"Hukukı islâmiyye ve ıstılahatı fıkhiyye" kamusu / Ömer Nasûhi Bilmen In Turkish, with some Arabic text.
Muʻjam muṣṭalaḥāt alfāẓ al-fiqh al-Islāmī / Sāʼir Baṣmahʹjī
Farhang-i vāzhagān va iṣṭilāḥāt-i Islāmī / Parvīz Āzhīdah Persian and English.
Muʻjam al-muṣṭalaḥāt al-fiqhīyah / taʾlīf Ibrāhīm Ismāʻīl al-Shahrakānī
Farhang-i fiqh : muṭābiq-i maẕhab-i ahl-i bayt, ʻalayhim al-salām / taḥqīq va taʼlīf Mūʾassasah-i Dāʻirat al-Maʻārif-i Fiqh-i Islāmī ; zīr-i naẓar-i Maḥmūd Hāshimī Shāhrūdī

Primary Sources - Qur'an and Hadith

There are many authoritative translations in other languages available in our collection. Please consult the reference staff if you have a specific title or would like to inquire about translations in another language.

The sources of Islamic Law are the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the traditions of the Prophet). Most of these texts have been digitized in various translations and are available on the web.

In addition to the web collections below, the Harvard University Libraries hold tremendous collections on the sources--in Arabic and English as well as Western European Languages. Please consult HOLLIS or a reference librarian for further assistance.

The Noble Qur'an Translations of the Qur'an.
Al-Tafsir.com Translations of the Holy Qur’an in various languages. Please note that not all of the following translations are authentic.
The Holy Qur'an : text, translation & commentary / by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. English and Arabic in parallel columns.
The Gracious Quran : a modern-phrased interpretation in English / Ahmad Zaki Hammad. Arabic-English parallel ed.
Collections of Ahadith Collections include: Sahih Bukhari صحيح البخاري Sahih Muslim صحيح مسلم Sunan al-Nasa'i سنن النسائي Sunan Abi Dawud سنن أبي داود Jami` al-Tirmidhi جامع الترمذي Sunan ibn Majah سنن ابن ماجه
al-Jāmiʻ al-kabīr li-kutub al-turāth al-Islāmī wa-al-ʻArabī [CD-ROM] : akthar min 30000 mujallad ḥāsūbī, akthar min 2600 ʻunwān kitāb, akthar min 1400 ʻunwān yanfaridu bi-hi al-barnāmaj, al-iṣdār 5.0, al-naskhah al-dhahabīyah al-muṭawwarah, 9Extrenal H.D) A large collection of Islamic and Arabic heritage books Ver 5.0. Law School Islamic Ref - hard disk is installed on both PCs next to Islamic Law Collection in L1N.

A good place to start is the Harvard online public catalogue called Hollis . General books dealing with Islamic law are catalogued under Islamic Law . Other topics are catalogued with the topic-- marriage for example and Islamic law. To find the application of Islamic law in a specific country, search for Islamic Law and a particular country like Egypt . At Harvard, most materials on Islamic law will be found in HLSL, Widener and Andover-Harvard Theological Library . If you are interested in knowing about books at other libraries, WorldCat is an excellent resource. Here you will access to the collections at major research libraries all over the world. Search terms are the same as for Hollis.

