nasa risk management case study

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• Published: 07 September 2023

Updates to the NASA human system risk management process for space exploration

• Erik L. Antonsen   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1042-7011 1 ,
• Erin Connell 2 ,
• Wilma Anton 3 ,
• Robert J. Reynolds 3 ,
• Daniel M. Buckland   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5274-3840 4 , 5 &
• Mary Van Baalen   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0915-9726 5  

npj Microgravity volume  9 , Article number:  72 ( 2023 ) Cite this article

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This paper describes updates to NASA’s approach for assessing and mitigating spaceflight-induced risks to human health and performance. This approach continues to evolve to meet dynamically changing risk environments: lunar missions are currently being designed and the ultimate destination will be Mars. Understanding the risks that astronauts will face during a Mars mission will depend on building an evidence base that informs not only how the humans respond to the challenges of the spaceflight environment, but also how systems and vehicles can be designed to support human capabilities and limitations. This publication documents updates to the risk management process used by the Human System Risk Board at NASA and includes changes to the likelihood and consequence matrix used by the board, the design reference mission categories and parameters, and the standardized evaluation of the levels of evidence that the board accepts when setting risk posture. Causal diagramming, using directed acyclic graphs, provides all stakeholders with the current understanding of how each risk proceeds from a spaceflight hazard to a mission-level outcome. This standardized approach enables improved communication among stakeholders and delineates how and where more knowledge can improve perspective of human system risks and which countermeasures can best mitigate these risks.

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Introduction.

As the scope of human spaceflight expands, the risk to space travelers expands as well. Together with international partners, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has crewed the International Space Station (ISS) for the last 23 years. After the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2011, the ISS became NASA’s primary effort of human spaceflight, and systems and approaches were tailored specifically to ISS mission parameters and risks. These ISS missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), which can stretch from 30 days to one year, are one type of design reference mission (DRM) that NASA evaluates for risk to human health and performance. With the flight of the first astronauts on commercial vehicles to the ISS in 2021 and the launch of Artemis I in 2023, plans to return humans to the moon, and a human mission to Mars rapidly approaching, mission types that have historically been considered futuristic are now far into their design and development phases. It is well understood that human spaceflight is a specialized endeavor that is organized and regulated differently than terrestrial environmental and occupational health risks. As astronauts go further from Earth and are subjected to other human spaceflight hazards, those differences increase and require specialized attention.

As NASA conceptualizes and designs the vehicles, suits, systems, and missions that will allow humans to travel beyond the ISS, the processes for addressing and communicating risk posture and mitigation needs must also evolve 1 . New challenges will be encountered because new vehicle designs and mission tasks will place unprecedented demands on astronauts’ capabilities during a mission 2 , 3 , and health risks are expected to escalate with lengthening duration of exposure to the spaceflight environment and distance from Earth 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 . Those same extended spaceflights are expected to increase risk to the long-term health (LTH) of astronauts after the mission 8 . Finally, the Artemis missions, which will return astronauts to the Moon, consists of an integrated set of flight programs that have separate program managers and teams. In this context, a “program” describes a formally funded NASA spaceflight program such as the Space Shuttle Program, the ISS Program, or the Commercial Crew Program. In Artemis, the Orion Program’s vehicle will carry astronauts to the lunar vicinity to dock with the Gateway Program’s lunar orbital space station, and descent to the lunar surface is under the purview of the Human Landing System Program. Integrating these 3 flight programs adds to the already complex crew-vehicle design challenges of any one of those vehicles and increases the level of mission complexity as well. An interdisciplinary approach will be required to integrate these flight programs and will result in complex systems that weigh the health, performance, and medical needs of astronauts against the engineering realities of the vehicle, habitat, and spacesuits 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 .

Romero and Francisco 14 published the last public update to the process for managing spaceflight-induced risk to humans (hereafter referred to as human system risk), which was used by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB) at NASA Johnson Space Center until 2018. Subsequent changes to this process were generated in response to changes in human spaceflight needs, and a new Human System Risk Management Plan (RMP) JSC 66705 Revision A that documented the changes, was released internally at NASA in October, 2020 15 . The HSRB uses the processes described here to provide transparent guidance during discussions of prioritization that explicitly state the priorities of the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) as a non-advocate. The goal of these processes is to systematically reduce total risk to astronaut crews. The HSRB piloted several updates to these processes that were evaluated to determine if they could be implemented by the board, including.

updates to definitions of key terms to improve alignment and communication among stakeholders.

formal definitions of risk drivers and a risk mitigation framework.

updates to the design reference missions (DRM) categories and their parameters used by NASA to align risk discussions with changing mission priorities.

changes to the process for assessing the levels of evidence used by the HSRB.

established principles for prioritizing risk characterization and mitigation efforts that were agreed upon by the stakeholder community.

directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to improve communication and enable configuration-managed causal diagramming of risks.

The HSRB assesses human system risk by DRM category, which is defined by destination, operating environment, and expected mission duration. DRMs are used to provide continuity of expected high-level mission parameters in lieu of the constantly changing attributes of specific mission proposals and future undefined missions that are determined at the Mission Directorate level within NASA. Because only a small number of humans have flown in space, significant uncertainty exits regarding how short-term and long-term exposure to the spaceflight environment changes human health and performance. Changes to human health and performance can adversely impact an astronaut’s ability to perform critical tasks tied to mission objectives and can affect their ability to be recertified for flight status after their spaceflight mission. Human system risks also address the long term health (LTH) effects of exposure to the spaceflight environment, effects that extend beyond the end of a flight program. The HSRB must ensure that the knowledge gained through human spaceflight and complementary advances in applicable terrestrial medicine are captured, documented, and applied to reduce the risks crewmembers will face during current spaceflights and future exploration missions. To accomplish this, a formal continuous risk management process is used to ensure that new evidence gleaned from flight operations and research effectively feeds back into risk assessment. This information is intended to help NASA make risk-informed decisions that protect the astronauts and the mission. The details of that process, described below, include updates to the formal definitions and processes that the HSRB uses to track risk posture for the 30 human system risks and concerns (as of July 2023) that are currently being managed by the board.

Risk management process update

Key definitions updates.

The HSRB has a variety of stakeholders who include experts in many fields such as spaceflight operations, engineering, medical, life sciences, performance, human factors and human system integration (HSI), and more. At times, these experts can have different interpretations of commonly used terminology at NASA. To address this, Rev. A of the RMP included formal definitions to ensure that the use of specific terms carry a common meaning among different experts.

A human system risk is a recognized potential undesired flight crew health or performance outcome that has a clear consequence and attendant likelihood (likelihood and consequence [LxC]) supported by evidence for a given DRM category.

A human system concern is a potential undesired human health or performance outcome for the crew for which there is insufficient evidence to allow an LxC assessment for any DRM.

The risk posture is an agreed upon understanding of the state of a human system risk that is based on the best available evidence. This is decided by the HSRB based on assigned DRM-specific LxC scores and their drivers and underlying assumptions. Risk posture is communicated through associated risk scores, colors, dispositions, and rationales. The HSRB uses risk posture to communicate human system risk for a given mission.

