what is speech act

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What is a Speech Act?

A speech act is an utterance that serves a function in communication. We perform speech acts when we offer an apology, greeting, request, complaint, invitation, compliment, or refusal. A speech act might contain just one word, as in "Sorry!" to perform an apology, or several words or sentences: "I’m sorry I forgot your birthday. I just let it slip my mind." Speech acts include real-life interactions and require not only knowledge of the language but also appropriate use of that language within a given culture.

Here are some examples of speech acts we use or hear every day:

Greeting:   "Hi, Eric. How are things going?" Request:   "Could you pass me the mashed potatoes, please?" Complaint:   "I’ve already been waiting three weeks for the computer, and I was told it would be delivered within a week." Invitation:   "We’re having some people over Saturday evening and wanted to know if you’d like to join us." Compliment:   "Hey, I really like your tie!" Refusal:   "Oh, I’d love to see that movie with you but this Friday just isn’t going to work."

Speech acts are difficult to perform in a second language because learners may not know the idiomatic expressions or cultural norms in the second language or they may transfer their first language rules and conventions into the second language, assuming that such rules are universal. Because the natural tendency for language learners is to fall back on what they know to be appropriate in their first language, it is important that these learners understand exactly what they do in that first language in order to be able to recognize what is transferable to other languages. Something that works in English might not transfer in meaning when translated into the second language. For example, the following remark as uttered by a native English speaker could easily be misinterpreted by a native Chinese hearer:

Sarah: "I couldn’t agree with you more. " Cheng: "Hmmm…." (Thinking: "She couldn’t agree with me? I thought she liked my idea!")

An example of potential misunderstanding for an American learner of Japanese would be what is said by a dinner guest in Japan to thank the host. For the invitation and the meal the guests may well apologize a number of times in addition to using an expression of gratitude (arigatou gosaimasu) -- for instance, for the intrusion into the private home (sumimasen ojama shimasu), the commotion that they are causing by getting up from the table (shitsurei shimasu), and also for the fact that they put their host out since they had to cook the meal, serve it, and will have to do the dishes once the guests have left (sumimasen). American guests might think this to be rude or inappropriate and choose to compliment the host on the wonderful food and festive atmosphere, or thank the host for inviting them, unaware of the social conventions involved in performing such a speech act in Japanese. Although such compliments or expression of thanks are also appropriate in Japanese, they are hardly enough for native speakers of Japanese -- not without a few apologies!

Back to Speech Acts .

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speech act theory

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• University of Minnesota - Center for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition - Pragmatics and Speech Acts
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Speech Acts

speech act theory , Theory of meaning that holds that the meaning of linguistic expressions can be explained in terms of the rules governing their use in performing various speech acts (e.g., admonishing , asserting, commanding, exclaiming, promising, questioning, requesting, warning). In contrast to theories that maintain that linguistic expressions have meaning in virtue of their contribution to the truth conditions of sentences where they occur, it explains linguistic meaning in terms of the use of words and sentences in the performance of speech acts. Some exponents claim that the meaning of a word is nothing but its contribution to the nature of the speech acts that can be performed by using it. Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin provided important stimuli for the theory’s development.

Speech Act Theory

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• First Online: 29 December 2020
• Cite this living reference work entry

• Amitabh Vikram Dwivedi 4  

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Posited by J.L. Austin, the Speech Act Theory considers language use as a type of action, and not merely as a medium to convey information and express thoughts. For example, the sentence “For security reasons, the girls are not allowed to come out from their hostels after 08.00 PM.” is considered as a speech act as it has two elements in it: to provide protection to girls as well as forcing them to remain inside their hostels. So, the speech act for security reasons is performative.

Introduction

Unlike the objectivist approaches which define security in terms of a threat and recommend that it can be controlled by the military force acted by state actors (Walt 1991 , p. 212), the Copenhagen School challenges this stance and defines security as a speech act. The School conceptualizes security within the analytical framework of “securitization,” and not as an objective condition. Weaver, an advocate of this framework, argues that security is a speech act (Buzan et al. 1998 , p....

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Further Reading

Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security a new framework for analysis . Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

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Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019: What is it and why is it seen as a problem. (2019, December 31). The Economic Times . https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/et-explains/citizenship-amendment-bill-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-it-seen-as-a-problem/articleshow/72436995.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

Does security exist outside of the speech act? (2011, October 9). E-International Relations . https://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/

Waever, O. (1995). Securitisation and desuritisation. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On security (pp. 46–87). New York: Columbia University Press.

Walt, S. M. (1991). The renaissance of security studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35 , 211–239.

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Amitabh Vikram Dwivedi

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Manish Thapa

Nemzetkozi Tanulmanyok Intezet, Rm 503, Corvinus Univ, Inst of Intl Studies, Budapest, Hungary

Péter Marton

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Dwivedi, A.V. (2021). Speech Act Theory. In: Romaniuk, S., Thapa, M., Marton, P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_132-1

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Speech Act Theory | How Words Shape Meaning & Interactions

• June 27, 2023 March 31, 2024

In the captivating world of media and communications, one theory that holds immense importance is the Speech Act Theory. Developed by philosophers J.L. Austin and John Searle, this theory helps us comprehend how our words possess the power to shape meaning. Also, how it influences our interactions with others. Let’s delve into this theory and explore its key concepts to unlock the secrets of effective communication.

The Power of Words

Words are not merely sounds or symbols; they carry profound power. Thus, they possess the ability to convey thoughts, express emotions, and influence others. Speech Act Theory enables us to comprehend that when we speak, we are not solely stating facts, but also performing actions through our words.

Understanding the power of words allows us to recognise the impact our speech has on others. It helps us become conscious of the choices we make in our language use. Thus, making us aware of the potential consequences they may have. By harnessing the power of words, we can express ourselves effectively and create meaningful connections with those around us.

Locution, Illocution & Perlocution

Speech acts can be understood through three levels: locution, illocution, and perlocution. Locution refers to the actual words and phrases we use. Illocution focuses on the intentions behind our words, such as making a request or giving an order. Perlocution refers to the impact our words have on others, like persuading or motivating them to take action.

By recognising these levels of speech acts, we gain a deeper understanding of the complexities of communication. We become aware that our words carry not only literal meanings but also implied intentions. We then need to consider the potential effects on the receiver. This awareness enables us to be more mindful of our speech and adapt it according to our communicative goals.

Types of Speech Acts

Speech Act Theory categorises speech acts into three main types: assertive, directive, and expressive. Assertive speech acts aim to convey information, such as stating facts or making claims. Directive speech acts involve issuing commands or requests. Expressive speech acts express emotions, attitudes, or feelings.

Understanding the different types of speech acts helps us navigate various communicative situations effectively. We learn to recognise when we need to provide information, give instructions, or express ourselves emotionally. This knowledge allows us to choose the appropriate speech acts to achieve our communication goals. Therefore, allowing us to convey our intended meanings accurately.

Felicity Conditions

For a speech act to be successful, certain conditions known as felicity conditions must be met. These conditions ensure that the act is performed appropriately and is understood by the intended audience. Felicity conditions may include factors such as sincerity, relevance, and the social context in which the speech act takes place. Understanding and adhering to these conditions contribute to effective communication.

Recognising felicity conditions helps us gauge the appropriateness and effectiveness of our speech acts. Therefore, we become more conscious of the importance of sincerity in our words. Furthermore, the relevance of our statements to the context, and finally the impact of social norms on communication. By considering these conditions, we enhance our ability to convey our messages successfully and build stronger connections with others.

Speech Act Theory & Performativity

Speech Act Theory emphasises the concept of performativity. This suggests that by uttering specific words, we bring about a change in the world. For example, saying “I now pronounce you husband and wife” during a wedding ceremony establishes a new marital status for the couple. Our words have the power to create realities and shape social structures. This aspect of speech acts highlights their transformative nature.

Understanding performativity allows us to appreciate the significant influence of our words on social and cultural contexts. As a result, we become aware of the role our speech plays in shaping perceptions, reinforcing norms, and constructing shared meanings. Also, by harnessing the power of performativity, we can contribute to positive social change and inspire others through our words.

Contextual Factors of Speech Act Theory

Context plays a vital role in comprehending speech acts. The same words can have different meanings depending on the context in which they are used. For instance, cultural norms, social relationships, and shared knowledge influence the interpretation of speech acts. Being aware of these contextual factors is essential for effective communication. Therefore, understanding the situational context helps to avoid miscommunication and ensures that the intended meaning is conveyed.

Considering contextual factors enhances our ability to adapt our communication to specific situations. We become sensitive to cultural nuances and adapt our language to different social relationships. Also, it allows us to utilise shared knowledge to convey our ideas effectively. By understanding context, we navigate diverse communication settings with ease and promote mutual understanding.

Pragmatics & Politeness

Speech Act Theory is closely intertwined with Pragmatics , the study of how language is used in real-life situations. Politeness is a significant aspect of pragmatics. Sociolinguists Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson argue that Politeness Strategies , such as using indirect language or employing polite expressions, help maintain social harmony and prevent potential conflicts. Being aware of cultural and social norms of politeness aids in building positive interpersonal relationships.

Understanding pragmatics and politeness allows us to engage in effective and harmonious communication. Thus, we learn to adapt our speech to different social contexts, respect cultural norms, and demonstrate consideration for others. Therefore, by employing politeness strategies, we cultivate empathy, show respect, and foster healthy relationships with those around us.

Criticisms of Speech Act Theory

Despite its significant contributions to understanding communication, Speech Act Theory is not without its criticisms. Some scholars argue that the theory places excessive focus on the speaker’s intentions. Therefore, it neglects the role of the listener in interpreting speech acts. They suggest that meaning is a collaborative effort between the speaker and the listener. This is influenced by shared knowledge and social context.

Others criticise Speech Act Theory for its limited scope in accounting for non-verbal communication. Also, the impact of non-linguistic elements such as body language and facial expressions. They argue that meaning is not solely derived from words but also from non-verbal cues that accompany speech acts.

Additionally, critics point out that Speech Act Theory tends to overlook the role of power dynamics and social inequalities in communication. They argue that the ability to perform certain speech acts may be constrained by societal structures. Thus, not all individuals have equal opportunities to exercise their speech acts freely.

Speech Act Theory offers us a valuable framework for comprehending the power of words and the intricacies of human communication. By recognising the various levels of speech acts, the significance of felicity conditions, the transformative nature of performativity, the impact of context, and the importance of pragmatics and politeness, we can become more effective communicators. However, it is important to acknowledge the criticisms of the theory and consider alternative perspectives. This helps us to then develop a more comprehensive understanding of communication.

Austin, J.L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words . Oxford University Press.

Searle, J.R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language . Cambridge University Press.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage . Cambridge University Press.

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Speech acts.

Although the idea that language is used to express social action was initially conceptualized in Plato’s Cratylus (1875), our current understanding of language, speech act theory and communicative action, dates back to modern philosophical thinking (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Wittgenstein, 1953/1957). These philosophers stated that the function of language is to perform speech acts or actions (or Wittgenstein’s concept of “language-games”), such as describing or reporting the weather, requesting a letter of recommendation from a professor, apologizing for arriving late, or complaining to our boss about an unfair work load. This view of language rejected the ideas of logical positivism of the 1930s that believed that the main function of language was to describe true or false statements. However, it was in the mid-1950’s that philosophical thinking brought speech act theory to life with the seminal work on speech acts by J. L. Austin and John Searle, two language philosophers who were concerned with meaning, use, and action. Speech acts represent a key concept in the field of pragmatics which can be broadly defined as language use in context taking into account the speaker’s and the addressee’s verbal and non-verbal contributions to the negotiation of meaning in interaction.

Although speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) was not designed to examine stretches of talk in social interaction, it provided the foundation for the analysis of social action. Austin proposed a three-way taxonomy of speech acts: (i) a locutionary act refers to the act of saying something meaningful, that is, the act of uttering a fragment or a sentence in the literal sense (referring and predicating); (ii) an illocutionary act is performed by saying something that has a conventional force such as informing, ordering, warning, complaining, requesting, or refusing; and (iii) a perlocutionary act refers to what we achieve ‘ by  saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading’ (1962: 109 [emphasis in original]).

Austin’s main interest was in utterances used to perform actions with words (e.g. ‘I pronounce you husband and wife’). For these actions to be accomplished, they must be executed under the appropriate conditions: (i) a conventional procedure and effect; (ii) the appropriate circumstances; (iii) the correct and complete execution of the procedure by all persons; and (iv) certain thoughts and feelings about the realization of the act on the part of persons involved [Austin: 1962: 14-15]). The notion of ‘performative action’ is fundamental to the analysis of formal and non-formal institutional interactions because it considers both speaker and hearer co-constructing joint actions in specific sociocultural contexts.

Searle’s (1976) classification of speech acts classified according to the illocutionary point, psychological state, and the direction of fit (word to world or world to word)

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Speech acts.

• Mitchell Green Mitchell Green Philosophy, University of Connecticut
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.200
• Published online: 29 March 2017

Speech acts are acts that can, but need not, be carried out by saying and meaning that one is doing so. Many view speech acts as the central units of communication, with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of an utterance serving as ways of identifying whether the speaker is making a promise, a prediction, a statement, or a threat. Some speech acts are momentous, since an appropriate authority can, for instance, declare war or sentence a defendant to prison, by saying that he or she is doing so. Speech acts are typically analyzed into two distinct components: a content dimension (corresponding to what is being said), and a force dimension (corresponding to how what is being said is being expressed). The grammatical mood of the sentence used in a speech act signals, but does not uniquely determine, the force of the speech act being performed. A special type of speech act is the performative, which makes explicit the force of the utterance. Although it has been famously claimed that performatives such as “I promise to be there on time” are neither true nor false, current scholarly consensus rejects this view. The study of so-called infelicities concerns the ways in which speech acts might either be defective (say by being insincere) or fail completely.

Recent theorizing about speech acts tends to fall either into conventionalist or intentionalist traditions: the former sees speech acts as analogous to moves in a game, with such acts being governed by rules of the form “doing A counts as doing B”; the latter eschews game-like rules and instead sees speech acts as governed by communicative intentions only. Debate also arises over the extent to which speakers can perform one speech act indirectly by performing another. Skeptics about the frequency of such events contend that many alleged indirect speech acts should be seen instead as expressions of attitudes. New developments in speech act theory also situate them in larger conversational frameworks, such as inquiries, debates, or deliberations made in the course of planning. In addition, recent scholarship has identified a type of oppression against under-represented groups as occurring through “silencing”: a speaker attempts to use a speech act to protect her autonomy, but the putative act fails due to her unjust milieu.

• performative
• illocutionary force
• communicative intentions
• perlocution
• felicity condition
• speaker meaning
• presupposition
• indirect speech act
• illocutionary silencing

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Literary Theory and Criticism

Home › Literary Terms and Techniques › Speech Act Theory

Speech Act Theory

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on October 11, 2020 • ( 0 )

Speech act theory accounts for an act that a speaker performs when pronouncing an utterance, which thus serves a function in communication. Since speech acts are the tools that allow us to interact in real-life situations, uttering a speech act requires knowledge not only of the language but also of its appropriate use within a given culture.

Speech act theory was first developed by J. L. Austin whose seminal Oxford Lectures in 1952–4 marked an important development in the philosophy of language and linguistics. Austin’s proposal can be viewed as a reaction to the extreme claims of logical positivists, who argued that the meaning of a sentence is reducible to its verifiability, that is to an analysis which verifies if utterances are true or false. Austin contended that most of our utterances do more than simply making statements: questions and orders are not used to state something, and many declarative sentences do not lend themselves to being analysed in terms of their falsifiability. Instead, they are instruments that allow speakers to change the state of affairs. This is tantamount to saying that we use language mainly as a tool to do things, and we do so by means of performing hundreds of ordinary verbal actions of different types in daily life, such as make telephone calls, baptise children, or fire an employee.

The fact that not all sentences are a matter of truth verifiability was first advanced by Aristotle who, in his De Interpretatione , argued that:

there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech. [. . .] A sentence is a significant portion of speech [. . .] Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. [. . .] Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry. (1–4)

Although he explicitly deems the nature of sentences to be uninteresting in his inquiry on apophantic logos, Aristotle represents the first account of language as action.

J. L. Austin/The Times Literary Supplement

Aristotle’s standpoint influenced the study of language for centuries and paved the way for a tradition of research on verifiability, but several German and British philosophers anticipated a view of language as a tool to change a state of affairs. The issues of language and conversation were addressed by Immanuel Kant who anticipated some concepts like ‘context’ and ‘subjective idealisation’, the rules that articulate conversation, and the para-linguistic gestures used in the accomplishment of speech acts. But it was only at the end of the nineteenth century that a more elaborate treatment of language as action was initiated.

The first, although non-systematic, study of the action-like character of language was conducted by Thomas Reid, who described different acts that can be performed through language, and grouped them into two categories: ‘solitary acts’ like judgements, intentions, deliberations and desiring, which can go unexpressed; and ‘social operations’ like commanding, promising or warning, which, by their very social nature, must be expressed. Reid’s contribution to the inception of a speech act theory can be fully understood if viewed from the wider perspective of the philosophical developments of his time.

Franz Brentano’s distinction between physical and psychological phenomena is particularly relevant in this respect because it reintroduced to philosophy the scholastic concept of‘intentionality’, which allows for a distinction between mental acts and the external world. As far as speech act theory is concerned, suffice it here to say that Brentano argued that every mental, psychological act has a content and is directed at an object (the intentional object), which means that mental phenomena contain an object intentionally within themselves and are thus definable as objectifying acts. The Brentanian approach to intentionality* allows for a distinction between linguistic expressions describing psychological phenomena and linguistic expressions describing non-psychological phenomena. Furthermore, Brentano claimed that speaking is itself an activity through which we can initiate psychic phenomena. Edmund Husserl picked up the importance of what Brentano’s psychological investigation could bring to logic*, in particular the contrast between emotional acts and objectifying acts. Husserl tackled the issue of human mental activities (‘acts’) and how they constitute the ‘object’ of knowledge through experience. In his Logical Investigations (1900/1) he developed a theory of meaning based on ‘intentionality’ which, for him, meant that consciousness entails ‘directedness’ towards an object. It is on the notion of ‘objectifying acts’, that is acts of representation, that Husserl shaped his theory of linguistic meaning, thus emphasising the referential use of language. Collaterally he treated the non-representational uses of language, that is acts like asking questions, commanding or requesting.

Following Brentano and moving within the field of psychology, Anton Marty offered the first account of uses of language meant to direct others’ behaviour, like giving an order, requesting, or giving encouragement. Marty stated that sentences may hint at the speaker’s psychic processes and argued that ‘deliberate speaking is a special kind of acting, whose proper goal is to call forth certain psychic phenomena in other beings’ (1908: 284). Stemming from Brentano’s tripartite subdivision of mental phenomena into presentation, judgements, and phenomena of love and hate, Marty discriminated linguistic forms into names, statements and emotives (utterances arousing an interest), which is a model that closely resembles Karl Bühler’s Sprachtheorie. It is precisely to Bühler that we owe the coinage of the label ‘speech act theory’. He offered the first thorough study of the functions of language – Darstellung (representation), Kindgabe (intimation or expression), and Auslösung (arousal or appeal) – thus endowing non-representational sentences with their own status.