Islamic Law: A Bibliography of Recent Works Published in English This bibliography covers English-language books and articles within books that discuss Islamic law. The titles have all been published since 2003 and are held in the Library of Congress. The listing is divided into three sections: works on Islamic law in general, works on the history of Islamic law, and works devoted to a specific area of law.
Oxford Bibliography on Hadith by J.A.C. Brown Lists major hadith collections in Arabic and translations.
An Introduction to Islamic Law by Joseph Schacht
An introduction to Islamic law by Wael B. Hallaq
A history of Islamic law by N.J. Coulson
Between God and the sultan : a history of Islamic law by Knut Vikør
Islamic law : from historical foundations to contemporary practice by Mawil Izzi Dien
al-Madkhal ilá dirāsat al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah / Rābiḥ Bin Gharīb
al-Madkhal li-dirāsat al-fiqh al-Islāmī / li-Ṣalāḥ Muḥammad Abū al-Ḥājj
al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah kamāl fī al-dīn wa-tamām lil-niʻmah / Muḥammad Riyāḍ
al-Madkhal ilá al-sharīʻah wa-al-fiqh al-Islāmī / ʻUmar Sulaymān al-Ashqar
Madkhal li-dirāsāt al-sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah / Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī
Materials from the Harvard libraries on Islamic law and jurisprudence Preset catalog search so you can browse the Harvard libraries' collection.
Islamic Manuscripts (HathiTrust Digital Library) Over 900 Islamic manuscripts from U. of Michigan.
Index Islamicus, 1665-1905: a bibliography of articles on Islamic subjects in periodicals and other collective publications Print edition of the above index for earlier years (1665-1905).
JSTOR This full-text database spans many disciplines, primarily in the humanities and social sciences. more... less... Includes all titles in the JSTOR collection, excluding recent issues. JSTOR (www.jstor.org) is a not-for-profit organization with a dual mission to create and maintain a trusted archive of important scholarly journals, and to provide access to these journals as widely as possible. Content in JSTOR spans many disciplines, primarily in the humanities and social sciences. For complete lists of titles and collections, please refer to http://www.jstor.org/about/collection.list.html.
PAIS International (Harvard Login) Multidisciplinary resource. "PAIS indexes publications in English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. The database is comprised of abstracts of thousands of journal articles, books, directories, conference proceedings, government documents and statistical yearbooks." more... less... PAIS International indexes the public and social policy literature of public administration, political science, economics, finance, international relations, law, and health care, International in scope, PAIS indexes publications in English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. The database is comprised of abstracts of thousands of journal articles, books, directories, conference proceedings, government documents and statistical yearbooks.
Academic Search Premier (Harvard Login) A multi-disciplinary database that includes citations and abstracts from over 4,700 scholarly publications (journals, magazines and newspapers). more... less... Academic Search Premier (ASP) is a multi-disciplinary database that includes citations and abstracts from over 4,700 scholarly publications (journals, magazines and newspapers). Full text is available for more than 3,600 of the publications and is searchable.
Islam in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa The bibliography contains several thousand references to secondary literature in European languages about Islam in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, published between 1960 to 2005. more... less... The bibliography of Islam in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa has been prepared in conjunction with the African Studies Centre (ASC) and the Centre d’Etude d’Afrique Noire project “Islam, the Disengagement of the State, and Globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa,” that was funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which resulted in a Conference held at the UNESCO in May 2005. ####The bibliography contains several thousand references to secondary literature in European languages about Islam in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, published between 1960 to 2005. Many of the entries also have abstracts produced by the ASC library. Select entries have abstracts from the authors, publishers, and journals themselves.
Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic law The Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law is a US-based law journal that covers relevant topics in Middle Eastern, Islamic, and comparative law.
Arab law quarterly Published on behalf of: the Society of Arab Comparative and International Law.
Islamic law and society Provides a forum for research in the field of classical and modern Islamic law, in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Articles are published in French or English.
UCLA journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law The UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law contains the full text of documents that are dedicated to the scholarly review of legal issues that are of importance to Muslims and Near Easterners.
The journal of Islamic law & culture The Journal of Islamic Law & Culture contains the full text of documents that are dedicated to the understanding of Islamic law and culture in America's legal, religious, and Muslim communities.
Majallat al-sharīʻah wa-al-dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah Alternate title: Journal of shari’a and Islamic studies. Articles are mainly in Arabic with some in English.
Islamic Law & Law of the Muslim World eJournal The only Social Science Research Network (SSRN) journal that focuses on this area of law, the Islamic Law and Law of the Muslim World Research Paper Series at New York Law School.

Legal periodical indexes generally only allow you to search the title, citation, abstract, keywords (sometimes author-supplied), and subject terms given to a journal article, rather than the full text. A benefit to using a legal periodical index is that it will include all issues and volumes of a given journal, without any gaps in coverage, back to a certain date. (For example, Legaltrac's contents go back to 1980. Full text databases can have gaps in coverage, sometimes many years' worth, for an individual journal.