Risk disposition represents the HSRB’s official position on the current state of the risk for a given DRM that assumes known countermeasures and monitoring will be implemented. Eight options exist for HSRB risk disposition: requires characterization, requires mitigation, requires mitigation/standards refinement, accepted, accepted with monitoring, accepted with optimization, transferred, and retired. A risk is accepted by the board when countermeasures are deemed effective and efficient or no further risk reduction is considered appropriate at that time. These dispositions are fully described in the RMP 15 .

Spaceflight hazards—In their 2020 report, Romero and Francisco 14 reviewed the 5 spaceflight hazards listed below, which guide the derivation of risks: Altered gravity, Radiation, Isolation and confinement, Hostile closed environment, and Distance from Earth.

These hazards are the evolving aspects of the spaceflight environment that are harmful to humans. They are understood to be the fundamental causes of spaceflight-induced risks to humans in the sense that they induce new challenges from the moment a human is launched into space. “New” here refers to a comparison with challenges faced by humans on Earth. For the purposes of risk management, it is not sufficient to simply list and describe these spaceflight hazards; we must also understand their potential impact to astronauts and mission-level outcomes.

The challenge of aligning perception of the terms used by various sets of experts within NASA also extends to the risks themselves. Different experts carry different mental models of what a specific human system risk is, what factors contribute to the development of that risk, and the importance that a given risk should carry when prioritizing research investments or operational capabilities within the constraints of budget and flight capacity. Therefore, the processes, DRMs, risk assessments, and other RMP aspects have been refined to improved clarity.

The continuous risk management process

The HSRB implements formal processes to track and manage human system risks. An overview of the risk management process using continuous risk management principles is shown in Fig. 1 .

HSRB Human systems risk board.

This process was described by Romero and Francisco and has not significantly changed with this update in risk management process 14 . The HSRB reviews each human system risk every 1–2 years and formalizes this process through configuration managed steps that include identifying, analyzing, planning, deciding, tracking, and implementing risk products within a continuous process of documentation and communication. Although the high-level continuous risk management process has not changed, many of the details and guidance that the HSRB provides have been updated, which are summarized here along with rationale and context.

The identify phase has 2 parts: to identify if there are any new risks or concerns that should be formulated and tracked; and to identify new evidence that may influence understanding of the risk posture that warrants further analysis. Once new evidence has been collected for a risk update at the HSRB, the analyze phase begins. Once the analyze phase is complete, the information must be used to drive decisions on risk mitigation. This is performed in the plan, review, track, and communicate steps. Analyze includes 7 steps.

Identifying risk drivers

Understanding risk DRM applicability

Delineating relevant risk impact categories

Assigning LxC scores

Assigning risk dispositions and rationale

Communicating supporting level of evidence (LoE)

Summarizing risk posture information

The steps that have relevant updates are explained below.

Risk drivers

The risk drivers were defined and included in the RMP updates to ensure that stakeholders understand how risk can change with different mission parameters. Early in the systems engineering processes for mission design, requirements are generated that ultimately define the level of risk that will be encountered in a mission 10 , 16 . If mission attributes change later in the design process and requirements are not revisited, the initial assessment of risk may no longer be a valid representation of the risk expected during a given mission.

Risk drivers describe how the spaceflight hazards modify risk posture depending on variation in mission attributes. Risk drivers are not risk-specific, they change depending on the mission objectives and can increase multiple human system risks. Identifying the potential drivers of human system risks allows (1) a clearer understanding of the origin of the risk and potential areas for risk mitigation, (2) an improved understanding of the potential relationships between risks, and (3) an improved ability to prioritize risks for stakeholders. Table 1 lists the risk drivers pertinent to human system risks; these are taken from the Human System RMP Revision A 15 .

Design reference missions (DRMs)

Recognition and articulation of risk drivers are intended to give stakeholders insight into the attributes of the DRMs being assessed. As NASA’s mission interests change, programs may modify significant portions of their concepts of operations, which in turn affects the level of human system risk for a mission. Table 2 shows the updated set of DRMs used by the HSRB, including associated assumptions relevant to risk assessment. The factors considered are derived from the risk drivers above and are presented in a fashion conducive to quantitative analysis.

These DRMs are broken into the 4 primary mission types that are relevant to current or anticipated programs. The LEO DRM includes short-duration missions similar to commercial spaceflight missions, and long-duration missions similar to ISS missions. The lunar orbital DRM includes short- and long-duration missions that apply to Orion and Gateway. The lunar orbital + surface DRM include both Orion and Gateway with the addition of the human lander system and lunar surface extravehicular activities (EVAs). The Mars DRM includes preparatory and planetary missions to account for the simulation and testing of new technologies that are likely needed prior to the full-scale Mars mission. Because the preparatory DRM is an analog of the Mars mission, it is considered to have different mission attributes than the actual planetary Mars missions.

Risk impact categories

Because risk consequence can impact the crew and/or NASA mission objectives, risk impact categories were created to enable construction of a risk matrix that reflects both possibilities. The 3 risk impact categories are used in the LxC matrix in Fig. 2 . As defined, a risk may be applicable to multiple categories.

LXC Likelihood and consequence.

In-Mission Risk—the risk posture for crews during a mission is defined from successful launch until successful and safe egress from the landing vehicle. The crew health impact subcategory identifies health issues, and the mission objectives impact subcategory identifies crew task performance issues that may result in loss of mission objectives if realized.

Flight Recertification—in some cases, exposure to the spaceflight environment affects the crewmember’s physical or mental health after a mission, delaying their flight certification and flight recertification status. This applies throughout the career of an astronaut. Although this is not often used in practice, it is included because this risk not only affects the crew, it also affects NASA’s available pool of veteran astronauts who qualify for different flight programs.

Long Term Health (LTH)—is the lifelong effect of spaceflight on physical and mental health and performance of astronauts. The LTH category now consists of the health outcomes impact subcategory, which includes medical conditions resulting from career exposures to the spaceflight environment, and the quality-of-life impact subcategory, which identifies decrements in the ability of an astronaut to perform daily living activities after a mission because of career exposure to the spaceflight environment.

Likelihood x Consequence (LxC) scoring and colors

Central to the risk assessment is determining the LxC score as applied to each DRM and to the different risk impact categories. Each LxC score is assessed by considering the level of supporting evidence and is assigned a color in the risk matrix. Accompanying an LxC score is a risk disposition that defines the HSRB’s overall position on the state of the risk assuming known countermeasures and monitoring that will be implemented in each DRM. Each risk has a summary table that includes these parameters, and the HSRB uses a risk roll-up chart to communicate a comparative assessment of all the risks. The HSRB updated the risk matrix from the 3 × 4 matrix shown in Romero and Francisco 14 to a 5 × 5 matrix that is based on the risk matrices more commonly used by NASA programs 15 . The 5 × 5 matrix and scale definitions, shown in Fig. 2 , add s granularity to risk assessments and help s improve communication with spaceflight programs.

