research on flashbulb memories has found that

Bipolar Disorder
Therapy Center
When To See a Therapist
Types of Therapy
Best Online Therapy
Best Couples Therapy
Managing Stress
Sleep and Dreaming
Understanding Emotions
Self-Improvement
Healthy Relationships
Student Resources
Personality Types
Sweepstakes
Guided Meditations
Verywell Mind Insights
2024 Verywell Mind 25
Mental Health in the Classroom
Editorial Process
Meet Our Review Board
Crisis Support

Flashbulb Memory: What to Know About Vivid Recall

cmart7327/E+/Getty

Where Are Flashbulb Memories Stored in the Brain?

Why are flashbulb memories so vivid, how do flashbulb memories resurface.

False Memories

A flashbulb memory is a vivid memory about an emotionally significant event, usually a historic or other notable event. People often experience these memories in photographic detail , and can recall aspects like what they were doing when the event occurred or how they learned about what happened. Flashbulb memories tend to endure over long periods of time, although it’s not clear if people continue to remember the events with accuracy.

Examples of Flashbulb Memory

Flashbulb memories usually involve a public event of importance and surprise. The memories formed aren’t just of the event itself, but circumstances surrounding the event: how you found out about it, who told you, where you were when you found out, and your emotional reaction.

Examples of flashbulb memories that many people share include:

September 11th
JFK assassination
The Challenger explosion
The fall of the Berlin wall
Natural disasters like earthquakes
The death of Princess Diana
Other significant political assassinations, wars, or noteworthy public occasions

Although flashbulb memories are usually associated with more public events, they also happen after personal events, especially ones that were surprising or pivotal in some way. For example, the memory of the sudden death of a loved one may turn into a flashbulb memory for some people.

What Causes a Flashbulb Memory?

The term “flashbulb memory” was coined by Roger Brown and James Kulik in a 1977 paper published in Cognition . They were studying how people remembered the JFK assassination and noted that these memories were formed with certain qualities. People remembered the JFK assassination with uncanny clarity, including details about where they were at the exact moment they heard, and what their emotional reaction was.

According to Brown and Kulik, there are three main qualities that cause a memory to turn into a flashbulb memory:

The event must elicit an elevated level of surprise
The event itself must have a significant level of importance
The event must cause a heightened emotional response

If these three aspects are not present, or don’t reach significant levels, it’s doubtful that a flashbulb memory will be formed, Brown and Kulik said.

Although flashbulb memories are still being studied, and much of Brown and Kulik’s characterization of them remains accurate, researchers have called into question the clarity of people’s flashbulb memories, noting that it’s common for people to form inaccurate memories of events that caused flashbulb memories, or that the accuracy declines as time goes on.

Researchers are still learning about the biological mechanisms behind flashbulb memories. A 2020 study published in Memory looked at adults undergoing MRI while recalling their flashbulb memories. They found that different parts of the brain seemed to be involved in flashbulb memories, as opposed to more ordinary autobiographical memories.

According to the study, flashbulb memories were more associated with the left side of the brain. Additionally, the amygdala seems to play a significant role in flashbulb memories. A 2018 study also found that the amygdala appears to be a key player when it comes to flashbulb memories.

These findings make sense, as the amygdala is where people store emotional memories.

There are several reasons why flashbulb memories are experienced so vividly. One reason is that flashbulb memories are often events shared by others, and repeated often in news coverage and in history books. This makes our memories of these events feel more vivid and clear to us.

Additionally, these events are often extremely emotionally potent, and form a strong impression on us. In fact, some of the events are associated with personal or public traumas , which may make them easier to attach to our memories. Research has found that our amygdala is involved in flashbulb memories, which is involved in the creation of emotional memories.

Although flashbulb memories involve heightened emotions and often include traumatic experiences, they are not the same as PTSD and don’t involve repressed memories that resurface. The term “flashbulb memories” may be confused with “flashbacks,” which are common in PTSD. Flashbacks refer to traumatic memories that tend to resurface without warning and cause significant distress. However, flashbulb memories are often easily retrieved, and don’t usually cause intense distress.