Index to Legal Periodicals and Books [Harvard Law only] Provides citations to articles in over 800 legal periodicals such as law reviews, bar association journals, yearbooks, institutes, and government publications from August 1981 to the present. Focus of content is mainly on journals from Anglo-American countries.
Legal Journals Index, only on Westlaw [Harvard Law only] Indexes articles from legal journals published in the United Kingdom and Europe as well as journals covering topics pertaining to the laws of the European Community and its Member States. Coverage is from 1986 to present.
Le Doctrinal Indexes French language law journals.

Domestic Legal Systems

This tab includes the sources on opinions, judgments and finding aids such as digests or indexes from the various states with Islamic law component (historical and/or contemporary). Most of the compilations include domestic relations cases in the vernacular and English translations, if available.

In-Library only. This resource is available on campus at the Harvard Law School Library.

al-Fatāwá al-Islāmīyah min Dār al-Iftāʼ al-Miṣrīyah Fatwas issued by Dār al-Iftāʼ al-Miṣrīyah. 39 volume set; coverage period 1895-2012
Official Gazette - al-Jarīdah al-rasmīyah
al-Maḥkamah al-Dustūrīyah al-ʻUlyā - Egyptian Constitutional Court cases Egyptian Constitutional Court cases are also available on the Court's website, http://hccourt.gov.eg/Pages/Rules/Rules_Search.aspx.
Mawsūʻat al-fatāwá al-muʼaṣṣalah min Dār al-Iftāʼ al-Miṣrīyah Fatwas issued by Dār al-Iftāʼ al-Miṣrīyah. Coverage 2013 supplements the above set.
Himpunan putusan kasasi peradilan agama Supreme Court’s decisions in cases involving Islamic family law for Indonesian Muslims. Published in 2001.
Himpunan putusan kasasi peradilan agama Supreme Court’s decisions in cases involving Islamic family law for Indonesian Muslims. Published in 2000.
Official Gazette - Rūznāmah-ʾi rasmī-i Jumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān. Official Gazette
Ḥudūd : jarāʼim-i khilāf-i akhlāq-i ḥasanah
Iran Criminal Code
al-Qarārāt al-istiʾnāfīyah fī al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣīyah
al-Qaḍāʼ al-sharʻī al-Jaʻfarī: ijtihādāt - nuṣūṣ
Muṭālaʻāt al-niyābah al-ʻāmmah al-istiʼnāfīyah ladá al-maḥkamah al-Sharʻīyah al-Sunnīyah al-ʻUlyā
Shariah law reports Quarterly case reporter of Malaysian shariah judgments.
Mudawwanat al-usrah wa-al-ʻamal al-qaḍāʾī al-Maghribī Covers cases on domestic relations.
Toma Legal Retrieve IP access. Access may be limited to users with a valid Harvard ID. Full text of all legislation in force (1990- ); full text of selected judgments of Court of Appeal of Nigeria, federal high courts of Nigeria, and states’ high courts of Nigeria; legal precedents and business letters; Supreme Court of Nigeria judgments (1956- ); investment, petroleum, company, and taxation laws of Nigeria; court rules; judgments of West African Court of Appeal (WACA) and appeals from WACA to Privy Council.
37 years’ excellent digest on family laws, 1961 to 1997: with digest of Islamic laws on family matters
Complete digest on Mahomedan law
Select ruling on family laws in Pakistan
Twenty eight years’ digest on Muslim laws, 1947-1974 : containing custody of minor, dower, gift, guardianship, maintenance, marriage, pre-emption. Muslim personal law (Shariat) application act (X of 1973), Muslim family laws ordinance (VIII of 1961)
The Board of Quazis’ law reports: with a digest Cases from the Board of Quazis from 2001-2010 on domestic relations.
al-Mawsūʻah al-ḥadīthah fī al-anẓimah al-Saʻūdīyah
Istanbul Kadi Sicilleri Available in print and searchable online, http://www.kadisicilleri.org/index.php, this 40-volume set includes Istanbul court records from the Ottoman period.