A more complete treatment we find in the work of Adolf Reinach, who offered the first systematic theory of speech acts. Reinach received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Munich; his dissertation was on the concept of cause in penal law. It was within the context of legal language that Reinach argued in favour of the relevance of speech acts which he referred to, presumably independently of Reid’s work, as ‘social acts, that is acts of the mind that are performed in the very act of speaking’. Reinach (1913) provided a detailed taxonomy of social acts as performative* utterances and their modification, and stated very clearly that the utterance ( Äusserung ) of a social act is different from the inner experience of emotions like anger or shame and from statements ( Konstatierungen ) about experiences. It is precisely the recourse to the physical medium, the Äusserung , that transforms the philosophical category of action into a social act. Drawing on previous literature, Reinach separated actions from internal experiences. Then he discriminated between external actions like kissing or killing and linguistic actions, and within this class he distinguished between social acts, which are performed in every act of speaking, and actions, where signs are used but no speech act is performed such as in ‘solitary asserting’ and emotive uses of language. The final distinction refers to the linguistic actions performed in uttering performative formulae and the linguistic and nonlinguistic actions whose performance has an effect on the state of affairs and even changes it.

While Reinach’s ideas were spreading through the Munich scholars, at Oxford A. J. Ayer, considered the philosophical successor of Bertrand Russell, deemed philosophically interesting only those sentences that can be subject to the truth-condition analysis. In line with the logical positivism* of the Vienna Circle, Ayer developed the verification principle in Language, Truth and Logic (1936) where he stated that a sentence is meaningful only if it has verifiable import. Sentences expressing judgements, evaluation and the like were not to be objects of scientific inquiry. This stance, which is now known as the ‘descriptive fallacy’, led him into conflict with Oxford linguist philosophers like Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin, who instead were greatly influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. He claimed that a language consists of a wide multiplicity of structures and usages that logical positivists had neglected to analyse but which encompass the majority of what human beings say in their construction of meaning.

Following Wittgenstein’s insights into language and putting himself against the positivist background, Gilbert Ryle rejected the Cartesian mind-body dualism in The Concept of Mind ( 1949), and revived the centrality of the standard uses of language, thus contributing to the development of ‘ordinary language philosophy’* in Oxford.

Taking the same veil and influenced by Husserl, Austin rejected the account that only sentences that are meant to describe a state of affairs are worth studying, and he observed that verifiable sentences are only a small part of the large amount of utterances produced by language users. Not all utterances express propositions: many perform actions as, for example, greetings or orders, which resist a truth-conditional analysis. Indeed, most of the sentences uttered by speakers are used in such a way as to perform more fundamental things in verbal interactions, such as naming a ship, marrying a couple, or making a request. In daily life we perform many ordinary verbal actions, and utterances are used in speech events to accomplish all that is achieved through language. Austin’s speech act theory was first delineated in the notes he prepared for some lectures interestingly entitled Words and Deeds which he delivered at Oxford University from 1952 to 1954. Such notes constituted the basis on which he developed his Harvard lectures in 1955, posthumously published in 1962. In the first phase of development of his theory, Austin retained the Aristotelian distinction between apophantic and non-apophantic logos, and introduced the terms of constative utterances and performative utterances, where the former describe or constate a state of affairs and the latter perform actions. Austin later realised that a clear distinction between the two types of utterances is unsustainable. If, for example, we say ‘There is a rat under your chair’, we do more than assert a state of affairs: we warn someone about a possible danger. Assertions can thus be used to perform such acts as to warn, to apologise, and many more. Austin then abandoned the dichotomy and contended that to say something equals to perform something.

According to Austin, when we say something, we perform three acts simultaneously: a locutionary act, an illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary act. At the locutionary level, a speaker produces sounds (phonetic act) which are well ordered with respect to the phonological system and grammar of a particular language (phatic act), and carry some sense with respect to the semantic and pragmatic rules of that language (rhetic act). At the illocutionary level, he is expressing his intention by virtue of conventions shared in his speech community. At the perlocutionary level, he performs a third act which includes the consequences of his speaking, and he has only limited control over them. In order for the speechact to be successful, it must fulfil some appropriateness conditions, or ‘felicity’ conditions: locution is successful if words and sounds are correctly produced; illocution is appropriate if it meets the conditions for its realisation; perlocution may be effective when it produces consequences desired by the producer. The notion of illocutionary force embodies the philosophical notion of intentionality, which can be expressed by performing a speech act through three modalities: (1) directly or indirectly through the performance of another speech act (‘Pass me the salt’ versus ‘Can you pass me the salt?’); literally or non-literally depending on the way words are used (‘Stick it in your head’); (3) explicitly or inexplicitly when meaning is spelled out fully or incompletely (‘I’ll be back later, Mary’s ready’). Indirectness and nonliterality are disambiguated by way of a conversational implicature*, whereas explicitation is achieved through expansion or completion of what one says.

John Searle, one of Austin’s students, contributed widely to developing speech act theory, which he addressed from the viewpoint of intentionality. Specifically he conceived of linguistic intentionality as derived from mental intentionality. In his Speech Acts (1969) Searle claimed that Austin’s ‘felicity conditions’ are constitutive rules of speech acts to the extent that to perform a speech act means to meet the conventional rules which constitute a specific speech act. Moving from this approach and analysing the act of promising, Searle proposed a classification of speech acts into four categories: (1) propositional content (what the speech act isabout); (2) preparatory condition, which states the prerequisites for the speech act; (3) sincerity condition (the speaker has to sincerely intend to keep a promise); and (4) essential condition (the speaker’s intention that the utterance counts as an act and as such is to be recognised by the hearer). One of Searle’s major contributions to the theory refers to indirectness, that is the mismatch between an utterance and an illocutionary force.

The interpretation of indirect speech acts has drawn a great deal of attention. Drawing on H. P. Grice’s pragmatics, most scholars assume that some inferential work on the part of the hearer is required in order to identify the speaker’s communicative intention and the core question is how such inference can be computed. Searle (1975) assumes that the hearer recognises both a direct-literal force, which he understands as the secondary force, and an indirect-nonliteral force, which is the primary force. Similarly Dan Gordon and George Lakoff (1975) argue that inference rules that they label ‘conversational postulates’ reduce the amount of inferential computing necessary to disambiguate an indirect speech act. Jerrold Sadock (1974) departs from the inferential hypothesis and proposes ‘the idiom model’ by claiming that a speech act like ‘Can you pass me the salt?’ is promptly interpreted as a request and needs no inference.

Speech act theory received great attention and valid theoretical proposals from cognitive linguists. Klaus Panther and Linda Thornburg (1998) claim that our knowledge of illocutionary meaning may be systematically organised in the form of what they call ‘illocutionary scenarios’. They are formed by a before, a core, and an after component. If a person wants someone to bring him his pen, he can utter a direct speech act like ‘Bring me my pen’, which exploits the core component, or he can make his request indirectly exploiting either the before component (‘Can you bring me my pen?’) where the modal verb ‘can’ points to the hearer’s ability to perform the action, or the after component (‘You will bring me my pen, won’t you?’) where the auxiliary ‘will’ instantiates the after component of the request scenario. Panther (2005) makes the point that metonymies provide natural ‘inference schemas’ which are constantly used by speakers in meaning construction and interpretation. Scenarios may be accessed metonymically by invoking relevant parts of them. Indirect requests like ‘Can you open the door?’, ‘Will you close the window?’, ‘Do you have hot chocolate?’ exploit all pre-conditions for the performance of a request, that is, the ability and willingness of the hearer, and his possession of the required object. Such pre-conditions are used to stand for the whole speech act category. By means of the explicit mention of one of the components of the scenario, it is possible for the speaker to afford access to the hearer to the whole illocutionary category of ‘requesting’ in such a way that the utterance is effortlessly interpreted as a request. With a view to improving Panther’s proposal, Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza (2007) contends that illocutionary meaning is directly tied to the notion of Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs), which are principle-governed cognitive structures. Illocutionary scenarios represent the way in which language users construct interactional meaning representations abstracted away from a number of stereotypical illocutionary situations. In an indirect request like ‘I fancy going out for dinner’ the hearer understands the implicated meaning by relying on high-level situational ICMs – that is, on the generic knowledge that expressing a wish indirectly corresponds to asking for its fulfillment. Thus, it is exactly the quick and easy retrieval from our long-term memory of a stored illocutionary scenario that allows us to identify the nature of indirectness.

Speech act theory is a thought-provoking issue which has attracted the interest of philosophers of language and linguists from diverse theoretical persuasions. Manifold aspects of the theory are being debated such as the classification of speech acts, the relationship between speech acts and culture, and the acquisition of speech acts by children, which proves how this area of language research still provides room for developments and new insights.

Primary sources Aristotle (1941). De Interpretatione. New York: Random House. 38–61. Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gordon D. and G. Lakoff (1975). ‘Conversational postulates’. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds), Syntax and Semantics, Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press. 83–106. Husserl, E. (1900/1). Logische Untersuchungen. Halle: Nyemeier.Panther, K. U. and L. Thornburg (1998). ‘A cognitive approach to inferencing in conversation’. Journal of Pragmatics 30: 755–69. Panther K. U. (2005). ‘The role of conceptual metonymy in meaning construction’. In F. Ruiz de Mendoza and S.Peña (eds), Cognitive Linguistics. Internal Dynamics and Interdisciplinary Interaction. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 353–86. Reinach, A. (1913). ‘Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes’. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 1: 685–847. Ruiz de Mendoza, F. (2007). ‘High level cognitive models: in search of a unified framework for inferential and grammatical behavior’. In Krzysztof Kosecki (ed.), Perspectives on Metonymy. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 1130. Ryle G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. Sadock J. (1974). Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press. Searle J. R. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle J. R. (1975). ‘Indirect speech acts’. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press. 59–82. Wittgenstein L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.

Further reading Ayer, A. J. (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London: Gollancz. Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Duncke and Humbolt. Marty, A. (1908). Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Halle: Nyemeier. Reid, T. (1894). The Works of Thomas Reid. Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart.

Source: Key Ideas in Linguistics and the. Philosophy of Language. Edited by Siobhan Chapman and Christopher Routledge. Edinburgh University Press. 2009.

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Article Summary

• content locked 1 Levels of speech acts
• content locked 2 Communicative and conventional speech acts
• content locked 3 Types of speech acts
• content locked 4 Direct, indirect and nonliteral speech acts
• content locked 5 Philosophical importance of speech act theory
• content locked Bibliography

Speech acts

Making a statement may be the paradigmatic use of language, but there are all sorts of other things we can do with words. We can make requests, ask questions, give orders, make promises, give thanks, offer apologies and so on. Moreover, almost any speech act is really the performance of several acts at once, distinguished by different aspects of the speaker’s intention; there is the act of saying something, what one does in saying it, such as requesting or promising, and how one is trying to affect one’s audience.

The theory of speech acts is partly taxonomic and partly explanatory. It must systematically classify types of speech acts and the ways in which they can succeed or fail. It must reckon with the fact that the relationship between the words being used and the force of their utterance is often oblique. For example, the sentence ‘This is a pig sty’ might be used nonliterally to state that a certain room is messy, and further to demand indirectly that it be tidied up. Even when this sentence is used literally and directly, say to describe a certain area of a farmyard, the content of its utterance is not fully determined by its linguistic meaning – in particular, the meaning of the word ‘this’ does not determine which area is being referred to. A major task for the theory of speech acts is to account for how speakers can succeed in what they do despite the various ways in which linguistic meaning underdetermines use.

In general, speech acts are acts of communication. To communicate is to express a certain attitude, and the type of speech act being performed corresponds to the type of attitude being expressed. For example, a statement expresses a belief, a request expresses a desire, and an apology expresses a regret. As an act of communication, a speech act succeeds if the audience identifies, in accordance with the speaker’s intention, the attitude being expressed.

Some speech acts, however, are not primarily acts of communication and have the function not of communicating but of affecting institutional states of affairs. They can do so in either of two ways. Some officially judge something to be the case, and others actually make something the case. Those of the first kind include judges’ rulings, referees’ decisions and assessors’ appraisals, and the latter include sentencing, bequeathing and appointing. Acts of both kinds can be performed only in certain ways under certain circumstances by those in certain institutional or social positions.

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Speech Acts

Speech acts are a staple of everyday communicative life, but only became a topic of sustained investigation, at least in the English-speaking world, in the middle of the Twentieth Century. [ 1 ] Since that time “speech act theory” has been influential not only within philosophy, but also in linguistics, psychology, legal theory, artificial intelligence, literary theory and many other scholarly disciplines. [ 2 ] Recognition of the importance of speech acts has illuminated the ability of language to do other things than describe reality. In the process the boundaries among the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind and even ethics have become less sharp. In addition, an appreciation of speech acts has helped lay bare an implicit normative structure within linguistic practice, including even that part of this practice concerned with describing reality. Much recent research aims at an accurate characterization of this normative structure underlying linguistic practice.

1. Introduction

2.1 the independence of force and content, 2.2 can saying make it so, 2.3 seven components of illocutionary force, 3. illocutions and perlocutions, and indirect speech acts, 4. force, fit and satisfaction, 5.1 force conventionalism, 5.2. an objection to force conventionalism, 6.1 grice's account of speaker meaning, 6.2 objections to grice's account, 6.3 force as an aspect of speaker meaning, 7.1 speech acts and conversation analysis, 7.2 speech acts and scorekeeping, 8. force-indicators and the logically perfect language, 9. do speech acts have a logic, further reading, other internet resources, related entries.

One way of appreciating the distinctive features of speech acts is in contrast with other well-established phenomena within the philosophy of language. Accordingly in this entry I will consider the relation among speech acts and: semantic content, grammatical mood, speaker-meaning, logically perfect languages, perlocutions, performatives, presuppositions, and implicature. This will enable us to situate speech acts within their ecological niche.

Above I shuddered with quotation marks around the expression ‘speech act theory’. It is one thing to say that speech acts are a phenomenon of importance for students of language and communication; another to say that we have a theory of them. While, as we shall see below, we are able to situate speech acts within their niche, having a theory of them would enable us to explain (rather than merely describe) some of their most significant features. Consider a different case. Semantic theory deserves its name: For instance, with the aid of set-theoretic tools it helps us tell the difference between good arguments and bad arguments couched in ordinary language. By contrast, it is not clear that “speech act theory” has comparable credentials. One such credential would be a delineation of logical relations among speech acts, if such there be. To that end I close with a brief discussion of the possibility, envisioned by some, of an “illocutionary logic”.

2. Content, Force, and How Saying Can Make It So

Construed as a bit of observable behavior, a given act may be done with any of a variety of aims. I bow deeply before you. So far you may not know whether I am paying obeisance, responding to indigestion, or looking for a wayward contact lens. So too, a given utterance, such as ‘You'll be more punctual in the future,’ may leave you wondering whether I am making a prediction or issuing a command or even a threat. The colloquial question, “What is the force of those words?” is often used to elicit an answer. In asking such a question we acknowledge a grasp of what those words mean. However, given the dizzying array of uses of ‘meaning’ in philosophy and related cognitive sciences, I will here refer instead to content. While different theories of content abound (as sets of possible worlds, sets of truth conditions, Fregean senses, ordered n -tuples, to name a few), the phenomenon is relatively clear: What the speaker said is that the addressee will be more punctual in the future. The addressee or observer who asks, “What is the force of those words?” is asking, of that content, how it's to be taken–as a threat, as a prediction, or as a command. The addressee is not asking for a further elucidation of that content.

Or so it seems. Perhaps whether the utterance is meant as a threat, a prediction or a command will depend on some part of her content that was left unpronounced? According to this suggestion, really what she said was, “I predict you'll be more punctual,” or “I command you to be more punctual,” as the case may be. Were that so, however, she'd be contradicting herself in uttering ‘You'll be more punctual in the future’ as a prediction while going on to point out, ‘I don't mean that as a prediction.’ While such a juxtaposition of utterances is surely odd, it is not a self-contradiction, any more than “It's raining but I don't believe it,” is a self-contradiction when the left conjunct is put forth as an expression of belief. What is more, ‘I predict you'll be more punctual,’ is itself a sentence with a content, and will be being put forth with some force or other when–as per our current suggestion—the speaker says it in the course of making a prediction. So that sentence, ‘I predict you'll be more punctual’ is put forth with some force–say as an assertion. This implies, according to the present suggestion, that really the speaker said, ‘I assert that I predict that you'll be more punctual.’ Continuing this same style of reasoning will enable us to infer that performance of a single speech act requires saying–though perhaps not pronouncing—infinitely many things. That is reason for rejecting the hypothesis that implied it, and for the rest of this entry I will assume that force is no part of content.

In chemical parlance, a radical is a group of atoms normally incapable of independent existence, whereas a functional group is the grouping of those atoms in a compound that is responsible for certain of the compound's properties. Analogously, it is often remarked that a proposition is itself communicatively inert; for instance, merely expressing the proposition that snow is white is not to make a move in a “language game”. Rather, such moves are only made by putting forth a proposition with an illocutionary force such as assertion, conjecture, command, etc. The chemical analogy gains further plausibility from the fact that just as a chemist might isolate radicals held in common among various compounds, the student of language may isolate a common element held among ‘Is the door shut?’, ‘Shut the door!’, and ‘The door is shut’. This common element is the proposition that the door is shut, queried in the first sentence, commanded to be made true in the second, and asserted in the third. According to the chemical analogy, then:

Illocutionary force : propositional content :: functional group : radical

In light of this analogy we may see, following Stenius 1967, that just as the grouping of a set of atoms is not itself another atom or set of atoms, so too the forwarding of a proposition with a particular illocutionary force is not itself a further component of propositional content.

Encouraged by the chemical analogy, a central tenet in the study of speech acts is that content may remain fixed while force varies. Another way of putting the point is that the content of one's communicative act underdetermines the force of that act. That's why, from the fact that someone has said, “You'll be more punctual in the future,” we cannot infer the utterance's force. The force of an utterance also underdetermines its content: Just from the fact that a speaker has made a promise, we cannot deduce what she has promised to do. For these reasons, students of speech acts contend that a given communicative act may be analyzed into two components: force and content. While semantics studies the contents of speech acts, pragmatics studies, inter alia , their force. The bulk of this entry may be seen as an elucidation of force.

Need we bother with such an elucidation? That A is an important component of communication, and that A underdetermines B , do not justify the conclusion that B is an important component of communication. Content also underdetermines the decibel level at which we speak but this fact does not justify adding decibel level to our repertoire of core concepts for the philosophy of language. Why should force be thought any more worthy of admission to this set of core concepts than decibel level? One reason for an asymmetry in our treatment of force and decibel level is that the former, but not the latter, seems to be a component of speaker meaning : Force is a feature not of what is meant but of how it is meant; decibel level, by contrast, is a feature at most of the way in which something is said. This point is developed in Section 6 below.

Speech acts are not to be confused with acts of speech. One can perform a speech act such as issuing a warning without saying anything: A gesture or even a minatory facial expression will do the trick. So too, one can perform an act of speech, say by uttering words in order to test a microphone, without performing a speech act. [ 3 ] For a first-blush delineation of the range of speech acts, then, consider that in some cases we can make something the case by saying that it is. Alas, I can't lose ten pounds by saying that I am doing so, nor can I persuade you of a proposition by saying that I am doing so. On the other hand I can promise to meet you tomorrow by uttering the words, “I promise to meet you tomorrow,” and if I have the authority to do so, I can even appoint you to an office by saying, “I hereby appoint you.” (I can also appoint you without making the force of my act explicit: I might just say, “You are now Treasurer of the Corporation.” Here I appoint you without saying that I am doing so.) A necessary and, perhaps, sufficient condition of a type of act's being a speech act is that acts of that type can–whether or not all are—be carried out by saying that one is doing so.