The determination of the LxC scores is based on the following approach using the best available evidence applicable to the particular DRM being assessed: For each risk and DRM, the most probable consequence within the applicable risk impact categories described above is scored from 1 to 5 based on the definitions provided. The associated likelihood for the consequences is then scored from 1 to 3 based on both qualitative and quantitative definitions provided. The choice of the most probable consequence in the assessment helps focus the risk on more reasonable scenarios than extremely low likelihood worst case scenarios. The assigned scores consider uncertainty based on the state of the evidence evaluated. Each risk will be assessed at least 8 LxC scores based on 4 DRM categories broken down into 2 mission types (short and long) for at least 1 risk impact category (up to 3). These scores are plotted in the 5 × 5 grid of likelihood and consequence (in Fig. 2 ) and will have an associated color and number. The evidence assessment and the resulting LxC scores are reviewed by the HSRB along with the other risk information to support risk posture determination (discussed below). The number in the LxC grid, which is called the risk prioritization score, is discussed further in the section on risk prioritization principles below. Next to the grid is a timeframe box that shows 3 categories for the expected need timeframe for mitigation.

Levels of evidence definition and assessment

Underpinning any assessment of risk posture or assertions about risk is the supporting evidence. Spaceflight causes changes to the human body that become a source of risk, and the duration of the spaceflight drives the magnitude of that risk. The Level of Evidence (LoE) scoring process was revised in the current process for managing the human system risk because the prior process required clarification and improvement. The new process includes explicit standards for determining the quality of evidence considered, modifying the LoE scale to move from correlative language specific to epidemiology to causative criteria that is broadly applicable to the broader sources of evidence considered by the HSRB, and clarifying the value of various types of data and evidence when attempting to draw conclusions that are relevant to the human system in spaceflight. The evaluation of the evidence base results in an LoE score assigned alongside each assessed LxC score. These are documented and discussed in more detail in the RMP and in another publication 15 , 17 .

Summarization of risk posture

Table 3 shows an example of a summary of the risk information for a given DRM: in this case a LEO DRM and the risk to crew health due to electrical shock. The DRM category is identified in the far-left column, the next column shows the mission duration (short and long). The LxC information for the in-mission operations and LTH risk impact categories include information on the currently understood likelihood case and related consequence case. The most appropriate LxC option is chosen by the risk custodian team and approved by the HSRB. For both in-mission and LTH categories, risk dispositions, risk disposition rationales, and LoE score represent the risk posture. In this table the green color indicates low risk whereas yellow or red would indicate mid or high-level risk. A table like this is created for each DRM and used by the HSRB as a high-level communication and reference tool.

A risk roll-up table is created to provide insight into the full complement of risks. Table 4 shows the roll-up table for the 30 human system risks that is current as of July 2023. A high-level overview of all the risks is presented across all the DRMs under consideration. The color assignments are a function of the risk matrix shown in Fig. 2 . It is important to note that the colors are not an indication of whether a risk should be used to stop a mission from occurring. Instead, they are intended to convey only relative risk levels to help identify opportunities for investment of resources or to justify recommendations to decision-makers. Maintenance of this table also tracks reduction in risk over time.

Risk mitigation framework

Once risk has been assessed and scored, the question of how risk is mitigated becomes relevant. The framework for risk mitigation is designed to compel program and project managers to identify how a particular investment is expected to help mitigate human system risks. The 5 categories are used to help clarify expected benefit of risk mitigation activities. Deliverables such as scientific research, occupational or clinical surveillance measures, standards development, technology investments, flight rules, etc., must contribute to one of the following categories to be considered by the HSRB as useful for risk mitigation.

Risk Characterization —Deliverables in this category contribute to understanding the nature of the risk—how and why the risk occurs—and enables plans to decrease likelihood or consequence based on that understanding. Characterizing the risk requires an understanding of the magnitude of the impact of that risk on spaceflight crews. This helps identify when a risk is worth investing in and when it should be down-prioritized in favor of other risk investments.

Prevention (Hazard Control) —These deliverables identify ways to prevent risks from occurring or to decrease the likelihood they will occur. Examples include crew selection recommendations, human system integration recommendations, standards recommendations, clinical practice guidelines, and flight rules.

Consequence Reduction —Prevention of all risk is impossible, so countermeasures that intervene or treat a problem are required for human spaceflight, and as the distance from Earth increases, intelligent selection of these countermeasures may be mission enabling. These deliverables identify approaches that will reduce the severity of problems that could have adverse effects on crew health or on mission objectives. For example, countermeasures, healthcare monitoring, diagnosis and treatment resources, and clinical practice guidelines all provide intervention capabilities that reduce the consequence of an event that has occurred.

System Resilience (Improving Margin)— These deliverables identify system improvements that may directly or indirectly improve posture of human system risk by helping to improve crew resilience in accomplishing mission objectives. In this case ‘system’ refers to the vehicles, habitats, space suits and humans and how they are integrated together, which can be thought of as the total system margin to tolerate error or off-nominal operations. This category includes technologies that enable system improvements such as decreased need for valuable mass, power, volume, or data storage or bandwidth requirements. These savings increase the likelihood that risk mitigation technologies will be included within the tight mass and volume restrictions of exploration missions. In some cases, individual risks that are yellow or green may contribute a large or synergistic effect on the system as a whole. In these cases, continued risk mitigation and investment may be warranted to help reduce total system risk.

Risk Acceptance— Deliverables that provide information to support a decision regarding acceptance of a moderate or high risk are included in this category. These may include information on return on investment or cost and schedule limitations, which can initiate discussion about whether investments for the risk in question are best moved to other areas.

Although the first 3 categories are intuitive, the historical approach to risk-related research and data collection has been siloed, in part, by the structure of the risks themselves. The HSRB encourages research investments that target improved system resilience as a means of reducing overall system risk. The design of the crew health and performance system through rigorous human system integration processes is one approach to improving system resilience. Residual system risk is difficult to characterize when research focuses primarily on silos of specific risks alone. Additionally, the work that NASA performs to understand and mitigate risk is applied toward a specific goal — achieving acceptance of an appropriate amount of human system risk within the larger context of vehicle and mission risk. The HSRB encourages investments in activities that help determine when risk has been sufficiently reduced. Although eliminating all human system risk is an admirable goal, it would likely result in increases in vehicle or mission risk that would obviate the gains achieved 18 . As such, the HSRB does not advise further investments beyond an appropriate level of risk acceptance, because that would have a poor likelihood of return on investment.

High value risk mitigation targets

Using the 5 risk mitigation categories, risk custodian teams identify high value risk mitigation targets and recommend investments and countermeasures that should reduce risk. These typically include areas where major gaps in knowledge or capability exist, or other targets that could yield returns worthy of investments in time, money, and other resources. These recommendations represent the risk custodian’s and the HSRB’s perception of the best near-term targets for reducing risk from a total system perspective.