Other Resources

Muslim Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Muslim Law Tradition provided by University of Ottawa

JuriGlobe - World Legal Systems
Fatawa - Muslim World League (Makkah) The Muslim World League was founded in accordance with a resolution adopted during the meeting of the General Islamic Conference, which was held in Holy Makkah on the 14th of Dhul Hijjah 1381 Hijra corresponding to the 18th May 1962. Affiliations: - The United Nations Organization: Observer in consultative status with the ECOSOC. - Organization of the Islamic Conference: Observe status in attendance at all meetings and conferences. - ISESCO: Member - UNICEF: Member
Islamic Legal Studies Program (Harvard Law School) Harvard Law School's Islamic Legal Studies Program (ILSP), established in 1991, is a research program that seeks to advance knowledge and understanding of Islamic law. As stated in its statement of objectives (incorporated into the terms of its major grants), the Program is dedicated to achieving excellence in the study of Islamic law through objective and comparative methods. It aims to foster an atmosphere of open inquiry that embraces many perspectives: Muslim and non-Muslim, scholar and practitioner, contemporary and classical, Sunni and Shi'i, law and religion. It seeks to promote appreciation of Islamic law as one of the world's major legal systems.
Bibliographic Resources for Middle East & Islamic Studies (Columbia University) This is a selective guide to major reference resources on Middle Eastern history, religion, literature, politics, and culture, available at Columbia University Libraries. The guide includes encyclopedias, biographical and subject-specific dictionaries, foreign-language dictionaries, research guides and subject bibliographies, and relevant databases for periodical articles and other writings.
Islamic Heritage Project IHP is a multi-disciplinary collection of high-quality digital reproductions of more than 270 Islamic manuscripts, more than 300 published texts, and 58 maps from Harvard's renowned library and museum collections. Subjects represented include religious texts and commentaries; Sufism; history, geography, law, and the sciences (astronomy, astrology, mathematics, medicine); poetry and literature; rhetoric, logic, and philosophy; calligraphy, dictionaries and grammar, as well as biographies and autobiographical works. Coverage 10th-20th centuries CE. more... less... IHP is a multi-disciplinary collection of high-quality digital reproductions of more than 270 Islamic manuscripts, more than 300 published texts, and 58 maps from Harvard's renowned library and museum collections. Subjects represented include religious texts and commentaries; Sufism; history, geography, law, and the sciences (astronomy, astrology, mathematics, medicine); poetry and literature; rhetoric, logic, and philosophy; calligraphy, dictionaries and grammar, as well as biographies and autobiographical works.
Islamic Manuscripts Cataloging Project (Princeton University) Online Cataloging for the New Series of Islamic Manuscripts at Princeton Cataloging is now available online for the entire collection of the nearly 2200 manuscripts comprising the New Series of Islamic Manuscripts in the Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. The New Series constitutes the premier collection of predominantly Shi`ite manuscripts in the Western Hemisphere and among the finest in the world. The online records have been created as part of the Islamic Manuscripts Cataloging and Digitization Project, to improve access to these rich collections and share them worldwide through digital technology. Researchers can now locate Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish manuscripts by searching the Library’s online catalog: http://catalog.princeton.edu.

Getting Help

Ask Us! Submit a question or search the knowledge base.

Call Reference Desk, 617-495-4516

Text Ask a Librarian, 617-702-2728

Email research @law.harvard.edu

Chat Open a chat window

Meet Consult a Librarian

Classes View Training Calendar or Request an Insta-Class

Visit Us Library and Reference Hours

Last Updated: Apr 12, 2024 4:50 PM
URL: https://guides.library.harvard.edu/islamiclaw

Harvard University Digital Accessibility Policy

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

We're Hiring!
Help Center

Islamic International Law (Siyar): an Introduction

This work explains the origin, sources, and evolution of Islamic international law (Siyar). It attempts to locate the role and place of Islamic International law (Siyar). It argues that Abu Hanifa was the first jurist to treat Siyar as a separate legal science and who systematically explained the rules of Siyar. This works discusses the role of Siyar within the domestic law in Pakistan. It concludes that since Islamic law is not only one of the principal legal systems in the world but also that Islam is one of the main forms of civilizations; therefore, Islamic law must be one of the sources of international law. Finally, it argues that since public international law is not secular in nature, but rather 'neutral' so as to 'accommodate' Muslim states. Siyar only