If you believe you are experiencing a flashback related to PTSD, please reach out to a therapist or mental health counselor. PTSD can cause serious mental health challenges, and impact your ability to function. But there’s hope: treatment is available and effective, including therapy for PTSD and medication to treat the condition.

Can Flashbulb Memories Be False?

One characteristic of people who have flashbulb memories is that they are usually quite confident in the accuracy of their memories, especially if the memories had emotional significance or a high level of emotional attachment. But research has found that flashbulb memories may not be as accurate as the people who experience them believe them to be.

For example, a group of researchers looked at flashbulb memories after the September 11th attacks. The researchers were able to look at how people recalled these events over a ten year period to see how accurate the flashbulb memories were.

What they found was surprising. People’s flashbulb memories were clearest right after the event, but lessened in accuracy within the first year. After that, their forgetfulness of the event stayed pretty much the same, and didn’t change much over the 10 year period. However, their confidence about the accuracy of their memory did not change, and remained high throughout.

Research has also found that although most people remember flashbulb memories with higher accuracy than more common memories, the rate at which they forget is similar in both flashbulb memories and ordinary memories. This decline usually happens in the first year after the event that elicited the flashbulb memory, and whatever inaccuracy the memory acquired remains present when the flashbulb memory is recalled in the future.

Flashbulb memories also often involve something called “time slice confusions.” This involves hearing reported news about the public event, and then incorporating that news into one’s memory of the event.

A Word From Verywell

The characteristics of flashbulb memories and how they work are a fascinating topic. Almost all of us have experienced flashbulb memories as the result of notable and emotionally potent events. It’s important to point out that although flashbulb events aren’t commonly associated with symptoms like PTSD, people who experience a traumatic event may also experience PTSD and other mental health disturbances. Please reach out to a mental health counselor if you are experiencing distress after a difficult event. You aren’t alone and help is out there.

APA Dictionary of Psychology. Flashbulb Memory .

El Haj M, Gandolphe M, Wawrziczny E, et al. Flashbulb memories of Paris attacks: Recall of these events and subjective reliving of these memories in a case with Alzheimer disease . Medicine. 2016;95(46):e5448. doi:10.1097/MD.0000000000005448

Hirst W, Phelps EA. Flashbulb Memories . Current Directions in Psychological Science. 2016;25(1):36-41. doi:10.1177/0963721415622487

Brown R, Kulik J. Flashbulb memories . Cognition. 1977;5(1):73–99. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(77)90018-X

Metternich B, Spanhel K, Schoendube E, et al. Flashbulb memory recall in healthy adults – a functional magnetic resonance imaging study . Memory. 2020;28(4):461-472. doi:10.1080/09658211.2020.1733022

Spanhel K, Wagner K, Geiger MJ, et al. Flashbulb memories: Is the amygdala central? An investigation of patients with amygdalar damage . Neuropsychologia. 2018;111:163-171. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.01.004

Hermans EJ, Battaglia FP, Atsak P, et al. How the amygdala affects emotional memory by altering brain network properties . Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. 2014;112:2-16. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2014.02.005

Law BM. Seared in our memories . Monitor on Psychology. 2011;42(8):60.

American Psychiatric Association. What is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)?

Day MV, Ross M. Predicting confidence in flashbulb memories . Memory. 2014;22(3):232-242. doi:10.1080/09658211.2013.778290

Hirst W, Phelps EA, Meksin R, et al. A ten-year follow-up of a study of memory for the attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb memories and memories for flashbulb events . Journal of Experimental Psychology. 2015;144(3):604–623. doi:10.1037/xge0000055

By Wendy Wisner Wendy Wisner is a health and parenting writer, lactation consultant (IBCLC), and mom to two awesome sons.