Risk prioritization principles

In the context of research investments, limited budget is available to address the myriad of potential research projects that could improve risk posture. Similarly, the systems engineering lifecycle and design process for vehicles, habitats and spacesuits have limited mass, power, volume, and data-bandwidth to accommodate all the potential countermeasures that can be envisioned to improve crew health and performance. Many subject matter experts (SMEs) have deep insight into specific spaceflight problems, but few have broad insight into the spectrum of needs and the full set of constraints placed on the crew health and performance system, therefore, the HSRB provides a non-advocate approach to help stakeholders prioritize investments and capabilities that are being considered for human spaceflight missions. Non-advocate in this context means that the HSRB is responsible for tempering the enthusiasm brought to any specific risk, project, or capability, and honestly weighing the potential value against the potential cost, which can include budget, schedule, changes in risk posture, or displacement of other important research or capabilities. The HSRB holds this responsibility because it is a health and medical technical authority board, and in this context the HSRB works with the stakeholders to define criteria that can help prioritize decisions. Briefly these include:

Risk Prioritization Score —The severities of risks are communicated at highest level using colors. However, for prioritization, the LxC scores, shown as the numbers in each of squares of the 5 × 5 matrix in Fig. 2 , identify the comparative urgency of resolving the risk. This single metric is used to identify “red risks”. For many years these scores were the sole discriminator for assessing priority, however, additional discriminating metrics should be considered.

Risk Hierarchy —The more fundamental risks likely require a certain level of mitigation before other dependent risks can be mitigated. For example, the basic human needs of food and nutrition must be met before mitigating the aerobic performance risk.

Risk Dependency —All the risks are simultaneously present in a mission despite the tendency to silo them for ease of research. Where possible, the risks whose nature or countermeasures are likely to affect many other risks should be prioritized over the risks that have few interconnections with other risks. For example, the design of the vehicle is a part of the human system integration architecture (HSIA) risk. This risk is mitigated, in part, by including experts in human systems integration at every step of the vehicle design, which also ensures that human system countermeasures for other risks are also included. As such, the HSIA risk is linked to the successful mitigation of all the other risks. Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) were constructed to help identify these links between risks, and to show the currently understood causal flow from spaceflight hazards to mission-level outcomes for each risk. Points of known or suspected interconnection between each risk are mapped in the DAGs, which are configuration managed by the HSRB. These DAGs discussed in more detail elsewhere 19 and are summarized in the next section.

Need Timeframe —The time available to mitigate a risk varies by the specific mission type and specific risk. For example, the risk of radiation-induced carcinogenesis is managed and accepted for both long and short missions in LEO. However, the radiation exposure significantly increases for Mars missions or long-duration lunar missions. A longer lead time will be available to effectively mitigate this risk than the lead time available to effectively mitigate risks from EVA given the earlier calendar dates for lunar surface missions.

In-Mission Risk vs. LTH Risk —Although LTH effects that occur either during or after an astronaut’s career must be mitigated, it is incumbent on NASA to prioritize in-mission risks over LTH risks to crews. Astronauts accepted a 1:90 risk of loss of life at the later phases of the Space Shuttle program, and as high as 1:10 in the early phases of the program 20 . NASA enables human spaceflight in the best achievable risk posture; however, if LTH concerns were to over-ride in-mission concerns, astronauts would never fly.

Expected Investment Benefit —Historically NASA is the leading source of research investment in human needs in spaceflight. Because of this, NASA has focused their investments on developing resources that can mitigate spaceflight risk. Other agencies and funding sources support research that targets human health and performance challenges on Earth. These are often much larger investments than NASA is able to provide. If technology developed by other funding sources is likely to reduce a risk faster or more successfully than NASA specific investments, that risk should receive less priority when considering NASA’s limited funding availability. For example, astronauts are exposed to higher levels of radiation during spaceflight than on Earth and this may induce a greater risk of developing cancer. The National Institutes of Health invests far more in attempting to cure cancer than NASA can or should. Therefore, rather than also funding research into cancer treatments, NASA should prioritize their investments into strategies such as characterizing the unique effects of space radiation or optimizing vehicle shielding.

The HSRB uses the principles described to reduce total risk to astronaut crews. If risk mitigation efforts in the human domain are over-stated, this could displace mass or volume that may be needed for other mission systems, and this could raise total mission risk while appearing to improve the human system risks.

Causal diagramming

To provide a metric for quantifying risk dependencies, a pilot program was instituted to construct DAGs for each of the 30 human system risks. This is described more completely elsewhere 15 , 19 , 21 , however, it is discussed here for context. One of the biggest challenges when a wide variety of experts discuss the risk reduction process is the lack of a shared mental model of the causes of spaceflight-induced risk. It is a common bias for SMEs to overstate the importance of their own area of expertise while understating the importance of other domains. This is a natural part of attempting in good faith to contribute to the larger systems problems faced by NASA. It is also difficult for non-experts to understand why a particular research project or medical capability may be important. To help address this problem, the DAGs show the causal flow of risk that begins with immersion in the spaceflight environment at launch, and through the many dependent contributing factors that lead to increased likelihood of adverse mission-level outcomes. Each of these DAGs were created using strict criteria and structure to enable like-to-like comparison of the risks and to map the known or suspected interactions between the risks at the level of contributing factors or countermeasures.

In the context of risk, the DAGs depict the relationship between important contributing factors that affect health and performance. ‘Health’ in this case refers to the absence of medical conditions that are likely to harm or cause decrements in performance needed to achieve mission objectives. ‘Performance’ typically refers to the individual crewmember’s ability to successfully complete tasks as assigned over the course of a mission. It is known that health and performance does change during spaceflight, but it is helpful to elucidate how those changes can lead to unsuccessful task performance and possibly loss of mission objectives.

Figure 3 illustrates the causal chain of performance visualized as a DAG. Task performance is often thought to start with individual readiness, however, in the human system risk domain the causal chain begins with the hazards astronauts are exposed to when they are launched into space. Exposure to those hazards leads to the issues identified as the human system risks, which affect individual health over time during a mission through physiologic changes and deconditioning. During short-duration spaceflight, the effects on an individual may be minor, but for long-duration spaceflight they can lead to incapacitation over time. Health decrements can contribute to decrements in an individual’s performance, but additional factors including the team and the systems involved can affect the performance of mission critical tasks. Individual health and vehicle and habitat factors cause changes to individual readiness. Those, along with team functionality, cause changes to crew capability. Additionally, the effects of system design and limitations impact the realistic chances of successfully performing a mission critical task. These are shown as vehicle and habitat factors, independent of effects on individual readiness or crew capability. For example, if the task is to repair a broken exercise device but spare parts for the device are not available because of mass constraints, the likelihood of successful task performance drops no matter the readiness of individuals or crew to perform the needed repairs. How the vehicle or habitat is designed can affect both individuals and an entire crew, for example the lack of individual quarters for sleep and privacy. However, vehicle and habitat factors can affect the likelihood of successful task performance, or in the case of mission critical tasks they can cause loss of mission objectives. If enough mission objectives are lost, then loss of mission may occur. Figure 3 is not an official HSRB DAG but is used here to communicate the concept. The point of this DAG is to ensure that SMEs consider multiple causes of decreased performance when thinking about risk, and how these effects on performance can lead to mission-level outcomes. Other nodes could be reasonably included in this DAG depending on their importance to the intended story. A graphical story such as this has been created for each of the 30 risks and the process is more thoroughly documented elsewhere 19 . Each of the DAGs are formally managed and tracked by the HSRB as part of the continuous risk management process 15 . The benefit of these diagrams primarily lies in communication, but they can help identify how and where specific factors contributing to a human system risk affect the larger system. In this sense, these diagrams are used to help highlight where gaps in knowledge or capability exist.