Related Papers

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Munir

International Journal of Social Science & Entrepreneurship

azeem Farooqi

This precise research work elucidates the derivation, sources, and gradual development of Islamic international law, which is also termed as “(Siyar).” This article is a humble endeavor to discover the position and role of Islamic International Law (Siyar). It debates about the pioneers and sublime jurists who treated Siyar as a distinct legal discipline and who methodically clarified the basic rubrics of Siyar. This research concludes that as Islamic legal principles are not only one of the leading legal schemes across the globe but also that Islam positions its illustrious place among different creeds and cultures of the world, Islamic jurisprudence is one of the leading sources of international law. The research is qualitative and interpretative, in which authors have relied on the classical and modern writings and have analytically scrutinized them in the modern context. Surely, this article debates that since public international rules are not irreligious in nature, these are “...

Kardan Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities

Zahid Jalaly

Modern scholars generally initiate history of almost all of the social sciences-related discourses with the ancient Greeks and the Romans and then jump to the modern era, thus other nations and civilizations are overlooked. The same happens with the international law discourse. Scholars of international law trace back the modern law of nations to the ancient Greeks and the Romans, while they both had no proper international law. On the other hand, Islamic Law of Nations 1-which is a rich source of a proper international law-is omitted. The present paper explores definition, early development and sources of Muslim International Law in which it argues that Islamic International Law was developed as a separate branch of law by eighth-century Muslim jurists. It similarly explains the nature of the science of siyar, in which, it explores the vital characteristics of Islamic Law of Nations, which international law lacks, such as divinity, justice and stability. Then, this paper discusses the reality of bifurcation of the world into dar al-Islam as well as dar al-harb and its relations with the theory of perpetual war, in which it contends that it is merely for the purpose of defining jurisdiction. Finally, for those who are interested in further studying the subject, the paper provides a general literature review.

Journal of Law and Religion

Khaled Ramadan A Bashir

Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies

Fajri Matahati Muhammadin

International law has developed since its pre-20th century consent-based positivistic framework to ‘international law-making’ where the role of state sovereignty is seen to have eroded. This development, however, still reproduces its pre-20th century colonialist features against non-European (including Islamic) legal thought, pushing them to the peripheries of relevance. Recently, countering that, stronger voices have demanded international law to generally include non-European and specifically Islamic international legal scholarship. However, while having a very rich body of classical scholarship, contemporary literature of fiqh al-siyar (Islamic international law) suffers from lethargy. It neither mentions nor responds to the trend of international law-making. This article, employing a literature-based research approach, bridges the gap of that lethargy so that fiqh al-siyar could develop to properly respond to the current trend of international law-making. It is found that fiqh a...

Short Essays

This short essay discusses what I think are the challenges brought by modern international law which would change what subjects should be discussed by fiqh al-siyar. It used to be as simple as how the Dar al-Islam relates with the rest of the world (war, diplomacy, trade). I argue that, in a more "universalised" model of international law in the world we live in today, fiqh al-siyar must be particularly adept in explaining the fiqh of Dar al-Islam and its (or their) participation in the international law making process.

Al-Jamiah Journal of Islamic Studies

International law has developed since its pre-20th century consent-based positivistic framework to 'international law-making' where the role of state sovereignty is seen to have eroded. This development, however, still reproduces its pre-20th century colonialist features against non-European (including Islamic) legal thought, pushing them to the peripheries of relevance. Recently, countering that, stronger voices have demanded international law to generally include non-European and specifically Islamic international legal scholarship. However, while having a very rich body of classical scholarship, contemporary literature of fiqh al-siyar (Islamic international law) suffers from lethargy. It neither mentions nor responds to the trend of international law-making. This article, employing a literature-based research approach, bridges the gap of that lethargy so that fiqh al-siyar could develop to properly respond to the current trend of international law-making. It is found that fiqh al-siyar must critically adopt and respond to the features of international law-making, and all actors must utilize all channels to participate in its process. [Hukum Internasional telah berkembang jauh sebelum abad 20 dalam kerangka dasar isi yang positivistik dalam pembentukannya, dimana peran kedaulatan negara mulai terlihat berkurang. Hal ini terus berkembang sampai berwajah kolonial yang mengabaikan dan meminggirkan hukum non Eropa, termasuk hukum Islam. Namun akhir-akhir ini muncul suara yang menginginkan bahwa hukum internasional harus mengakui secara umum hukum non Eropa dan khususnya pemikiran hukum Internasional Islam. Alih alih memberikan kontribusi dalam pemikiran klasik, literatur kontemporer hukum internasional Islam (fiqh al-siyar) justru mengalami kelesuan. Bukan hanya tidak disebut tapi juga tidak merespon perkembangan hukum internasional. Dengan pendekatan kajian literatur, tulisan ini berusaha menjembatani kesenjangan kelesuan tersebut agar hukum internasional Islam (fiqh al-siyar) dapat berkembang dan merespon dengan baik trend saat ini. Selain itu, fiqh al-siyar harus secara kritis dalam mengadopsi dan merespon perkembangan hukum internasional, serta semua aktor harus mendayagunakan semua saluran untuk terlibat dalam proses tersebut.]