Flashbulb Memory In Psychology: Definition & Examples

Ayesh Perera

B.A, MTS, Harvard University

Ayesh Perera, a Harvard graduate, has worked as a researcher in psychology and neuroscience under Dr. Kevin Majeres at Harvard Medical School.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Saul McLeod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

Exceptionally clear memories of emotionally significant events are called flashbulb memories. They’re called so because they are typically very vivid and detailed, much like a photograph , and often pertain to surprising, consequential, and emotionally arousing events, such as hearing about a national tragedy or experiencing a personal milestone.

Key Takeaways

A flashbulb memory is a highly vivid and detailed ‘snapshot’ of a moment in which a consequential, surprising, and emotionally arousing piece of news was learned.
Roger Brown and James Kulik introduced the term ‘flashbulb memory’ in 1977 in their study of individuals’ ability to recall consequential and surprising events.
Debate centers on whether they are a special case (resistant to forgetting over time) or the same as other memories.
The photographic model, the comprehensive model, and the emotional-integrative model are some models which have been employed to study the phenomenon of flashbulb memory.
The vividness and accuracy of flashbulb memories can vary across age and culture.
The amygdala seems to play a key role in the formation and retrieval of flashbulb memories.
Relatively little evidence for flashbulb memories as a distinct memory process. They ‘feel’ accurate (we are confident in recall) but are just as prone to forgetting & change as other episodic memories.

yellow brain on blue clear background, concept light bulb idea with pencil drawing

A flashbulb memory is an accurate and exceptionally vivid long-lasting memory for the circumstances surrounding learning about a dramatic event. Flashbulb Memories are memories that are affected by our emotional state.

The analogy of a flashbulb describes how we can often remember where you were, what you were doing, how you were informed, and how you reacted as if the whole scene had been “illuminated” by a flashbulb.

Roger Brown and James Kulik coined the term ‘flashbulb memory’ in 1977. While the term ‘flashbulb memory’ implies shock, illumination, brevity, and detail, a memory of this type is far from complete.

Moreover, the fundamental characteristics of a flashbulb memory are informant (who broke the news), own affect (how they felt), aftermath (importance of the event), another affect (how others felt), ongoing activity (what they were doing) and place (where they where when the event happened).

Examples of Flashbulb Memory

Flashbulb memories are often associated with important historical or autobiographical events. Typical ‘flashbulb’ events are dramatic, unexpected, and shocking.

Here are several real-life examples of flashbulb memories:

Remembering where you were and what you were doing when you heard about the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The moment you heard about the death of a beloved public figure like Princess Diana or Michael Jackson.
Recalling the exact circumstances when you learned about a significant world event, such as the election of the first Black U.S. president, Barack Obama.
Remembering the moment you were informed about a family member’s sudden and unexpected death.
Recalling where you were and what you were doing when the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 as a pandemic in 2020.

Why do Flashbulb Memories Occur

Brown and Kulik (1977) constructed the special-mechanism hypothesis, which supposedly demonstrated the existence of a distinct special neural mechanism for flashbulb memories.

This mechanism was named “now print”, because it was as if the whole episode was a snapshot and imprinted in memory as such.

Brown and Kulik argued that experiences and events which exceeded the critical levels of consequentiality and surprise caused this mechanism of neural memory to register a permanent record of the event. Surprise refers to not anticipating the event and consequentiality refers to the level of importance of the event.

Notably, however, they held that while flashbulb memories are fixed, they are not always necessarily accessible from long-term memory (Cohen, McCloskey & Wible, 1990).

The special-mechanism hypothesis of Brown and Kulik further held that the features of flashbulb memories are distinct from those of ordinary mechanisms of memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977).

Detail, vividness, accuracy, and resistance to forgetting were initially identified as the distinct properties of flashbulb memories. However, over time, the validity of these properties has been debated, and several models have been subsequently developed to understand and explain the phenomenon of flashbulb memory (Er, 2003).

The Photographic Model

The photographic model posits that a stimulus experience can engender a flashbulb memory only with a significant amount of shock, emotional arousal, and consequentiality (Brown & Kulik, 1977). The element of surprise initially helps register an event in memory, and the event’s importance would subsequently trigger emotional arousal.