This notional-directed acyclic graph shows the progression from the hazards of the spaceflight environment encountered at the time of launch through to mission-level outcomes that include loss of mission objectives and loss of mission.

Outlook and summary

This paper illustrates the evolution of the human system risk management process in recent years. These updates build on the formalized processes that are already in place. Updates to the risk scoring mechanisms and matrix ensure that the risk matrix more clearly conveys the current risk posture. Detail was added to the definitions, processes, and principles that the HSRB uses to provide guidance on how to approach human system risk management. Although the current updates were implemented in response to recognized limitations of prior approaches, they are not likely to solve all the challenges faced in this arena. It is fully expected that after several years of implementing these updates, further revisions will be needed. The process of continuous risk management used by the HSRB must continue to evolve in the face of changing needs of NASA and of the larger spaceflight industry. Extrapolation of these processes to commercial entities would likely require significant discussion of the driving goals of each business and whether the level of detail involved in this process would be useful outside of NASA. However, NASA concepts and approaches may be valuable for other health and science agencies to review as they make updates and evolve their human health risk assessment processes and procedures. The authors hope that this update will continue to raise public awareness of the current approaches used for managing human system risk at NASA and stimulate discussion about how to improve these processes for future space missions.

Reporting summary

Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study. The Human System Risk Board at NASA maintains a public website where further information and documentation can be found: https://www.nasa.gov/hhp/hsrb . The governing document for risk management JSC-66705 can be found at the NASA Technical Reports Server at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205008887 . Formal guidance on the NASA DAGs is publicly available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20220006812 . The HSRB approved DAGs for each Human System Risk are publicly available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20220015709 .

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The authors would like to thank J. Charvat (KBR), N. Narty (JES Tech), and A. Monti (JES Tech) for review and editing comments. Special thanks to Kerry George, ELS for assistance with technical editing.

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EA, EC, WA, RR, DB, MVB provided subject matter expertise regarding NASA risk management processes and updates. EA, EC, and WA wrote document JSC-66705 that updated NASA requirements in October 2020. EC created the figures and tables. EA wrote the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Antonsen, E.L., Connell, E., Anton, W. et al. Updates to the NASA human system risk management process for space exploration. npj Microgravity 9 , 72 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41526-023-00305-z

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The Case for Safety

The north sea piper alpha disaster.

System safety engineering is embraced at NASA from the beginning of the program/project life cycle to the end. Historically, an assurance model has been the paradigm, expressed at each life cycle stage via oversight or insight into requirements development and compliance.

Assumptions are made to identify critical areas of risk so that advanced analytical tools such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) can be reasonably and efficiently applied. This has proven to be a successful technical approach, except when the assumptions themselves miss scenarios driven more by complex social interactions.

We can learn from a sentinel 1988 event in the petroleum industry: the loss of 167 personnel and $3.4 billion damage following fire and explosions on the Piper Alpha offshore oil platform. Design flaws hindering communications, emergency procedures and evacuation conspired with an unfortunate configuration change and deficient work permit process to doom workers. The North Sea oil drilling industry changed dramatically as a result, with new regulations calling for a "safety case"--a compelling set of documents that could prove a drilling system was safe to an acceptable degree. Ever since the safety case concept was developed, the entering assumptions for safe system development and operation could be covered completely and systematically.

The NASA System Safety Handbook, Volume 1 is your source to discover how the NASA safety case, called a Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC) should be constructed.

The Lasting Leadership Lessons From The Challenger Disaster

The flawed decision making process that contributed to the Challenger disaster remains relevant to ... [+] today’s business leaders.

The space shuttle Challenger disaster remains one of the most evocative events of the American 20th Century—and for more than just the obvious reasons.

Certainly, the 35th anniversary of this tragedy returns to mind a multitude of images, memories and emotions that prompt pause. But it also reminds us of the crucial importance of informed decision making and risk oversight which are as relevant today as they were on January 28, 1986.

As some will remember, the specific, highly technical cause of the Challenger accident was the notorious “O-Ring”; i.e. the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors, including the effects of cold temperature (launchpad temperature was 36 degrees on January 28).

But more important to remember is the decidedly non-technical contributing cause: the multiple risk management errors that fatally flawed the Challenger launch decision. As documented by the presidential review commission , these were not errors arising from system complexities, but rather from the erosion of once-effective and redundant safety protocols. 

And they were the kinds of errors that can still arise today, in planning for any significant business initiative. As such, and based on the conclusions of the presidential commission, they offer a number of valuable oversight lessons for business leaders across industry sectors.

Lesson #1 :  Risks Hiding in Plain Sight . The flight history of O-ring performance would have demonstrated the correlation of O-ring damage and low temperature. Yet project leadership didn’t review that history, and thus were unprepared to properly evaluate the launch risks. For many new organizational initiatives, there are often indications “in the files” that offer warning signs of possible risks. Project leaders should commit the time to look for them.

Lesson #2 :  When the Signs Are Right In Front of You . While the manufacturer didn’t tell NASA not to launch, it warned that the impact of launchpad ice on the shuttle was an unknown condition, and that risk of ice striking the shuttle was a potential flight safety hazard. Yet NASA proceeded. Effective risk management depends on the ability to identify, process and give adequate consideration to signs and indicators that can be critical to project success.

Lesson #3 :  Those Right Hand, Left Hand Problems . Senior launch officials were unaware of key warnings expressed by others: the most recent problem with the O-Rings; a contractor’s recommendation not to launch below 53 degrees; the similar warnings of project engineers and the manufacturer’s concerns with launchpad ice. Project information flow must provide decision-makers with access to the perspectives of all meaningful project participants.

Lesson #4:   Protecting Checks and Balances . At some point in the launch process, NASA management made an independent decision to waive previously established launch constraints designed to assure flight safety. Basic principles of risk oversight make it imperative that both the establishment of project compliance checks and balances, and decisions to override them, are subject to review by higher levels of management.

Lesson #5 :  Increasing Levels of Acceptable Risks . The response of NASA and a key shuttle contractor to early indications of a design flaw was to increase the amount of damage considered to be an acceptable risk. This was justified, according to the commission, “because we got away with it the last time.” Effective project leaders recognize that the ability to “get away with” something is never an acceptable basis for assuming material risk.

Lesson #6 :  Yielding to Pressure Rarely Works Out . A primary contractor reversed its opinion and recommended the shuttle launch, contrary to the strenuous safety concerns of its engineers. This was done to accommodate a major customer of the contractor. Effective risk evaluation processes typically involve “give and take” exchanges with various interested parties, but provide protections against the excessive influence of purely financial pressures.