Muhammad Munir

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

Fact-Checking Claims About Tim Walz’s Record

Republicans have leveled inaccurate or misleading attacks on Mr. Walz’s response to protests in the summer of 2020, his positions on immigration and his role in the redesign of Minnesota’s flag.

Share full article

Flowers, candles, and various items placed on the street. A big black and white mural of George Floyd is seen in the background.

By Linda Qiu

Since Gov. Tim Walz of Minnesota was announced as the Democratic nominee for vice president, the Trump campaign and its allies have gone on the attack.

Mr. Walz, a former teacher and football coach from Nebraska who served in the National Guard, was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2006 and then as Minnesota’s governor in 2018. His branding of former President Donald J. Trump as “weird” this year caught on among Democrats and helped catapult him into the national spotlight and to the top of Vice President Kamala Harris’s list of potential running mates.

The Republican accusations, which include questions over his military service , seem intended at undercutting a re-energized campaign after President Biden stepped aside and Ms. Harris emerged as his replacement at the top of the ticket. Mr. Trump and his allies have criticized, sometimes inaccurately, Mr. Walz’s handling of protests in his state, his immigration policies, his comments about a ladder factory and the redesign of his state’s flag.

Here’s a fact check of some claims.

What Was Said

“Because if we remember the rioting in the summer of 2020, Tim Walz was the guy who let rioters burn down Minneapolis.” — Senator JD Vance of Ohio, the Republican nominee for vice president, during a rally on Wednesday in Philadelphia

This is exaggerated. Mr. Walz has faced criticism for not quickly activating the National Guard to quell civil unrest in Minneapolis in the summer of 2020 after the murder of George Floyd by a police officer. But claims that he did not respond at all, or that the city burned down, are hyperbolic.

Mr. Floyd was murdered on May 25, 2020, and demonstrators took to the streets the next day . The protests intensified, with some vandalizing vehicles and setting fires. More than 700 state troopers and officers with the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources’ mobile response team were deployed on May 26 to help the city’s police officers, according to a 2022 independent assessment by the state’s Department of Public Safety of the response to the unrest.

We are having trouble retrieving the article content.

Please enable JavaScript in your browser settings.

Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and log into your Times account, or subscribe for all of The Times.

Thank you for your patience while we verify access.

Already a subscriber? Log in .

Want all of The Times? Subscribe .