Saying can make it so, but that is not to suggest that any old saying by any speaker constitutes the performance of a speech act. Only an appropriate authority, speaking at the appropriate time and place, can: christen a ship, pronounce a couple married, appoint someone to an administrative post, declare the proceedings open, or rescind an offer. Austin, in How To Do Things With Words, spends considerable effort detailing the conditions that must be met for a given speech act to be performed felicitously . Failures of felicity fall into two classes: misfires and abuses . The former are cases in which the putative speech act fails to be performed at all. If I utter, before the QEII, “I declare this ship the Noam Chomsky,” I have not succeeded in naming anything simply because I lack the authority to do so. My act thus misfires in that I've performed an act of speech but no speech act. Other attempts at speech acts might misfire because their addressee fails to respond with an appropriate uptake : I cannot bet you $100 on who will win the election unless you accept that bet. If you don't accept that bet, then I have tried to bet but have not succeeded in betting.

Some speech acts can be performed–that is, not misfire—while still being less than felicitous. I promise to meet you for lunch tomorrow, but haven't the least intention of keeping the promise. Here I have promised all right, but the act is not felicitous because it is not sincere. My act is, more precisely, an abuse because although it is a speech act, it fails to live up to a standard appropriate for a speech act of its kind. Sincerity is a paradigm condition for the felicity of speech acts. Austin foresaw a program of research in which individual speech acts would be studied in detail, with felicity conditions elucidated for each one. [ 4 ]

Here are three further features of the “saying makes it so” condition. First, the saying appealed to in the “saying makes it so” test is not an act of speech: My singing in the shower, “I promise to meet you tomorrow for lunch,” when my purpose is simply to enjoy the sound of my voice, is not a promise, even if you overhear me. Rather, the saying (or singing) in question must itself be something that I mean. We will return in Section 6 to the task of elucidating the notion of meaning at issue here.

Second, the making relation that this “saying makes it so” condition appeals to needs to be treated with some care. My uttering, “I am causing molecular agitation,” makes it the case that I am causing molecular agitation. Yet causing molecular agitation is not a speech act on any intuitive understanding of that notion. One might propose that the notion of making at issue here marks a constitutive relation rather than a causal relation. That may be so, but as we'll see in Section 5, this suggests the controversial conclusion that all speech acts depend for their existence on conventions over and above those that imbue our words with meaning.

Finally, the saying makes it so condition has a flip side. Not only can I perform a speech act by saying that I am doing so, I can also rescind that act later on by saying (in the speech act sense) that I take it back. I cannot, of course, change the past, and so nothing I can do on Wednesday can change the fact that I made a promise or an assertion on Monday. However, on Wednesday I may be able to retract a claim I made on Monday. I can't take back a punch or a burp; the most I can do is apologize for one of these infractions, and perhaps make amends. By contrast, not only can I apologize or make amends for a claim I now regret; I can also take it back. Likewise, you may allow me on Wednesday to retract the promise I made to you on Monday. In both these cases of assertion and promise, I am no longer beholden to the commitments that the speech acts engender in spite of the fact that the past is fixed. Just as one can, under appropriate conditions, perform a speech act by saying that one is doing so, so too one can, under the right conditions, retract that very speech act.

Searle and Vanderveken 1985 distinguish between those illocutionary forces employed by speakers within a given linguistic community, and the set of all possible illocutionary forces. While a certain linguistic community may make no use of a force such as conjecturing or appointing, these two are among the set of all possible forces. (These authors appear to assume that while the set of possible forces may be infinite, it has a definite cardinality.) Searle and Vanderveken go on to define illocutionary force in terms of seven features, claiming that every possible illocutionary force may be identified with a septuple of such values. The features are:

1. Illocutionary point : This is the characteristic aim of each type of speech act. For instance, the characteristic aim of an assertion is to describe how things are; the characteristic point of a promise is to commit oneself to a future course of action.

2. Degree of strength of the illocutionary point : Two illocutions can have the same point but differ along the dimension of strength. For instance, requesting and insisting that the addressee do something both have the point of attempting to get the addressee to do that thing; however, the latter is stronger than the former.

3. Mode of achievement : This is the special way, if any, in which the illocutionary point of a speech act must be achieved. Testifying and asserting both have the point of describing how things are; however, the former also involves invoking one's authority as a witness while the latter does not. To testify is to assert in one's capacity as a witness. Commanding and requesting both aim to get the addressee to do something; yet only someone issuing a command does so in her capacity as a person in a position of authority.

4. Propositional content conditions : Some illocutions can only be achieved with an appropriate propositional content. For instance, I can only promise what is in the future and under my control. I can only apologize for what is in some sense under my control and already the case. For this reason, promising to make it the case that the sun did not rise yesterday is not possible; neither can I apologize for the truth of Snell's Law.

5. Preparatory conditions : These are all other conditions that must be met for the speech act not to misfire. Such conditions often concern the social status of interlocutors. For instance, a person cannot bequeath an object unless she already owns it or has power of attorney; a person cannot marry a couple unless she is legally invested with the authority to do so.

6. Sincerity conditions : Many speech acts involve the expression of a psychological state. Assertion expresses belief; apology expresses regret, a promise expresses an intention, and so on. A speech act is sincere only if the speaker is in the psychological state that her speech act expresses.

7. Degree of strength of the sincerity conditions : Two speech acts might be the same along other dimensions, but express psychological states that differ from one another in the dimension of strength. Requesting and imploring both express desires, and are identical along the other six dimensions above; however, the latter expresses a stronger desire than the former.

Searle and Vanderveken suggest, in light of these seven characteristics, that each illocutionary force may be defined as a septuple of values, each of which is a “setting” of a value within one of the seven characteristics. It follows, according to this suggestion, that two illocutionary forces F 1 and F 2 are identical just in case they correspond to the same septuple.

I cannot lose ten pounds by saying that I am doing so, and I cannot convince you of the truth of a claim by saying that I am doing so. However, these two cases differ in that the latter, but not the former, is a characteristic aim of a speech act. One characteristic aim of assertion is the production of belief in an addressee, whereas there is no speech act one of whose characteristic aims is the reduction of adipose tissue. A type of speech act can have a characteristic aim without each speech act of that type being issued with that aim: Speakers sometimes make assertions without aiming to produce belief in anyone, even themselves. Instead, the view that a speech act-type has a characteristic aim is akin to the view that a biological trait has a function. The characteristic role of wings is to aid in flight, but some flightless creatures have wings.

Austin called these characteristic aims of speech acts perlocutions (1962, p. 101). I can both urge and persuade you to shut the door, yet the former is an illocution while the latter is a perlocution. How can we tell the difference? We can do this by noting that one can urge by saying, “I urge you to shut the door,” while there are no circumstances in which I can persuade you by saying, “I persuade you to shut the door.” A characteristic aim of urging is, nevertheless, the production of a resolution to act. (1962, p. 107)

Perlocutions are characteristic aims of one or more illocution, but are not themselves illocutions. Nevertheless, a speech act can be performed by virtue of the performance of another one. For instance, my remark that you are standing on my foot is normally taken as, in addition, a demand that you move; my question whether you can pass the salt is normally taken as a request that you do so. These are examples of so-called indirect speech acts (Searle 1975b).

Indirect speech acts are less common than might first appear. In asking whether you are intending to quit smoking, I might be taken as well to be suggesting that you quit. However, while the embattled smoker might indeed jump to this interpretation, we do well to consider what evidence would mandate it. After all, while I probably would not have asked whether you intended to quit smoking unless I hoped you would quit, I can evince such a hope without suggesting anything. Similarly, the advertiser who tells us that Miracle Cream reversed hair loss in Bob, Mike, and Fred, also most likely hopes that I will believe it will reverse my own hair loss. That does not show that he is (indirectly) asserting that it will. Whether he is asserting this depends, it would seem, on whether he can be accused of being a liar if in fact he does not believe that Miracle Cream will staunch my hair loss.

Whether, in addition to a given speech act, I am also performing an indirect speech act would seem to depend on my intentions. My question whether you can pass the salt is also a request that you do so only if I intend to be so understood. My remark that Miracle Cream helped Bob, Mike and Fred is also an assertion that it will help you only if I intend to be so committed. What is more, these intentions must be feasibly discernible on the part of one's audience. Even if, in remarking on the fine weather, I intend as well to request that you pass the salt, I have not done so. I need to make that intention manifest in some way.

How might I do this? One way is by virtue of inference to the best explanation. All else being equal, the best explanation of my asking whether you can pass the salt is that I mean to be requesting that you do so. All else equal, the best explanation of my remarking that you are standing on my foot, particularly if I use a stentorian tone of voice, is that I mean to be demanding that you desist. By contrast, it is doubtful that the best explanation of my asking whether you intend to quit smoking is my intention to suggest that you do so. Another explanation at least as plausible is my hope that you do so. Bertolet 1994, however, develops an even more skeptical position than that suggested here, arguing that any alleged case of an indirect speech act can be construed just as an indication, by means of contextual clues, of the speaker's intentional state–hope, desire, etc., as the case may be. Postulation of a further speech act beyond what has been (relatively) explicitly performed is explanatorily unmotivated.

These considerations suggest that indirect speech acts, if they do occur, can be explained within the framework of conversational implicature–that process by which we mean more than we say, but in a way not due exclusively to the conventional meanings of our words. Conversational implicature, too, depends both upon communicative intentions and the availability of inference to the best explanation. (Grice, 1989). In fact, Searle's 1979b account of indirect speech acts was in terms of conversational implicature. The study of speech acts is in this respect intertwined with the study of conversations; we return to this connection in Section 7.

Force is often characterized in terms of the notions of direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction. The first of these may be illustrated with an example derived from Anscombe (1963). A woman sends her husband to the grocery store with a list of things to get; unbeknownst to him he is also being trailed by a detective concerned to make a list of what the man buys. By the time the husband and detective are in the checkout line, their two lists contain exactly the same items. The contents of the two lists is the same, yet they differ along another dimension. For the contents of the husband's list guide what he puts in his shopping cart. Insofar, his list exhibits world-to-word direction of fit : It is, so to speak, the job of the items in his cart to conform to what is on his list. By contrast, it is the job of the detective's list to conform with the world, in particular to what is in the husband's cart. As such, the detective's list has word-to-world direction of fit : The onus is on those words to conform to how things are. Speech acts such as assertions and predictions have word-to-world direction of fit, while speech acts such as commands have world-to-word direction of fit.

Not all speech acts appear to have direction of fit. I can thank you by saying “Thank you,” and it is widely agreed that thanking is a speech act. However, thanking seems to have neither of the directions of fit we have discussed thus far. Similarly, asking who is at the door is a speech act, but it does not seem to have either of the directions of fit we have thus far mentioned. Some would respond by construing questions as a form of imperative (e.g., “Tell me who is at the door!”), and then ascribing the direction of fit characteristic of imperatives to questions. This leaves untouched, however, banal cases such as thanking or even, “Hooray for Arsenal!” Some authors, such as Searle and Vanderveken 1985, describe such cases as having “null” direction of fit. That characterization is evidently distinct from saying such speech acts have no direction of fit at all. (The characterization is thus analogous to the way in which some non-classical logical theories describe some proposition as being neither True nor False, but as having a third truth value, N : Evidently that is not to say that such propositions are bereft of truth value.) It is difficult to discern from such accounts how one sheds light on a speech act in characterizing it as having a null direction of fit, as opposed to having no direction of fit at all. [ 5 ]

Direction of fit is also not so fine-grained as to enable us to distinguish speech acts meriting different treatment. Consider asserting that the center of the Milky Way is inhabited by a black hole, as opposed to conjecturing that the center of the Milky Way is so inhabited. These two acts seem subject to norms: The former purports to be a manifestation of knowledge, while the latter does not. This is suggested by the fact that it is appropriate to reply to the assertion with, “How do you know?”, while that is not an appropriate response to the conjecture. (Williamson 1996) Nevertheless, both the assertion and conjecture have word-to-world direction of fit. Might there be other notions enabling us to mark differences between speech acts with the same direction of fit? This is not to say that the difference between assertion and conjecture cannot be expressed as a difference among Searle and Vanderveken's seven components of illocutionary force; for instance that difference might be thought of as a difference in parameter 2, namely the degree of strength of illocutionary point. Rather, what we are seeking is an account of, rather than a label for, that difference.

One suggestion might come from the related notion of conditions of satisfaction . This notion generalizes that of truth. As we saw in 2.3, it is internal to the activity of assertion that it aims to capture how things are. When an assertion does so, not only is it true, it has hit its target; the aim of the assertion has been met. A similar point may be made of imperatives: It is internal to the activity of issuing an imperative that the world is enjoined to conform to it. The imperative is satisfied just in case it is fulfilled. Assertions and imperatives both have conditions of satisfaction–truth in the first place, and conformity in the second. In addition, it might be held that questions have answerhood as their conditions of satisfaction: A question hits its target just in case it finds an answer, typically in a speech act, performed by an addressee, such as an assertion that answers the question posed. Like the notion of direction of fit, however, the notion of conditions of satisfaction is too coarse-grained to enable us to make some valuable distinctions among speech acts. Just to use our earlier case again: An assertion and a conjecture that P have identical conditions of satisfaction, namely that P be the case. May we discern features distinguishing these two speech acts, and that may enable us to make finer-grained distinctions among other speech acts as well? I shall return to this question in Section 7.

5. Mood, Force and Convention

Just as content underdetermines force and force underdetermines content; so too even grammatical mood together with content underdetermine force. ‘You'll be more punctual in the future’ is in the indicative grammatical mood, but as we have seen that fact does not determine its force. The same may be said of other grammatical moods. Although I overhear you utter the words, ‘shut the door’, I cannot infer yet that you are issuing a command. Perhaps instead you are simply describing your own intention, in the course of saying, “I intend to shut the door.” If so, you've used the imperative mood without issuing a command. So too with the interrogative mood: I overhear your words, ‘who is on the phone.’ Thus far I don't know whether you've asked a question. After all, you may have so spoken in the course of stating, “John wonders who is on the phone.” Might either or both of initial capitalization or final punctuation settle the issue? Apparently not: What puzzles John is the following question: Who is on the phone?

Mood together with content underdetermine force. On the other hand it is a plausible hypothesis that grammatical mood is one of the devices we use, together with contextual clues, intonation and so on to indicate the force with which we are expressing a content. Understood in this weak way, it is unexceptionable to construe the interrogative mood as used for asking questions, the imperatival mood as used for issuing commands, and so on. So understood, we might go on to ask how speakers indicate the force of their speech acts given that grammatical mood and content cannot be relied on alone to do so.

One well known answer we may term force conventionalism . According to a strong version of this view, for every speech act that is performed, there is some convention that will have been invoked in order to make that speech act occur. This convention transcends those imbuing words with their literal meaning. Thus, force conventionalism implies that in order for use of ‘I promise to meet you tomorrow at noon,’ to constitute a promise, not only must the words used possess their standard conventional meanings, there must also exist a convention to the effect that the use, under the right conditions, of some such words as these constitutes a promise. J.L. Austin, who introduced the English-speaking world to the study of speech acts, seems to have held this view. For instance in his characterization of “felicity conditions” for speech acts, Austin holds that for each speech act

There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances… (1962, p. 14).

Austin's student Searle follows him in this, writing

…utterance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts in the way in which, e.g., making an X on a ballot paper stands to voting. (1969, p. 24)

Searle goes on to clarify this commitment in averring,

…the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and …speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering sentences in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules. (1969, p. 37)

Searle espouses a weaker form of force conventionalism than does Austin in leaving open the possibility that some speech acts can be performed without constitutive rules; Searle considers the case of a dog requesting to be let outside (1969, p. 39). Nevertheless Searle does contend that speech acts are characteristically performed by invoking constitutive rules.

Force-conventionalism, even in the weaker form just adumbrated, has been challenged by Strawson, who writes,

I do not want to deny that there may be conventional postures or procedures for entreating: one can, for example, kneel down, raise one's arms, and say, “I entreat you.” But I do want to deny that an act of entreaty can be performed only as conforming to such conventions….[T]o suppose that there is always and necessarily a convention conformed to would be like supposing that there could be no love affairs which did not proceed on lines laid down in the Roman de la Rose or that every dispute between men must follow the pattern specified in Touchstone's speech about the countercheck quarrelsome and the lie direct. (1964, p. 444)

Strawson contends that rather than appealing to a series of extra-semantic conventions to account for the possibility of speech acts, we explain that possibility in terms of our ability to discern one another's communicative intentions. What makes an utterance of a sentence in the indicative mood a prediction rather than a command, for instance, is that it is intended to be so taken; likewise for promises rather than predictions. This position is compatible with holding that in special cases linguistic communities have instituted conventions for particular speech acts such as entreating and excommunicating.

Intending to make an assertion, promise, or request, however, is not enough to perform one of these acts. Those intentions must be efficacious. The same point applies to cases of trying to perform a speech act, even when what one is trying to do is clear to others. This fact emerges from reflecting on an oft-quoted passage from Searle:

Human communication has some extraordinary properties, not shared by most other kinds of human behavior. One of the most extraordinary is this: If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what it is I am trying to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it to him. (1969, p. 47.)

An analogous point would not apply to the act of sending : Just from the facts that I am trying to send my addressee something, and that he recognizes that I am trying to do so (and what it is I am trying to send him), we cannot infer that I have succeeded in sending it to him. However, while Searle's point about telling looks more plausible at first glance than would a point about sending, it also is not accurate. Suppose I am trying to tell somebody that I love her, and that she recognizes this fact on the basis of background knowledge, my visible embarrassment, and my inability to get past the letter ‘l’. Here we cannot infer that I have succeeded in avowing my love for her. Nothing short of coming out and saying it will do. Similarly, it might be common knowledge that my moribund uncle is trying, as he breathes his last, to bequeath me his fortune; still, I won't inherit a penny if he expires before saying what he was trying to. [ 6 ]

The gist of these examples is not the requirement that words be uttered in every speech act–we have already observed that speech acts can be performed silently. Rather, its gist is that speech acts involve intentional undertaking of one or another form of commitment; further, that commitment is not undertaken simply by virtue of my intending to undertake it, even when it is common knowledge that this is what I am trying to do. Can we, however, give a more illuminating characterization of the relevant intentions than merely saying that, for instance, to assert P one must intentionally put forth P as an assertion? [ 7 ] Strawson (1964) proposes that we can do so with aid of the notion of speaker meaning–a topic to which I now turn.

6. Speaker-Meaning and Force

As we have seen, that A is an important component of communication, and that A underdetermines B , do not justify the conclusion that B is an important component of communication. One reason for an asymmetry in our treatment of force and decibel level is that the former, but not the latter, seems to be a component of speaker meaning. I intend to speak at a certain volume, and sometimes succeed, but in most cases it is no part of what I mean that I happen to be speaking at the volume that I do. On the other hand, the force of my utterance is part of what I mean. It is not, as we have seen, part of what I say–that notion being closely associated with content. However, whether I mean what I say as an assertion, a conjecture, a promise or something else will be a feature of how I mean what I do.