Lesson #7 :  When the Fox Guards the Chicken Coop . Organizational structures at key shuttle project levels placed safety, reliability and quality assurance offices under the supervision of the very organizations and activities whose efforts they were responsible for supervising. Effective risk management and compliance structures pay close attention to organizational hierarchies and administrative structures in order to assure appropriate checks and balances.

Lesson #8 :  Insidious Risk Equations . The decision to launch in the presence of so many obvious “yellow flags” of safety created the impression that NASA was actually requiring a contractor to prove that it was  not safe to launch , as opposed to proving that it was  safe to launch . The effectiveness of risk management and compliance protocols can be severely compromised by review standards that are biased in favor of project design feasibility.

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Lesson #9 .  Beware the Counterproductive Culture . The management culture at a primary NASA facility was criticized for a propensity to contain potentially serious problems and seek to resolve them internally instead of reporting them upstream. Indeed, silos are antithetical to effective risk management. Leaders should promote knowledge and information sharing amongst management, and board committees with risk/compliance/legal responsibilities.

Lesson #10 :  “Just Say No” . Five booster rocket engineers employed by the prime NASA contractor made a last-ditch (but ultimately unsuccessful) effort to stop the launch because of fears that the O-Rings would fail in the cold. The righteousness of their efforts underscores the importance of strong whistleblowing and futility bypass mechanisms in product design processes. Project participants need the freedom and access to say “Stop-we’re not ready!”

The Challenger disaster should best be remembered for the sacrifice of seven astronauts who died in the accident. But for those currently in leadership positions, it should also be remembered as a colossal failure of process - a process designed by the best and the brightest. By the people who sent men to the moon. That was a sobering thought on January 28, 1986, and it remains so today.

I wish to acknowledge “Key Portions of Commission Report on Challenger Accident”;  The New York Times  (April 28, 1986) as a resource in the preparation of this post.

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Reevaluating Risk Management 30 Years After the Challenger Disaster

Anyone who was alive to remember July 21, 1969, can still recall the sight of Neil Armstrong stepping for the first time on to the moon’s surface. I was 11 years old at the time, sitting with my family around our black-and-white TV when Armstrong proclaimed, "That's one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind." I was proud to be an American.

Seventeen years later, January 28, 1986, different room, different TV, but the same feeling of exhilaration as the Space Shuttle Challenger headed off for the dark side of the moon. But 73 seconds later the coin flipped and the spacecraft exploded, killing all seven crewmembers. Seventeen percent of all Americans were watching as the external tank containing the liquid hydrogen fuel and liquid oxygen oxidizer exploded. To this day, the Challenger disaster is a case study in engineering safety and workplace ethics.

What lessons can we learn from what went wrong that day? How could this disaster have been avoided by following a simple risk management process? To understand, we must examine the Challenger disaster using the five steps of risk management, which are: 1.  Identify Risk — NASA managers had known the design of the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings since 1977, but failed to address it properly. 2.  Analyze Data — The O-rings, as well as other critical components, had no test data to support the expectation of a successful launch in such cold conditions. Engineers who

worked on the Shuttle delivered a biting analysis: “We're only qualified to 40° F. No one was even thinking of 18° F. We were in no man's land.” 3.   Control Risk — NASA had “Launch Fever” that morning and disregarded advice not to launch. Later, we learned that concerns about the launch never made it up the chain of command. It was these lapses in judgment that triggered this catastrophic event. 4.  Transfer Risk — While there may be some risk transferred to an insurance company for a satellite aboard, there is no place to transfer the loss of life in this case. NASA put all shuttle launches on hold for 32 months and some would argue that they never recovered from the damage to their reputation. 5.   Measure Results — This is where we ask the question, “What went wrong?” In fact, the Rogers Commission did an extensive review. They found NASA’s organization culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident. NASA managers had known since 1977 that the design of the solid rocket boosters (SRB’s) contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings yet failed to address it properly. They also disregarded warnings (an example of “go fever”) from engineers about the dangers of launching because of the low temperatures that morning, while also failing to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors.

Establishing a Safety Culture

So, how do we avoid this happening in your business? It’s all about establishing a safety culture .  And, the ways in which safety is managed in the workplace often reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that employees share in relation to safety. Are senior leaders hearing the “real” story of what is going on, and does it trickle down all the way to the hourly worker that only came on board a week ago?

It never ceases to amaze me the risk we uncover when we go looking. During a recent risk assessment at a manufacturer we discovered they had a Hilo driver that was declared legally blind, but knew the factory floor so well that even with extremely limited eyesight the employer felt he could still do his job. Fortunately this optimistic viewpoint didn’t fare well with the senior manager who reassigned the employee was reassigned to a job in the warehouse, where it was unlikely he would run over a co-worker with a 2,000-lb forklift.

Another time we were analyzing workmen’s comp claim data at a trailer repair facility where we noticed several eye injuries had occurred recently because rust particles were getting past the safety glasses. We contacted a safety glasses supplier, explained the problem and asked for their recommendations. They provided a few samples of safety glasses that were designed to prevent the rust particles from getting in the worker’s eyes. The employer replaced the old glasses with the new model and there hasn’t been an eye injury in the past two years.

Unfortunately every story doesn’t have a happy ending.  On the morning of November 5, 2003, Kristi Fries, an employee at Maverick Metal Stamping in Mancelona, Mich., reached to remove a part from a 110-ton stamping press. Her unzipped sweatshirt triggered the machine's controls, causing the press to slam down and crush her arms, both of which had to be amputated between the wrist and the elbow. Fries later said it was her first time using the machine, and that she had never been warned about the risk of wearing loose clothing while operating the machine, nor that the machine had previously malfunctioned.

In fact, the potential danger of the machine was so widely known that the regular operator wore his button down shirt backwards to make sure it he had no loose clothing in front that could trigger the machine. Sadly, no one thought to bring this potential danger to Fries’ attention.

This is the perfect example of risk management failure . The risk was identified but never addressed. After the accident it was discovered that the parts to fix the machine had been in the maintenance department for over two years. Not only did Fries loose both her arms, the company was hit with over $300,000 in OSHA fines and subsequently went out of business, resulting in a loss of jobs for 50 people.

Two Critical Mistakes

So what can we learn from the Space Shuttle tragedy, caused by an “O” ring failing just over a minute after lift-off? Manufactured by Morton-Thiokol, the O-rings had worked on all 24 previous shuttle flights. But, all of those launches took place with a temperature of at least 51°F.  At 11:38 AM on January 28, the morning of lift-off, the outside temperature at the launch pad was 36°F.

A critical mistake had been made by at least two parties: NASA and Morton-Thiokol. Morton-Thiokol knew that there was risk in maintaining the integrity of the O-ring at such a low temperature, but so did NASA, which had ultimate responsibility for the launch. The result was seven lost souls.

