human dignity essay sample

Essay on Human Dignity

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100 Words Essay on Human Dignity

What is human dignity.

Human dignity means treating every person with respect because they are valuable. It’s like saying every person is important, no matter who they are or where they come from. This idea is like a rule that helps us live together in peace.

Human Rights and Dignity

Human dignity is the heart of human rights. Rights like freedom and equality come from the belief that all people deserve respect. It’s like giving everyone a shield to protect them from being treated badly.

Respecting Others

To show human dignity, we should be kind and fair to others. It’s not just about not hurting people, but also about helping them feel good about themselves. When we respect others, we make the world a friendlier place.

Challenges to Dignity

Sometimes, people face bullying or unfair treatment, which attacks their dignity. Standing up against such wrongs is important. By doing so, we defend the value of each person and support a world where everyone is respected.

250 Words Essay on Human Dignity

Why human dignity is important.

Human dignity is like the golden rule: treat others as you want to be treated. When we respect each other’s dignity, we create a world where everyone can feel safe and happy. This helps us get along better, make friends, and live peacefully. Without dignity, people might feel sad, scared, or alone.

Human Dignity in Our Lives

In school, human dignity shows up when teachers listen to students’ ideas and when students are kind to each other. At home, it’s when family members support one another. In the world, it means making sure everyone has food, a home, and a chance to learn.

Standing Up for Dignity

Sometimes, people’s dignity is not respected. When this happens, it’s important to stand up for them. This could be helping a friend who is being bullied or telling an adult when something is wrong. By doing this, you protect dignity and show that you care about others.

Human dignity is a simple yet powerful idea. It’s about seeing the worth in every person and acting with kindness. Remember, when you respect others, you help make the world a better place for everyone.

500 Words Essay on Human Dignity

Human dignity is a powerful idea that means every person is valuable and deserves respect. This idea is like a golden rule that tells us to treat others as we would like to be treated. It doesn’t matter where someone is from, what they look like, or what they believe in—every person has dignity just because they are human.

Human Dignity in Everyday Life

Human dignity and equality.

Human dignity also means that all people should be treated as equals. No one is better or more important than anyone else. This is why there are rules and laws in countries around the world that try to make sure everyone is treated fairly. For example, when a girl and a boy are given the same chance to learn and play, it shows we value their dignity equally.

Human Dignity and Making Choices

Another part of human dignity is being able to make your own choices. This means that people should be able to decide things for themselves, like what they want to do when they grow up or what they believe is right and wrong. When we let others make choices for their own lives, we are showing respect for their dignity.

Challenges to Human Dignity

Our role in upholding dignity.

We all have a part to play in making sure we and the people around us are treated with dignity. This can be as simple as being kind, standing up for someone who is being picked on, or learning about different cultures to understand others better. When we do these things, we help create a world where everyone’s dignity is respected.

Human dignity is a special idea that touches every part of our lives. It reminds us that every person is important and deserves to be treated with kindness and respect. By understanding and upholding human dignity, we can make sure that we, and the people around us, live in a world that is fair and kind to everyone. Remember, it starts with you and the small acts of respect you show to others every day.

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Exploring The Essence of Human Dignity: a Philosophical Inquiry

Categories: Virtue

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Published: Sep 5, 2023

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Philosophical foundations of human dignity, manifestations of human dignity in society, ethical and moral considerations, challenges and global perspective.

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Dignity is a complex concept. In academic and legal contexts, it is typically used in the couplet “human dignity” to denote a kind of basic worth or status that purportedly belongs to all persons equally, and which grounds fundamental moral or political duties or rights. In this sense, many believe that dignity is a defining ideal of the contemporary world, especially in western society. However, the concept of dignity has long been associated with many more meanings, some of which cut in distinctly different directions: rank, station, honor, uniqueness, beauty, poise, gravitas, integrity, self-respect, self-esteem, a sacred place in the order of things, supreme worth, and even the apex of astrological significance. Some of these connotations have faded with time. But most have enduring influence.

So, what exactly is dignity? Do its different connotations hang together in any principled way? Does dignity understood as “universal human worth”, for example, have any meaningful connection to “social rank” or “personal integrity”? Is dignity primarily a moral concept or a political and legal one? Even assuming we can make sense of its different meanings, what does dignity demand of us? What does it mean to recognize or respect it? Does it ground rights? If so, which ones? And where does the idea of dignity come from? What, in other words, is its history?

This entry will take up these questions, but without any pretense of being exhaustive. The goal is to provide a general guide to existing theory and debate, with a focus on philosophical approaches to human dignity, and mostly as it figures into the western tradition. The vast literature makes anything more ambitious than this unrealistic, even for an encyclopedic survey.

1.1 The legal history of dignity

1.2.1 the revolutionary platitude, 1.2.2 the kantian platitude, 1.2.3 the imago dei platitude, 1.2.4 the ciceronian platitude, 2.1 dignity’s defining properties vs. dignity’s grounds, 2.2 is a connection to rights a defining property of dignity, 2.3 are distinctiveness and fragility defining properties of dignity, 3.1 virtue, value, status, and the “distinctiveness” point reconsidered, 3.2 individuals vs. species, 3.3 inherent vs. constructed, 3.4 respect: an alternative lens on dignity, 4. skeptical worries, other internet resources, related entries, 1. a historical primer.

In the opening sentence of its preamble, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights affirms the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UN 1948). This claim would surprise our modern ancestors. Until about 1830–1850, neither the English term “dignity,” nor its Latin root dignitas , nor the French counterpart dignité , had any stable currency as meaning “the unearned status or worth of all persons”, let alone the grounds of universal rights or equality. Instead, in everything from Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) to Webster’s Compendious Dictionary (1806), “dignity” was primarily used with a conventional merit connotation—something like the “rank of elevation” that Johnson officially gave it.

How did this sea change in meaning come about? The UN Declaration makes clear that dignity’s moral-political meaning had become normalized by 1948. But what happened before 1948 that explains this transformation? These are not easy questions to answer. Although theorists often include historical remarks in their inquiries, they are just as often brief and subservient to some further, non-historical point. The result is a great many half-told stories about dignity’s past.

There are some notable exceptions. For some time, legal theorists have been etching out the details of dignity’s historical role in law and jurisprudence, especially in connection to rights. Second, theological inquiries into human dignity often engage an older history of ideas, especially the Renaissance thinker Pico della Mirandola or scholastic debates about the biblical doctrine of imago Dei . Third, there is a considerable body of literature on the Enlightenment luminaire, Immanuel Kant, and his famous claim that humans do not have a “price”, only a distinctive and incomparable worth or Würde —usually translated as “dignity” (see, e.g., Korsgaard 1986; Meyer 1987; Hill 1992; Kofman 1982 [1997]; Wood 1999; Kain 2009). Let us turn to these various exceptions, and their challenges.

The connection between law and dignity strikes many as socially and morally urgent. It is thus unsurprising that some serious history of this connection already exists, especially in relation to rights theory (see, e.g., Eberle 2002 or Barak 2015). Nevertheless, the bulk of this history does not look back very far.

For example, Lewis (2007) gives a wonderful overview of the idea of dignity in international law, but his focus is on the writing of, and reaction to, the 1945 UN Charter and 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Or consider McCrudden’s impressive 2013 edited volume, Understanding Human Dignity. The historical chapters of this volume make important contributions, but again the focus is largely the twentieth century. Scott’s chapter (2013), for example, begins by observing that the 1848 French decree to abolish slavery motivates itself from the consideration “that slavery is an assault upon human dignity ( la dignité humaine )” (2013: 61). She then nicely explores the idea of dignity in the context of post-slavery Louisiana c.1862–96. However, the chapter then jumps forward to a comparison with Brazilian society c.1970–2012. Moyn’s chapter (2013) examines early and middle twentieth century constitutional debates to show that the concept of dignity labors under poorly appreciated debts to a specifically Christian conception of democracy, and for this reason, Moyn argues, we should be skeptical about the long-term utility of dignity for secular rights theory. And Goos’s chapter (2013) offers a close examination of the role of dignity in German thought, but the focus is on post-World War II interpretation of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law). [ 1 ]

A longer legal history can be found in McCrudden (2008), whose concise review of dignity reaches back to classical Roman thought. McCrudden argues that we can trace the merit connotation of dignity as “elevated social rank” to the Roman idea of “ dignitas homini ” (2008: 656); but also, and crucially, he argues that we can trace our contemporary moral-political notion of the “basic worth or status of human persons” to this same period, when Cicero introduced the idea of “the dignity of the human race” (see also, Cancik 2002). This claim about Cicero is echoed in Michael Rosen’s 2012, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , which is another important entry into dedicated history that focuses on legal connections. Rosen’s history is mostly from a bird’s eye view, but, like McCrudden’s, Rosen’s history has the virtue of taking a long view that stretches back to antiquity. Moreover, Rosen offers some nuanced reflections on eighteenth and nineteenth century connections, including Kant’s influence on the writing of the German Grundgesetz .

Finally, when it comes to legal history, Darwall (2017) offers a sophisticated analysis of dignity’s connections to western Enlightenment conceptions of jurisprudence stretching back to the sixteenth century. Importantly, however, Darwall’s history challenges McCrudden’s and Rosen’s appeal to Cicero as a key source. We will return to this scholarly disagreement and Darwall’s competing proposal below ( §1.2.2 and §1.2.4 ).

1.2 Four Origin Stories

Given the present popularity of studying dignity, we should not only expect the historical contours of dignity to become clearer in coming years, but also for them to be occasionally redrawn. A few important platitudes have already been challenged.

The western creed of human dignity stems from the wisdom of eighteenth-century revolutionary thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, or Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette. At the founding of new liberal states like America, or the reformation of existing ones like England or France, political sages like these propounded the inviolable value of individual human beings.

In reality, one looks in vain for dignity in the founding documents of these new republics. The term appears a few times in the English Bill of Rights (1689), but not with our contemporary moral-political meaning. It appears once in the French Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (1789), but the connotation is of the privileges that attend public or political office. And for all its fiery rhetoric about equality and the “inalienable” rights of man, the US Declaration of Independence does not mention human dignity at all. Nor does the US Constitution. In fact, it is not until the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the 1919 Weimer Constitution, that the term appears in a constitutional context possibly with its moral-political connotation (McCrudden 2008; Debes 2009 and 2017b). To this corrective evidence, we should add the testimony of an entirely different set of historical voices—from Sojourner Truth, David Walker, Anna Wheeler, and William Thompson, to Susan B. Anthony, Frederick Douglass, James Rapier, and Ida B. Wells—who remind us that the revolutionary platitude was contradicted by the lived reality within these new republics. These voices decried the systematic oppression and often bloody inhumanity that stained the supposedly egalitarian societies in which they lived.

The early modern concept of dignity originates with Immanuel Kant, who in his 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , argued that all persons have an inherent value, or dignity, in virtue of their rational autonomy. This value commands a distinct kind of moral respect, which we express by abiding by certain limits in our treatment of others. Thus, Kant argued that we have a categorical duty to treat persons always “as an end” and “never merely as a means” ( Groundwork , 4:429).

This is the greatest dogma about dignity in philosophy. But there are good reasons to rethink it in favor of a more complicated history of ideas. First, although it is well known that Kant is indebted to Rousseau in various ways (see especially Beiser 1992), recent scholarship suggests that when it comes to his ideas about “humanity” and “dignity”, the debt runs deeper than is generally understood (James 2013; Hanley 2017; Sensen 2017). Sensen also argues that it is a longstanding interpretive mistake to think that Kant grounds the obligation to respect others on any “absolute inner value” that humans possess; and that “dignity” is not the name Kant gave to such a value anyway (Sensen 2011 & 2017; see also Meyer 1987). Relatedly, Debes (2021) argues that contemporary philosophers have greatly overestimated Kant’s influence on the historical development of our notion of moral respect for persons.

On top of these corrections, Darwall (2017) argues that the conceptual link between dignity and rights does not originate with Kant. According to Darwall, only certain conceptions of dignity will support the kind of inferences about respect that could justify using dignity to ground human rights. Namely, those conceptions that render dignity as a kind of authoritative standing to make “second-personal” claims—that is, claims by one person to another. However, the original insight for this crucial point, Darwall further argues, comes from the natural lawyer Samuel Pufendorf (see also Darwall 2012).