Let us elucidate this notion of speaker meaning (née non-natural meaning). In his influential 1957 article, Grice distinguished between two senses of ‘mean’. One sense is exemplified by remarks such as ‘Those clouds mean rain,’ and ‘Those spots mean measles.’ The notion of meaning in play in such cases Grice dubs ‘natural meaning’. Grice suggests that we may distinguish this sense of ‘mean’ from another sense of the word more relevant to communication, exemplified in such utterances as

In saying “You make a better door than a window”, George meant that you should move,

In gesticulating that way, Salvatore means that there's quicksand over there,

Grice used the term ‘non-natural meaning’ for this sense of ‘mean’, and in more recent literature this jargon has been replaced with the term ‘speaker meaning’. [ 8 ] After distinguishing between natural and (what we shall heretofore call) speaker meaning, Grice attempts to characterize the latter. It is not enough that I do something that influences the beliefs of an observer: In putting on a coat I might lead an observer to conclude that I am going for a walk. Yet in such a case it is not plausible that I mean that I am going for a walk in the sense germane to speaker meaning. Might performing an action with an intention of influencing someone's beliefs be sufficient for speaker meaning? No: I might leave Smith's handkerchief at the crime scene to make the police think that Smith is the culprit. However, whether or not I am successful in getting the authorities to think that Smith is the culprit, in this case it is not plausible that I mean that Smith is the culprit.

What is missing in the handkerchief example is the element of overtness. This suggests another criterion: Performing an action with the, or an, intention of influencing someone's beliefs, while intending that this very intention be recognized. Grice contends that even here we do not have enough for speaker meaning. Herod presents Salome with St. John's severed head on a charger, intending that she discern that St. John is dead and intending that this very intention of his be recognized. Grice observes that in so doing Herod is not telling Salome anything, but is instead deliberately and openly letting her know something. Grice concludes that Herod's action is not a case of speaker meaning either. The problem is not that Herod is not using words; we have already considered hunters who mean things wordlessly. The problem seems to be that to infer what Herod intends her to, Salome does not have to take his word for anything. She can see the severed head for herself if she can bring herself to look. By contrast, in its central uses, telling requires a speaker to intend to convey information (or alleged information) in a way that relies crucially upon taking her at her word. Grice appears to assume that at least for the case in which what is meant is a proposition (rather than a question or an imperative), speaker meaning requires a telling in this central sense. What is more, this last example is a case of performing an action with an intention of influencing someone's beliefs, even while intending that this very intention be recognized; yet it is not a case of telling. Grice infers that it is not a case of speaker meaning either.

Grice holds that for speaker meaning to occur, not only must one (a) intend to produce an effect on an audience, and (b) intend that this very intention be recognized by that audience, but also (c) one must intend this effect on the audience to be produced at least in part by their recognition of the speaker's intention. The intention to produce a belief or other attitude by means (at least in part) of recognition of this very intention, has come to be called a reflexive communicative intention .

It has, however, been shown that intentions to produce cognitive or other effects on an audience are not necessary for speaker meaning. Davis 1992 offers many cases of speaker meaning in the absence of reflexive communicative intentions. Indeed, he forcefully argues that speaker meaning can occur without a speaker intending to produce any beliefs in an audience. [ 9 ] [ 10 ] Instead of intentions to produce certain effects in an audience, some authors have proposed that speaker meaning is a matter of overtly indicating some aspect of oneself. (Green, 2007). Compare my going to the closet to take out my overcoat (not a case of speaker meaning), with the following case: After heatedly arguing about the weather, I march to the closet while beadily meeting your stare, then storm out the front door while ostentatiously donning the coat. Here it's a lot more plausible that I mean that it's raining outside, and the reason seems to be that I am making some attitude of mine overt: I am not only showing it, I am making clear my intention to do just that.

How does this help to elucidate the notion of force? One way of asserting that P , it seems, is overtly to manifest my commitment to P , and indeed commitment of a particular kind: commitment to defend P in response to challenges of the form, “How do you know that?” I must also overtly manifest my liability to be either right or wrong on the issue of P depending on whether P is the case. By contrast, I conjecture P by overtly manifesting my commitment to P in this same “liability to error” way; but I am not committed to responding to challenges demanding justification. I must, however, give some reason for believing P ; this much cannot, however, be said of a guess.

We perform a speech act, then, when we overtly commit ourselves in a certain way to a content–where that way is an aspect of how we speaker-mean that content. One way to do that is to invoke a convention for undertaking commitment; another way is overtly to manifest one's intention to be so committed. We may elucidate the relevant forms of commitment by spelling out the norms underlying them. We have already adumbrated such an approach in our discussion of the differences among asserting and conjecturing. Developing that discussion a bit further, compare

• conjecturing

All three of these acts have word-to-world direction of fit, and all three have conditions of satisfaction mandating that they are satisfied just in case the world is as their content says it is. Further, one who asserts, conjectures, or guesses that P is right or wrong on the issue of P depending on whether P is in fact so. However, as we move from left to right we find a decreasing order of stringency in commitment. One who asserts P lays herself open to the challenge, “How do you know that?”, and she is obliged to retract P if she is unable to respond to that challenge adequately. By contrast, this challenge is inappropriate for either a conjecture or a guess. On the other hand, we may justifiably demand of the conjecturer that she give some reason for her conjecture; yet not even this much may be said of one who makes a guess. (The “educated guess” is intermediate between these two cases.)

We may think of this illocutionary dimension of speaker meaning as characterizing not what is meant, but rather how it is meant. Just as we may consider your remark, directed toward me, “You're tired,” and my remark, “I'm tired,” as having said the same thing but in different ways; so too we may consider my assertion of P , followed by a retraction and then followed by a conjecture of P , as two consecutive cases in which I speaker-mean that P but do so in different ways. This idea will be developed a bit further in Section 9 under the rubric of “mode” of illocutionary commitment.

Speaker meaning, then, applies not just to content but also to force, and we may elucidate that claim with a further articulation of the normative structure characteristic of each speech act: When you overtly display a commitment characteristic of that speech act, you have performed that speech act. Is this a necessary condition as well? That depends on whether I can perform a speech act without intending to do so—a topic for Section 9 below. For now, however, compare the view at which we have arrived with Searle's view that one performs a speech act when others become aware of one's intention, or at least one's attempt, to perform that act. What is missing from Searle's characterization is the notion of overtness: The agent in question must not only make her intention to undertake a certain commitment manifest; she must also intend that that very intention be manifest. There is more to overtness than wearing one's heart (or mind) on one's sleeve.

7. Force, Norms, and Conversation

In elucidating this normative dimension of force, we have brought speech acts into their conversational context. That is not to say that speech acts can only be performed in the setting of a conversation: I can approach you, point out that your vehicle is blocking mine, and storm off. Here I have made an assertion but have not engaged in a conversation. Perhaps I can ask myself a question in the privacy of my study and leave it at that–not continuing into a conversation with myself. However, it might reasonably be held that a speech act's ecological niche is nevertheless the conversation. In that spirit, while we may be able to remove it from its environment and scrutinize it in isolated captivity, doing so may leave us blind to some of its distinctive features.

This ecological analogy sheds light on a dispute over the question whether speech acts can profitably be studied in isolation from the conversations in which they occur. An empiricist framework, exemplified in John Stuart Mill's, A System of Logic , suggests attempting to discern the meaning of a word, for instance a proper name, in isolation. By contrast, Gottlob Frege (1884) enjoins us to understand a word's meaning in terms of the contribution it makes to an entire sentence. Such a method is indispensable for a proper treatment of such expressions as quantifiers, and represents a major advance over empiricist approaches. Yet students of speech acts have espoused going even further, insisting that the unit of significance is not the proposition but the speech act. Vanderveken writes,

Illocutionary acts are important for the purpose of philosophical semantics because they are the primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of natural language. (Vanderveken, 1990, p. 1.)

Why not go even further, since speech acts characteristically occur in conversations? Is the unit of significance really the debate, the colloquy, the interrogation?

Students of so-called conversation analysis have contended precisely this, remarking that many speech acts fall naturally into pairs. [ 11 ] For instance, questions pair naturally with assertions when the latter purport to be answers. Likewise, offers pair naturally with acceptances or rejections, and it is easy to multiply examples. Searle, who favors studying speech acts in isolation, has replied to these considerations (Searle 1992). There he issues a challenge to students of conversation to provide an account of conversations parallel to that of speech acts, arguing as well that the prospects for such an account are dim. One of his reasons is that unlike speech acts conversations do not as such have a point or purpose. More recently, Asher and Lascardes 2003 have defended a more systematic treatment of speech acts in their conversational setting that responds to Searle's challenge.

Much literature concerned with speech acts is curiously disconnected from certain traditions flowing from work in the semantics of natural language emphasizing pragmatic factors. For instance, Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974) Lewis (1979, 1980), Thomason (1990) and others have developed models of the evolution of conversations aimed at understanding the role of quantification, presupposition (both semantic and pragmatic), anaphora, deixis, and vagueness in discourse. Such models typically construe conversations as involving an ever-developing set of propositions (construed as the conversational “common ground”) that can be presupposed by interlocutors. (Such propositions may, but need not be, understood as sets of possible worlds.) Other parameters characterizing a conversation at a given point include the domain of discourse, a set of salient perceptible objects, standards of precision, time, world or situation, speaker, addressee, and so forth. The set of all values for these items at a given conversational moment is often referred to as “conversational score”.

“Scorekeeping” approaches to language use typically construe a contribution to a conversation as a proposition: If that “assertion” is accepted, then the score is updated accordingly. Little attention is paid to the question whether that proposition is put forth as a conjecture, guess, assertion, or supposition for the sake of argument. An enrichment of the scorekeeping model would do just this. Accordingly Green 1999 attempts a synthesis of some aspects of this scorekeeping model, Gricean pragmatics, and concepts pertaining to speech acts.

Frege's Begriffschrift constitutes history's first thoroughgoing attempt to formulate a rigorous formal system. However, Frege did not see his Begriffschrift as merely a tool for assessing the validity of arguments. Rather, he appears to have seen it as an organon for the acquisition of knowledge from unquestionable first principles; in addition he wanted to use it in order to help make clear the epistemic foundations on which our knowledge rests. To this end his formal system contains not only symbols indicating the content of propositions (including logical constants), but also symbols indicating the force with which they are put forth. In particular, Frege insists that when using his formal system to acquire new knowledge from proposition already known, we use an assertion sign to indicate our acknowledgment of the truth of the proposition used as axioms or inferred therefrom. Frege thus employs what would now be called a force indicator : an expression whose use indicates the force with which an associated proposition is being put forth. (Green 2002).

Reichenbach expands upon Frege's idea in his 1947. In addition to using an assertion sign, Reichenbach also uses indicators of interrogative and imperatival force. Hare similarly introduces force indicators to lay bare the way in which ethical and cognate utterances are made (Hare 1970). Davidson, however, challenges the value of this entire enterprise, arguing that since natural language already contains many devices for indicating the force of one's speech act, the only interest in a force indicator would be if it could guarantee the force of one's speech act. But nothing could: Any device purporting to be, say, an infallible indicator of assertoric force is liable to being used by a joker or actor to heighten the realism of her performance:

It is easy to see that merely speaking the sentence in the strengthened mood cannot be counted on to result in an assertion; every joker, storyteller, and actor will immediately take advantage of the strengthened mood to simulate assertion. There is no point, then, in the strengthened mood; the available indicative does as well as language can do in the service of assertion (Davidson 1979, p. 311).

Dummett 1993 and Hare 1989 reply to Davidson. Hare in particular remarks that there could be a society with a convention that utterance of a certain expression constituted performance of a certain illocutionary act. Green 1997 questions the relevance of this observation to the issue of illocutionary acts, which, as we have seen, seem to require intentions for their performance. Just as no convention could make it the case that I believe that P (though perhaps a convention could make it the case that people say I believe that P ), so too no convention could make it the case that I intend to put forth a certain sentence as an assertion.

On the other hand, Green 1997 and Green 2000 also observe that even if there can be no force indicator in the sense Davidson criticizes, nothing prevents natural language from containing devices that indicate force conditional upon one's performing a speech act: Such a force indicator would not show whether one is performing a speech act, but, given that one is doing so, which speech act one is performing. For instance, parenthetical expressions such as, ‘as is the case’ can occur in the antecedent of conditionals, as in: ‘If, as is the case, the globe is warming, then Greenland will melt.’ Use of the parenthetical cannot guarantee that the sentence or any part of it is being asserted, but if the entire sentence is being asserted, then, Green claims, use of the parenthetical guarantees that the speaker is committed to the content of the antecedent. If that claim is correct, natural language already contains force indicators in this qualified sense. Whether it is worth introducing such force indicators into a logical notation remains an open question.

Students of speech acts contend, as we have seen, that the unit of communicative significance is the speech act rather than the proposition. This attitude prompts the question whether logic itself might be enriched by incorporating inferential relations among speech acts rather than just inferential relations among propositions. Since particulars cannot stand in inferential relations to one another, no such relations could obtain between individual speech acts. However, just as two events E 1 and E 2 (such as running quickly and running) could be logically related to one another in that it is not possible for one to occur without the other; so too speech act types S 1 and S 2 could be inferentially related to one another if it is not possible to perform one without performing the other. A warning that the bull is about to charge is also an assertion that the bull is about to charge but the converse is not true. This is in spite of the fact that these two speech acts have the same propositional content: That the bull is about to charge. If, therefore, warning implies asserting but not vice versa, then that inferential relation is not to be caught within the net of inferential relations among propositions.

In their Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (1985), Searle and Vanderveken attempt a general treatment of logical relations among speech acts. They describe their central question in terms of commitment:

A theory of illocutionary logic of the sort we are describing is essentially a theory of illocutionary commitment as determined by illocutionary force. The single most important question it must answer is this: Given that a speaker in a certain context of utterance performs a successful illocutionary act of a certain form, what other illocutions does the performance of that act commit him to? (1985, p. 6)

To explicate their notion of illocutionary commitment, these authors invoke their definition of illocutionary force in terms of the seven values mentioned in Section 2.3 above. On the basis of this definition, they define two notions pertinent to entailment relations among speech acts, namely strong illocutionary commitment and weak illocutionary commitment . According to the former definition, an illocutionary act S 1 commits a speaker to another illocutionary act S 2 iff it is not possible to perform S 1 without performing S 2 . Whether that relation holds between a pair of illocutionary acts depends on the particular septuples with which they are identified. Thus suppose that S 1 is identical with <IP 1 , Str " , Mode 1 , Cont 1 , Prep 1 , Sinc 1 , Stresinc 1 > (corresponding to illocutionary point, strength, mode of achievement, propositional content, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and strength of sincerity condition, respectively); and suppose that S 2 is identical with <IP 1 , Str $ , Mode 1 , Cont 1 , Prep 1 , Sinc 1 , Stresinc 1 >. Suppose further that Str " and Str $ differ only in that " is stronger than $. Then it will not be possible to perform S 1 without performing S 2 ; whence the former strongly illocutionarily implies the latter. (This definition of strong illocutionary commitment generalizes in a straightforward way to the case in which a set of speech acts S 1 , …, S n -1 implies a speech act S n .)

Performance of a speech act or set of speech acts can also commit an agent to a distinct content, and do so relative to some force. If P and Q jointly imply R , then my asserting both P and Q commits me to R . That is not to say that I have also asserted R : If assertion were closed under deduction I would assert infinitely many things just by virtue of asserting one. By contrast, if I conjecture P and Q , then I am once again committed to R but not in the way that I would have been had I asserted P and Q . For instance, in the assertion case, once my further commitment to R is made clear, it is within the rights of my addressee to ask how I know that R holds; this would not have been an acceptable reply to my merely conjecturing P and Q .

To explicate this relation, Searle and Vanderveken define weak illocutionary commitment: S 1 weakly illocutionarily implies S 2 iff every performance of S 1 commits an agent to meeting the conditions laid down in the septuple identical to S 2 (1985, p. 24). Searle and Vanderveken infer that this implies that if P logically entails Q , and an agent asserts P , then she is committed to believing that Q . These authors stress, however, that this does not mean that the agent who asserts P is committed to cultivating the belief Q when P implies Q . In lieu of that explication, however, it is unclear just what notion of commitment is at issue. It is unclear, for instance, what it could mean to be committed to believing Q (rather than just being committed to Q ) if this is not to be explicated as being committed to cultivating the belief that Q .

Other approaches attempt to circumvent such problems by reductively defining the notion of commitment in terms of obligations to action and liability to error and/or vindication. Let S be an arbitrary speaker, < ⊢ l A l , …, ⊢ n A n , ⊢ B > a sequence of force/content pairs; then:

<⊢ l A l , …, ⊢ n A n , ⊢ B > is illocutionarily valid iff if speaker S is committed to each A i under mode ⊢ i , then S is committed to B under mode ⊢. [ 12 ]

Because it concerns what force/content pairs commit an agent to what others, illocutionary validity is an essentially deontic notion: It will be cashed out in terms either of obligation to use a content in a certain way conversationally, or liability to error or vindication depending upon how the world is.

Our discussion of the possibility of an illocutionary logic answers one question posed at the end of Section 6.3, namely whether it is possible to perform a speech act without intending to do so. This seems likely given Searle and Vanderveken's definition of strong illocutionary commitment: We need only imagine an agent performing some large number of speech acts, S 1 , …, S n -1 , which, unbeknownst to her, jointly guarantee that she fulfills the seven conditions defining another speech act S n . Evidently such a “strict liability” conception still requires that one performs S n only by virtue of intentionally performing some other set of speech acts S 1 , …, S n -1 ; it is difficult to see how one can perform S n while having no intention of performing a speech act at all.

We have also made progress on a question raised in Section 1, namely whether “speech act theory” deserves its name. An appropriate definition of illocutions would enable us to explain, rather than merely describe, some features of speech acts. Vanderveken 1990 offers a set of tableaux depicting inferential relations among speech acts. For instance, the following is a fragment of his tableaux for assertives–speech acts whose illocutionary point is to describe how things are:

castigate  reprimand  accuse  blame  criticize  assert  suggest

where strong illocutionary validity moves from left to right. This is because all these speech acts have the illocutionary point of describing how things are, but the propositional content conditions and degree of strength of illocutionary point conditions become increasingly less stringent as we move from left to right. Accounts of this sort offer hope of our being able informatively answer such questions whether someone who castigates an addressee for some state of affairs is also assertorically committed to the obtaining of that state of affairs. Might we discover “illocutionary tautologies”, “illocutionary absurdities” and other phenomena that could shed light on such utterances as “This very utterance is an assertion”, “I doubt this very claim”? Affirmative answers to such questions will be needed if we are to justify our use of “speech act theory”.

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SPEECH ACT THEORY

INTRODUCTION

The speech act theory considers language as a sort of action rather than a medium to convey and express. The contemporary Speech act theory developed by J. L. Austin a British philosopher of languages, he introduced this theory in 1975 in his well-known book of ‘How do things with words’.  Later John Searle brought the aspects of theory into much higher dimensions. This theory is often used in the field of philosophy of languages. Austin is the one who came up with the findings that people not only uses that language to assert things but also to do things. And people who followed him went to greater depths based on this point.