Wayne Hale, a former NASA flight director and Space Shuttle Program manager, cited 10 lessons that can be learned from this catastrophe: 1.  It can happen to you.  Nobody is smart enough to avoid all problems. A preoccupation with failure results in high reliability organizations. 2.  Focus. “Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity, or neglect.” –Captain A. G. Lamplugh, RAF. 3.  Speak up.  A foolish question is more forgivable than a mistake. Loss of respect, loss of your job, loss of a promotion pale compared to program shutdowns, life-long regret and funerals. 4.  You are not nearly as smart as you think you are.  There is a reason we all have one mouth and two ears. Too many people are so busy giving their thoughts that they fail to hear warnings of a disaster. Don’t just listen, comprehend and take action. 5 .   Dissension has tremendous value. No dissension means the issue hasn’t been examined enough. Appoint devil’s advocates and don’t allow people to remain silent—draw them out. 6.  Question conventional wisdom . People in groups tend to agree on courses of action that, as individuals, they know are stupid. Told that the shuttle was as safe as an airliner, we denied the shuttle crew parachutes and pressure suits — something patently wrong to a casual observer. 7.  Do good work. There is no room for half-hearted efforts or second best. Do it well or don’t do it at all. Don’t accept excuses from others. 8.  Any analysis without numbers is only an opinion .  Engineering is done with numbers. Not having all the information you need is never a satisfactory excuse for not starting an analysis. 9.  Use your imagination. Keep vigilant and have an active imagination of possible hazards. Murphy wasn’t completely wrong when he wrote his law. 10.  Nothing worthwhile is accomplished without taking risk . At some point we must leap into the unknown without knowing everything we should know. Fear, or a preoccupation with failure, cannot and should not paralyze us into inaction. Make the risk of those who put their life on the line as small as possible, then go forward.

It’s only by identifying the risks you face each day as a business, and having a plan in place to minimize them, that will you succeed as a company that truly cares not only about the bottom line but also the human capital that makes your business run.

Randy Boss is a Certified Risk Architect at Ottawa Kent, a commercial insurance, risk management, workers' comp and employee benefits consulting business in Jenison, Mich. He designs, builds and implements risk management and insurance plans for middle market companies in the areas of human resources, property/casualty and benefits.

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Key concepts in risk management, 6.4.1 risk management process description, 6.4.1.1 inputs, 6.4.1.2 activities, 6.4.1.3 outputs, 6.4.2 risk management process guidance.

6.1    Technical Planning 6.2     Requirements Management 6.3     Interface Management 6.4    Technical Risk Management 6.5     Configuration Management 6.6     Technical Data Management 6.7     Technical Assessment 6.8     Decision Analysis

The Technical Risk Management Process is one of the crosscutting technical management processes. Risk is the potential for performance shortfalls, which may be realized in the future, with respect to achieving explicitly established and stated performance requirements. The performance shortfalls may be related to institutional support for mission execution or related to any one or more of the following mission execution domains:

Systems engineers are involved in this process to help identify potential technical risks, develop mitigation plans, monitor progress of the technical effort to determine if new risks arise or old risks can be retired, and to be available to answer questions and resolve issues. The following is guidance in implementation of risk management in general. Thus, when implementing risk management on any given program/project, the responsible systems engineer should direct the effort accordingly. This may involve more or less rigor and formality than that specified in governing documents such as NPRs. Of course, if deviating from NPR “requirements,” the responsible engineer must follow the deviation approval process. The idea is to tailor the risk management process so that it meets the needs of the individual program/project being executed while working within the bounds of the governing documentation (e.g., NPRs). For detailed information on the Risk Management Process, refer to the NASA Risk Management Handbook (NASA/SP-2011-3422).

Risk is characterized by three basic components:

• The scenario(s) leading to degraded performance with respect to one or more performance measures (e.g., scenarios leading to injury, fatality, destruction of key assets; scenarios leading to exceedance of mass limits; scenarios leading to cost overruns; scenarios leading to schedule slippage);
• The likelihood(s) (qualitative or quantitative) of those scenario(s); and
• The consequence(s) (qualitative or quantitative severity of the performance degradation) that would result if the scenario(s) was (were) to occur.

Uncertainties are included in the evaluation of likelihoods and consequences.

Scenarios begin with a set of initiating events that cause the activity to depart from its intended state. For each initiating event, other events that are relevant to the evolution of the scenario may (or may not) occur and may have either a mitigating or exacerbating effect on the scenario progression. The frequencies of scenarios with undesired consequences are determined. Finally, the multitude of such scenarios is put together, with an understanding of the uncertainties, to create the risk profile of the system.

This “risk triplet” conceptualization of risk is illustrated in Figures 6.4-1 and 6.4-2 .

Undesired scenario(s) might come from technical or programmatic sources (e.g., a cost overrun, schedule slippage, safety mishap, health problem, malicious activities, environmental impact, or failure to achieve a needed scientific or technological objective or success criterion). Both the likelihood and consequences may have associated uncertainties.

Risk:  Risk is the potential for shortfalls, which may be realized in the future with respect to achieving explicitly-stated requirements. The performance shortfalls may be related to institutional support for mission execution, or related to any one or more of the following mission execution domains: safety, technical, cost, schedule. Risk is characterized as a set of triplets:

• The scenario(s) leading to degraded performance in one or more performance measures.
• The likelihood(s) of those scenarios.
• The consequence(s), impact, or severity of the impact on performance that would result if those scenarios were to occur. 

Cost Risk:  This is the risk associated with the ability of the program/project to achieve its life-cycle cost objectives and secure appropriate funding. Two risk areas bearing on cost are (1) the risk that the cost estimates and objectives are not accurate and reasonable; and (2) the risk that program execution will not meet the cost objectives as a result of a failure to handle cost, schedule, and performance risks.

Schedule Risk:  Schedule risks are those associated with the adequacy of the time estimated and allocated for the development, production, implementation, and operation of the system. Two risk areas bearing on schedule risk are (1) the risk that the schedule estimates and objectives are not realistic and reasonable; and (2) the risk that program execution will fall short of the schedule objectives as a result of failure to handle cost, schedule, or performance risks.

Technical Risk:  This is the risk associated with the evolution of the design and the production of the system of interest affecting the level of performance necessary to meet the stakeholder expectations and technical requirements. The design, test, and production processes (process risk) influence the technical risk and the nature of the product as depicted in the various levels of the PBS (product risk).

Programmatic Risk: This is the risk associated with action or inaction from outside the project, over which the project manager has no control, but which may have significant impact on the project. These impacts may manifest themselves in terms of technical, cost, and/or schedule. This includes such activities as: International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), import/export control, partner agreements with other domestic or foreign organizations, congressional direction or earmarks, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) direction, industrial contractor restructuring, external organizational changes, etc.

Scenario: A sequence of credible events that specifies the evolution of a system or process from a given state to a future state. In the context of risk management, scenarios are used to identify the ways in which a system or process in its current state can evolve to an undesirable state.

Figure 6.4-3 provides a typical flow diagram for the Risk Management Process and identifies typical inputs, activities, and outputs to consider in addressing risk management.

The following are typical inputs to risk management:

• Project Risk Management Plan: The Risk Management Plan is developed under the Technical Planning Process and defines how risk will be identified, mitigated, monitored, and controlled within the project.
• Technical Risk Issues: These will be the technical issues identified as the project progresses that pose a risk to the successful accomplishment of the project mission/goals.
• Technical Risk Status Measurements: These are any measures that are established that help to monitor and report the status of project technical risks.
• Technical Risk Reporting Requirements: Includes requirements of how technical risks will be reported, how often, and to whom.