The consequentiality of the memory may be determined by the event’s impact on one’s own life. Finally, the properties of surprise, emotional arousal, and consequentiality would impact the frequency of rehearsal of a certain flashbulb memory, thereby possibly strengthening or weakening the associations to and accounts of the experience.

The Comprehensive Model

The comprehensive model emphasizes upon the importance of incorporating a larger sample of subjects from a greater diversity of backgrounds (Conway, Anderson, Larsen, Donnelly, McDaniel, McClelland, Rawles & Logie, 1994).

Additionally, unlike the photographic model, which follows a sequential process in the development of a flashbulb account, the comprehensive model incorporates the interconnected nature of the pertinent variables.

For instance, interest in and knowledge of the experience may impact the level of consequentiality, which in turn, may affect one level of emotional arousal.

All these factors would impact the frequency of rehearsal, and finally, their aggregate impact would influence the strength of the associations.

The Emotional-Integrative Model

The emotional-integrative model incorporates elements of the photographic model and the comprehensive model (Finkenauer, Luminet, Gisle, El-Ahmadi, Van Der Linden & Philippot, 1998).

Like the photographic model, this model posits that the degree of shock constitutes the initial registration of the event.

Moreover, according to this model, the elements of surprise and consequentialism, as well as one’s attitude, can trigger an emotional state which directly helps create a flashbulb memory.

Furthermore, this emotional state, in turn, contributes to the rehearsal of the event, thereby strengthening the association and forming a flashbulb memory.

Herein, the formation of the flashbulb memory is significantly influenced by the individual’s emotional relationship to the particular event (Curci & Luminet, 2009).

What Research Suggests

A common approach seems to characterize studies of flashbulb memory. Researchers generally conduct their studies of flashbulb memory following a surprising and consequential public event (Neisser, 1982).

Initially, the participants are tested via interview or survey questions immediately after the event. Herein, the subjects are often expected to describe their personal relationship to the event.

Afterward, the participants would be divided into different groups and tested for a second time—each group at a different time.

For instance, one group may be tested 12 months later, while another group may be tested 18 months after the event (Schmolck, Buffalo & Squire, 2000). This approach can expose memory decay and the rate of accuracy of the relevant flashbulb memories.

Brown and Kulik (1977) found that participants tended to have vivid memories of political assassinations: 75% of black people who were asked about the assassination of Martin Luther King could recall it, compared to only 33% of white people. This shows the importance of relevance.

Several studies imply that although flashbulb memories may be recollected with great confidence and vividness, they might not be as accurate as most people expect them to be.

For instance, a study conducted among 54 Duke University students in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks suggests that the accuracy of retrieval declines over time for flashbulb memories in the same way as it does for everyday memories (Talarico & Rubin, 2003).

Moreover, a study that examined the flashbulb memories of the Challenger Space Shuttle explosion showed that despite the participants’ high level of confidence in their recollection of the event, their actual recollections were not accurate three years after the tragedy (Neisser & Harsh, 1992).

Thus, it is possible that flashbulb memories rank higher not necessarily in their accuracy but in their perceived accuracy. However, there are other research findings that suggest that flashbulb memories are more accurate than everyday memories because consequentiality, personal involvement, distinction, and proximity can enhance recall (Sharot, Delgado & Phelps, 2004).

Neurology Related to Flashbulb Memory

Studies have shown that emotional arousal engenders neurohormonal changes which impact the amygdala (Dolcos, Labar & Cabeza, 2005). The amygdala , thus, seems to play a role in encoding and retrieving the memories of significant public events.

The amygdala’s function in memory is related to the increase in arousal caused by an experience (McGaugh, 2004).

This suggests that what influences arousal possibly impacts the nature of memories. Moreover, as the amygdala’s involvement with episodic memory is explicitly linked to physiological arousal, the intensity of the arousal may differ based on an individual’s personal relationship to an event (Phelps et al., 2006).

Individual Differences

Younger adults in general, are more likely to form flashbulb memories than older ones (Cohen, Conway & Maylor, 1993). Moreover, younger adults and their older counterparts recall flashbulb memories for different reasons.