All sort of linguist communication are comprised of linguistic actions. Previously it was conceived that the very basic unit of communication is words, Symbols, sentences or some kind of token of all of these, but it was speech act theory which suggested that production or issuances if words, symbols are the basic units of communication. This issuance happens during the process of performance of speech act. The meaning of these basic units was considered as the building blocks of mutual understanding between the people intend to communicate.

“ A theory of language is a theory of action”- Greig E. Henderson and Christopher Brown.

The theory emphasis that the utterances have a different or specific meaning to its user and listener other than its meaning according to the language. The theory further identify that there are two kinds of utterances, they are called constative and performative utterances.  In his book of ‘How do things with words’ Austin clearly talks about the disparities between the constative and performative utterances.

A constative utterances is something which describes or denotes the situation, in relation with the fact of true or false.

Example: The teacher asked Olivia whether she had stolen the candy. Olivia replies “mmmmmm”. Here the utterances of Olivia describes the event in pact of answering her teacher whether the situation was true or false.

The performative utterances is something which do not describes anything at all. The utterances in the sentences or in the part of sentences are normally considered as having a meaning of its own. The feelings, attitudes, emotions and thoughts of the person performing linguistic act are much of a principal unit here.

Example: Bane and Sarah have been dating for the past four years. One fine evening Bane took Sarah to the most expensive restaurant in town. And he ordered the most expensive wine available in the restaurant. Then he moved closer to her and asked her that “ will you marry me?”. Sarah burst with contentment and replied “I will”. Here the “I will” of Sarah express her feelings, attitudes and emotional towards the context. This utterances have its specific meaning only in relation to it specific context.

Further Austin divides his linguistic act into three different categories. They are,

• Locutionary act – This is the act of saying something. It has a meaning and it creates an understandable utterly to convey or express
• Illocutionary act –  It is performed as an act of saying something or as an act of opposed to saying something. The illocutionary utterance has a certain force of it. It well well-versed with certain tones, attitudes, feelings, or emotions. There will be an intention of the speaker or others in illocutionary utterance. It is often used as a tone of warning in day today life
• Perlocutionary act – It normally creates a sense of consequential effects on the audiences. The effects may be in the form of thoughts, imaginations, feelings or emotions. The effect upon the addressee is the main charactership of perlocutionary utterances

For example

The locutionary act describes a dangerous situation, the illocutionary act acts as a force of the warning and perlocutionary acts frighten the addressee.

Austin himself admits that these three components of utterances are not altogether separable.“We must consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued- the total speech act – if we are to see the parallel between statements and performative utterance, and how each can go wrong. Perhaps indeed there is no great distinction between statements and performative utterances.” Austin.

Searle suggested that the basic unit of linguistic communication is speech act. It can be a word, a phrase, a sentence or a sound, it should fulfil the task of expressing the intention of the user.  Understanding the user’s intention can lead to complete understanding of the speech act.

The context of speech act is in the context of situation than explanation. The speech act borrows it ideas from structuralism. The indirect speech act of John Searle was developed based on Austin’s speech act.

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It has written in fabulous manner!!

lookie here

It is a nice script

very triggering to think more about language as cognition, languange as emotion, and language as action

please give us more example of the three levels of speech acts

The simplest and easiest explanation there is. Brief but direct to the point. 🙂

Till now i cannot get it,dod Austen devide Speech acts into constative and performative OR locutionary,illocutionary ,perlocutionary???

It’s a wonderful piece and wish to get more

learned a lot. Thanks!

Article is insightful and straight forward. Thumbs up.

Learned great from it

I do agree with Mari that more specific example is needed for each classification. Without such example， we are still hanging with those philosophical words.

Very impressive!

Thank you, for your contribution.

İ needed to read this twice to understand. The theory isn’t easy to understand in my opinion.

I got a little confusion on locutionary , illocutionary & perlocutionar also in the perforamtive & constative I’ m asking for more examples that I can be well on it.. but the rest are perfect understandable..

Very impressive, direct to the point hence easy to understand,, thanks much…!!

Nicely explained in precise manner.

Nice material

Really helpful for my graduation research and quoted some of it, I’m very grateful.

Paul C. Hoffman dice

Really helpful for my research Nice material

Thank you for this explanation!

Good explanation

Well develop and simple

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Communication Theory

Debate Fact Check: Harris and Trump on the Economy, Immigration and Abortion

The 2024 presidential candidates clashed on their records and their visions for the country’s future in a high-stakes debate.

By The New York Times

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Luke Broadwater

“I had nothing to do” with Jan. 6

— Former President Donald J. Trump

Trump and his allies spread lies for months about vast fraud that they falsely claimed stole the 2020 election from him. His supporters then organized a large rally near the White House designed to pressure Congress to overturn his loss. Trump encouraged the crowd to attend, promising it would be “wild.” He urged his supporters to march to the Capitol, where the rally turned into a violent riot that injured about 150 police officers. He faces federal felony charges of plotting to overturn the 2020 election and similar charges in Georgia.

Sheryl Gay Stolberg

“Now she wants to do transgender operations on illegal aliens that are in prison.”

This needs context..

Trump is referring to Harris’s response to a 2019 American Civil Liberties Union questionnaire , in which she said she supported using taxpayer funds to give access to gender-affirming care to transgender and nonbinary people, including those in immigration detention and prison.

CNN reported on the survey earlier this week, in a segment that drew sharp criticism from supporters of gay, lesbian and transgender people. The survey asked: “As president, will you use your executive authority to ensure that transgender and nonbinary people who rely on the state for medical care — including those in prison and immigration detention — will have access to comprehensive treatment associated with gender transition, including all necessary surgical care? If yes, how will you do so?”

Harris answered yes, writing, “It is important that transgender individuals who rely on the state for care receive the treatment they need, which includes access to treatment associated with gender transition. That’s why, as attorney general, I pushed the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to provide gender transition surgery to state inmates. I support policies ensuring that federal prisoners and detainees are able to obtain medically necessary care for gender transition, including surgical care, while incarcerated or detained. Transition treatment is a medical necessity, and I will direct all federal agencies responsible for providing essential medical care to deliver transition treatment.”

In an interview on Tuesday morning on Fox News, Michael Tyler, Harris’s campaign communications director, sought to distance Harris from the statement without disavowing it. “That questionnaire is not what she is proposing or running on,” Tyler said.

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Hamed Aleaziz

“In Springfield, they’re eating the dogs. The people that came in, they’re eating the cats. They’re eating — they’re eating the pets of the people that live there.”

A spokeswoman for the city of Springfield, Ohio, said this week that despite viral social media posts that have been promoted by Trump and his supporters, “there have been no credible reports or specific claims of pets being harmed, injured or abused by individuals within the immigrant community.” A Clark County, Ohio, official said that they “have absolutely no evidence of this happening.”

Alexandra Berzon

“A lot of these illegal immigrants coming in —” Democrats are “trying to get them to vote.”

This lacks evidence..

In recent months, Trump and other Republicans have frequently made the false claim that there’s a major crisis of noncitizens illegally voting in federal elections . They often claim, with no evidence, that Democrats are trying to get undocumented immigrants to vote in order to cheat their way to electoral victory.

In fact, people who are not U.S. citizens already face fines or imprisonment for voting in federal elections under a 1996 law. And experts point to data indicating that cases of noncitizens voting are rare and nowhere near the threshold to sway an election. Instance of undocumented people doing so are even rarer . Registrants to vote have to swear under penalty of perjury that they are citizens, and some states check for citizenship against federal databases.

Organizations including the left-leaning Brennan Center , the conservative Heritage Foundation and the libertarian Cato Institute that have examined the legal system, registration records or election offices for cases of citizenship fraud have found very few examples.

Jeanna Smialek

“We have inflation like very few people have ever seen before. Probably the worst in our nation’s history: We were at 21 percent.”

Inflation was higher by standard measures during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Consumer Price Index peaked at 9.1 percent in 2022, less than in that earlier episode. Analysts will sometimes argue that if one adjusts for a methodological change to how housing is measured, recent inflation has rivaled that episode, which may be what Trump is referencing. In any case, it is not true that America’s recent inflation episode is the world leader, as one can see by looking at international data

“All I can say is I read where she was not Black. That she put out. And I’ll say that and then I read that she was Black, and that’s OK. Either one was OK with me.”

It’s unclear what Trump read, but Vice President Kamala Harris has always identified as Black and South Asian during her time in public office. Harris wrote in her 2019 memoir that “my mother understood very well that she was raising two Black daughters.”

Harris joined Alpha Kappa Alpha, a sorority for Black women , at Howard University, a historically Black university. She was also the president of the Black Law Students Association at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. A 1999 Los Angeles Times article mentioning Harris, then an assistant district attorney in San Francisco, referred to her as a “liberal African American” prosecutor, and a 2000 San Francisco Examiner article called Harris a leader in the city’s Black community.

She first ran for public office in 2002 for San Francisco district attorney and, when she won her race, became the state’s first Black district attorney. She appeared on a panel as an emerging leader in the Black community in a 2006 conference. And in a 2009 speech to a Los Angeles-area high school about Black history, Harris spoke of her personal history as intertwined with that of the civil rights movement, alluding to how her parents “organized” in the streets during the 1960s.

Michael Crowley

“As of today, there is not one member of the United States military who is in active duty in a combat zone, in any war zone around the world, for the first time this century.”

— Vice President Kamala Harris

No U.S. troops are fighting in an all-out war like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. But thousands of American troops have become entangled in hostilities around the Middle East since the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks.

President Biden has deployed numerous warships and fighter jets to Israel’s coast, and U.S. forces have intercepted Iranian missiles and drones fired at Israel. They have also launched dozens of airstrikes against Yemen’s Houthi militants. American forces have also suffered casualties: Three U.S. service members based in Jordan were killed in January by an attack drone, and two Navy Seals drowned earlier in February during anti-Houthi operations. Iranian-backed militias have also repeatedly attacked U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria, causing multiple injuries.

Zolan Kanno-Youngs

“Crime here is up and through the roof.”

The claim is factually incorrect. While there was an increase in crime during the pandemic, various studies have shown violent crime has now dropped to the lowest level in decades. Despite public perception of lawlessness, violent crime was higher in 2020 under Mr. Trump than under President Biden so far. The violent crime rate was 380.7 per 100,000 people in 2022, according to police agencies’ data gathered by the F.B.I. That was a lower rate than in all but three years — 2013, 2014 and 2015 — since 1985. Preliminary analysis from the F.B.I. suggested that violent crime decreased 15.2 percent in the first quarter of 2024 from the same period in 2023 , with an even greater drop of 18 percent in cities with more than one million people. Still, some studies have found that shoplifting and motor vehicle theft increased in 2023.

Kate Zernike

“Her vice-presidential pick says abortion in the ninth month is absolutely fine. He also says execution after birth. It’s execution, no longer abortion, because the baby is born is, OK, and that’s not OK with me.”

Abortion terminates a pregnancy, so “abortion after birth” is a contradiction. Killing a child after birth is infanticide, which is illegal in all 50 states. Vice President Kamala Harris has said she wants to restore the abortion rights established in Roe v. Wade. Roe, the 1973 Supreme Court decision overturned in 2022, allowed states to prohibit abortion in the third trimester — the seventh, eighth and ninth months of pregnancy — so long as they made exceptions to save the health and life of the mother. “Late term” is defined as 41 weeks, or just beyond nine months. According to federal data , less than 1 percent of all abortions take place after the 20th week of pregnancy; 93 percent are at or before 13 weeks. Minnesota, where the Democrat vice-presidential nominee, Tim Walz, is governor, is one of the few states to allow abortion at any stage of pregnancy . But allowing abortions at that stage does not mean that doctors perform them. State data for 2022 , the most recent available, shows that of the 12,175 abortions in the state that year, only two happened between 25 and 30 weeks of pregnancy, and none after the 30th week of pregnancy, which is roughly the start of the third trimester.

Ben Protess

“Every one of those cases was started by them against their political opponent.”

Trump’s claims that the Biden administration orchestrated his four criminal cases , including the one in Manhattan that led to his conviction in May on charges of falsifying records to cover up a sex scandal, has no basis in fact.

The Manhattan investigation began while Trump, not President Biden, was in office. The case was brought by the district attorney, Alvin L. Bragg, a local Democrat who does not answer to Biden or Vice President Kamala Harris. The same goes for Trump’s criminal case in Georgia, where a district attorney accused him of trying to overturn the 2020 election results in that state. And Trump’s two federal cases were brought by a special counsel, a semi-independent prosecutor who is accountable to the attorney general. While the attorney general is chosen by the president, the White House has no direct influence over the special counsel.

All of Trump’s legal challenges to the outcome of the 2020 election were dismissed on “technicalities” or the basis of “standing.”

This is false..

While some of the challenges to the last election were rejected on the basis of standing — that is, on the issue of whether the plaintiffs had the legal right to question the results and assert they had been harmed — there were some cases that were decided on the merits of whether there were improprieties in the race. And none of those cases were decided in Mr. Trump’s favor. One of the merits cases was decided in Wisconsin by Brett H. Ludwig, a federal judge appointed by Mr. Trump. “This court has allowed the plaintiff the chance to make his case,” Judge Ludwig wrote in his ruling, “and he has lost on the merits.”

Julian E. Barnes

“Putin endorsed her last week, said, ‘I hope she wins.’”

This is misleading..

Most observers believe that Vladimir V. Putin’s comments on Sept. 5 that he supported Vice President Kamala Harris were said in jest. The U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed that Putin supports the election of Trump. Documents released as part of an indictment against two employees of the Russian state broadcaster show the Kremlin developed a plan to influence swing state voters in favor of Trump. The Kremlin believes Trump will cut back, or end, U.S. military aid to Ukraine. While Trump has claimed that the invasion of Ukraine would not have taken place if he were president, there is little evidence that he would have taken action to deter Russia.

Helene Cooper

“They sent her in to negotiate with Zelensky and Putin, and she did, and the war started three days later.”

The vice president traveled to the Munich Security Conference in February 2022, in the days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that month. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine was there, and Harris met with him. Putin was not present.

Margot Sanger-Katz

“When Donald Trump was president, 60 times he tried to get rid of the Affordable Care Act — 60 times.”

As president, Trump did try to get rid of the Affordable Care Act, urging Republicans in Congress in 2017 to pass several bills to repeal and replace major portions of it. Those efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. Republicans in Congress had voted many times since the health law was enacted in 2010 to fully repeal or substantially modify Obamacare. Most of those attempts predated Trump’s presidency. Various analysts have tallied those efforts at 70 , or even 100 . But those very high counts include even proposed changes to the landmark legislation that were relatively minor — and some that had bipartisan support. Most failed to become law.

“I had a choice to make” on Obamacare. “Do I save it and make it as good as it can be? Or do I let it rot? And I saved it. I did the right thing.”

Trump did not “save” the health insurance law known as Obamacare; the United States Senate did, in defiance of him. During his first year in office, Trump asked Congress to pass legislation repealing the Affordable Care Act, the 2010 law that created the program. The Republican-controlled House approved the bill. But in a dramatic moment on Capitol Hill, Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican and nemesis of Trump, cast the decisive vote to defeat the proposal, just days after returning to the Senate after receiving a diagnosis of brain cancer. The vote was a surprise to Trump; he had cheered McCain’s return to Washington in a social media post calling the Arizona senator “brave” and a “hero,” apparently believing that he had come back to Congress to help kill — not save — Obamacare.

Andrew Duehren

“Over the last four years, we have invested $1 trillion in a clean energy economy.”

The current administration has facilitated a burst of private investment because of tax credits and other incentives included in the Inflation Reduction Act passed in 2022. According to the Clean Investment Monitor, which tracks investments, clean energy investment since 2021 has totaled roughly $700 billion. Some experts expect the clean energy incentives to eventually help drive more than $1 trillion in private investment.

“Donald Trump, the candidate, has said in this election there will be a blood bath if this, and the outcome of this election, is not to his liking.”

Harris is correct that Trump warned of a “blood bath” if he did not win the 2024 election, but Trump has contended that he was speaking about an economic blood bath and was focused on competition from Chinese electric vehicles.

Here is the full quote of what Trump said at rally in March, so readers can decide for themselves.

“If you’re listening, President Xi, and you and I are friends, but he understands the way I deal, those big monster car manufacturing plants that you’re building in Mexico right now, and you think you’re going to get that, you’re going to not hire Americans and you’re going to sell the cars to us, we’re going to put a 100 percent tariff on every single car that comes across the line, and you’re not going to be able to sell those cars if I get elected,” he said.

“Now, if I don’t get elected, it’s going to be a blood bath. That’s going to be the least of it. It’s going to be a blood bath for the country. That’ll be the least of it. But they’re not going to sell those cars,” he continued.

“We have millions of people pouring into our country from prisons and jails, from mental institutions and insane asylums.”

Immigration experts have said they could not corroborate Mr. Trump’s claims . The Trump campaign has previously cited a September 2022 article in Breitbart, a conservative website. One unnamed source told Breitbart that officials believed an unspecified number of Venezuelan prison inmates were headed for the United States’ southern border with Mexico. (No other news organization or government source has verified this report.)

The campaign also pointed to reports warning that Tren de Aragua, a transnational criminal gang founded in Venezuela, was growing in the United States. But none of this is evidence that “millions” of criminals are infiltrating the southern border.

Customs and Border Protection reported apprehending 47 members of Tren de Aragua along the southern border under Mr. Biden. Prison populations all over the world have been increasing, not decreasing. Penal Reform International, a Netherlands-based nonprofit, estimated that the global prison population was a record 11.5 million in 2023 , an increase of 500,000 people since 2020 .

“For years we were paying almost all of NATO. We were being ripped off by European nations, both on trade and on NATO. I got them to pay up.”

Trump incorrectly characterizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Member countries make direct contributions to the organization, based on national income, and also agree to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on their own defense.

Trump’s complaints led to NATO reducing the United States’ contribution to the common fund. Previously the United States paid about 22 percent of its central budget, and it dropped to 16 percent. And the number of countries meeting that 2 percent guideline increased to 10 from five in recent years.

Trump can claim some credit for increased spending, but it’s worth noting that countries pledged in 2014 to meet that goal within a decade.

Jim Tankersley

“The Trump administration resulted in a trade deficit — one of the highest we’ve ever seen in the history of America.”

In 2020, at the end of Donald J. Trump’s tenure in office, the trade deficit — the difference between how much the United States imports and how much it exports — was about $650 billion. That was lower than four years of the George W. Bush administration, and the first three years of the Biden-Harris administration.

Brad Plumer

“We had the largest increase in domestic oil production in history, because of an approach that recognizes that we cannot over-rely on foreign oil.”

U.S. crude oil production has indeed risen to record highs this year , though experts say that has little to do with actions taken by the Biden administration. Most oil production has occurred on private and state lands, where the federal government has little oversight. At times, President Biden has actually tried to restrict drilling on federal lands and waters in the name of tackling climate change, but the courts have frequently limited his ability to do so .

Lisa Friedman

Biden “ended the XL pipeline, the XL pipeline in our country. He ended that.”

On his first day in office, President Biden rescinded the construction permit for the Keystone XL oil pipeline , which would have transported carbon-heavy oil from the Canadian oil sands to the Gulf Coast. That same day, the sponsor of the project, TC Energy, a Canadian company, said that it was suspending work on the line.