Additional inputs that may be useful:

• Other Plans and Policies: Systems Engineering Management Plan, form of technical data products, and policy input to metrics and thresholds.
• Technical Inputs: Stakeholder expectations, concept of operations, imposed constraints, tracked observables, current program baseline, performance requirements, and relevant experience data.

6.4.1.2.1 Prepare a Strategy to Conduct Technical Risk Management

This strategy would include documenting how the program/project risk management plan (as developed during the Technical Planning Process) will be implemented, identifying any additional technical risk sources and categories not captured in the plan, identifying what will trigger actions and how these activities will be communicated to the internal and external teams.

6.4.1.2.2 Identify Technical Risks

On a continuing basis, the technical team will identify technical risks including their source, analyze the potential consequence and likelihood of the risks occurring, and prepare clear risk statements for entry into the program/project risk management system. Coordination with the relevant stakeholders for the identified risks is included. For more information on identifying technical risks, see Section 6.4.2.1.

6.4.1.2.3 Conduct Technical Risk Assessment

Until recently, NASA’s Risk Management (RM) approach was based almost exclusively on Continuous Risk Management (CRM), which stresses the management of individual risk issues during implementation. In December of 2008, NASA revised its RM approach in order to more effectively foster proactive risk management. The new approach, which is outlined in NPR 8000.4, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements and further developed in NASA/SP-2011-3422, NASA Risk Management Handbook , evolves NASA‘s risk management to entail two complementary processes: Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) and CRM. RIDM is intended to inform direction-setting systems engineering (SE) decisions (e.g., design decisions) through better use of risk and uncertainty information in selecting alternatives and establishing baseline performance requirements (for additional RIDM technical information, guidance, and process description, see NASA/SP-2010-576 Version 1, NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook ).

CRM is then used to manage risks over the course of the development and implementation phases of the life cycle to assure that requirements related to safety, technical, cost, and schedule are met. In the past, RM was considered equivalent to the CRM process; now, RM is defined as comprising both the RIDM and CRM processes, which work together to assure proactive risk management as NASA programs and projects are conceived, developed, and executed. Figure 6.4-4 illustrates the concept.

6.4.1.2.4 Prepare for Technical Risk Mitigation

This includes selecting the risks that will be mitigated and more closely monitored, identifying the risk level or threshold that will trigger a risk mitigation action plan, and identifying for each risk which stakeholders will need to be informed that a mitigation/contingency action is determined as well as which organizations will need to become involved to perform the mitigation/contingency action.

6.4.1.2.5 Monitor the Status of Each Technical Risk Periodically

Risk status will need to be monitored periodically at a frequency identified in the risk plan. Risks that are approaching the trigger thresholds will be monitored on a more frequent basis. Reports of the status are made to the appropriate program/project management or board for communication and for decisions whether to trigger a mitigation action early. Risk status will also be reported at most life cycle reviews.

6.4.1.2.6 Implement Technical Risk Mitigation and Contingency Action Plans as Triggered

When the applicable thresholds are triggered, the technical risk mitigation and contingency action plans are implemented. This includes monitoring the results of the action plan implementation and modifying them as necessary, continuing the mitigation until the residual risk and/or consequence impacts are acceptable, and communicating the actions and results to the identified stakeholders. Action plan reports are prepared and results reported at appropriate boards and at life cycle reviews.

6.4.1.2.7 Capture Work Products

Work products include the strategy and procedures for conducting technical risk management; the rationale for decisions made; assumptions made in prioritizing, handling, and reporting technical risks and action plan effectiveness; actions taken to correct action plan implementation anomalies; and lessons learned.

Following are key risk outputs from activities:

• Technical Risk Mitigation and/or Contingency Actions: Actions taken to mitigate identified risks or contingency actions taken in case risks are realized.
• Technical Risk Reports: Reports of the technical risk policies, status, remaining residual risks, actions taken, etc. Output at the agreed-to frequency and recipients.
• Work Products: Includes the procedures for conducting technical risk management; rationale for decisions made; selected decision alternatives; assumptions made in prioritizing, handling, and reporting technical risks; and lessons learned.

For additional guidance on risk management, refer to NASA/SP-2010-576, NASA RIDM Handbook and NASA/SP-2011-3422, NASA Risk Management Handbook .

Impact of spatial resolution on soil loss estimation: a case study of abandoned quarries in Morocco

• Original Paper
• Published: 02 September 2024

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• Nabil Aouichaty   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1201-7435 1 &
• Yahya Koulali 1  

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Soil erosion poses significant challenges to sustainable land management. The Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE) has emerged as a valuable tool for predicting soil-erosion risk, providing essential insights for effective soil-conservation practices. However, the accuracy of RUSLE predictions strongly depends on the quality and suitability of the input data. This study investigated the impact of variability in the input data on the performance of the RUSLE model in quantifying soil-erosion rates for abandoned quarries in the Bouguergouh commune in Morocco using two sets of input data. The first set represents coarse resolution data (30 m) extracted from different available sources (ISRIC for soil data, NASA database for weather data, Landsat 8 for land use, and ASTER Digital Elevation Model (DEM) for elevation data). These data were compared with a high-resolution (10 m) dataset comprising field data for soil, observed weather data from the Bouregreg and Chaouia Hydraulic Basin Agency data extracted from the Mohammed VI satellites at 0.5 m, and a DEM from Sentinel-1A at 10 m. Our findings reveal that the erosion rates obtained from both the measured (10 m) and international (10 m) databases, using the LS (10 m) factor set, exhibit significant and comparable values. Specifically, the erosion rates ranged from 1.28 to 7.7 t/ha/yr for the measured database and from 1.25 to 7.74 t/ha/yr for the international database. Based on the results of this study, international databases can estimate soil losses using high-resolution DEMs instead of investing in time-consuming soil sampling and analysis results or acquiring expensive high-resolution satellite images, however, conducting the same comparison in other areas can generate global conclusions.

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish to express their gratitude to Hassan First University (Settat, Morocco) for financial support. We also appreciate the Royal Moroccan Center for Remote Sensing for granting our university access to Mohammed-VI satellite data at educational rates and the Bouregreg and Chaouia Hydraulic Basin Agency for supplying the precipitation data utilized in this study. We thank three anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism, which helped improve our final text.

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Hassan First University of Settat, Faculty of Sciences and Techniques, Moroccan Agro-Resources and Environment (ARME) Team, Settat, Morocco

Nabil Aouichaty & Yahya Koulali

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The authors made equal contributions to this paper. All authors have thoroughly reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript.

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Correspondence to Nabil Aouichaty .

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Aouichaty, N., Koulali, Y. Impact of spatial resolution on soil loss estimation: a case study of abandoned quarries in Morocco. Med. Geosc. Rev. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42990-024-00138-2

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Received : 06 May 2024

Revised : 11 August 2024

Accepted : 13 August 2024

Published : 02 September 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s42990-024-00138-2

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