Writing a century before Kant, Pufendorf argued that human beings have perfect natural rights (rights owed to one another) in virtue of a certain moral “standing” that we assign to each other as a constitutive part of being sociable. Whenever we address another person directly—e.g., with a claim like “You must allow me to speak”—we implicitly treat them as an accountable, responsible being. Otherwise, why address them at all? And the same is true when they address us. In other words, according to Pufendorf, being sociable implicitly involves a reciprocal assumption of basic moral status—us of them, them of us—whenever we interact, and even if the address is one that offends the equal standing of the other. Indeed, this is precisely when “dignity” becomes most urgent. Thus, Pufendorf writes:

There seems to him to be somewhat of Dignity [ dignatio ] in the appellation of Man : so that the last and most efficacious Argument to curb the Arrogance of insulting Men, is usually, I am not a Dog but a Man as well as yourself . (1672: I.VII.I [2003]: 100)

The moralized concept of dignity does not originate in the early modern era. It was celebrated as early as the Renaissance, in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s 1486 Oration on the Dignity of Man . Moreover, Pico’s oration is drawn from the older, medieval Christian doctrine of imago Dei (based on Genesis 1:26 and Wisdom 2:23), which tells us that we are made in “in the image of God”, and that this likeness grounds our distinctive moral worth or status.

This story about dignity is to Christian theology what the Kantian dogma is to philosophy. However, these claims are usually misleading if not false. For example, Copenhaver (2017) flatly contradicts the claim that Pico was talking about human dignity in a sense akin to our contemporary moral-political notion. First, Copenhaver notes that the title of the work, which draws our attention, postdates Pico (who never published it). More substantively, Copenhaver argues that Pico’s speech was a public failure in large part because it was entangled with Kabbalah mysteries for how humans can escape the body to increase their status by becoming angels. Finally, Copenhaver points out that Pico uses the Latin dignitas only twice; and

In neither case does dignitas belong to humans, except aspirationally, and neither justifies “dignity” as a translation, with all the Kantian baggage of the modern English word. (2017: 134–5)

Adding to this reversal of fortunes, Kent (2017) marshals extensive evidence from the scholastic tradition against the imago Dei platitude more generally. Although she confirms that both dignity and the doctrine of imago Dei were widely discussed by medieval Christian scholars in the Latin West, she convincingly demonstrates that these discussions did not intersect in a way that supports an inference to our contemporary moral-political notion of the “basic worth or status of humans”. This said, not all interpretations of the Christian tradition, including the doctrine of imago Dei , are beholden to this historical platitude. And the imago Dei line of inquiry on dignity has a somewhat different life in the Jewish tradition. [ 2 ]

“Dignity” derives from the Latin dignitas . And while most Romans used dignitas only in its merit sense, a few, and Cicero in particular, had a proleptic understanding of dignitas that anticipated today’s moral-political sense.

This historical view has attracted more attention lately, as evidenced by its earlier noted endorsement in McCrudden (2008) and Rosen (2012a) (see also, Englard 2000). However, it has been challenged on both philosophical and interpretive grounds. For example, Miriam Griffin (2017) carefully demonstrates that the textual support for this view is very thin. She argues that straightforward lexical analysis of Roman sources offers sparing evidence for connecting dignitas to our contemporary moral-political concept. Moreover, even if we branch out to other ancient Roman concepts to see if dignity might be hiding under different terminology, we run into a fundamental challenge: “Stoics and Roman moralists”, Griffin explains, “think in terms of officia , obligations or duties or functions that our nature, properly understood, imposes on us ”. Correspondingly, “[t]he entitlements and rights of those at the receiving end of our actions is not a prominent aspect of their thinking” (2017: 49).

Admittedly, Griffin allows that in some cases these obligations or duties entail a kind of treatment of others that accords with our contemporary notion of human dignity. Still, this result does not depend on any right that persons have in virtue of “the worth of a human being per se” (2017: 64; see also Meyer 1987; and Lebech 2009, especially p. 46 n. 22.)

To these challenges, Darwall (2017) adds another problem for the Ciceronian platitude. Borrowing from the exact quotations that McCrudden and Rosen use to defend attributing a moral-political notion of human dignity to Cicero, Darwall argues:

Human dignity for Cicero is nothing that could be established by conventional patterns of deference. It is the idea, rooted in the ancient notion of a great chain of being, that distinctive capacities for self-development “by study and reflection” give human beings a “nature” “superior” to that of “cattle and other animals”. Other species are motivated only by sensory instincts, whereas human beings can “learn that sensual pleasure is wholly unworthy of the dignity of the human race”, and be guided by this understanding. [Consequently] nothing in the Ciceronian notion of human dignity requires, or even leads naturally to, basic human rights. The proposition, for example, that “sensual pleasure” is “unworthy” of human dignity is less a thesis about what human beings are in a position to claim from one another by virtue of their dignity than it is an ethical standard to which we are to live up. (2017: 182–3; Cicero quotations cited in McCrudden 2008: 657, and Rosen 2012a: 12)

To be fair, Darwall’s critique hangs on two assumptions about the concept of dignity: (1) that a satisfactory account of dignity will involve a connection to, if not a grounding for, rights claims; and (2) that dignity is in no way an achievement. Both assumptions resonate strongly with contemporary moral-political talk of dignity. Nevertheless, identifying these assumptions should remind us that we have not yet clearly formulated a concept of dignity. So, let us turn to that task. [ 3 ]

2. Formulating Dignity

There is no single, incontestable meaning of dignity. In fact, there are so many possible meanings that it has become commonplace in the literature to worry about the expansive variety of conceptions, and in turn to worry whether dignity is or has become essentially ambiguous. And while its defenders find ways to mitigate or explain away this ambiguity, the concept of dignity has its share of detractors. But we will return to skeptical worries at the end of this entry. For now, and granting the prima facie force of the ambiguity worry, four broad categories of meaning stand out across context and history:

Dignity as Gravitas: a poise or grace associated with behavioral comportment; e.g., the sophisticated manners or elegant speech of nobility, or outward composure in the face of insult or duress.
Dignity as Integrity: the family of ideas associated with living up to personal or social standards of character and conduct, either in one’s own eyes or the eyes of others.
Dignity as Status : noble or elevated social position or rank.
Dignity as Human dignity : the unearned worth or status that all humans share equally (either inherent or constructed).

This “general schema” is rough and ready. Scholars divide the conceptual space in different ways, often advocating intersections between the foregoing four categories, making elaborations on them, or noting wrinkles within them.

For example, Kolnai (1976) argues that the primary function of the concept is descriptive, not evaluative. Dignity is a quality of persons, which is the fitting object of a set of pro-attitudes related to both moral appreciation and aesthetic appreciation. Thus, to be dignified is to comport oneself in a way that is not simply a reflection of authority, rank, moral uprightness, or a regimented or serious adherence to codes of conduct, but instead reflects something of “the beautiful”. As Kolnai puts it, our response to dignity is characterized, at least in part, by “our devoted and admiring appreciation for beauty” (1976: 252). Hence the distinction between (1) and (2) above (see also Brady 2007).

By contrast, although Rosen (2012a) notes that the Latin term dignitas was once part of a critical vocabulary of classical art and rhetoric, used “to characterize speech that was weighty and majestic, in contrast to discourse that was light and charming” (2012a: 13), Rosen largely blends categories (1) and (2) into a single strand of meaning, which he identifies as “dignity as behavior, character or bearing that is dignified” (2012a: 54). Rosen then accepts (3) and (4) but adds his own further category, which he calls “dignity as treatment”: “To treat someone with dignity is…to respect their dignity” (2012a: 58). As we will see more fully in a moment, this addition reflects a common observation by scholars about a tight connection between dignity and its recognition (although, it is not common to claim that the proper recognition of dignity is a separate category of dignity).

Meanwhile, Kateb (2011) stresses the need to distinguish between human dignity qua individual humans, and human dignity qua human species. According to Kateb, both have dignity. But whereas the dignity of individuals can be described as a special kind of “status”—as in category (4) above—the dignity of the human species requires a further concept, namely, of “stature”. He writes, “In comparison to other species, humanity has a stature beyond comparison” (2011: 6). To be clear, Kateb does not think that the human species has an existence above and beyond its members: it is not a natural kind. However, he argues that the interdependence of humans is,

so extensive, so deep, and so entangled…that for certain purposes we might just as well make the human species a unified entity or agency, even though we know it isn’t. (2011: 6)

Correspondingly, we can sensibly talk about the “dignity” of the species. This conclusion cuts against some positions that maintain dignity “proper” can only belong to individuals (Stern 1975; Gaylin 1984; Egonsson 1998).

A more recent schema is offered by Killmister (2020). Killmister proposes three “strands” of dignity: personal, social, and status. To have personal dignity, Killmister argues, is to take oneself to be subject to personal “dignitarian” norms. And to have social dignity is to be subject to social “dignitarian” norms. What are dignitarian norms? Dignitarian norms are norms that either the person themself, or society at large, take to be “ennobling” to uphold, or whose transgression the person or society consider to be “disgraceful or debasing” (2020: 25, 29). Like Rosen, then, Killmister effectively blends categories (1) and (2) , while at the same time drawing attention to a different organizational distinction one might make, namely, between the personal and the social. As for “status dignity”, Killmister argues that explaining this category of dignity requires a distinctive concept of respect. And her argument is worth elaborating because it exemplifies and fleshes out two closely related points shared by many existing theories:

that any satisfactory theory of dignity must explain what it means to recognize dignity; and
that this recognition is best described as a kind of respect .

So, consider: Dignitarian norms, according to Killmister, can typically be redescribed as articulating the grounds of respect—either self-respect (in the case of personal dignity) or respect from others (in the case of social dignity). Moreover, the kind of respect relevant to personal and social dignity, she argues, is what Stephen Darwall (1977) influentially named “appraisal respect”. This kind of respect is a positive evaluative attitude or feeling , which we express towards ourselves or others, for some merit of character. In this sense, respect is akin to esteem. Killmister writes:

to be highly personally dignified is to be such that, by our own lights, we ought to hold ourselves in high esteem…to be highly socially dignified is to be such that, by the light of our community, they ought to hold us in high esteem. (2020: 23)

By contrast, Killmister connects status dignity to what Darwall called, “recognition respect”. Recognition respect is a way of thinking about oneself or others. To recognize-respect someone (at least as Darwall first explained it) is to give appropriate weight to some fact about them in our practical deliberations, and to restrict our choices or actions accordingly.

Killmister thus argues,

We come to have status dignity, when we fall within a particular [social] category, membership in which commands respectful treatment from others in our community. (2020: 22)

She elaborates,

status dignity does not call on others to esteem us, but rather to treat us in ways appropriate to the kind of thing we are. (2020: 23, emphasis added)

Correspondingly, human dignity ends up as “an especially important instance” of status dignity. And all humans deserve recognition respect in virtue of the “fact” of their membership in the category “human” (2020: 129–30).

This said, Killmister’s conclusion diverges from Darwall’s own account of human dignity, which is tied to a revision he made to his theory of recognition respect, which connected recognition respect to the reciprocal “authority” of second-personal address, as discussed in the earlier historical reflection on Pufendorf (see §1.2.3 above; and Darwall 2006, esp. p. 14). Note also that Killmister, like Kateb, eschews thinking of “human” as a natural kind, in favor of understanding it as a social kind.

The previous section offered examples of how the general schema of dignity’s meaning gets modified in existing theory, as well as how each category of meaning might be fleshed out. More examples could be given. But to decide between any of them, it seems crucial to ask, how should we formulate the concept of dignity? In other words, instead of simply cataloging first-order views about its meaning, we need to introduce some second-order criteria.

On the one hand, we need to determine the defining properties of dignity: the distinguishing characteristics or explanatory demands that are supposed to apply to any contentful account of dignity. Such criteria might include, for example, that dignity is “inherent”; that it is “incommensurable” with other values; that it has a “distinctive normative function”; that it has an essential connection to rights; and so on.

On the other hand, we need to determine what grounds dignity: we need to say what it is about humans, or any being with dignity, that satisfies the defining properties. In other words, we need to answer the question: In virtue of what do we have dignity? The most common answer to this question, historically speaking, especially when it comes to human dignity, involves a claim about autonomy. Or if not autonomy tout court, then the “capabilities” for such autonomy (see, e.g., Nussbaum 1995, 2006a, and 2006b). Thus, one finds many variations of the claim that humans have dignity in virtue of their capacity for (or exercise of) “choice” or “rational agency”—claims that are often tethered to the earlier discussed historical platitude about Kant. This said, alternatives to the grounding question about human dignity include brute species membership, sentience, the creative power of humanity, creation “in the image of God”, a politically conferred status as “rights bearer”, the capacity for empathy and caring relationships, the earlier mentioned “personality”, the concrete “particularity” of an individual person, and the possession of “perspective”.

Sorting these views is not easy for a few reasons. First, some of the operative concepts, such as “autonomy”, are themselves hotly disputed. Second, there is no pre-theoretical reason to deny multiple ways of satisfying any given definitional criteria. That is, any given proposal for the defining properties of dignity might be satisfied by more than one ground. For example, depending on the criteria, humans might “have” dignity in virtue of both autonomy and sentience, or both divine creation and our capacity for empathy, and so on. Third, twentieth century theorists rarely took a second-order view on their subject and methods. In turn, they often confused or at least failed to clarify which of the two foregoing challenges they were trying to tackle, articulating dignity’s defining properties or articulating dignity’s grounds.