Trump had revived the project after it stalled under the Obama administration, but it continued to face legal challenges that hampered construction. Opponents had fought the project for years over concerns that burning oil sands crude could make climate change worse and harder to reverse.

I “have built it into many, many billions of dollars; many, many billions.”

This is exaggerated..

Trump habitually exaggerates his wealth, so much so that the New York attorney general’s office sued him for fraudulently inflating his net worth, a case that led to a more than $450 million judgment against him .

In reality, he has about $400 million in cash, stocks and bonds, though if the New York case is upheld on appeal, it will essentially wipe out his liquid assets.

Much of his purported net worth is tied up in the real estate he owns. So when Trump says he is worth many billions, he appears to be referring to the value of that property. But property values fluctuate, and there is no reliable assessment of his assets. He also has a roughly $2 billion stake in his social media company, though he can’t yet access those shares and their value has plummeted in recent months.

“She wouldn’t even meet with Netanyahu when he went to Congress to make a very important speech. She refused to be there because she was at a sorority party of hers.”

It is true that when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel addressed Congress on July 19, Vice President Kamala Harris did not attend the speech. On that day she delivered a long-planned speech in Indiana to the national conference for Zeta Phi Beta, one of the country’s historically Black sororities. But Harris returned to Washington the next day for a meeting with Netanyahu .

“And when she ran, she was the first one to leave because she failed” in the 2020 Democratic presidential primary.

Harris dropped out of the Democratic primary in December 2019 , which came as a surprise given expectations surrounding her candidacy. But her exit was preceded by more than a dozen others , including prominent members of Congress, former and sitting governors and the mayor of New York City.

“She went out in Minnesota and wanted to let criminals that killed people, that burned down Minneapolis.”

After the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis and the protests that ensued, Vice President Kamala Harris posted on social media in June 2020 asking supporters “to help post bail for those protesting on the ground in Minnesota” by donating to the Minnesota Freedom Fund, a bail fund.

The fund used some of those money to bail out people who committed serious crimes. But Ms. Harris did not specifically call to release murderers from behind bars.

Michael D. Shear

“Remember that she was the border czar. She doesn’t want to be called the border czar because she’s embarrassed by the border.”

Harris was never appointed “border czar,” nor was she tasked with addressing border security. Rather, she had a role in addressing the root causes of migration in Central American countries. Moreover, she did visit the border in June 2021, where she toured an immigration facility in El Paso.

“By the way, Joe Biden was found essentially guilty on the documents case.”

A special counsel, Robert K. Hur, was appointed by Attorney General Merrick B. Garland to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute President Biden after his aides reported that classified documents from his time as vice president had been found in his possession. Hur spent months investigating Biden and in February issued a report in which he declined to bring charges against Biden for a number of reasons. Among them was that Biden, unlike Trump, cooperated with the federal inquiry into his handling of classified documents.

Elizabeth Dias

“And as far as the abortion ban, no, I’m not in favor of abortion ban.”

Trump privately expressed support for a 16-week abortion ban earlier this year, although he later reviewed polling suggesting it was problematic, and did not support it. His allies, including former Trump administration officials, have also planned new sweeping abortion restrictions that do not require a national ban passed by Congress. One plan includes enforcing a long-dormant law from 1873, called the Comstock Act , to criminalize the shipping of any materials used in an abortion — including the medication used in the majority of abortions in America.

“Fracking? She’s been against it for 12 years.”

During her first presidential campaign in 2019, Harris endorsed a ban on hydraulic fracturing, or fracking , a process used to extract oil and natural gas from bedrock. She also challenged federal approvals of offshore fracking when she was attorney general of California. When she became President Biden’s running mate in 2020, she distanced herself from that position, and now says she no longer supports a ban on fracking.

“We made ventilators for the entire world.”

Early in the pandemic, the Trump administration was criticized for a shortage of ventilators . In March 2020, Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, was put in charge of an effort to ramp up production. Trump later announced a plan to make the United States the “king of ventilators” by donating them to other countries. But ProPublica reported that while White House officials had pushed the U.S. Agency for International Development to purchase thousands of ventilators and donate them abroad, the effort was “marked by dysfunction.”

In the end, the ventilators weren’t needed. By May 2020, doctors began using ventilators only as a last resort, after observing unusually high death rates for Covid-19 patients who were put on the devices. The Associated Press quoted Daniel Edelman, a professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, as saying the Trump administration was buying more than twice the number of ventilators it needed.

“People give me credit for rebuilding the military.”

Trump’s allies often repeat his talking point that he “rebuilt” the military. He did increase the defense budget during his four years in office, by around $225 billion. But he also promised to build a 350-ship Navy and to expand the Army. He did neither. The Army today is at its smallest size since 1940. The year Mr. Trump left office, the Navy was down to 294 ships. Efforts to expand the number of Air Force squadrons received no presidential push and went nowhere.

“I have nothing to do with Project 2025.”

Project 2025, a set of conservative policy proposals assembled by a Washington think tank for a Republican presidential administration, does not directly come from Trump or his campaign. Still, CNN documented that 140 people who worked for the Trump administration had a role in Project 2025. Some were top advisers to Trump in his first term and are all but certain to step into prominent posts should he win a second term.

Trump has also supported some of the proposals, with some overlap between Project 2025 and his own campaign plans. Among the similarities: undercutting the independence of the Justice Department and pressing to end diversity, equity and inclusion programs. And he enacted other initiatives mentioned in Project 2025 in his first term, such as levying tariffs on China and making it easier to fire federal workers. Trump has criticized some elements as “absolutely ridiculous and abysmal,” though he has not specified which proposals he opposes.

When the director of the project departed the think tank, Trump’s campaign released a statement that said, “Reports of Project 2025’s demise would be greatly welcomed and should serve as notice to anyone or any group trying to misrepresent their influence with President Trump and his campaign — it will not end well for you.”

“We handed them over a country where the economy and with — the stock market was higher than it was before the pandemic came in. Nobody’s ever seen anything like it.”

The economy grew at a fairly normal pace in the United States in the years leading up to the pandemic, and while the stock market did touch new highs under Trump’s watch, that is typically the case during a presidency: Historically, stock prices tend to climb over time. Stocks have traced new highs under the Biden administration, as measured by the S&P 500 index .

“Every legal scholar — every Democrat, every Republican, liberal, conservative — they all wanted” abortion policy “to be brought back to the states.”

Some conservative legal scholars asked the Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that identified a right to abortion in the Constitution. They said state legislators, not unelected justices, should set abortion policy. But many legal scholars also filed briefs urging the court not to do so, arguing that the original decision had been on solid legal ground and that overturning federal protection for abortion would disastrously reverse five decades of precedent.

Immigrants are “coming in and they’re taking jobs that are occupied right now by African Americans.”

Various economists have found that immigrants are a crucial part of the U.S. labor force and that their presence has been healthy for the nation’s economy. The population of foreign-born workers is also not large enough to offset job creation over the past three years. A few studies have indeed shown negative wage effects, particularly on Black workers and other Americans in occupations in which there are many immigrants. But while this dynamic has been debated for decades, there is no clear conclusion.

Several studies have, however, found a mutually beneficial relationship between high-skilled immigrants and similarly skilled U.S.-born workers, as well as between low-skilled immigrants and more highly skilled U.S.-born workers, contributes to higher wages for natives. Economists also have found immigrants are especially important as more Americans age and leave the labor force.

Immigrants are “taking over the towns. They’re taking over buildings. They’re going in violently.”

The claim is factually incorrect. The former president was referring to towns in Ohio and Colorado that have seen large influxes of immigrants, most of whom came into the United States legally, often with work permits. There have been examples of crime in those cities, but the vast majority of the immigrants have been working and paying taxes. In Springfield, Ohio, for example, thousands of Haitian immigrants have helped fill jobs as the city recovered from steep economic decline, but their presence has divided the town politically. A traffic accident caused by a Haitian immigrant has roiled the city, but there has not been widespread violence, and many in the city support the Haitian migrants as an important part of the economy.

“She’s a Marxist. Everybody knows she’s a Marxist.”

Marxism refers to the political, social and economics theories of Karl Marx, practiced as socialism or communism. Ms. Harris’s campaign has described her as a capitalist . She has not proposed to seize the means of production. And she has received the backing of more than 80 chief executives , some of whom have called her “pro-business.”

“The only jobs they got were bounce-back jobs.”

Trump claimed that the only jobs created under the Biden-Harris administration were from recovering jobs that were lost under Trump amid the pandemic recession. In fact, under the Biden administration, the American economy has regained all the jobs it lost from before the pandemic and created nearly 6.5 million additional jobs on top of that.

“Donald Trump left us the worst unemployment since the Great Depression.”

Unemployment spiked to its worst levels since the Great Depression in the pandemic recession of 2020, but it was 6.4 percent the month Trump left office . That’s nowhere near the worst rate since the Depression.

Shawn Hubler

“This business about taking everyone’s guns away — Tim Walz and I are both gun owners.”

This is true..

A career prosecutor in California before she ran for the U.S. Senate, Harris has long said that she owns a handgun. “I am a gun owner, and I own a gun for probably the reason a lot of people do — for personal safety,” she told reporter s outside a campaign event in Iowa during her run for the White House in 2019.

Although she has long called for universal background checks, a ban on assault-style weapons and other controls, she has not called for seizing legally purchased firearms. Gov. Tim Walz of Minnesota, her running mate, is an Army veteran and a hunter who was endorsed by the National Rifle Association until he began supporting tighter firearm restrictions after a teenage gunman opened fire at a Florida high school in 2018.

“I was a better shot than most Republicans in Congress and I have the trophies to prove it,” he said. “But I’m also a dad. I believe in the Second Amendment, but I also believe that our first responsibility is to keep our kids safe.”

“He lost manufacturing jobs.”

The United States had lost nearly 200,000 factory jobs at the end of Donald Trump’s presidency compared with when Trump took office. Those losses were largely a product of the pandemic recession.

“We have created over 800,000 new manufacturing jobs.”

Since President Biden took office, seasonally adjusted manufacturing employment has increased by 739,000 jobs. Previous estimates put that increase above 800,000, but that number fell after the Labor Department issued an annual revision to its jobs numbers last month.

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H.R.4471 - Speech Privacy Act of 2023 118th Congress (2023-2024) | $(document).ready(function () { $('#alert-BILL-442624-76').congress_Alert({ type: 'BILL', id: '442624', buttonDivId: 'alert-BILL-442624-76', buttonText: 'Get alerts', buttonTextIfLoggedIn: 'Get alerts', buttonTextIfHasAlert: 'Cancel Alerts', buttonTextIfHasDialog: 'Edit Alerts', dialogDivId: 'alert-dialog-BILL-442624-76', titleText: 'To get email alerts ', alertSourceType: ' legislation', alertMessageText: "You will receive an alert for any updates to actions, bill text, cosponsors, or summaries.", titleTextIfLoggedIn: 'Get email alerts ', titleTextAddendum: 'for this', titleTextIfHasAlert: 'Cancel this alert?', showEditDialogue: 'true', editAlertDialogTitle: 'Track Changes - Choose one or more (Optional) Help ', hideEditLink: 'false', dataSet: '', countLimitReached: 'false', cannotAddNewAlertDialogTitle: 'Cannot add new alert', cannotAddNewAlertDialogMessage: '' }); });

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Summary: H.R.4471 — 118th Congress (2023-2024) All Information (Except Text)

There is one summary for H.R.4471. Bill summaries are authored by CRS .

Shown Here: Introduced in House (07/06/2023)

Speech Privacy Act of 2023

This bill prohibits, with certain exceptions, any entity of the federal government from collecting or requiring the submission of information on the identification of any donor to a tax-exempt organization. It also prohibits an entity from disclosing to the public information identifying a donor.

Act MP Mark Cameron delivers emotional speech in Parliament after son’s death

Act Party MP Mark Cameron has described his life as a “godawful mess” following the death of his son and urged politicians to listen to “rural folk” in an emotional speech in Parliament today.

Cameron lost his son Brody in May this year to what the MP called the “scourge of suicide”. He said the 22-year-old had been a contractor, farmer and “an everyday Kiwi bloke”.

“This will be hard for me,” Cameron said at the start of his speech in the House.

“It is about rural mental health. You all know why I came to this building. It was for the farmers, that somehow, we could all celebrate rural New Zealand, that I might be able to shed some light on what it meant to be a farmer for farming folk.”

Cameron, who was first elected to Parliament 2020, said he wanted to “bring an authentic voice” to the halls of power and “to keep it bloody real”.

Tuesday was World Suicide Prevention Day and Cameron said it was “hard for some, bloody hard for me”.

“I buried my boy and he is gone,” Cameron said.

The MP said he addressed MPs as “a shadow of the man that boy would have become”.

“A shadow, but I am here because I must. I am a father to a lost son, a parent to a lost child, but I turn up everyday in this House because I believe in rural New Zealand. I believe in this man and I believe in my team.”

Cameron pointed to Act leader David Seymour – who had left the House earlier in the proceedings but returned briefly to sit alongside Cameron – and other Act MPs seated around him. Some were visibly emotional during Cameron’s speech.

He said, “in this godawful mess that is my life I am in this House every day because I absolutely believe in rural people”.

The MP said that although his son had died, “I might save someone else”.

“I might be able to help rural people preserve their way of life. There is a novel idea.”

He said that meant listening to those in the rural community and asking whether policy would help or hinder their lives.

“We don’t need any more vacuous sermons on what we should be doing in rural New Zealand. We need people who actually listen to us, and on this side of the House, we are invested in that.”

Among Cameron’s latest moves at Parliament has been to lodge a member’s bill restoring provisions to the Resource Management Act that would prohibit councils from considering climate change as a factor in their plans.

“It’s not feasible to have regional councils trying to save the world’s climate. In fact, it’s hopeless, because emissions are already managed nationally under the Emissions Trading Scheme,” he said in July.

“If one council cracks down on emissions, it just pushes carbon-intensive activity someplace else. And councils aren’t equipped to consider carbon offsets that businesses might have in other parts of the country.”

That proposed legislation attracted some criticism, such as from Greater Wellington Regional councillor and Green Party member Thomas Nash, who was reported by RNZ as saying it was “completely irresponsible”.

“We need every tool we can get to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including local decision-making to incentivise the transition away from fossil fuels and disincentivise further investment in fossil fuel use.”

After the death of his son, a number of politicians sent their condolences to the Act MP. They included Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, who said the thoughts of the whole of Parliament would be with him.

SUICIDE AND DEPRESSION

Where to get help:

• Lifeline : Call 0800 543 354 or text 4357 (HELP) (available 24/7)

• Suicide Crisis Helpline : Call 0508 828 865 (0508 TAUTOKO) (available 24/7)

• Youth services: (06) 3555 906• Youthline : Call 0800 376 633 or text 234

• What’s Up : Call 0800 942 8787 (11am to 11pm) or webchat (11am to 10.30pm)

• Depression helpline : Call 0800 111 757 or text 4202 (available 24/7)

• Helpline: Need to talk? Call or text 1737

If it is an emergency and you feel like you or someone else is at risk, call 111

Jamie Ensor is a political reporter in the NZ Herald Press Gallery team based at Parliament. He was previously a TV reporter and digital producer in the Newshub Press Gallery office.

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Illocutionary Act

Making an Explicit Point

Jim Kruger / Getty Images

• An Introduction to Punctuation
• Ph.D., Rhetoric and English, University of Georgia
• M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
• B.A., English, State University of New York

In speech-act theory , the term illocutionary act refers to the use of a sentence to express an attitude with a certain function or "force," called an  illocutionary force , which differs from locutionary acts in that they carry a certain urgency and appeal to the meaning and direction of the speaker. 

Although illocutionary acts are commonly made explicit by the use of performative verbs  like "promise" or "request," they can often be vague as in someone saying "I'll be there," wherein the audience cannot ascertain whether the speaker has made a promise or not.

In addition, as Daniel R. Boisvert observes in "Expressivism, Nondeclarative, and Success-Conditional Semantics" that we can use sentences to "warn, congratulate, complain, predict, command, apologize, inquire, explain, describe, request, bet, marry, and adjourn, to list just a few specific kinds of illocutionary act."

The terms illocutionary act and illocutionary force were introduced by British linguistic philosopher John Austin in 1962's "How to Do Things With Words, and for some scholars, the term illocutionary act is virtually synonymous with speech act .

Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts

Acts of speech can be broken down into three categories: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. In each of these, too, the acts can either be direct or indirect, which quantify how effective they are at conveying the speaker's message to its intended audience.

According to Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay's "Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics," locutionary acts are "the mere act of producing some linguistic sounds or marks with a certain meaning and reference," but these are the least effective means of describing the acts, merely an umbrella term for the other two which can occur simultaneously.

Speech acts can therefore further be broken down into illocutionary and perlocutionary wherein the illocutionary act carries a directive for the audience, such as promising, ordering, apologizing and thanking. Perlocutionary acts, on the other hand, bring about consequences to the audiences such as saying "I will not be your friend." In this instance, the impending loss of friendship is an illocutionary act while the effect of frightening the friend into compliance is a perlocutionary act.

Relationship Between Speaker and Listener

Because perlocutionary and illocutionary acts depend on the audience's reaction to a given speech, the relationship between speaker and listener is important to understand in the context of such acts of speech.

Etsuko Oishi wrote in "Apologies," that "the importance of the speaker's intention in performing an illocutionary act is unquestionable, but, in communication , the utterance becomes an illocutionary act only when the hearer takes the utterance as such." By this, Oishi means that although the speaker's act may always be an illocutionary one, the listener can choose to not interpret that way, therefore redefining the cognitive configuration of their shared outer world.

Given this observation, the old adage "know your audience" becomes especially relevant in understanding discourse theory, and indeed in composing a good speech or speaking well in general. In order for the illocutionary act to be effective, the speaker must use language which his or her audience will understand as intended.

• Speech Acts in Linguistics
• What Is The Speech Act Theory: Definition and Examples
• Locutionary Act Definition in Speech-Act Theory
• Perlocutionary Act Speech
• Illocutionary Force in Speech Theory
• Performative Verbs
• Mental-State Verbs
• Felicity Conditions: Definition and Examples
• What Is Entailment in Semantics?
• What Is a Minor Sentence?
• Appropriateness in Communication
• Definition and Examples of Sarcasm
• The Power of Indirectness in Speaking and Writing
• The Four Master Tropes in Rhetoric
• Definition and Examples of Linguistic Accommodation
• Definition and Examples of Metanoia

Darlene Superville, Associated Press Darlene Superville, Associated Press

Colleen Long, Associated Press Colleen Long, Associated Press

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• Copy URL https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-biden-delivers-remarks-30th-anniversary-of-violence-against-women-act

WATCH: Biden delivers remarks on 30th anniversary of Violence Against Women Act

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden on Thursday joined scores of advocates and survivors of domestic abuse to mark the 30th anniversary of the landmark Violence Against Women Act, a law he wrote and championed as a U.S. senator because he wanted to “change the culture of America” around this touchy issue.

Watch Biden’s remarks in the player above.

Biden said that back then “society often looked away” and that violence against women was not treated as a crime in many places. He said a national hotline was not available to those suffering abuse and few police departments with what are known now as special victim units.