COMMENTS

PDF INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC AW
Background papers are selected for wider distribution based on such factors as their contemporary relevance and potential to contribute to ongoing discussions. This paper was produced for a February 2009 Thematic Workshop on Islamic Law and Protection of Civilians that took place in Amman, Jordan. The views expressed herein are those of the ...
Methods and Meaning in Islamic Law: Introduction
By Intisar Rabb*. This essay is part of the Islamic Law Blog's Roundtable on Islamic Legal History & Historiography, edited by Intisar Rabb (Editor-in-Chief) and Mariam Sheibani (Lead Blog Editor), and introduced with a list of further readings in the short post by Intisar Rabb: "Methods and Meaning in Islamic Law: Introduction." How should we think about the most pressing questions of ...
Wael B. Hallaq on the Origins of Islamic Law: A Review Essay
In his The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Wael B. Hallaq seeks to create a new paradigm for the scholarly understanding of the origins of Islamic law. In this essay, I review Hallaq's Origins and four other publications of his in an effort to assess his achievement. A comparison of Hallaq's vision of legal developments during the first ...
What Is Islamic Law? How Should We Study It?
This essay is part of the Islamic Law Blog's ... Lena Salaymeh, The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late Antique Islamicate Legal Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), ch. 2, 43-83. I borrow the useful term "beginnings" from the title of her provocative book. She refers to "Islamicate" law, which is a good way to ...
PDF An Introduction to Islamic Law
An Introduction to Islamic Law The study of Islamic law can be a forbidding prospect for those entering theﬁeldfortheﬁrsttime.WaelHallaq,aleadingscholarandpractitioner of Islamic law, guides students through the intricacies of the subject in this absorbing introduction. The ﬁrst half of the book is devoted to a discussion of Islamic law ...
Understanding Sharia: The Intersection of Islam and the Law
Summary. Sharia is the ideal form of divine guidance that Muslims follow to live a righteous life. Human interpretations of sharia, or fiqh, are the basis of Islamic law today. About half the ...
Islamic Law: Its Sources, Interpretation and the Translation ...
The present issue will deal chiefly with Islamic Law, placing special emphasis on five major issues. These lie in the sources of Islamic Law, its interpretation, economics, its finance as well as the translation between it and other laws written in English. 5.1 Issues Related to the Qurʾān and the Interpretation of Its Legal Contents
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law
Abstract. The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law offers a historiographic window into the scholarly treatment of a wide range of topics in the field of Islamic legal studies. Each essay, authored by an expert in the field, situates its subject in relation to historical academic scholarship. The historiographic feature of the volume is deliberate.
Islamic Law and Ethics: Introduction
ISLAMIC LAW AND ETHICS An earlier focus on Islamic ethics, edited by Frederick S. Carney (Fall 1983), brought to readers of the Journal of Religious Ethics five excellent essays, each dealing with a central discipline of classical Is-lamic tradition. At the time, the editors hoped to follow with a second focus on contemporary developments in Islam.
Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics
distaste and distortion in the treatment of Islamic law. This essay, however, is an attempt to present Islamic legal thought in a manner that conveys some-thing of its true fascination by showing that, properly understood, Islamic law is not merely law, but also an ethical and epistemological system of great subtlety and sophistication.
Sharia
sharia, the fundamental religious concept of Islam—namely, its law.. The religious law of Islam is seen as the expression of God's command for Muslims and, in application, constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent upon all Muslims by virtue of their religious belief. Known as the sharīʿah (literally, "path leading to the watering place"), the law represents a divinely ...
Islamic Legal Theory
The importance of usul is the more so striking since classical Islam, despite the centrality of law, never knew a discipline described as "philosophy of law." At best, the field may just be nascent on the contemporary scene (Mallat 2007: 57-70).This is supported in a review published at the turn of the century of relevant modern writings in the Qum (Iran) seminary by one of its active ...
(PDF) The Quran and the Rule of Law in Islam
My aim is to show that a comparable yet far more powerfully structuring "event" in the constitutional history of Islam was the Quran itself, the most authoritative "voice" in that tradition, past and present. I shall therefore argue that Islam's robust system of the rule of law,1 which lasted until the nineteenth 1 Obviously, this ...
(PDF) "Wael B. Hallaq on the Origins of Islamic Law: A Review Essay