For instance, among the younger ones, the chief predictor was emotional connectedness to an experience. Among the older adults, however, the reliance on rehearsal seemed to be the more salient determining factor. Additionally, older adults demonstrated a greater tendency to forget the context of the experience.

However, if older adults had been severely affected by the relevant event, then they would be able to form flashbulb memories that are as detailed as the flashbulb memories formed by their younger counterparts (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine & Kornbrot, 2010) (Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich & Kershaw, 2009).

For instance, older adults who were directly affected by the 9/11 attacks recollected memories that, in detail, resembled the recollections of younger adults. Additionally, older adults also tend to have an enhanced recollection of experiences from their early adulthood and adolescence.

This phenomenon is described as the ‘reminiscence bump’. As a result of the ‘reminiscence bump,’ older adults can retain flashbulb memories from their adolescence and early adulthood better than flashbulb memories from the recent past (Denver, Lane & Cherry, 2010).

In general, the factors which impact flashbulb memories are considered to be independent of cultural variation. Proximity to an event and personal involvement are generally regarded as the chief determining factors in memory formation.

However, some research suggests that the vividness of flashbulb memories may be influenced by cultural factors (Kulkofsky, Wang, Conway, Hou, Aydin, Johnson & Williams, 2011).

For instance, a study that evaluated the formation of flashbulb memories in China, the United States, Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom showed a notable variation in retrieval.

The participants from the United Kingdom and the United States were able to report more memories within the allotted time span than the participants from Turkey, China, and Germany.

Moreover, the Chinese participants were less impacted by factors associated with personal involvement and proximity. Additionally, the effects of surprise and emotional intensity too varied across the countries.

Relationship to Autobiographical Memory

Flashbulb memory has long been classified as a subset of autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory involves’ one’s everyday life experiences (Davidson & Glisky, 2002).

However, the memory of neutral autobiographical experiences such as an exam or a picnic is considered not as accurate as an emotionally arousing flashbulb memory involving one’s experiences closely tied to an issue of public concern or a national calamity.

Moreover, a comparative analysis of flashbulb memories and non-flashbulb memories demonstrates that while the former are encoded incidentally, the latter can be encoded specifically (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine & Kornbrot, 2010).

It has also been observed that although vividness accompanies both these types of memory, the vividness of non-flashbulb memories decreases over time—unlike that of flashbulb memories.

Additionally, while ordinary autobiographical memories involve a dimensional structure containing every level of autobiographical information, flashbulb memories stem apparently from a more densely integrated area of autobiographical information (Lanciano & Curci, 2012).

Additionally, while flashbulb memories require episodic memories , everyday memories are semantic recollections (Curci & Lanciano, 2009).

Why are flashbulb memories so vivid?

Flashbulb memories are so vivid because they are often associated with highly emotional events, which can heighten attention and deepen memory encoding. They involve strong emotional reactions, typically from surprise or shock, which stimulate the amygdala, a brain structure involved in emotion and memory, enhancing the recall of the event’s details.

Brown, A. (1987). Metacognition, executive control, self-regulation, and other more mysterious mechanisms. Metacognition, motivation, and understanding .

Cohen, G., Conway, M. A., & Maylor, E. A. (1994). Flashbulb memories in older adults . Psychology and Aging, 9 (3), 454.

Cohen, N. J., McCloskey, M., & Wible, C. G. (1990). Flashbulb memories and underlying cognitive mechanisms: Reply to Pillemer.

Conway, A. R., Skitka, L. J., Hemmerich, J. A., & Kershaw, T. C. (2009). Flashbulb memory for 11 September 2001 . Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 23 (5), 605-623.

Conway, M. A., Anderson, S. J., Larsen, S. F., Donnelly, C. M., McDaniel, M. A., McClelland, A. G., … & Logie, R. H. (1994). The formation of flashbulb memories . Memory & Cognition, 22 (3), 326-343.

Curci, A., & Lanciano, T. (2009). Features of autobiographical memory: Theoretical and empirical issues in the measurement of flashbulb memory . The Journal of General Psychology, 136 (2), 129-152.