Thankfully, twenty-first century formulations of dignity are marked by increasingly conscientious attempts to articulate the defining properties of dignity, and to do so in a way that might guide discussion about dignity’s grounds. For example, in “Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual”, Iglesias (2001) distinguishes between historically older, “restricted” meanings of dignity associated with general schema (1) , (2) , and (3) ; and, on the other hand, what she calls “universal” meanings associated with schema (4) , “human dignity”. She further argues that any satisfactory universalist account must render human dignity as (4a) in some sense “inherent” or “intrinsic”; and (4b) the “grounds” of basic rights. Regarding the latter, Iglesias writes:

The connection is essential. It is rooted in the concept of the human person, in human self-understanding as constituted by the bedrock truths about what and who we are…The universal meaning of the concept of dignity, as inherent to every human being, expresses the intrinsic good that the human being is. The distinct human rights articulate those basic intrinsic goods proper to, and expressive of, each one’s dignity, individually and in community relationships—as dimensions of our very being. These basic goods—guaranteed as rights—must be recognized, respected, and promoted so that the intrinsic good that the human being is himself or herself, personally and as an individual, may be preserved and assured. Thus, the ground for advocacy and defense of human rights resides on what and who the human being is, as a human being, namely on his or her dignity. (2001: 130)

By comparison, Shultziner (2007) adopts a “philosophical-linguistic” method to distinguish moral-philosophical uses of dignity from political and legal “functions” of the concept, especially the use of dignity to ground specific rights and enforceable duties. Regarding the latter, Shultziner stresses that in real world contexts, the rights which the concept of dignity is used to ground vary considerably:

There is no fixed and universal content that spouts out of human dignity and, hence, its content and meanings are determined separately in each legal document in accordance with the political agreement achieved at the time. (2007: 78)

This might seem to express skepticism about the possibility of any general, stable concept of dignity. In fact, it underlines the point of Iglesias’s final criterion (4b) ; namely, that a defining property of dignity is the grounding connection to rights. In other words, strictly speaking, Shultziner agrees with Iglesias that at least one defining property of human dignity—in political contexts—is that dignity grounds rights, even though the content of these rights vary greatly because the grounds of dignity itself vary greatly. [ 4 ]

Another example of second-order thinking can be found in Debes (2009), who argues that any satisfactory “formal” account of human dignity—by which he means an account of its defining properties—must pick out a “distinctive” value or status belonging to humans. And it must be distinctive in the sense that it (a) is not merit based, but instead unearned; (b) is in some sense “incommensurable” with other values; and (c) makes sense of the basic “normative function” of the concept. Regarding (c), Debes argues that the concept of dignity does not purport to be only or even mainly descriptive. Instead, it has a normative purpose or role, namely, “to set off in our practical deliberations whatever ‘dignity’ is applied to—to guard or protect what has dignity” (2009: 61–2).

Or consider Waldron (2012), who tracks a confusion in legal discussions of dignity between (on the one hand) definitional claims about dignity’s defining properties and (on the other hand) claims about dignity’s practical conditions; that is, the conditions of its moral, social, or political recognition. Thus, Waldron notes the way that various human rights charters claim that dignity is “inherent” in the human person; but also “command us to make heroic efforts to establish everyone’s dignity” (2012: 16, emphasis added). Such claims, he writes, may look like an equivocation akin to claiming, as Rousseau once did, that “Man is born free but everywhere is in chains”—a claim that Jeremy Bentham later called “miserable nonsense”. However, Waldron argues that Bentham missed an easy explanation of Rousseau:

[A person] might be identified as a free man in a juridical sense—that is his legal status—even though he is found in conditions of slavery…So, similarly, one might say that every human person is free as a matter of status—the status accorded to him by his creator—even though it is the case that some humans are actually in chains and need to have their freedom represented as the content of a normative demand. (2012: 16–17)

To be clear, Waldron quickly adds that one might shy away from the specific premise of divine creation as a way of grounding human freedom. That metaphysical premise is only an example. His overarching point is that it is not incoherent to make this kind of claim. Because the operative claim about the status of human persons—namely, that they are free—is a claim about a defining property of the concept of “man” (in a juridical sense), it follows that we can distinguish this claim from any further claim about what grounds this “free” status, as well any claim about the worldly conditions that are required for this status to be expressed, realized, or recognized.

Keeping this in mind, we can now understand why Waldron thinks that we are not necessarily equivocating if we claim that dignity is inherent , but nevertheless enjoin others to establish it in practice. He writes,

On the one hand, the term [“dignity”] may be used to convey something about the inherent rank or status of human beings; on the other hand, it may be used concomitantly to convey the demand that rank or status should actually be recognized. (2012: 17)

Importantly Waldron further argues that dignity finds its proper conceptual home not in morality, but in the legal context of rights. He writes, “law is its natural habitat” (2012: 13). This is because, he argues, rights articulate, or flesh out, the kind of status that modern conceptions of dignity typically include or allude to; but also, which his own theory depends on. Thus, for Waldron, it is historically mistaken and theoretically confused to ground our contemporary concept of human dignity on thick metaphysical bases—some inviolable value that “inheres” in humans, whether by dint of divine creation or otherwise. Instead, on Waldron’s view, the contemporary notion of human dignity is essentially Samuel Johnson’s old idea of “elevated rank”, albeit refashioned in the modern consciousness to apply to all humans.

In other words, Waldron explains the historical revolution in our concept of dignity as turning on a leveling up of all people to the kind of social status once reserved only for the noble elite. We simply reappropriated the term “dignity” to describe this high status, ditching its original “sortal” connotation for a new egalitarian one (2012: 57–61). Furthermore, he claims that all this happened through (or mainly through) the paradigm of rights. Oversimplifying for sake of argument: Waldron thinks that people of lower social rank successfully annexed the rights reserved to those of higher ranks, by reinterpreting those rights as human rights. Hence why rights remain the critical apparatus for fleshing out the kind of status relevant to “dignity”, and why the proper home of dignity is law, not morality.

Waldron’s view on dignity has been influential, so a few more notes about it are fitting. First, in making these claims about dignity-as-elevated-rank, Waldron partly aligns himself with Appiah (2010), although Waldron does not seem to notice this. Second, Waldron’s claim about the “home” of dignity is contentious. It is prima facie hard to square with everyday claims about human dignity, which seem evenly spread over moral, political, and legal contexts. And it contradicts Shultziner (2007), discussed above. Moreover, Dimock (2012), Herzog (2012), and Rosen (2012b) challenge it directly, among others (see, e.g., Bird 2013).

Most important, however, in the greater context of discussing the defining prosperities of dignity, it is to register Waldron’s underlying suggestion about an “essential” connection between dignity and rights. As we have seen, this claim finds wide traction in the literature, even in accounts of dignity that are at odds with the Appiah-Waldron view of “dignity-as-elevated-rank”. For example, considering only accounts reviewed so far, Iglesias (2001) made the same claim; Darwall (2017) implies it; and both Kateb (2011) and Killmister (2020) endorse it in different ways. This raises an obvious question: What exactly is the connection between dignity and rights?

It is beyond the scope of this entry to answer this question in anything close to a comprehensive way. (Good starting points include Meyer and Parent 1992; Gewirth 1992, Carozza 2008 and 2013; and Tasioulas 2013). Instead, let us draw out a few points about the connection between dignity and rights as it bears specifically on attempts to make it a defining property of dignity itself. To get at these points, consider a final proposal about the definitional criteria of dignity, from Fitzpatrick (2013):

The primary notion of dignity is the idea of a certain moral status involving possession of an inherent, unearned form of worth or standing —a basic worth or standing that is neither dependent on one’s being of use or interest to others nor based on one’s merits, and which essentially calls for certain forms of respect. (2013: 5546)

Fitzpatrick presents this definition within the context of an encyclopedic effort to capture its meaning. As such, he is understandably aiming at something generic. However, in the light of our analysis so far, the tensions in his attempt are manifest, albeit instructive.

First, describing dignity as primarily a “status” instead of a “value” aligns with those like Waldron, who make a principled distinction between their accounts and all kinds of “worth” or “value” conceptions of human dignity (see, e.g., Killmister 2020, who emphasizes this distinction; and Dan-Cohen 2012, for analysis on its import to Waldron). However, Fitzpatrick immediately equivocates on this point, redefining status as, “worth or standing”. Similarly, consider that those like Appiah-Waldron who think human dignity depends on a refashioned idea of high social rank, must, strictly speaking, reject the property of “inherentness” that Fitzpatrick appeals to. But they might allow for the alternative description of “unearned”, especially if this is interpreted as historically indexed to the refashioned conception of status.

More important for the question about rights is to consider Fitzpatrick’s final remark that dignity, “calls for certain forms of respect”. At first blush, this appeal might seem to be merely a refinement of Debes’s (2009) claim that dignity has a distinctive “normative function”. If so, it would be a refinement that is common to many theorists, as we already noted in §2.1 . However, Fitzpatrick immediately connects this generic claim about respect to two specific elaborations of dignity’s normative function. He writes:

It is in this sense [of an inherent worth or standing that calls for respect] that many hold that all persons possess a fundamental, inalienable dignity, which grounds [1] basic rights…or [2] the authority to make claims and demands of others. (2013: 5546)

Both claims merit elaboration.

The first claim [1] gives voice to the strongest, or at least the most direct way to make the connection to rights a defining property of dignity, by making dignity the normative basis of rights. Thus, suppose one asks of any given right x , what justifies the claim that “ x is a human right”? The answer for those who take this line is, “dignity”. Or at least, “human dignity”.

Now, in one sense, claim [1] is unsurprising given that it has legal reality. For example, although the claim is only implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as well as the original Charter of the United Nations (1945), a 1966 amendment to the Charter made it explicit, declaring that rights “derived from the inherent dignity of persons”. Moreover, claims like this have become increasingly common in state constitutions, especially in the west, as well as other international charters and humanitarian declarations (see, e.g., Schachter 1983, Iglesias 2001, Shultziner 2007, and McCrudden 2008, for summaries and analysis).

And yet, it is important to note that such legal claims are almost always brute assertions. They are not conscientious attempts at theory. More exactly, they do not claim that any adequate theory of dignity (as a concept) must account for the grounding relationship between dignity and rights. This is important because, pace FitzPatrick, or those like James Griffin (2008) who adamantly stress dignity as the foundation of rights, some theorists challenge or avoid or even reject claim [1] . This includes skeptics who challenge the viability of any existing substantive accounts of dignity to ground rights (discussed later). But it also includes some theorists who defend dignity (in one form or other). For example, Waldron skirts around the kind of commitment at issue in claim [1]. He allows that dignity involves each person thinking of themselves, “as a self-originating source of legal and moral claims” (2012: 60), but the overarching implication of his argument is that rights articulate the nature of the “high” status humans have been elevated to. Dignity is thus not the normative basis of rights on his view. Instead, legal systems, and rights in particular, “constitute and vindicate human dignity, both in their explicit provisions and in their overall modus operandi” (2012: 67).

Killmister (2020) follows Waldron’s lead, but she is more explicit. “[H]uman rights”, she argues, “form part of our articulation of how members of the human kind ought to be treated” (2020: 143). And, like Shultziner (2007), she warns against attempts to derive the content of rights directly from dignity, a warning that further tells against making claim [1] part of the definitional criteria. Relatedly, Meyer (1989) concludes that insofar as we aim to explain rights, we can never successfully explain dignity: “While having and exercising certain rights is important to our dignity as human beings”, Meyer argues,

what we commonly regard as essential to human dignity would not be explained even if we were able to delineate all of the relevant rights and the particular ways in which each of them expresses or protects human dignity. (1989: 521)

Meyer’s point is enhanced (perhaps even preempted) by Donnelly’s (1982) sociological claim that in cultures where “rights” are or once were a relatively foreign concept, human dignity is not. If Donnelly is correct, then excepting motivational purposes, rights theory is arguably a non-starter for a proper account of dignity’s defining properties (see also, Howard 1992, who partly recapitulates Donnelly’s point).

Piling onto this, Schroeder (2012) and Moyn (2013) warn that the “normative basis” version of the connection claim between rights and dignity—i.e., claim [1] —leaves dignity vulnerable, because our contemporary concept of human dignity carries underappreciated debts to non-secular, theological traditions (see also Addis 2013). And Valentini (2017) argues that the plausibility of claim [1] depends on which other defining properties of dignity we want to defend. Specifically, if dignity is taken to be inherent, she argues, then claim [1] becomes not only “uninformative” because “the notion of inherent dignity is opaque”; it also becomes counterproductive to the aims of most rights theories. This is because, she continues, the inherentness claim pushes rights debates, “into deep metaphysical waters”, and distracts us from the main political function of rights (especially, human rights), namely, to constrain, “the conduct of powerful actors” (2017: 862–3).