“My goal was to do more than change the law,” he said at a White House event marking Friday’s 30th anniversary of the law. He said his goal was “to change the culture of America” by providing more protection and support for survivors and accountability for perpetrators.

“I believed the only way we could change the culture was by shining a light on that culture, and speaking its name,” he said.

Biden wrote and championed the legislation as a U.S. senator. It was the first comprehensive federal law that addressed violence against women and sought to provide support for survivors and justice. It sought to shift the national narrative around domestic violence at the time; that it was a private matter best left alone.

The White House said that between 1993 and 2022, annual rates of domestic violence dropped by 67 percent and the rate of rapes and sexual assaults declined by 56 percent, according to FBI statistics. A national domestic violence hotline has fielded more than 7 million calls since 1996, Biden said.

“It matters. It saves lives,” he said Thursday.

During a hearing on domestic violence in 1990, Biden told the committee that “for too long, we have ignored the right of women to be free from the fear of attack based on their gender. For too long, we have kept silent about the obvious.”

He spent years advocating for the law, moved by horrible stories of domestic violence. Congress passed it in 1994 with bipartisan support. Then-President Bill Clinton signed it into law on Sept. 13, 1994.

“The Violence Against Women Act is my proudest legislative achievement,” Biden said at the event on the White House lawn. It was attended by hundreds of people, including survivors of domestic violence, advocates, administration officials and members of Congress.

The president also spoke about continued efforts to strengthen the law, including announcing that the Justice Department was awarding more than $690 million in grants, along with efforts to serve orders of protection electronically and strategies to address online gender-based violence, a growing problem that law enforcement struggles to combat.

Federal agencies also sent reminders on housing rights for survivors of domestic violence who live in federally funded homes, including that they can request emergency housing transfers.

“Today, officers, prosecutors, judges, families, and society at large understand what should have always been clear: these crimes cannot be cast aside as somehow distinct or private,” said Attorney General Merrick Garland. “Instead, we recognize that they are among the most serious crimes that our society faces and that we must continue to improve access to justice, safety, and services for survivors.”

Jen Klein, the White House gender policy adviser, said the measures are meant to keep pushing efforts to help survivors of domestic violence.

“While we have made tremendous progress since VAWA was signed into law in 1994, we also know that much work remains in the fight to prevent and end gender-based violence,” she said.

The law was reaffirmed in 2022, but it almost didn’t happen. The sticking point was a provision in the last proposal, passed by the House in April 2019, that would have prohibited persons previously convicted of misdemeanor stalking from possessing firearms.

WATCH: President Biden remarks on the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act

Under current federal law, those convicted of domestic abuse can lose their guns if they are currently or formerly married to their victim, live with the victim, have a child together or are a victim’s parent or guardian. But the law doesn’t apply to stalkers and current or former dating partners. Advocates have long referred to it as the “boyfriend loophole.”

Expanding the restrictions drew fierce opposition from the National Rifle Association and Republicans in Congress, creating an impasse. Democrats backed down and did not include the provision.

That provision was later addressed in Biden’s bipartisan gun safety legislation signed by Congress in 2022, and now prohibits people convicted of misdemeanor crimes in dating relationships from purchasing or possessing firearms for at least five years.

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VMAs 2024 live updates: Taylor Swift wins, Katy Perry honored, Megan Thee Stallion hosts and more

Everything to know about the 2024 vmas:.

• Megan Thee Stallion hosted the MTV Video Music Awards show at the UBS Arena in Elmont, New York.
• Taylor Swift came into the show with 12 nominations, the most of any artist. Post Malone followed with nine nominations, while Ariana Grande, Eminem and Sabrina Carpenter each had six.
• Katy Perry received MTV’s Video Vanguard Award and performed a career-spanning medley live. Other performers this year included Carpenter , Camila Cabello, Chappell Roan , GloRilla and Rauw Alejandro.
• The VMAs have a history of memorable and provocative red carpet looks. See this year's stand-out outfits.

The 40th MTV Video Music Awards were chock-full of performances and peppered with memories of the award show’s storied four-decade history.

Taylor Swift took home the biggest award of the night — video of the year — in addition to six others, tying her with Beyoncé for the most VMA wins ever. After tonight, Swift and Beyoncé have 30 Moon People each to their names.

Chappell Roan took home the first major award of her career for best new artist, beating out Gracie Abrams and Tyla after a show-stopping summer on the festival circuit.

Iconic moments from VMAs past also got their place to shine. Notably, host Megan Thee Stallion took the stage with a live snake roped around her body as an homage to Britney Spears’ 2001 “I’m a Slave 4 U” performance. A supercut of such moments also featured Miley Cyrus twerking onstage with Robin Thicke in 2013 and Madonna’s 1984 “Like A Virgin” performance, among many others.

Tonight’s show ushered in a new era of iconic moments, as well, from Sabrina Carpenter’s kissing an alien during a mashup of her newest singles to Benson Boone’s flips off his piano and Roan’s performance in front of a burning castle.

No more Moon People for Queen Bey

Rebecca Cohen

Beyoncé was nominated for three awards tonight — song of the year, best trending video and most iconic performance — but ultimately did not win any.

The lackluster VMAs showing follows her being shut out of the Country Music Award nominations that were announced on Monday after coming out with her first country album, "Cowboy Carter."

Beyoncé still holds the record for most VMAs with 30 statues, although she's now tied with Taylor Swift, who won seven awards tonight.

Taylor Swift snags video of the year for third year in a row

Daysia Tolentino

“Directing this video and putting it together and writing it was the most wonderful experience," she said of making the "Fortnight" video with Post Malone. "And that is because of all the people that I got to make it with.”

She also took a moment to thank boyfriend Travis Kelce for cheering her on between takes.

Swift won the award in 2023 for “Anti-Hero” and in 2022 for “All Too Well (10 minute version) (Taylor’s Version).”

LL Cool J take some of us back

Richie Duchon

This LL Cool J performance feels like a time machine to the early 90s. Busta Rhymes tee'd up LL Cool J and Public Enemy to insert some classic hip hop into the VMAs.

LL nodded to some genre staples while also marking a comeback, performing a track featuring Saweetie from his new Q-Tip produced record "The Force," which dropped last week.

Video of the year

Taylor Swift wins the video of the year VMA for “Fortnight” featuring Post Malone.

Anitta thanks Brazil for her VMA

Doha Madani

Anitta gave a shoutout to her country while holding her VMA for "Mil Veces," saying that her enthusiastic fans are the reason she gets to represent Brazil over and over at the show.

"Thank you so much everybody, I am so happy," Anitta said. "First of all, I wanna say thanks to my fans who vote and they're always supporting me."

She also called it an amazing year for Latin music, shouting out fellow nominee Karol G specifically for her monumental year.

Anitta wins the best Latin VMA for “Mil Veces.” 

Chappell Roan dedicates first VMA to her LGBTQ fans

Kaetlyn Liddy Kaetlyn Liddy is a newsroom coordinator for NBC News Digital.

The rise of a Midwest Princess continues.

After making her VMAs debut with a performance of her breakout hit, "Good Luck, Babe!", Chappell Roan took home her first Moon Person for best new artist.

"I dedicate this to all the drag artists who inspire me and I dedicate this to queer and trans people who fuel pop," Roan said in her speech, reading from her diary. On her "Midwest Princess" tour, Roan invited local drag artists to open her shows. She has also spoken extensively about the role drag plays in her own performances.

She added, "For all the queer kids in the Midwest watching right now, I see you, I understand you, because I’m one of you."

With the best new artist win, she joined the lofty company of artists like Billie Eilish, Olivia Rodrigo and Cardi B, who have all won the award.

Best new artist

Chappell Roan wins the best new artist VMA.

GloRilla cranks up the energy

The crowd was on its feet as the Memphis rapper performed "Yeah Glo!," which was nominated in the best hip-hop category.

She also played her hit "TGIF" as her backup dancers hyped up the audience atop a long dining table.

Camila Cabello returns to the VMA stage

From inside a glass case on stage, Camila Cabello performed a mash-up that started with "June Gloom" and transitioned into "GODSPEED." It was a return to the stage for the singer, who last performed at the show in 2021.

LISA wins the best K-pop VMA for “Rockstar.” 

Lenny Kravitz performs his greatest hits, new and old

After winning the Moon Person for best rock earlier in the evening, Lenny Kravitz performed on the VMAs stage for the first time since his 1998 appearance with Madonna.

Kravitz performed a medley featuring a reprise of his 1993 VMA performance of "Are You Gonna Go My Way" along with two 2024 releases, "Human," and "FLY." He finished off with a special appearance from rapper Quavo.

Best hip-hop

Eminem wins the best hip-hop VMA for “Houdini.” 

LISA accepts her first solo VMA

LISA, known for her role in girl group BlackPink, accepted the moon person for best K-pop tonight. She called her winning song, "Rockstar," a "meaningful comeback" in her career.

Best visual effects

Eminem’s “Houdini” wins the best visual effects VMA. Visual effects by Synapse Virtual Production, Louise Lee, Rich Lee, Metaphysic and Flawless Post.  

Best choreography

Dua Lipa’s “Houdini” wins the best choreography VMA. Choreography by Charm La’Donna. 

Best editing

Taylor Swift’s “Fortnight” wins the best editing VMA. Editing by Chancler Haynes.

Best direction

Taylor Swift’s “Fortnight” featuring Post Malone wins the best direction VMA. Directed by Taylor Swift.

Best art direction

Megan Thee Stallion’s “BOA” wins the best art direction VMA. Art direction by Brittany Porter.

Best cinematography

Ariana Grande’s “we can’t be friends (wait for your love)” wins the best cinematography VMA. Cinematography by Anatol Trofimov.

Video for good

Billie Eilish wins the video for good VMA for “What Was I Made For? (From The Motion Picture ‘Barbie’).” 

Best R&B

SZA wins the best R&B VMA for “Snooze.” 

Taylor Swift wins the best pop VMA.

Artist of the year

Taylor Swift wins the artist of the year VMA.

Halsey performs newest single 'Ego'

Angela Yang

Halsey just rocked out on stage, performing her latest single “Ego” in a makeshift garage.

The singer, who arrived on the carpet with long red hair and a matching gown, seemingly ditched her long locks before stepping on stage in a fiery pixie cut.

Rauw Alejandro leaves a piece of Puerto Rico on stage

Before the show began, Rauw Alejandro told interviewers he wanted to honor his Puerto Rican culture on stage tonight. He added that he also wanted to throw in nods to New York, where many Puerto Ricans have created tight-knit communities.

Alejandro delivered by honoring his Nuyorican roots on a set that emulated the city's apartment rooftops. He was joined by dancers and musicians who helped bring a slice of the island's musical heritage to the stage.

Sabrina Carpenter wins first VMA for song of the year

That's that Sabrina espresso, after all. The singer snagged the coveted award for her hit song "Espresso," which has dominated summer playlists since it was released in April.

"I've literally never won one of these," Carpenter said while accepting her moon person. "I feel so grateful to have truly the best fans in the world."

Song of the year

Sabrina Carpenter wins the song of the year VMA for “Espresso.” 

Benson Boone soars

Benson Boone, who already won the VMA for best alternative, started off his performance with a sweet serenade before literally flipping the song into a rocking show.

He promised a show with "lots of flips" and he certainly delivered with two literal backflips, the last being off of his piano. Boone's sweet crooning turned into big vocal crescendos as easily and quickly as he moved through the air.

Megan Thee Stallion is not just here to host

The rapper played an energized medley of hits from her album "Megan," starting off with "BOA," which is nominated in the best hip-hop category.

She cut to a dance break as fans chanted the chorus of "B.A.S" to her. Megan then launched into her venomous diss track "HISS," which made waves earlier this year and opened the door for disses against Drake .

She then brought out Japanese rapper Yuki Chiba to perform their viral hit "Mamushi," which won best trending video earlier tonight.

Tyla wins best Afrobeats

The South African singer Tyla won for her hit song "Water," which also spawned a viral trend on TikTok.

"African music can be pop music too," she said. "This is just so special but also bittersweet because I know there's a tendency to group all African artists under afrobeats."

The artist is also nominated for best new artist.

"African music is so diverse, it's more than just Afrobeats," she said as she accepted her award.

Best Afrobeats

Tyla wins the best Afrobeats VMA for “Water.” 

Chappell Roan performs: 'Your favorite drag queen's favorite artist' 

After a loving intro from drag queen Sasha Colby, Chappell Roan took the VMAs stage in full armor in front of a burning castle as she sang "Good Luck, Babe!" her hit summer single that has helped propel her to stardom.

Roan's rise to fame began with an opening act during Olivia Rodrigo's "Guts" tour in the Spring, which then paved the way for a sold-out festival circuit, all leading her to tonight's stage, where she is nominated for her first major awards including best new artist.

Roan credits Colby with a slogan she's used to reference herself — "your favorite artist's favorite artist." After shouting that on stage this summer, Roan said she got the quote from Colby, who coined "your favorite drag queen's favorite drag queen."

Colby introduced Roan tonight as "your favorite drag queen’s favorite artist."

Performances galore but few moon people

It's been about an hour since anyone accepted an award, with the exception of Katy Perry's pre-announced Vanguard award.

While there were quite a few awards announced in the pre-show livestream, no other statues have been given out since Taylor Swift and Post Malone accepted the best collaboration award.

Katy Perry performs her most nostalgic hits ahead of accepting Vanguard Award

Katy Perry gave a high-energy performance ahead of her acceptance of the Michael Jackson Video Vanguard Award.

She was introduced by her fiancé Orlando Bloom, who gave a heartfelt tribute to the longtime pop star, noting that “the remarkable world she creates has brought a sense of joy and laughter, inspiring generations of people from all over the world.”

She took the stage in a cloud of colored smoke, held up by cables as she sang a mashup of “Dark Horse” and “E.T.” in mid-air. The singer then brought Doechii onstage for a snippet of their upcoming release “I’M HIS, HE’S MINE.”

Perry continued the show with a nostalgic string of her fan-favorites — “California Gurls,” “Teenage Dream,” “I Kissed a Girl” and “Firework" — before ending with her latest release "LIFETIMES" and sharing a post-performance kiss with Bloom.

"Thank you. I did that all on my first day of my period, too, can you believe it?" she said breathlessly as she accepted her Moon Person.

"I just want to say with my whole heart: Do whatever it takes to stay true to yourself and true to your art," she added in her speech. "Turn off social media, safeguard your mental health, pause, touch grass."

Anitta makes the VMAs feel like paradise

Isabela Espadas Barros Leal

"The queen of Brazil" Anitta showed off her trilingual singing chops in a major medley alongside Tiago PZK, Fat Joe and DJ Khaled. She flawlessly transitioned from English to Portuguese and Spanish while showing off her impressive dance moves.

This is also her second all-white outfit of the night, which she suggested on the red carpet may be hinting at an upcoming surprise.

Taylor Swift ditches the punk plaid for sparkly green

Always one to keep people on their toes, Taylor Swift has made an unexpected outfit change.

While Swift arrived in a punk plaid ensemble, she appears to now be seated in a sparkling green gown. The singer was seen on an online stream in a beaded outfit that had a spaceship display, a likely nod to her performance of "Down Bad" during the "The Eras Tour," which features visuals of a UFO.

Sabrina Carpenter performs moonwalking mashup

At last year's VMAs, Sabrina Carpenter was relegated to a pre-show performance. Not this year.

This year, she performed a mashup of "Please Please Please," "Taste" and "Espresso" during the primetime ceremony. Carpenter danced, appropriately, with astronauts and an alien, who she proceeded to kiss onstage. The space-themed backdrop to her bubble gum pop bobs mirrored the iconic Moon Person statue awarded to VMA winners.

Carpenter's most recent album, "Short n' Sweet," is her sixth studio album and first to debut at No. 1 on the Billboard 200. After opening for Taylor Swift's "Eras Tour" and performing her breakout hit "Espresso" at Coachella this spring, Carpenter has ascended into pop's most rarified echelon.

LISA rocks out on the VMA stage

With pyrotechnics and leather outfits, LISA put on a rockin' show for her performance on the VMAs stage.

She started her performance with her latest single "New Woman," although Rosalia, her collaborator on the song, was absent.

She then transitioned into "Rockstar," which is nominated in the best K-Pop category.

Megan Thee Stallion pays homage to Britney Spears' 'I'm a Slave 4U'

With a large yellow snake wrapped around her body, Megan Thee Stallion gave a nod to Britney Spears' iconic "I'm a Slave 4 U" VMAs performance by wearing the same green and blue two piece while performing her hosting duties.

"I don’t know this snake, this snake don’t know me," she said. She then screamed as someone tried to remove the snake from her body.

Chappell Roan’s success marks the rise of the ‘middle class’ pop star

Chappell Roan is no longer just “your favorite artist’s favorite artist.”

Roan, who is known for the queer themes in her music and her drag-inspired aesthetic, is among the recent crop of artists who have hit unforeseen career highs in recent months, despite being considered part of pop music’s “middle class.”

This designation has typically been associated with artists who have cultivated devout  online fan bases , but who are not necessarily household names.

A-list pop stardom has become increasingly difficult to achieve. But some music industry experts say the recent rise of Roan and others — including Sabrina Carpenter, Tinashe and Charli XCX — is a testament to their authenticity and ability to foster such strong fandoms.

Read the full story here.

Taylor Swift honors 9/11 victims

Taylor Swift just took home her second Moon Person of the night with a win for best collaboration for “Fortnight” featuring Post Malone. She opened her acceptance speech with an acknowledgement of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks given the event's location in New York.

Speaking about her music video, Swift described her collaborator Post Malone as “everyone in music’s favorite person to collaborate with.”

“And it is because you are so ridiculously talented, you are so versatile and you’re the most down to earth person,” Swift said. “Honestly, so unfailingly polite, it has taken me forever to get him to stop calling me ‘ma’am.’”

Flavor Flav gifts Jordan Chiles a replacement medal

After being stripped of her Olympic bronze medal shortly after leaving Paris, Flavor Flav followed through on his promise to award Jordan Chiles a custom-made replacement.

"I gotcha something that they can't take away from you," Flavor Flav told the two-time Olympian on the VMAs stage. He bestowed her with a bronze clock necklace and tied it on her neck himself.

Megan Thee Stallion opens the show with a nod to the Paris Games

The host opened the show with a message to everyone watching.

“Shout out to my hotties, and my haties ‘cause I know y’all watching too,” she said.

She donned a Team USA-inspired leotard while greeting viewers. She then passed the mic to Jordan Chiles and Flavor Flav.

Flav gave Chiles a bronze clock and promised to gift her the prize money she lost after her bronze medal was stripped from her after last month's Paris Olympic Games.

Best collaboration

Taylor Swift wins the best collaboration VMA for “Fortnight” featuring Post Malone.

Eminem brings his mob of Slim Shadys to open the VMAs

Opening the show with his song "Houdini," off of his latest album "The Death of Slim Shady (Coup de Grâce)," the rapper brought a gang of his alter egos to support him on stage. He also brought a doppelgänger who looked strikingly similar to his younger self.

Jelly Roll also made a virtual appearance to perform with Eminem on their collaboration "Somebody Save Me."

Lenny Kravitz dedicates best rock win to late mother

The VMA for best rock video went to Lenny Kravitz for “Human” from his 2024 album, “Blue Electric Light.”

He dedicated the award to his late mother, who died in 1995.