He begins the essay with a reference to recent scholarship on Islamic law in the West: Recent scholarship on the history of Islamic law—especially in the United States, Canada, and Germany—has shown the impressive extent to which Islamic law was a working system that evolved in tandem with the developments that Islamic societies from ...
Qurʾanic Ethics and Islamic Law
The issue of Islamic law and morality has for the most part received scant attention in the modern age. This essay contributes to the exploration of possible ways of understanding the relationship of ethics to Shariʿah and Islamic law. The author's objective in this essay is largely normative. While he makes every effort to root his arguments in the fabric of the Islamic tradition, this ...
Introduction to Islamic Law
This course will survey core concepts in Islamic law ( sharia) in historical and comparative modern contexts. Popular perceptions of this legal system imagine it to be a static code from 7th-century Arabia. By contrast, we explore aspects of Islamic law and society, as a dynamic system, that uncover rich debates about cases historically ...
Research Guides: Islamic Law: Introductory Sources
A good place to start is the Harvard online public catalogue called Hollis.General books dealing with Islamic law are catalogued under Islamic Law.Other topics are catalogued with the topic--marriage for example and Islamic law.To find the application of Islamic law in a specific country, search for Islamic Law and a particular country like Egypt.At Harvard, most materials on Islamic law will ...
Relevance of islamic law in modern times
Moreover, the essay will demonstrate that the Islamic law doesn't govern international law per se, but the way its modern reinterpretation has rekindled Muslim-majority states' attitude towards international relations with non-Muslim states. Foremost though the historic influence will be noted.
The Four Main Sources Of Islamic Law Religion Essay
Abstract: This essay deals with the four main sources of Islamic Law. Its goal is to introduce some of the prevailing concepts of Islamic thought and to analyse the different disciplines and opinions that shape the practice of Islam today. It is known that there are four Muslim schools of thoughts. However, each differs in their interpretations .
PDF The Justice of Islam: Comparative Perspectives in Islamic Law and
that Islamic law invests women 'with many personal rights and independent privileges.'3 A more successful attempt to use this approach is realized in his essay on Muhammad's sociological jurisprudence (chapter 10). This piece challenges much of the Orientalist scholarship on the origins of Islamic law - especially Joseph Schacht4 - which places ...
LA3028
Guardianship essay - I got a 76 in Islamic using these materials. Essays 100% (4) 13. 6. Sucession - This note is a comprehensive and easy to understand study material that covers ... Abdul decides to bring a claim to recover the debt under Islamic law. Discuss how Abdul can establish his claim with reference to the rules of evidence and ...
Islamic International Law (Siyar): an Introduction
View PDF. Islamic International Law (Siyar): an Introduction MUHAMMAD MUNIR* Abstract This work explains the origin, sources, and evolution of Islamic international law (Siyar). It attempts to locate the role and place of Islamic International law (Siyar). It argues that Abu Hanifa was the first jurist to treat Siyar as a separate legal science ...
Source of Islamic Law
Ans) In Islamic law, there ar e said to be mu ltiple sourc es from wher e the law s can be deriv ed, to. name some, it is the Holy Book Qur an, Sunnah of the Holy Pr ophet ... Guardianship essay - I got a 76 in Islamic using these materials. Introduction to Islamic law 100% (4) 11. IJMA, Qiyas, Istihsan, Istishab, Urf.
'There is no law and order. And Hindus are being targeted again'
Avirup Sarkar is a Bangladeshi Hindu, living in a country that is 90% Muslim. His widowed cousin lives in a sprawling joint family house in a mixed neighbourhood in Netrokona, a district ...
Fact-Checking Claims About Tim Walz's Record
That May, Mr. Walz also signed a budget deal into law that, among other provisions, allowed unauthorized immigrants to enroll in MinnesotaCare, the state's program for low-income residents. Mr. Mr.

What Is Islamic Law? How Should We Study It?

Share this:

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Understanding Sharia: The Intersection of Islam and the Law

Introduction

What is sharia?

Why is it so controversial?

How much room is there for reform?

How do governments in the Muslim world interpret and enforce sharia?

How do extremist groups interpret sharia?

How do Muslim-minority countries approach sharia?

Recommended Resources

More From Our Experts

Top Stories on CFR

Nature and significance of Islamic law

Historical development of sharia law

Islamic Legal Theory

Introduction

Access this chapter

Author information

Corresponding author

Editor information

Section Editor information

Rights and permissions

Copyright information

About this entry

Download citation

Share link with colleague or librarian

Qurʾanic Ethics and Islamic Law

Content Metrics

Introduction to Islamic Law

Islamic Law

Primary Sources - Qur'an and Hadith

Domestic Legal Systems

Other Resources

Getting Help

Islamic International Law (Siyar): an Introduction

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS

Fact-Checking Claims About Tim Walz’s Record

COMMENTS