Now consider connection claim [2] : dignity grounds the authority to make claims in general. Some have argued that the first connection claim [1] , which makes dignity the normative basis of rights, is ultimately just a special case of the second claim [2], about authority. Perhaps most well-known in this respect is Feinberg (1970 [1980]), who, in the course of arguing that the act or practice of making interpersonal claims is what “gives rights their special moral significance”, adds this passing remark about dignity: “what is called ‘human dignity’ may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims” (1970 [1980: 151]). Admittedly, Feinberg does not unpack the point. And it is not perfectly clear if authority per se is part of his conception of this “capacity”. Still, the point seems to resonate with claim [2], especially if we pair Feinberg’s point with Darwall’s views about second-personal authority, considered earlier. Indeed, Meyer (1989) tries to unpack Feinberg in a way that seems to anticipate Darwall’s view. (See also, Forst 2011, who offers a similar line of argument to Darwall, which he credits partly to Ernst Bloch. But see Sangiovanni 2017, who objects to both Darwall and Forst, esp. pp. 50–60).

It is possible to take an even wider view on the defining criteria of dignity. For example, consider Etinson (2020), who represents another case of conscientious second-order theorizing. Etinson argues that a complete theory of dignity should explain not only what “grounds” dignity—“that is, how and why one comes to possess or lose it”—but also its “proper” method—that is, “how inquiry into all of this should proceed and be understood” (2020: 356). The latter demand is akin to calling for an articulation of the defining properties of dignity, in the sense that we have been discussing. However, Etinson adds an important substantive claim about this method: He agrees that dignity is partly distinguished by something like a distinctive “normative function”, but sharpens this claim by suggesting that to explain this function, we should focus specifically on the conditions of dignity’s violation. This refinement is important for two broad reasons.

First, over its long history, inquiry into human dignity has often been conjoined with considerations of what it means to harm dignity: What constitutes disrespect of dignity? Can we lose it? Can it be destroyed? And so on. Call this, the question of dignity’s “fragility”. Sometimes, this question is taken up within a direct examination of dignity (see, e.g., Kaplan 1999 or Dussel 2003). At other times, the motivation is pragmatic. For example, in his reflection on legal appeals to dignity, Schacter (1983) writes:

When [dignity] has been invoked in concrete situations, it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognized even if the abstract term cannot be defined. “I know it when I see it even if I cannot tell you what it is”. (1983: 849)

And in some cases, these reflections go the other way around; that is, from an analysis of a specific kind of dehumanizing harm (slavery, torture, rape, genocide; alienation, humiliation, embarrassment) to dignity, or one of its close cognates like “humanity” (see especially, Neuhäuser 2011; Morawa 2013; Haslam 2014; Frick 2021; Mikkola 2021). [ 5 ]

But whatever the context, it is crucial to distinguish between first-order encounters with dignity’s fragility, and second-order efforts that try to draw a connection between a negative methodology centered on the question of fragility and the positive effort to articulate the defining properties of dignity. It is the latter claim that Etinson makes, illustrated in the following incisive point:

Not all moral wrongs convincingly register as violations of human dignity…And this suggests that dignity is normatively special—that its violation represents a particular type of wrong. (2020: 357)

Essentially, Etinson is arguing that (1) we should add to the defining properties of dignity, that the value or status “dignity” picks out is in some sense “normatively distinctive”; and (2) in order to articulate (positively) what makes it distinctive, we must investigate (negatively) what it means to harm it. Thus, for Etinson, dignity does not simply have the normative function to “set off” the special status of humans in our practical deliberations; it sets off humans in a special way. And this “way” can only be understood through a consideration of dignity’s fragility.

The second reason for underlining this kind of negative methodology comes from Killmister (2020), who also makes second-order claims about the proper method for theorizing dignity. On her view, all the primary senses of dignity in the general schema can be harmed in some way or other. Each can be injured, lowered, embarrassed, humiliated, threatened, frustrated, even destroyed. Correspondingly, it is a criterion of any satisfactory theory, that it explains the nature and conditions of dignity’s fragility in all its primary senses ( categories 1–4 in the general schema).

The emphasis on “all” is important. Killmister’s theory stands out for being an attempt to use the criterion of fragility to offer a unified theory of dignity. And this raises a question beyond whether fragility is a defining property of dignity. Namely, for any given theory of dignity, does it purport to theorize dignity in general, or human dignity in particular? Most literature bearing the term “dignity” in its title will say at some point that it is really or mostly about human dignity. But if so, then are such theories in some sense incomplete? Must a complete theory of human dignity ( category 4 in the general schema) reconcile itself with the other primary senses of the term ( categories 1–3 ), as Killmister implores?

The next section attempts to offer some footholds for answering these new questions. But there is one more point to make here, because it is pertinent to second-order questions about how to formulate dignity. Part of what motivates Killmister’s effort at a unified theory is an attending argument that theories of dignity should fit with everyday ways of speaking about dignity. And everyday talk of dignity, she argues, often refers to the other primary senses of dignity in the general schema. Moreover, she claims that all these ways of talking are connected by the fragility criterion, as well as some of the other defining criteria we have discussed, especially (A) the idea of a normative function and (B) an essential connection to respect. Finally, she treats this “fit” between her account of the defining properties of dignity and everyday talk about dignity as important evidence for the correctness of her own criteria. Nor is she alone in staking evidentiary value on fitness to everyday language. For example, Bird (2013) and Etinson (2020) make similar arguments. [ 6 ] Do we agree? Surely, a good theory of dignity will not run roughshod over everyday usage. Still, exactly how beholden should a theory be?

3. Human Dignity: Touchstones of Analysis

The conclusion of the last section raised the following question about the conceptual landscape of dignity research: Which of the many points being made are relevant to theorizing dignity in general, and which pertain specifically to human dignity? To answer this question, it will help to distill a few enduring themes that characterize the debate over specifically human dignity. These are hardly all the themes that could be identified. Also, because each theme has been introduced in one way or other already, the following is intentionally condensed, with the understanding that any of these leads could be followed into a forest of nuance.

One could take all the existing literature on human dignity and arrange it into three groups, depending on whether any given argument renders dignity as a kind of (i) virtue or quality of character; (ii) value or worth; or (iii) status or standing. Our analysis already laid out the most important aspects in deciding between these classifications. We also noted that the trend in secular accounts is to articulate dignity as a kind of status rather than as a virtue or value. To this it should be added that virtue accounts make up the minority of all modern positions, no doubt because most contemporary positions eschew the hierarchical drift that comes with tying dignity to virtue.

Perhaps less obvious in the literature, is the agreement to articulate what is distinctive about dignity, regardless of which way it is rendered: virtue, value, or status. This “distinctiveness” point is pressing, given Etinson’s (2020) argument that a negative analysis of dignity’s fragility is crucial to understanding what is “special” about dignity as a normative concept. On his view, a good theory of dignity will pick out a “meaningful distinct set of concerns” (2020: 354), if it is to justify using the term at all. The force of this point extends beyond the question of whether fragility is a defining property of dignity. But to appreciate fully why, we need to contextualize it. So, consider the following:

The idea that human beings are morally special or distinctive has found expression in the religion, philosophy, literature, and art of all societies, modern and ancient. And connected to that idea and those expressions is an enduring struggle to understand what this peculiar “value” is. Since antiquity many have leveraged this idea about human distinctiveness into the idea that humans are supremely valuable. The chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone (c. 441 BCE), for example, lauds man as the most “wondrous” of all things in the world, a prodigy who cuts through the natural world the way a sailor cuts through the “perilous” surging seas that threaten to engulf him (verses 332 ff., cited in Debes 2009 at p. 52). Similarly, the Judeo-Christian doctrine of imago Dei trumpets human dominion over the earth and the distinctive value of humanity. Excluding God and angels, the doctrine implies that humankind is preeminently valuable.

Admittedly, these are not references to theory, strictly speaking. However, the historical development of dignity has long been tangled up with this kind of widespread attempt to explain human distinctiveness, even if only implicitly or under cognate terms like “uniqueness” (e.g., Muray 2007 and Rolston 2008). Indeed, one might say that the most basic point of the concept of dignity, especially as it was molded into the category of “human dignity”, just is to describe the distinctive virtue, value, or status of humans. From Cicero’s ancient claim about the special worth of the “human race”; to Schacter’s (1983) anti-Waldron argument that dignity’s importance outside of legal contexts highlights the need “to treat it as a distinct subject” (1983: 854); to Iglesias’s (2001) attempt to explain our “distinctiveness” as human beings; to Kateb’s (2011) claim that human dignity involves the unique role humans have as “stewards” of the earth—in all these arguments the distinctiveness point is in play. Or consider Simone Weil, writing in the shadow of World War II, and who inspired Iglesias:

There is something sacred in every man, but it is not his person. Nor yet is it the human personality. It is this man; no more nor less… The whole of him. The arms, the eyes, the thoughts, everything. Not without infinite scruple would I touch anything of this. (first published 1957 [1986: 50–51])

Similarly, Malpas (2007) explicitly argues that insofar as we are investigating human dignity, it seems we are inquiring into what is distinctively valuable about “being” human, by which he means something like the experience of being human.

This said, we must understand Etinson as arguing that it is not enough to claim that what explains the moral distinctiveness of humans is their “dignity”. We have to say what about human dignity itself is distinctive. And we must do so in a way that would substantiate (in part or in whole) the more general claim of human distinctiveness. After all, Etinson argues, not all kinds of harms to humans count as harms to their human dignity. Not even all harms to their status are obviously harms to their human dignity. Slapping someone in the face is certainly an affront to their status in some sense, and perhaps even necessarily to their social-status dignity ( (3) in the general schema), but not necessarily to their human dignity ( (4) in the general schema). (See also, Valentini 2017.)

So, what is distinctive about human dignity itself? There is more than one way to answer this question. Etinson’s own suggestion, as we have seen, is to use a negative normative lens to articulate what kinds of harms to humans count distinctively as harms against their dignity. But rather than tracing out further particular answers to this question, let us note a few final general observations about the distinctiveness point.

First, most theorists of dignity do not explicitly parse out the need to explain the distinctiveness of dignity itself, as contrasted with human distinctiveness in general. However, I submit that explaining the distinctiveness of dignity (itself) is often part of what many theorists take themselves to be doing, however indirectly. In other words, explaining dignity’s “distinct set of concerns”, to use Etinson’s phrase, seems to be constitutive of many theories of dignity. There is no space to substantiate this contention here, but we risk losing valuable insights about dignity’s distinctiveness if we don’t take this charitable approach.

Second, it is important not to run together the normative upshot of any claim about the grounds of dignity, with a definitional point about dignity’s distinctiveness. For example, if one thinks humans have dignity in virtue of their rational agency, then in one sense, this will entail a kind of distinctiveness. For, it will necessarily inform the substance of whatever rights or duties we think dignity justifies. In other words, the content of such rights and duties will need to be “distinctively” tied to rational agency, and what it means to protect, harm, or nurture this agency. Likewise for any other candidate account of dignity’s grounds. Nevertheless, this is different than talking about distinctiveness as a defining property of human dignity. Scholars like Etinson and Killmister are trying to articulate the distinctive normative function that defines dignity, regardless of its grounds—indeed, which any satisfactory account of dignity’s grounds must be able to explain.

Finally, Debes (2009) adds the following qualification to the “distinctiveness” point:

A proper account of dignity must pick out a distinctive value belonging to humans. This is not equivalent to demanding a value that belongs distinctively to humans.

The latter demand (which some theorists do insist on), not only arbitrarily rules out a shared space of dignity between different entities but also risks ruling out the best options for dignity’s grounds:

For example, if rationality should after all turn out to be the most defensible basis for a theory of human dignity, we [humans] wouldn’t want to yield it simply because we discovered that chimps and whales were rational or that Martians really have been trying to communicate with us for millennia. (2009: 61).

The conclusion of the last section brings to mind another theoretical dividing line in the literature, between those arguing for human dignity qua human individual, and those arguing for human dignity qua species. Which is it?

Some say, both. For example, Kateb (2011) argues that we must explain the uniqueness of persons and the species: “I am what no one else is, while not existentially superior to anyone else; we human beings belong to a species that is what no other species is” (2011: 17). According to Kateb (echoing Cicero), humans are partly divorced from the natural order both individually and collectively, in virtue of possessing unparalleled and morally special capacities for self-creation. Moreover, Kateb is clear that the distinctiveness of human dignity also grounds human normative supremacy. Indeed, on his view, human supremacy is one of the defining properties of dignity: “The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of being” (2011: 3–4); we are “the highest species on earth—so far” (2011: 17).