"31 years ago, my mother was with me," he said after his win. "The last time she was with me at an award show was at the VMAs and so I dedicate this to her.”

Kravitz will perform at tonight's ceremony for the first time since 1998.

Taylor Swift is on the carpet

The highly anticipated arrival of Taylor Swift is finally here as the singer poses for the cameras ahead of tonight's show. She won a VMA for song of summer before even setting foot on the carpet.

Swift is known for using her award show outfits as a way to clue in fans about her upcoming projects. Last year, Swift's black and white dress at the Grammys hinted at her announcement of the album "The Tortured Poets Department" later during the show. That came after she announced her album "Midnights" at the 2022 VMAs, wearing a silver-draped dress that hinted at a new "Bejewled" era for the singer.

So with fans eager for her to drop "reputation (Taylor's Version)," is her outfit signaling any easter eggs for news to come?

Lenny Kravitz wins the best rock VMA for “Human.” 

'Fortnight' nabs song of summer

Taylor Swift has officially won her first award of the night.

Her single "Fortnight" from "The Tortured Poets Department" won song of the summer, which was announced on the VMAs red carpet before the awards show even kicked off.

If she takes home at least six more of the 12 awards she's nominated for tonight, she will match Beyoncé's record for most VMA wins.

Megan Thee Stallion wins best trending video

Megan Thee Stallion was caught off guard by the news of her own win as pre-show host Kevan Kenney abruptly handed her a Moon Person. The rapper, who is also hosting the VMAs this year, clinched the best trending video award for “Mamushi” featuring Yuki Chiba.

“Me and Yuki recorded that song in Japan in like, a small apartment studio, and we were just messing around,” Megan said, adding that she was "shocked" by fans' embrace of the song.

The singer is up for six more categories tonight.

Taylor Swift's presidential endorsement hangs in the air

The self-proclaimed "Childless Cat Lady" endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris after Tuesday night's debate, inspiring some 330,000 v isits to vote.gov in the process. It's unclear if the pop star will continue speaking out about politics in the weeks before the election.

Photos of the best looks on the MTV VMAs red carpet

Justine Goode

Chelsea Stahl Chelsea Stahl is the art director for NBC News Digital

It's your favorite artists' favorite looks! See them all here .

Song of summer

Taylor Swift wins the song of summer VMA for “Fortnight” featuring Post Malone.

Expect a tribute to 9/11

This year’s show had originally been scheduled for Sept. 10 but was moved to Sept. 11 because the broadcast would clash with Tuesday’s presidential debate. 

The show’s producers plan to recognize the 9/11 attacks by donating proceeds from the show to 9/11 Day, a nonprofit that organizes community service programs on the anniversary of the attacks, and Tuesday’s Children, which helps support impacted families. 

Taylor Swift has a chance to break Beyoncé's record

Pop sensation Taylor Swift is the most nominated artist of the night, with the potential to make history by breaking fellow nominee Beyoncé's record.

Swift is up for a total of 12 awards, including video of the year, artist of the year and song of the year. Currently, Swift has a total of 23 VMAs throughout her career and is seven awards shy of matching Beyoncé's record of 30.

But Beyoncé is also nominated for several VMAs tonight following the success of her country album "Cowboy Carter" — which was notably snubbed from the Country Music Association Awards earlier this week. The album's hit song, "Texas Hold 'Em," is up against Swift's "Fortnight" for song of the year.

Naomi Scott attends her first VMAs

British actress and singer Naomi Scott, who plays pop star Skye Riley in the upcoming film “Smile 2,” said her character drew inspiration from some of the pop stars here tonight.

As for the movie itself, slated to release in theaters Oct. 18, the first-time VMA attendee teased it as being “kind of like the first movie, but on steroids and a lot of party drugs.

“It’s very intense, but it’s so fun and so unhinged and also kind of funny,” Scott said. “My director brought me in to watch some of the edit, and I remember just being like, I wish I was here with my best friend, because we would just be grabbing each other laughing and screaming.”

'Dreams don’t have deadlines:' LL Cool J on his first album in a decade

After a 10-year break from releasing music, LL Cool J dropped his 14th studio album, "The Force," on Friday.

"I wanted to show the people that I came up with that your dreams don't have deadlines," he said on the MTV pre-show. "You could continue to do this thing at a high level. You don't have to be successful at one age and then all of a sudden taper off and wallow around in mediocrity."

He is set to perform in tonight’s ceremony, but the legendary artist's relationship with the VMAs started 27 years ago. LL Cool J became the first rap artist to win the Video Vanguard Award in 1997, which he noted as his favorite VMAs moment.

"I am a kid raised on hip hop ... So that was an unbelievable moment," he said of the honor.

Jordan Chiles makes VMAs debut after bronze medal debacle

Two-time Olympic champion Jordan Chiles made her first public appearances on Wednesday since she was stripped of her bronze medal from the Paris Olympic Games.

"This is a dream come true to be able to come to the VMAs," Chiles said. "Meeting people, especially celebrities out here." Despite the big names in the room, Chiles said her Olympic resume has prepared her for this moment.

Competing is "harder than doing an interview," she joked.

Hours before the VMAs ceremony, Chiles spoke at the Forbes Power Women’s Summit in New York City, where she said the controversy was more about "peace" and "justice" for her than the medal itself.

"The biggest thing that was taken from me was the recognition of who I was, not just my sport, but the person I am ... the star is never going to get dimmed." she said.

Best trending video

Megan Thee Stallion wins the best trending video VMA for “Mamushi” featuring Yuki Chiba.

Katy Perry arrives at the VMAs ahead of her Vanguard award

Katy Perry is serving a wet look on the carpet. She will be performing a medley of her biggest hits later tonight in celebration of her Video Vanguard award, which celebrates an artists' career and impact on pop culture.

Addison Rae gives showgirl chic

The TikToker-turned-pop star arrived on the carpet wearing a white feathery bikini set with a tulle bustle.

She said the look was partly inspired by Madonna, who wore a wedding dress in her performance of "Like A Virgin" during the 1984 VMAs.

The "Diet Pepsi" singer is a presenter at tonight's awards.

Chappell Roan is thinking about her ex tonight

Chappell, who is nominated for best new artist alongside three other categories, said it would be “awesome” if she won — noting that she’s “never won anything.” If she does cinch the category, she said, she wants to give a shoutout to her ex: “You got me here.”

Chappell said she’s a bit nervous about performing in front of her peers tonight, many of whom she said she looks up to. The pop star teased in a red-carpet interview with MTV that her performance will include “a lot of technical things going on that I’ve never had happen.”

She also shared a few details about the medieval look she donned on the carpet.

“That robe that I had on ... was 300 years old. And then the rug that was rolled out is 600 years old," she said.

Most iconic performance

Katy Perry wins the most iconic performance VMA for “Roar.”

Best alternative

The winner for best alternative is Benson Boone for his song “Beautiful Things,” awarded during the pre-show livestream on YouTube.

Boone thanked the fans for all their support and their votes as he accepted the Moon Man statue in an interview on the carpet.

“You know what? This has been the craziest year of my life so far,” Boone said. “I’m truly honored to be in this crowd of people... it’s been pretty insane for me.”

When asked about his performance to come later tonight, Boone just said, “lot of sparkles, lots of flips.”

Halsey teases performance of new song ‘Ego’

Halsey put the red in red carpet tonight (although the VMAs carpet is technically black), with long, bright red locks and a gown to match.

She also teased her later performance of a new song called "Ego," which officially dropped on Friday as the fourth single in the lead up to her highly-anticipated album, "The Great Impersonator."

In June, the singer revealed she has been battling chronic illnesses in a social media post tied to the release of "The End," another song on her upcoming album. In the post, Halsey did not confirm any diagnoses.

"long story short, i'm Lucky to be alive. short story long, i wrote an album," Halsey wrote in the post.

The VMAs are pop culture gold

If the Grammys are the music industry's biggest night, the VMAs may be the most entertaining.

Since the first VMAs were held in New York City's Radio City Music Hall in 1984, an astounding number of prolific moments in pop culture history have taken place with the iconic "moon person" statue standing nearby.

From Kanye West interrupting Taylor Swift’s acceptance speech at the 2009 ceremony to Madonna, Britney Spears and Christina Aguilera shocking early 2000's America by kissing onstage, the VMAs have a knack for crystalizing cultural moments. Many of these moments will likely be revisited tonight in the new most iconic performance category.

'Twin, where have you been?' Muni Long arrives on the carpet

The singer's TikTok-viral song "Made For Me" is nominated in the best R&B category.

The Kelces are wishing nominees luck — 'except if you're up against Tay'

Jason and Travis Kelce are excited for everyone nominated for a moon man tonight, but they're especially hyped for Taylor Swift.

The brothers plugged the award show as one of the advertisements in this morning's episode of their podcast "New Heights." Kansas City Chiefs star Travis Kelce proudly pointed out that his girlfriend was up for multiple VMA awards.

"Let's go, Tay! Come on, Tay!" Jason Kelce cheered.

"Stay on top! Here we go," Travis Kelce said while clapping. "Wishing everybody the best though."

"Unless you're up against Tay, then I hope you lose," his brother joked.

Anitta teases a surprise

Brazilian sensation Anitta has arrived at the VMAs ahead of her expected performance in a wedding-style dress and veil.

“It’s a little spoiler of something,” the singer told MTV on the red carpet. “But I can’t say much.”

Sabrina Carpenter shimmers on the black carpet

Sabrina Carpenter has arrived dressed in head-to-toe white. Carpenter dominated the summer charts and is nominated for seven categories tonight — including artist of the year, song of the year and song of summer. Fans are also awaiting a highly anticipated performance tonight.

LE SSERAFIM kicks off first performance of the night

South Korean girl group LE SSERAFIM just hyped up the black carpet with a pre-show performance of "1-800-hot-n-fun," a track off their fourth EP "Crazy." The group is up tonight for PUSH performance of the year for “EASY."

Shaboozey dazzles on the carpet

The country artist has had a major year, from snagging two features on Beyoncé's "Cowboy Carter" to releasing a smash hit with "A Bar Song (Tipsy)," which is nominated for song of the summer.

LISA looks like a 'Rockstar'

LISA, known for her work as part of K-Pop group Blackpink and as a soloist, is nominated in the best K-Pop category for her single "Rockstar." She is also expected to perform tonight.

In an interview with MTV on the carpet, she shared why her music video for the song was so special.

"I had a chance to shoot in my home country, in Bangkok, and I think it's really cool," she said.

It's a special birthday for the VMAs

This year marks the 40th anniversary of MTV's Video Music Awards.

Over the course of its history, the VMAs have remained a cornerstone of the music awards landscape despite drastic changes in the music, video and broadcast landscapes.

The show has kept its relevance in part by delivering moments of controversy that ultimately shaped pop culture history. It's also managed to integrate digital platforms into its programming, including by adding categories that honor social media success and even allowing viewers to vote for their favorite artists via Instagram stories.

Lenny Kravitz serves up his signature leather-clad look

The rockstar is nominated in the best rock category tonight for "Human."

The rapid rise of Chappell Roan

Once a niche pop singer from Missouri trying to make it in Los Angeles, Chappell Roan has skyrocketed to mainstream fame over the past year. Known for the queer themes in her music as well as her drag-inspired aesthetic, Roan’s high-energy music — paired with her deeply emotional lyricism — has earned her a cult following online.

Her debut album “The Rise and Fall of a Midwest Princess,” released last September, became a sleeper hit that further cemented her status this summer as a rising pop icon. The album charted in the top five on the U.S. Billboard 200 earlier this year, after Roan’s stint as Olivia Rodrigo’s opening act and the release of her hit followup single, “Good Luck, Babe!”

The artist has been open in speaking about the impact of sudden fame on her mental health, recently telling Rolling Stone that "it's been a really hard adjustment."

The 'Midwest Princess' herself is here

Chappell Roan has arrived at the VMAs — holding a sword. The rising pop star is up for four categories this year, including best new artist and song of summer. She's also one of the night's most anticipated performers.

Katy Perry to receive the Video Vanguard Award

The pop star and recently departed American Idol judge dominated the 2010s with hits like “Teenage Dream,” “California Gurls” and “Roar,” delivering some classic, candy-colored music videos along the way.

Now, ahead of her upcoming album “143,” she is being honored with the Video Vanguard Award, which celebrates artists who have made major contributions to music videos and popular culture. 

As is tradition with the winners of this award, Perry will perform a medley of her biggest hits.

Karol G's look is fire

The Colombian superstar has arrived at the VMAs red carpet. She said her outfit and performance tonight will honor her Latino community.

"It's about fire," the singer said on the carpet about her dress. "Latina community has fire everywhere," she told MTV.

She is nominated in the best latin category for “MI EX TENÍA RAZÓN.”

Who is presenting at the VMAs?

The VMAs will have a star-studded lineup of presenters this year, from celebs to influencers and even an Olympian. Here’s the full list:

• Addison Rae
• Alessandra Ambrosio
• Amelia Dimoldenberg
• Busta Rhymes
• Cyndi Lauper
• Damiano David (Måneskin)
• Flavor Flav
• French Montana
• Halle Bailey
• Jordan Chiles
• Miranda Lambert
• Naomi Scott
• Paris Hilton
• Sasha Colby
• Suki Waterhouse

Rauw Alejandro poses on the VMAs carpet

The artist is nominated in the best latin category for “Touching The Sky” and is expected to perform tonight.

There's still time to cast your ballot

If you missed the chance to vote on some of the major VMA categories, fear not. Voting for b est n ew a rtist will remain open into the live show. The three remaining contenders are:

• Chappell Roan
• Gracie Abrams

Megan Thee Stallion will host the show

Megan Thee Stallion is wrapping up her hot girl summer on the VMAs stage. The rapper had an epic summer promoting her third studio album on her first headlining tour, aptly titled the "Hot Girl Summer Tour."

Now, she’s coming to New York to host and perform at the VMAs.

When and where to watch the VMAs

The event will air live on MTV starting at 8.pm. ET. You can also catch the entire show streaming on Fubo TV and other Paramount-owned channels including VH1, BET, Nickelodeon, Paramount Network and Comedy Central.

The red carpet has officially opened

Celebrities are starting to make their way down the VMAs red carpet. Viewers can watch pre-show red carpet coverage starting at 6:30p ET on the MTV YouTube channel.

Where are the VMAs taking place this year?

The VMAs are broadcasting live from the UBS Arena on Long Island, New York. Last year, the awards show was held at the Prudential Center in New Jersey.

Who is performing at the VMAs?

Eminem is set to open the show with songs from his most recent album, “The Death of Slim Shady (Coup de Grâce).”

Chappell Roan and Sabrina Carpenter, the two rising stars who arguably defined this summer's pop music landscape, will also perform. 

Speaking of pop queens, Katy Perry will return to the VMAs for the first time since 2017 to accept the Video Vanguard Award and perform her biggest hits.

Other performers include host Megan Thee Stallion, GloRilla, Anitta, Camila Cabello, Halsey, Karol G, Lenny Kravitz, LE SSERAFIM, LISA, LL Cool J, Rauw Alejandro, Shawn Mendes and Jessie Murph.

Here's a full list of tonight's VMA nominees

Drew Weisholtz, TODAY

• Ariana Grande — “we can’t be friends (wait for your love)”
• Billie Eilish — “LUNCH”
• Doja Cat — “Paint The Town Red”
• Eminem — “Houdini”
• SZA — “Snooze”
• Taylor Swift ft. Post Malone — “Fortnight”
• Ariana Grande
• Sabrina Carpenter
• Taylor Swift
• Beyoncé — “Texas Hold ‘Em”
• Jack Harlow — “Lovin On Me”
• Kendrick Lamar — “Not Like Us”
• Sabrina Carpenter — “Espresso”
• Teddy Swims — “Lose Control”

Best New Artist

Mtv push performance of the year.

• Aug. 2023: Kaliii — “Area Codes”
• Sept. 2023: GloRilla — “Lick or Sum”
• Oct. 2023: Benson Boone — “In The Stars”
• Nov. 2023: Coco Jones — “ICU”
• Dec. 2023: Victoria Monét — “On My Mama”
• Jan. 2024: Jessie Murph — “Wild Ones”
• Feb. 2024: Teddy Swims — “Lose Control”
• March 2024: Chappell Roan — “Red Wine Supernova”
• April 2024: Flyana Boss — “yeaaa”
• May 2024: Laufey — “Goddess”
• June 2024: LE SSERAFIM — “EASY”
• July 2024: The Warning — “Automatic Sun”
• Drake ft. Sexyy Red & SZA — “Rich Baby Daddy”
• GloRilla, Megan Thee Stallion — “Wanna Be”
• Jessie Murph ft. Jelly Roll — “Wild Ones”
• Jung Kook ft. Latto — “Seven”
• Post Malone ft. Morgan Wallen — “I Had Some Help”
• Camila Cabello
• Olivia Rodrigo

Best hip-hop 

• GloRilla — “Yeah Glo!”
• Gunna — “fukumean”
• Megan Thee Stallion — “BOA”
• Travis Scott ft. Playboi Carti — “FE!N”
• Alicia Keys — “Lifeline”
• Muni Long — “Made For Me”
• Tyla — “Water”
• USHER, Summer Walker, 21 Savage — “Good Good”
• Victoria Monét — “On My Mama”

Best alternative 

• Benson Boone — “Beautiful Things”
• Bleachers — “Tiny Moves”
• Hozier — “Too Sweet”
• Imagine Dragons — “Eyes Closed”
• Linkin Park — “Friendly Fire”
• Teddy Swims — “Lose Control (Live)”
• Bon Jovi — “Legendary”
• Coldplay — “feelslikeimfallinginlove”
• Green Day — “Dilemma”
• Kings of Leon — “Mustang”
• Lenny Kravitz — “Human”
• U2 — “Atomic City”
• Anitta — “Mil Veces”
• Bad Bunny — “MONACO”
• KAROL G — “MI EX TENÍA RAZÓN”
• Myke Towers — “LALA”
• Peso Pluma & Anitta — “BELLAKEO”
• Rauw Alejandro — “Touching The Sky”
• Shakira & Cardi B — “Puntería”

Best afrobeats

• Ayra Starr ft. Giveon — “Last Heartbreak Song”
• Burna Boy — “City Boys”
• Chris Brown ft. Davido & Lojay — “Sensational”
• Tems — “Love Me JeJe”
• USHER — “Pheelz”

Best K-pop 

• LISA — “Rockstar”
• NCT Dream — “Smoothie”
• NewJeans — “Super Shy”
• Stray Kids — “LALALALA”
• TOMORROW X TOGETHER — “Deja Vu”
• Alexander Stewart — “if only you knew”
• Billie Eilish — “What Was I Made For”
• Joyner Lucas & Jelly Roll — “Best For Me”
• RAYE — “Genesis.”
• Tyler Childers — “In Your Love”
• Sabrina Carpenter — “Please Please Please”
• Charli xcx — “Von dutch”
• Dua Lipa — “Illusion”
• Olivia Rodrigo — “obsessed”

Best editing 

Best choreography .

• Dua Lipa — “Houdini”
• Tate McRae — “Greedy”
• Troye Sivan — “Rush”
• Ariana Grande — “the boy is mine”
• Justin Timberlake — “Selfish”
• Olivia Rodrigo — “get him back!”
• Charli xcx — “360”
• Olivia Rodrigo — “bad idea right?”