Of course, such claims are contentious. But if we want to engage them, it is important to be clear about whether we are doing so at the definitional level, or at the level of dignity’s grounds. For example, recall Cicero’s claim that it is in virtue of our distinctive capacities for self-development “by study and reflection”, that human beings have a “superior” “nature” to that of “cattle and other animals”. This Ciceronian idea about the grounds of dignity shares affinities with many other extant views, including Kant, Pico, and obviously Kateb. And we have considered reasons for rejecting this line of argument. But even if one accepts it, the present point is that one might not endorse Kateb’s claim about the “core idea” of dignity being essentially about the human species. That is, one could agree with Kateb about what grounds dignity but disagree that part of what defines dignity, is the property of species superiority. Stern (1975) and Gaylin (1984), for example, agree that the concept of dignity is most essentially about human worth or status, but argue that this does not imply that the human species possesses dignity. It only implies that each individual human has dignity.

Finally, any claim about the dignity of the species or collective humanity must confront worries about speciesism, and in turn all the objections of those who think that non-human animals have a purchase on the normative space of dignity (see, e.g., Rachels 1990; Pluhar 1995; LaFollette & Shanks 1996; Bekoff 1998; Meyer 2001; Rolston 2008; Singer 2009; and especially Gruen 2003 [2010], who explores the idea of “wild dignity”.)

It is common to talk of human dignity as “inherent”. What this means, however, is often unclear. Sometimes it is redescribed to mean “intrinsic”, other times “inalienable”. It is also often conjoined with claims that dignity is “inviolable”—although this is dubious if inviolability is supposed to be entailed by inherentness. After all, one might agree that human dignity cannot be entirely destroyed because dignity is inherent, but nevertheless allow that human dignity can be harmed, insulted, frustrated, and humiliated.

This is not to suggest that all that is inherent is indestructible. Whether human dignity can really be destroyed depends entirely on why one thinks human dignity is inherent. If one thinks that human dignity is inherent because we have dignity in virtue of possessing a soul, then they probably do not think dignity can be truly destroyed (although they may think it can be degraded; or even, if they subscribe to Christian dogma, that it was in fact degraded by the “fall” from grace). On the other hand, if one thinks that human dignity is inherent because we have dignity in virtue of our capacities for rational agency, then they probably do think dignity can be lost or destroyed, whether by extreme psychological trauma or a sharp blow to the head.

It must also be reiterated that secular theorists of dignity have increasingly turned away from “inherentness” as a defining property of dignity (see, e.g., Darwall 2006; Debes 2009; Kateb 2011; Rosen 2012a; Waldron 2012; Valentini 2017; Killmister 2020). The reasons for doing so vary. Most reflect suspicion about the metaphysical baggage, especially of the theological kind, that historically has gone hand in hand with inherentness claims. But there are often other reasons. For example, for those that think human dignity is defined by the authority or standing to hold others responsible with second-personal claims, dignity only comes into existence within actual second-personal encounters (see, e.g., Meyer 1989, Darwall 2006, Forst 2011, and perhaps Feinberg 1970 [1980]). Or recall Valentini, who argues that the problem with the metaphysical claims needed to back up inherentness is not simply that they are “heavy”, but that they distract us from the core political function of rights. Meanwhile, for those committed to a negative methodology, like Killmister or Etinson, the starting assumption is that dignity can be destroyed. And while this does not entail that dignity is not inherent, Killmister persuasively argues that such fragility strongly tells against inherentness.

All this raises the question: If not inherent, then what? The simple answer is that on many theories dignity is socially constructed. Of course, there are many theories about what it means for something to be socially constructed, with many important differences between them. There is, for example, a chasm of difference between claiming that dignity is constructed as a constitutive part of second-personal relationships ( à la Darwall or Forst) and claiming that it is constructed through the transformation of an old idea about “elevated rank” ( à la Appiah or Waldron). So, the simple answer must be turned into a complicated one, which we cannot do here.

A complete theory of human dignity must articulate the demands that dignity places on us, morally and politically. Some theories, as we have seen, build this expectation into the defining properties of dignity. But even when they do not, there is almost always some appeal, positive or negative, to some claim about what it means to recognize dignity, and most often to some claim about respect —which, furthermore, is usually claimed to be both what dignity demands and what it means to recognize dignity. The subject of respect, however, is its own labyrinth. It boasts an array of meanings, diverse applications, and extensive commentary. This said, two very general points about respect stand out in connection to human dignity.

First, the connection between dignity and respect has been made concrete in various political contexts. For example, Schachter (1983) notes that Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that,

all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. (1983: 848)

He marks a similar provision in Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Ibid). And this connection generates distinct challenges in the political context that reach beyond the human rights discourse. Schachter explains:

In the political context, respect for the dignity and worth of all persons, and for their individual choices, leads, broadly speaking, to a strong emphasis on the will and consent of the governed. It means that the coercive rule of one or the few over the many is incompatible with a due respect for the dignity of the person. (1983: 850)

However, Schachter further points out, many political theories contend,

that substantial equality is a necessary condition of respect for the intrinsic worth of the human person…In particular, relations of dominance and subordination would be viewed as antithetical to the basic ideal [of human dignity]. If this is so, great discrepancies in wealth and power need to be eliminated to avoid such relations. (ibid)

The question thus becomes, how can we achieve such egalitarian objectives, without the kind of “excessive curtailment of individual liberty and the use of coercion” that human dignity is also thought to eschew (1983: 850)? This question figures into some of history’s most influential political theories, from Hegel to Rawls. (For an inroad to understanding the Hegelian line, see Honneth 2007; for the Rawlsian line, see Bird 2021.)

Second, as already hinted, the introduction of respect raises its own distinctive challenge, namely, to explain what respect is. To do this, many theorists appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to what we earlier called “recognition respect”. When we make plans or choose to act, we recognize-respect others when we appropriately take account of some fact about them, by adapting, revising, or even foregoing our plans and choices in the light of that fact. So, which “fact”? Well, if we are talking about respecting persons as persons, in a moral sense, many theorists have answered that human dignity is the operative fact. Or, if they drill down further, then whatever they end up defending as the grounds of human dignity—whether rational autonomy, species membership, an immortal soul, etc.—is the relevant fact. [ 7 ]

However, the last few decades have witnessed a wave of new theorizing about respect. And this has consequences for theorizing about human dignity. The most notable consequence stems from the field of care ethics, where empathy, compassion, and caring have been conceived as distinct kinds of respect. Thus, although human dignity did not figure explicitly into early formulations of care ethics, as conceived by those like Noddings (1984) or Held (2006), care ethics has increasingly been developed in ways that does bring dignity to the fore, e.g., by those like Dillon (1992), Kittay (2005 and 2011), and Miller (2012). Dillon, in particular, gives voice to a profound alternative to rationalist paradigms of human dignity, noted frequently in this entry, and associated especially with Kant. She writes:

[Care respect] grounds respect for persons in something which, considered in the abstract, nearly all human beings have and can be said to have equally - the characteristic of being an individual human “me” - a characteristic which each of us values and thinks is both morally important and profoundly morally problematic not only in others but in ourselves as well, and which pulls our attention to the concrete particularities of each human individual. We are, on the care respect approach, to pay attention not only to the fact that someone is a “me” but also to which particular “me” she is. (Dillon 1992: 118)

The core idea Dillon expresses here about the grounds of dignity qua the concrete “particularity” of an individual person (as she puts it on 1992: 115), traces to Iris Murdoch (1970) and Elizabeth Spelman (1978). It also resonates with the thinking of Simon Weil, noted above in §3.2 . More generally, Dillon’s argument illustrates how taking the concept of respect as our starting point might lead to very different views about human dignity.

The conceptual complexity surrounding dignity has sparked a long history of disagreement about the utility of the concept, with some concluding that it is hopelessly messy or essentially ambiguous. One of the more cited versions comes from the Yale bioethicist Ruth Macklin, who made this complaint in a widely read 2003 editorial. “Dignity”, she asserted, “is a useless concept. It means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy” (2003: 1419).

Macklin’s claim was not backed by much argument. And judging by the literature, her complaint did nothing to slow down the application of dignity in bioethics, where it is now discussed in the context of everything from disability studies, elderly care, human research, cloning, “chimeras”, enhancement, transhumanism, and euthanasia (see the bibliography for leads to each of these). Still, one does not have to look hard to find Macklin’s allies.

For example, Rosen (2012a) claims that “animus against dignity is widely shared among philosophers, in my experience, and goes back a long way” (2012a: 143). He buttresses his claim by recounting the encouragement of a colleague to give the concept “a good kicking”, and by quoting his favorite historical challenges by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the former of whom called dignity, “the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists” (1840 [1965: 100] cited in Rosen 2013: 143). Importantly, however, for Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the problem wasn’t simply the ambiguity of the concept. They thought that the moralized notion of inherent or distinctive human worth garners widespread credence only because it flatters our pride and allows us to slip into self-deceptive moral complacency. This deflationary hypothesis strikes at the heart of our modern dignitarian ethos.

So, exactly how widespread is skepticism of dignity? There is no simple answer to this question because it depends greatly on what one takes dignity to be. Even defenders of one conception of dignity often express skepticism about other conceptions. For example, we already noted the trend away from thick metaphysical claims about dignity, which make dignity depend on anything like a divinely implanted “soul” or Kant’s “noumenal” idea of the self. Rosen calls such views, “internal kernel” theories, and further notes that reservations about these views are often both metaphysical (no such thing exists) and epistemological (we cannot justify our belief in such things). The present point, however, is that if one’s skepticism about human dignity in general turns on the specific reservation about internal kernel theories, then one should stay open minded. For, as we have seen, there are many alternatives for theorizing dignity that do not depend on such metaphysical commitments.

Still, because there is more than one way to interpret Schopenhauer’s claim that dignity is a “shibboleth”, it may prove helpful to trace out a little further a few possible skeptical lines of argument, albeit briefly. So, here are four ways skepticism tends to play out in the existing literature:

Rosen suggests that Schopenhauer’s main complaint is that “dignity” is an impressive “façade” obscuring the harsh reality behind the idea, namely, that the concept lacks the substance to do the work we assign to it. More exactly, dignity cannot serve as a foundation for morality, including, serving as the normative basis of rights (Rosen 2012a: 143). We encountered this line of thinking already in the earlier discussion of the connection between dignity and rights. Essentially, the complaint is that no extant account of the grounds of dignity (e.g., Kantian rationalist arguments, Judeo-Christian imago Dei arguments, etc.) can satisfactorily explain and justify the kind of normative work dignity is supposed to do. See especially, Sangiovanni 2017, who rejects Aristotelian, Kantian, and imago Dei accounts of dignity as insufficient for the tasks dignity is typically set to, including grounding rights.

A related but distinctively different way of taking Schopenhauer’s objection, is the worry that dignity has been politically manipulated to capitalize on its deceptive potential. As Rosen notes, the general point here is not new. “The idea that illusions are essential to the political order”, he writes, “runs through the Western tradition of political thought from Plato” (2012a: 144). However, Rosen suggests that Nietzsche gets the credit for understanding how powerful an illusion human dignity, specifically, can be, for such political purpose. “Such phantoms as the dignity of man”, Nietzsche writes,

are the needy products of slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woeful time, in which the slave requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and beyond himself! (from “The Greek State”, 1871; quoted in Rosen 2012a: 144)

In fact, this skeptical line goes back further than Rosen seems to appreciate. Thus, in his 1714, Fable of the Bees , Bernard Mandeville essentially made the same argument. Speaking conjecturally about the origins of morality, Mandeville writes:

Making use of this bewitching Engine [of flattery], [the Politicians] extoll’d the excellency of our Nature above other Animals…Which being done, they laid before them how unbecoming it was the Dignity of such sublime Creatures to be solicitous about gratifying those Appetites, which they had in common with Brutes, and at the same time unmindful of those higher Qualities that gave them the preeminence over all visible Beings. (1714 [1988: 43])

Dignity is vacuous. Bracketing any worries about how any given political institution manipulates the idea of dignity to achieve its ends, or how human pride might capitalize on the idea of dignity to facilitate self-deception about our personal moral failings, perhaps the idea of dignity is simply unnecessary. For example, consider the first sentence of Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights : “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. What would be lost, Rosen asks, “if one were just to say, ‘All human beings are born free and equal in rights’?” (2012a: 149). A slightly different version of this complaint is that, because of its vacuousness, dignity has become mere dogma. For example, in the legal context, Theoder Heuss, called dignity a “non-interpreted thesis” in law. And Costas Douzinas argued dignity was an empty placeholder in a “hegemonic battle” of competing legal ideologies (see also, McCrudden 2013a for some analysis of both; also, Bargaric & Allan 2006).

Dignity is ambiguous. The thrust of this frequent complaint is that dignity has become a useless concept, not so much because it is empty, but because it has too many meanings. (A few have even claimed that the concept is “essentially” ambiguous, though it is not clear what this is supposed to mean; see, e.g., Shultziner 2007 or Rotenstreich 1983.) When focused, this worry comes in three forms:

the ambiguity of meaning makes “dignity” incomprehensible;
the ambiguity of meaning makes “dignity” susceptible to abuse;
the ambiguity of meaning conceals objectionable subjective opinion or substantive baggage in the concept of “dignity”.

Examples of all these positions can easily be found. But perhaps the best illustrations once again come from the legal context. Regarding (1) : see, e.g., Bates (2005), who acknowledges the problem but then tries to defend dignity. Regarding (2) : see, e.g., Gearty (2014) and Moyn (2013), who argue that the continuing ambiguity of dignity make it too easily abused in courtroom deliberation and democratic theories of rights. Regarding (3) : see Pinker (2008), who argues that dignity is a subjective phenomenon, “relative, fungible, and often harmful”; also Rosen (2012a) and Moyn (2013), both of whom argue that our modern concept labors under underappreciated debts to Christian theology;

These are not all the possible reasons for skepticism about dignity, only the most prevalent. And each is usually sharpened in various ways that make the argument cut deeper than what this summary suggests. This said, the merits of these critiques are disputable. Indeed, much of the foregoing analysis in this entry suggests strategies of response to each.

But perhaps the most fitting way to conclude is with a different kind of question entirely. Namely, how ought we respond to such skeptical attacks, if at all? Thus, it is hard not to think of Frederick Douglass’s warning, delivered in his 1852 “Fourth of July” speech, about the dangers of demanding of anyone, that they argue for their equal and basic human worth or status—especially when so many people remain not simply oppressed, but exposed to vitriolic hate in a world that constantly proclaims its faith and commitment in the ideal of human dignity. “At a time like this”, Douglass said, “scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed” (1852: 20).

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UNESCO, 2005, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights , 19 October 2005, Paris.

Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful to my anonymous referees, who provided careful, generous, and thorough feedback on initial drafts of this entry. For research assistance on various elements of this article I am grateful to Zachary Neemah, Samuel Munroe, Reese Faust, and Alejandro Toledo. The history section draws on my own introduction to Dignity: A History (2017a), by permission of Oxford University Press.

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Human Dignity in Philosophy and Bioethics

This essay about the essence of human dignity, both in philosophy and bioethics. It explores how this concept, intrinsic to each individual, shapes moral philosophy, ethical decision-making in healthcare, and broader societal discourse. Human dignity serves as a guiding principle, emphasizing the inherent worth and value of every person, irrespective of societal constructs or circumstances. From ancient philosophical inquiries to contemporary bioethical debates, it underscores the importance of compassion, empathy, and respect in our interactions and societal structures. Ultimately, this essay highlights the enduring significance of human dignity in fostering a more just, compassionate, and inclusive society.

How it works

In the tapestry of human existence, there exists a thread that binds us all together, weaving through the complexities of philosophy and bioethics alike. This thread is none other than the concept of human dignity, a beacon of light illuminating our understanding of what it means to be truly human. It is a notion that transcends borders and disciplines, resonating deeply within the fabric of our collective consciousness.

At its essence, human dignity embodies the intrinsic worth and value of every individual, irrespective of societal labels or preconceived notions.

It is a recognition of our shared humanity, affirming the uniqueness and irreplaceability of each person’s journey through life. From the bustling streets of urban metropolises to the serene landscapes of rural communities, the principle of human dignity serves as a guiding principle, steering our moral compass towards compassion and empathy.

Throughout the annals of history, philosophers have grappled with the complexities of human dignity, delving into its philosophical underpinnings and implications for ethical discourse. From the towering intellects of ancient Greece to the enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century, the concept of human dignity has sparked debates and reflections on the nature of moral agency and the sanctity of human life. It is a testament to the enduring relevance of this concept that continues to inspire scholars and thinkers across generations.

In the realm of bioethics, human dignity takes center stage, shaping our understanding of medical ethics and the ethical implications of advances in biomedical technology. From the ethical considerations surrounding organ transplantation to the ethical dilemmas posed by genetic engineering, the principle of human dignity provides a moral framework for navigating the complexities of modern healthcare. It reminds us that behind every medical diagnosis and research protocol lies a human being deserving of dignity and respect.

Beyond the confines of academia, human dignity finds expression in our everyday interactions and societal structures. It is reflected in the pursuit of social justice and equality, as we strive to dismantle systems of oppression and discrimination that undermine the dignity of marginalized communities. It is embodied in acts of kindness and compassion, as we extend a helping hand to those in need, affirming their inherent worth and value as fellow members of the human family.

In conclusion, human dignity stands as a beacon of hope in an increasingly complex world, guiding our moral decisions and ethical reflections with its timeless wisdom. As we navigate the myriad challenges of the 21st century, let us hold fast to the principle of human dignity, embracing its transformative power to build a more just, compassionate, and humane society for all.

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Human persons and human dignity: implications for dialogue and action.

By: Thomas Banchoff

August 19, 2013

" Contending Modernities ," August 19, 2013

What is the human person? As human beings, we are biological as well as social creatures; we inhabit both physical and cultural space. What distinguishes us as persons , and not just as organisms, is a culture of human dignity – the shared idea that, as human beings, we are entitled to respect and recognition from one another.

Where does the dignity of the human person come from? Broadly speaking, one can distinguish secular-scientific and religious foundations.

From a secular and scientific angle, we have dignity and should respect and recognize one another because of our common humanity. Some emphasize our shared capacity for independent thought; in line with Immanuel Kant, they see autonomy and rationality as a foundation for human dignity. Others focus more on our ability to identify and sympathize with others, an approach related to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of “pitié” and Adam Smith’s “moral sentiments.”

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and neuroscience have deepened our understanding of this latter, relational approach to the foundations of human dignity. In the long run, evolution appears to have favored the development of ecological sensitivity, group identification and solidarity, and cooperation in the acquisition and shared use of resources. In the here and now, new developments in neuroscience suggest that our brains are much more than autonomous information processors; they change and grow through our interactions and relationships with others and with our external environments.

Interestingly, scientific methods that do not begin with the concept of human dignity are increasingly leading to a conclusion compatible with it — that we have good evolutionary and biological reasons to acknowledge one another as fellow human beings worthy of respect and recognition and therefore endowed with an intrinsic dignity.

For Catholicism and Islam, the focus of the Contending Modernities project , the dignity of the human person has divine foundations. Because God created each of us and cares for each of us, each individual person has an intrinsic and inviolable dignity. The moral theology of the person is most developed in Christianity; it is connected with the mystery of the Trinity (one God in three persons), and in the Incarnation (God becoming a human being.) But the idea of the person, as a creature of an all powerful and merciful God, also plays an important role in Islam. God reveals his law to humankind and calls us to live as His co-regents on earth, honoring one another with recognition and respect.

There is, of course, a fundamental asymmetry between the secular-scientific and the religious understandings of the human person. The non-believer will reject the idea that the dignity of the human person has divine origins, while the believer will typically assert that human dignity has both divine and natural foundations.

Yet this asymmetry need not be a barrier to dialogue. In our contemporary era, even those who reject the idea of human dignity as fuzzy and unscientific generally affirm the importance of according basic respect and recognition to all human beings. The basic idea of the human person and of universal human dignity is shared, even as terminology differs. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emerged out of decades of contestation within and across secular and religious traditions – and in revulsion against the horrors of two world wars and the Holocaust – remains the clearest and most powerful expression of this far-reaching consensus.

In practice we know that this broad contemporary convergence around the idea of the human person and human dignity, across the secular-religious divide, coexists with fierce disagreement on a range of ethical and policy questions. Is the human embryo or fetus a human person deserving of protection? Are primates or other non-human animals to be considered persons with intrinsic dignity or rights? Should governments work to secure equality of opportunity for their citizens and provide a minimum standard of living for all? Should governments and citizens share their wealth with those in need outside, as well as inside, a nation’s borders? Questions relating to the human person and human dignity can be multiplied across economic, social, cultural, and foreign policy domains (even if, in the United States, they tend to center on bioethics).

A key challenge in such ethical and policy debates, within and across secular-scientific and religious communities, is to keep the ideas of the human person and of human dignity in the foreground. That means asking what is at stake for particular people and their livelihoods in particular contexts, as well as thinking through the ethical implications of our individual and collective decisions for global humanity, at a time when the rapid advance of technology and of globalization in all its dimensions is rendering those decisions more complex and consequential.

A focus on the human person has a further implication, perhaps the most challenging of all – that in all these ethical and policy controversies, we should acknowledge the humanity and dignity of our interlocutors, no matter how much we may disagree.

This article was originally published on the University of Notre Dame blog " Contending Modernities ."

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A brief history of human dignity

Credit: Benjavisa Ruangvaree / AdobeStock

Human dignity means that each of our lives have an unimpeachable value simply because we are human, and therefore we are deserving of a baseline level of respect.
That baseline requires more than the absence of violence, discrimination, and authoritarianism. It means giving individuals the freedom to pursue their own happiness and purpose.
We look at incredible writings from the last 200 years that illustrate the push for human dignity in regards to slavery, equality, communism, free speech and education.

In a New York Times essay published the day of his funeral on July 30, 2020, Congressman John Lewis wrote that his “last days and hours”—in which he watched widespread protests over George Floyd’s murder and saw a square in downtown D.C. christened Black Lives Matter Plaza—filled him with hope. “Around the country and the world you set aside race, class, age, language and nationality to demand respect for human dignity.”

Human dignity is a powerful phrase invoked to peacefully protest against violence, discrimination, and authoritarianism. But when we talk about human dignity, what do we mean?

Human dignity is the inherent worth of each individual human being. Recognizing human dignity means respecting human beings’ special value—value that sets us apart from other animals; value that is intrinsic and cannot be lost.

Liberalism—the broad political philosophy that organizes society around liberty, justice, and equality—is rooted in the idea of human dignity. Liberalism assumes each of our lives, plans, and preferences have some unimpeachable value, not because of any objective evaluation or contribution to a greater good, but simply because they belong to a human being. We are human, and therefore deserving of a baseline level of respect.

Because so many of us take human dignity for granted—just a fact of our humanness—it’s usually only when someone’s dignity is ignored or violated that we feel compelled to talk about it.

But human dignity means more than the absence of violence, discrimination, and authoritarianism. It means giving individuals the freedom to pursue their own happiness and purpose—a freedom that can be hampered by restrictive social institutions or the tyranny of the majority. The liberal ideal of the good society is not just peaceful but also pluralistic: It is a society in which we respect others’ right to think and live differently than we do.

With Google Books Ngram Viewer , we can chart mentions of human dignity from 1800-2019.

We can also map human dignity against mentions of liberalism to see that discussion of human dignity increased with discussion of liberalism.

Then we can search through individual mentions to find how human dignity was discussed and understood over the last 200 years.

For example, German rabbi Dr. Samuel Hirsch gave a lecture in 1853 on “ The Religion of Humanity ” in which he condemned slavery. “That which we love in ourselves, our true human dignity, compels us to recognize and love the same human dignity in all others,” Hirsh said. He wrote:

If I can look upon my brother-man as a creature, as a thing void of any will of his own, instead of as a free personality, that furnishes ample proof that I have not yet recognized the true human dignity in myself. To own slaves is spiritual suicide and homicide. This sin is in no way excusable on account of the kind treatment accorded to the slaves by their owner, as he never can treat them humanely. When man becomes a piece of property he is robbed of his human dignity.

In 1917, Kansas State Normal School published a journal on teaching that called for instructors to help each pupil “make completer use of his one lifetime” because “an abundant life, a life of awareness, a life of dignity is an undertaking worthy of gods.”

Thomas Bell’s 1941 novel Out of the Furnace centered on an immigrant Slovak family in Pennsylvania. A character muses that it wasn’t “where you were born or how you spelled your name or where your father had come from” that mattered; instead,

It was the way you thought and felt about certain things. About freedom of speech and the equality of men and the importance of having one law—the same law—for rich and poor, for the people you liked and the people you didn’t like. About the right of every man to live his life as he thought best, his right to defend it if anyone tried to change it and his right to change it himself if he decided he liked some other way of living better…. About human dignity, which helped a man live proudly and distinguished his death from animals; and finally, about the value to be put on a human life, one’s enemy’s no less than one’s own.

In a 1953 speech , then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that communist countries might be able to achieve short-term material gain, but “results so produced are not a glory but a shame. They are achieved by desecrating the dignity of the human individual.” Dulles believed human dignity meant being entitled to a life that included physical well-being and “freedom to think, to believe, and to communicate with one’s fellows,” “opportunities which permit some exercise of individual choices,” and “the contemplation and enjoyment of what is beautiful.”

American novelist, writer, playwright, poet, essayist and civil rights activist James Baldwin at his home in Saint-Paul-de-Vence, southern France, on November 6, 1979. Credit: Ralph Gatti/AFP via Getty Images

One hundred years after U.S. law stopped allowing Black Americans to be treated as property, Black writer James Baldwin was still calling for Black Americans’ dignity to be equally recognized. It was not enough, not nearly enough, that the 14th Amendment ensured equal protection of the laws; what mattered was how Black Americans were treated by their fellow human beings. In a 1960 Canadian television interview , Baldwin said, “I don’t know what white people see, you know, when they look at a Negro anymore. But I do know very well—I realized when I was very young—that whatever he was looking at, it wasn’t me… I was not a man .”

In his seminal 1963 book The Fire Next Time , Baldwin seemed to echo Dr. Hirsh’s argument from a century earlier:

I am very much concerned that American Negroes achieve their freedom here in the United States. But I am also concerned for their dignity, for the health of their souls, and must oppose any attempt that Negroes may make to do to others what has been done to them. I think I know—we see it around us every day—the spiritual wasteland to which that road leads. It is so simple a fact and one that is so hard, apparently, to grasp: Whoever debases others debases himself.

This, then, is a common thread in our historic understanding of human dignity: Anyone who treats another human being as less than human undermines their own human dignity in addition to undermining the dignity of their victim.

A 1964 New York University Law Review article argued that privacy was a key aspect of human dignity. “A man whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversation may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that account,” wrote author Edward J. Bloustein, who later became president of Rutgers University.

Around the world, people are still working toward the full and equal recognition of human dignity. Every year, new speeches and writings help us understand what dignity is—not only what it looks like when dignity is violated but also what it looks like when dignity is honored. In his posthumous essay, Congressman Lewis wrote, “When historians pick up their pens to write the story of the 21st century, let them say that it was your generation who laid down the heavy burdens of hate at last and that peace finally triumphed over violence, aggression and war.”

The more we talk about human dignity, the better we understand it. And the sooner we can make progress toward a shared vision of peace, freedom, and mutual respect for all.

37 Dignity Examples

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Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

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dignity examples and definition, explained below

Dignity can be characterized as an individual’s innate right to be valued, respected, and ethically treated.

It is generally associated with notions of personal worth, honor and self-esteem (McCrudden, 2008; Nussbaum, 2009) and points to the intrinsic worth of each human being. As such, it serves as the cornerstone for human rights (Gilabert, 2019).

Dignity for the elderly and minority groups is particularly important because these are categories of people who are at risk of exploitation.

The following examples reflect some commonly-held ideas about what it means to live a dignified life and how respect for human dignity can underpin our conceptions of individual rights , minority rights, and the natural rights of all humans .

Dignity Examples

1. Standing Up For Oneself Sometimes, we need to be assertive to maintain our own dignity. If someone is showing us disrespect or violating our rights, speaking up and standing up for ourselves is an assertion of our own human dignity. The important part, however, is in respecting the human dignity of others when standing up for ourselves so we don’t come across as hypocrites.

2. Assisting Elders As we age, it becomes harder for us to look after ourselves. Some elderly people have memory lapses or chronic diseases that prevent them from being able to look after ourselves. As a society, we need to respect the human dignity of our grandparents, parents, and elders, by assisting them when they need that help to maintain a comfortable living.

3. Respect at Workplace It is the responsibility of leadership in a workplace to set in place a workplace culture that places dignity above all. This might include setting rules around professional behavior and respectful communication, but also leading through example.

4. Fair Judgement In a court setting, a judge needs to respect the dignity of the people in their courtroom by maintaining an impartial stance when addressing the defendant, upholding safety in the space, and ensuring everyone’s legal rights are upheld.

5. Fair Trial Democratic societies uphold human dignity by ensuring that everyone gets a fair trial. This is reflected in the refrain: “innocent until proven guilty.” It’s important that everyone gets their day in court and has the chance to defend themselves, present their point of view, and be fairly judged by an impartial and well-trained judge.

6. Standards of Cleanliness Whether it’s in a retirement home, group home, school, prison, or any other environment, dignity means ensuring people can live in a space that is clean and won’t make them sick. For example, there are many reports of nursing homes being shut down because of their poor health standards, which we as a society refuse to accept.

7. Patient Autonomy Autonomy is regularly associated with dignity. If we don’t have the autonomy to make our own decisions, then we don’t have our human rights. For example, a physician must inform their patient of all the necessary details regarding their treatment before the treatment begins, so the patient can give consent.

8. Fair Wage for a Day’s Work Unions exist in order to uphold the dignity of workers, given that individual workers (especially low-wage or unskilled) have minimal power in the capitalist system. One of the most important functions of unions is to advocate for a fair wage, preventing labor exploitation and mistreatment of the working-class by the capitalist class.

9. Privacy Protection In the 21st Century, when sensitive digital data is transmitted online every second, consumers are increasingly asserting their right to digital privacy. Companies are expected to respect user privacy because we have the right to know who’s using our data and for what purposes.

10. Protecting Animal Rights Animal rights activists also argue that animals deserve a certain level of dignity. And this doesn’t just extend to vegetarians. Even many meat-eaters believe that animals should be treated well while their alive. We can uphold this by, for example, only purchasing pasture-raised meat and free-range eggs.

11. Upholding Disability Rights Under the social model of disability , society upholds that disabled people have the same rights as non-disabled people, they should have equal rights to public participation, and should not be discriminated against for their disabiliries. As a result, many societies insist that public and private service providers have a duty to make reasonable accommodations to ensure that they can take part in daily activities without facing unnecessary obstacles.

12. Providing Affordable Housing Some people may argue that everyone has the right to a place they can call home. If you hold this belief, then you may believe that it’s society’s responsibility to ensure the provision of cost-effective housing. We may not all agree on this, but it’s likely that most of us agree that living on the streets does not cohere with our idea of full human dignity.

13. Providing Quality Education In recent decades, there has been a strong push for the promotion of girls’ education in the developing world, with the idea that education for girls is a matter of girls’ dignity. Ideally, we should all have the opportunity to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge that can open up opportunities everyone to lead fulfilling lives.

14. Dignity In Healthcare All patients deserve to be treated with respect and compassion when they seek medical help. This means that all efforts should be made to preserve the dignity of patients. Interestingly, doctors generally see this as a duty to care for everyone who seeks help – even people who are criminals or enemies at war.

15. Anti-Discrimination Policies Implementing anti-discrimination policies in workplaces, educational institutions and within different sectors of society uphold dignity. Such policies ensure each individual is treated fairly and respected regardless of their race, religion, sexual orientation, or other distinguishing features.

16. Preserving Cultural Heritage The preservation and promotion of cultural heritage is a mark of respect and recognition of the dignity of different cultures. This involves efforts to maintain cultural practices, languages, monuments, rituals and even traditional knowledge systems. We see, for example, in colonized nations, that societies believe in protecting Aboriginal and First Nations cultural artifacts .

17. Self-Determination Similarly, First Nations and Aboriginal people believe it is a matter of dignity that they have the option to determine their own futures rather than have laws passed for them by governments. As a result, we seeing the USA and Canada that tribal lands have been returned to the traditional owners, and to some extent, they can pass their own laws and not have to obey some state laws on their territories.

18. Free Speech and Expression The ability to express oneself freely, without the danger of censorship, is considered a respected natural right by enlightenment philosophers like John Rawls and Adam Smith. If we censor people for their beliefs, we are undermining their rights to their own thoughts and beliefs, and their rights to express those beliefs.

19. Supporting Vulnerable Groups To foster a dignified society, support must be extended towards vulnerable groups and minority groups . This includes providing targeted support towards refugees, war-torn communities, and economically disadvantaged areas, with initiatives aimed at restoring or securing their dignity.

20. Internet Access for All In our growing digital world, having access to reliable internet is becoming increasingly important for maintaining dignity. This can enable individuals to connect with others, access important services, gain education, and even find job opportunities.

21. End of the Death Penalty The abolition of the death penalty upholds human dignity by recognizing the fundamental right to life. With the discontinuation of this practice, societies affirm the view that no matter the crime committed, every human life is valuable and irreversible punishments should be avoided.

22. Euthanasia The legalization of euthanasia in some cultures is viewed as a method of upholding human dignity. By enabling individuals who are terminally ill or experiencing intolerable suffering to choose a respectful and peaceful end to their life, respect for individual autonomy is upheld.

23. Inclusive Hiring Practices Implementing inclusive hiring practices promotes diversity and equality in the workplace. By ensuring opportunities are open to all, irrespective of race, gender, age, or disabilities, organizations can create a conducive environment, encouraging respect and fostering self-worth among employees.

24. Child Rights Protection of child rights is an affirmation of their dignity. By guaranteeing their right to education, preventing child labor, and ensuring their safety, we can safeguard their innocence and provide them with a conducive environment for growth and development.

25. Right to Clean Water and Sanitation Everyone has the right to clean drinking water and sanitation facilities. This basic human right upholds dignity by allowing individuals to maintain their physical health and personal hygiene, essential for a decent standard of living.

26. Food Security Providing individuals with reliable access to a sufficient quantity of affordable, nutritious food upholds dignity. Food insecurity can lead to malnutrition and a host of related health issues, compromising individual and societal wellbeing.

27. Freedom From Torture Prohibiting torture and cruel, inhumane treatments protects a person’s dignity. Everyone has the right to be free from such degrading treatment, regardless of the situation, even during times of conflict or war.

28. Access to Legal Services Ensuring every person’s right to access legal services upholds dignity. This allows even those from disadvantaged backgrounds to fight for their rights, protect their interests, and seek justice when wronged.

29. Disaster Relief Provision of immediate and effective help in disaster-stricken areas respects human dignity. By offering essential resources like food, shelter, and medical aid, we can alleviate suffering and restore hope and dignity to those affected.

30. Consumer Rights The protection and respect for consumer rights upholds dignity. By providing accurate information, safe products, and fair treatment in the marketplace, consumers can make informed decisions, and have their interests safeguarded.

31. Right to Personal Safety Individuals have an inherent right to feel and be safe in their environments. This involves measures in place for individual protection against violence, bullying, harassment, and other forms of harm that can compromise their security and dignity.

32. Freedom of Religion The freedom to practice and observe one’s religious beliefs without fear of reprisal or persecution, reflects respect for personal dignity. This not only includes practicing religious rituals, but also the right to change or not to follow any religious tradition at all.

33. Freedom of Movement This principle affirms that individuals should have the liberty to move freely within their country of residence or to travel to another. It acknowledges the basic rights of individuals to self-determine their domicile towards upholding their personal dignity.

34. Right to Marry Every adult has the right to marry and start a family, regardless of their gender, race, or religion. This right acknowledges the fundamental human desire for companionship and familial bonds, essential for individual happiness and dignity.

35. Right to Seek Asylum from Persecution The right to seek asylum and find refuge in a foreign land in the face of persecution is key to maintaining human dignity. It offers hope and protection to those facing dire circumstances, ensuring they are safeguarded from harm and have the opportunity for a secure future.

36. Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Every individual has the right to not be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention. Law enforcement should always have clear, legitimate reasons for arresting or detaining a person, and due process should be followed to maintain the individual’s dignity.

37. Freedom of Thought The freedom to think independently and form one’s own opinions contributes significantly to personal dignity. It promotes intellectual growth and stands as a cornerstone of individual autonomy, fostering creativity, innovation, and personal transformation.

Gilabert, P. (2019). Human dignity and human rights. Oxford University Press, USA.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2009). Hiding from humanity: Disgust, shame, and the law . Princeton University Press.

McCrudden, C. (2008). Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights. European Journal of international Law, 19 (4), 655-724.

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Essay on Human Rights: Samples in 500 and 1500

Updated on
Jun 20, 2024

Essay writing is an integral part of the school curriculum and various academic and competitive exams like IELTS , TOEFL , SAT , UPSC , etc. It is designed to test your command of the English language and how well you can gather your thoughts and present them in a structure with a flow. To master your ability to write an essay, you must read as much as possible and practise on any given topic. This blog brings you a detailed guide on how to write an essay on Human Rights , with useful essay samples on Human rights.

This Blog Includes:

The basic human rights, 200 words essay on human rights, 500 words essay on human rights, 500+ words essay on human rights in india, 1500 words essay on human rights, importance of human rights, essay on human rights pdf, what are human rights.

Human rights mark everyone as free and equal, irrespective of age, gender, caste, creed, religion and nationality. The United Nations adopted human rights in light of the atrocities people faced during the Second World War. On the 10th of December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Its adoption led to the recognition of human rights as the foundation for freedom, justice and peace for every individual. Although it’s not legally binding, most nations have incorporated these human rights into their constitutions and domestic legal frameworks. Human rights safeguard us from discrimination and guarantee that our most basic needs are protected.

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Human Dignity and Justice / Fall 2007 / Introduction

Human dignity and justice, from the editors.

The language of “human dignity” plays a key role in discussions of justice and human rights. And yet, the concept of human dignity presents significant challenges that often go unacknowledged in the realm of public discourse. What do we mean when we say that humans have dignity? And what kind of claim is it? Is it a claim based on some kind of comprehensive worldview or set of worldviews? Is it simply a pragmatic assertion—one that, hopefully, leads to less violence and a more just world?

Of central concern here is the status of human rights and global justice. The language of human rights appears again and again in the pages of this issue, not surprisingly since numerous human rights documents—in particular, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights—refer to humans as having dignity and to this dignity as being the basis for human rights. What is the relationship between this triad of terms: “human rights,” “human dignity,” and “justice”? And what are the implicit assumptions in these terms that need to be explored?

Contemporary skepticism regarding universal accounts of human nature raises doubts about the idea of human dignity. For some, a universal human nature is a myth and what it is to be a human person is exclusively shaped by our local and social contexts; transcendent accounts of why the lives of all persons should be valued do not make sense. Against this backdrop, one might ask whether a rhetoric of human dignity can be sustained and whether calls to honor the dignity of every individual can gain traction.

The questions concerning human dignity are not limited to the conflict between universal and particular understandings of the human. The bare facts of human history—the long list of atrocities for which humanity must answer—raise some serious questions about why or if we think humans have dignity. Would another intelligent species, viewing the range of human actions throughout history (or, even, currently occurring), arrive at the idea that humans have dignity? If dignity is associated with goodness and innocence, then it seems to weaken in the face of human behavior.

Here is the quandary that this issue of The Hedgehog Review explores: there are strong challenges to the idea of human dignity, and yet the pursuit of justice seems to be dependent on this idea, or one like it. Is it possible to sustain justice without the idea of human dignity, or a similar concept? Can we pursue justice independently of any robust theorizing about these matters? Without the commitment to a dignity that extends to all human beings, we seem to be left with value structures that have little or no commerce with each other.

Considered from a different direction, it is not clear precisely what follows from the claim of human dignity, either for those whose commitment is broadly theoretical or for those who marshal the concept in support of various causes. Does respect for the value of each and every human being have any direct implications for public policy? Does it provide substantive guidance to those who are working to relieve suffering and combat injustice?

In this issue, we take up these crucial questions, trying to bring some conceptual clarity to terms that are frequently used but often without adequate reflection on their meaning. Without a closer look at the assumptions brought to, but unexplored in, discussions of justice and human dignity, we cannot hope to sustain the human rights efforts that cross our globe—particularly since these assumptions are not uniform, or even necessarily compatible, across cultures or communities. While we are optimistic regarding the fruitfulness of a discourse of human dignity, it is unwise to dismiss theoretical challenges out-of-hand. For any idea to make good on its promise, it must be capable of withstanding the most rigorous and critical of examinations. In what follows we try to bring into view some of the fundamental assumptions that ground the language of human dignity and justice and to engage the challenges that this language faces in our world today.

—T.H.R.

Reprinted from The Hedgehog Review 9.3 (Fall 2007). This essay may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission. Please contact The Hedgehog Review for further details.

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Human life is sacred. The teaching about life is similar in its application in both religious perspectives as well as in nursing perspective. Just as the way religions such as Catholic Church view the aspect of human dignity, so is the way nursing profession view it. This discussion will focus on some of the major key principles of Catholic Social teachings and their application in nursing practice.

Dignity of a human person

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Immanuel Kant was known for his philosophical views and principles. The definition of human dignity according to Kant is where human beings can act independently from others. The ability of one who can act independently from others can reason and rationally develop their thoughts are, according to Kant is given respect Gentzler (890). Viewing human being as capable and rational beings is a worthy position.

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Dignity of the Human Person: What Does It Mean?

Human dignity is discussed in a wide array of contexts. Most people recognize it as a critical part of justifying human rights and measuring what is just and moral. By nature of being human, all people are ensured certain rights that cannot be withheld based on characteristics that make them unique, such as gender, race, sexuality, and so on. Where did the concept of human dignity come from? Has it changed over the years?

Human dignity as a philosophical concept

The word “dignity” comes from the Latin word dignitas and the French dignite . In their original meaning, these words referenced a person’s merit and not their inherent value as a human person. “Dignity” was about social status, wealth, and power. To have dignity meant a person held a privileged position in society over others. The word “dignified” still has this connotation as you most likely picture a certain type of person when you hear the word. Does this mean the concept of human dignity as we recognize it today didn’t exist?

While the term “dignity” meant something different in the past, people have always been drawn to the concept of inherent human rights. In 539 B.C.E., Cyrus the Great of Persia established basic rights for the newly-conquered Babylon. He freed slaves, promoted racial equality, and allowed people to practice their own religions. The laws were recorded in cuneiform on a clay cylinder, which was unearthed in the late 19th-century. Experts consider “the Cyrus Cylinder” one of the earliest human rights documents in history.

The concept of “natural law” and “natural rights” can also be found in ancient Indian, Greek, and Roman philosophy. In most places, wealth and social status still entailed more privileges. While the idea of inherent rights was brewing, they were not respected equally based solely on shared humanity.

Human dignity in international law

Since people understood dignity to mean something specifically related to status, it does not appear in the US Constitution. It was also not used by British abolitionists working against slavery. It wasn’t until 1948 with the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the dignity of the human person entered international law. It can be found at the beginning of the preamble: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world…” (emphasis added). It appears another five times including in Article 1, which states, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) , this concept is emphasized in the line, “These rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”

There can be no doubt about what “dignity” means in this context. While the concept of natural laws, human rights, and human dignity did exist before the post-WWII era, it was not established as a legal concept. From this point on, human dignity represents the foundation of universal human rights. It’s also found in various constitutions around the world. In Germany, it is the most important principle and stated in the first paragraph of Article 1: “Human dignity is invoidable.” Dignity is also listed in the constitutions of South Africa and Switzerland .

Human dignity as a religious concept

Human dignity isn’t only a philosophical or legal concept. It’s also found within religious frameworks. Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism are four major examples, though all religions recognize the equality of humans. That equality is often not respected or emphasized in practice, but in terms of religious teachings, it is something the vast majority of religions have in common. In Catholic teachings, the church believes all humans have dignity because they are created in the likeness of God. Judaism and Islam teach a similar belief, while in Buddhism, a person’s dignity is derived from humanity’s shared “Buddha-nature.” This describes everyone’s potential for a state of wakening defined by wisdom and compassion .

Why does respecting human dignity matter?

As a philosophical, legal, and religious concept, why is human dignity important? It justifies universal human rights and dictates how people should be treated. While humans have seemed naturally drawn to the concept of human rights, they have just as naturally looked for reasons to exclude certain people. Traits like gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, and more have been used to discriminate and harm. Inherent rights stem from the concept of human dignity and establish that discrimination is immoral. Those that perpetuate discrimination and violate human rights can be held accountable. Respecting human dignity matters because it ensures a just, fairer world where everyone can flourish.

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About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

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The Concept of Human Dignity: [Essay Example], 687 words
Human dignity is a complex and multi-faceted concept that holds great significance in society. It is rooted in the belief that every individual possesses inherent value and worth, regardless of their background, characteristics, or circumstances. Understanding and acknowledging human dignity is crucial for fostering respect, equality, and ...
Human Dignity, Free Essay Sample
Often, people forget or fail to put their human identity first, and this often leads to conflict. This innate feeling to be loved, seen, listened to, heard, understood, to be recognized, and to be treated fairly all comes or stems from human dignity and not respect. Dignity gifts us or makes us feel included, free and independent, as well as ...
Human Dignity: The Inherent Worth of Every Individual
Human dignity is a fundamental concept that underscores the inherent worth and value of every individual, regardless of their background, identity, or circumstances.It is a concept deeply ingrained in philosophy, ethics, and human rights, serving as the foundation for principles such as equality, respect, and justice.In this essay, we will explore the meaning and significance of human dignity ...
The Concept of Human Dignity
1. INTRODUCTION The concept of human dignity has been a critical element in bioethics and contemporary ethics and human rights instruments. The idea of human dignity has also been the subject of philosophical inquiry for centuries, where its origin can be traced back to Antiquity. Slade (2022) defines human dignity as the acknowledgment that people […]
Human Dignity Essay Examples
INTRODUCTION The concept of human dignity has been a critical element in bioethics and contemporary ethics and human rights instruments. The idea of human dignity has also been the subject of philosophical inquiry for centuries, where its origin can be traced back to Antiquity. Slade (2022) defines human dignity as the acknowledgment that ...
What's So Special About Human Dignity?
9 Martha Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements," Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics (Washington, DC: President's Council on Bioethics, 2008), 351-81. 10 Michael Meyer, "Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control," Ethics 99 (1989): 520-34.
Essay on Human Dignity
Human dignity is like the golden rule: treat others as you want to be treated. When we respect each other's dignity, we create a world where everyone can feel safe and happy. This helps us get along better, make friends, and live peacefully. Without dignity, people might feel sad, scared, or alone.
Human Dignity
It is used to emphasize the value a person attaches to himself, the extent to which he respects himself (Dillon, 2013). Dignity is the central term in assessing technological developments for their application to human life (Human dignity and bioethics: essays commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics, 2008). Dignity is also used ...
Exploring the Essence of Human Dignity: A Philosophical Inquiry: [Essay
Human dignity is a concept that transcends cultures, beliefs, and time periods. This essay delves into the intricate nature of human dignity, examining its philosophical foundations, its manifestations in society, and its implications for ethical and moral considerations.
Dignity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Dignity is a complex concept. In academic and legal contexts, it is typically used in the couplet "human dignity" to denote a kind of basic worth or status that purportedly belongs to all persons equally, and which grounds fundamental moral or political duties or rights. In this sense, many believe that dignity is a defining ideal of the ...
What is Human Dignity? Common Definitions
Human dignity: the human rights framework. The original meaning of the word "dignity" established that someone deserved respect because of their status. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that concept was turned on its head. Article 1 states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.".
Human Dignity in Philosophy and Bioethics
Essay Example: In the tapestry of human existence, there exists a thread that binds us all together, weaving through the complexities of philosophy and bioethics alike. This thread is none other than the concept of human dignity, a beacon of light illuminating our understanding of what it means
Human Persons and Human Dignity: Implications for Dialogue and Action
For Catholicism and Islam, the focus of the Contending Modernities project, the dignity of the human person has divine foundations. Because God created each of us and cares for each of us, each individual person has an intrinsic and inviolable dignity. The moral theology of the person is most developed in Christianity; it is connected with the ...
A brief history of human dignity
Here's a primer, told through 200 years of great essays, lectures, and novels. Credit: Benjavisa ... Human dignity is a powerful phrase invoked to peacefully protest against violence ...
37 Dignity Examples (2024)
37 Dignity Examples. Dignity can be characterized as an individual's innate right to be valued, respected, and ethically treated. It is generally associated with notions of personal worth, honor and self-esteem (McCrudden, 2008; Nussbaum, 2009) and points to the intrinsic worth of each human being. As such, it serves as the cornerstone for ...
Essay on Human Rights: Samples in 500 and 1500
Essay on Human Rights - Here are 4 sample essays covering the topic of human rights. Check out the 200, 500 and 1500 word essays here. ... Human rights are of utmost importance to seek basic equality and human dignity. Human rights ensure that the basic needs of every human are met. They protect vulnerable groups from discrimination and abuse ...
Assignment: The Dignity of the Human Person
The dignity of the human person is based on the fact that man is created in God's image. This, in turn, translates that whenever we see another human being, we are looking at God's likeness. Apart from good nature, man was also bestowed free will making human beings able to discern between good and evil. Being human sets us apart from other ...
Human Dignity and Justice
The questions concerning human dignity are not limited to the conflict between universal and particular understandings of the human. The bare facts of human history—the long list of atrocities for which humanity must answer—raise some serious questions about why or if we think humans have dignity. ... 9.3 (Fall 2007). This essay may not be ...
God, Humanity, and Human Dignity
Introduction: Discussions on the value of human life and dignity have been ongoing for centuries among philosophers, religious thinkers, and ethicists. This paper explores the Christian perspective on human nature and moral status theory within the Fetal Abnormality case study. In addition to analyzing the fetus's moral status, the paper will also examine how Jessica, […]
Human Dignity Essay Examples
Our essay writing service presents to you an open-access selection of free Human Dignity essay samples. We'd like to underline that the showcased papers were crafted by skilled writers with relevant academic backgrounds and cover most various Human Dignity essay topics. Remarkably, any Human Dignity paper you'd find here could serve as a great ...
Dignity of the Human Person: What Does It Mean?
The word "dignity" comes from the Latin word dignitas and the French dignite. In their original meaning, these words referenced a person's merit and not their inherent value as a human person. "Dignity" was about social status, wealth, and power. To have dignity meant a person held a privileged position in society over others.
Dignity Of The Human Person Essay Examples
Dignity Of The Human Person Essays. Assignment: The Dignity of the Human Person. Under catholic teachings, every human being is created in the likeness of God. This is the bedrock that makes human beings creatures that are dignified since every person is a reflection of God's image. ... For research and sample use only. Learn more in our ...