Curci, A., & Luminet, O. (2009). Flashbulb memories for expected events: a test of the emotional‐integrative model . Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 23 (1), 98-114.

Davidson, P. S., & Glisky, E. L. (2002). Is flashbulb memory a special instance of source memory? Evidence from older adults . Memory, 10 (2), 99-111.

Denver, J. Y., Lane, S. M., & Cherry, K. E. (2010). Recent versus remote: Flashbulb memory for 9/11 and self-selected events from the reminiscence bump . The International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 70 (4), 275-297.

Dolcos, F., LaBar, K. S., & Cabeza, R. (2005). Remembering one year later: role of the amygdala and the medial temporal lobe memory system in retrieving emotional memories . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102 (7), 2626-2631.

Er, N. (2003). A new flashbulb memory model applied to the Marmara earthquake . Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 17(5) , 503-517.

Finkenauer, C., Luminet, O., Gisle, L., El-Ahmadi, A., Van Der Linden, M., & Philippot, P. (1998). Flashbulb memories and the underlying mechanisms of their formation: Toward an emotional-integrative model . Memory & cognition, 26 (3), 516-531.

Kulkofsky, S., Wang, Q., Conway, M. A., Hou, Y., Aydin, C., Mueller-Johnson, K., & Williams, H. (2011). Cultural variation in the correlates of flashbulb memories: An investigation in five countries . Memory, 19 (3), 233-240.

Kvavilashvili, L., Mirani, J., Schlagman, S., Erskine, J. A., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2010). Effects of age on phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories of September 11 and a staged control event . Psychology and Aging, 25 (2), 391.

Lanciano, T., & Curci, A. (2012). Type or dimension? A taxometric investigation of flashbulb memories . Memory, 20 (2), 177-188.

McGaugh, J. L. (2004). The amygdala modulates the consolidation of memories of emotionally arousing experiences. Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 27 , 1-28.

Neisser, U., & Harsch, N. (1992). Phantom flashbulbs: False recollections of hearing the news about Challenger .

Neisser, U. (1982). Snapshots or benchmarks. Memory observed: Remembering in natural contexts , 43-48.

Phelps, E. A. (2006). Emotion and cognition: insights from studies of the human amygdala . Annu. Rev. Psychol., 57 , 27-53.

Schmolck, H., Buffalo, E. A., & Squire, L. R. (2000). Memory distortions develop over time: Recollections of the OJ Simpson trial verdict after 15 and 32 months. Psychological Science, 11 (1), 39-45.

Sharot, T., Delgado, M. R., & Phelps, E. A. (2004). How emotion enhances the feeling of remembering . Nature neuroscience, 7 (12), 1376-1380.

Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). Confidence, not consistency, characterizes flashbulb memories . Psychological science, 14 (5), 455-461.

Further Information

McCloskey, M., Wible, C. G., & Cohen, N. J. (1988). Is there a special flashbulb-memory mechanism?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117 (2), 171.

Phelps, E. A., & Sharot, T. (2008). How (and why) emotion enhances the subjective sense of recollection. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17 (2), 147-152.

Hirst, W., Phelps, E. A., Meksin, R., Vaidya, C. J., Johnson, M. K., Mitchell, K. J., … & Olsson, A. (2015). A ten-year follow-up of a study of memory for the attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb memories and memories for flashbulb events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144 (3), 604

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Publications
Account settings
My Bibliography
Collections
Citation manager

Save citation to file

Email citation, add to collections.

Create a new collection
Add to an existing collection

Add to My Bibliography

Your saved search, create a file for external citation management software, your rss feed.

Search in PubMed
Search in NLM Catalog
Add to Search

Flashbulb Memories

Affiliations.

1 New School for Social Research.
2 New York University.
PMID: 26997762
PMCID: PMC4795959
DOI: 10.1177/0963721415622487

We review and analyze the key theories, debates, findings, and omissions of the existing literature on flashbulb memories (FBMs), including what factors affect their formation, retention, and degree of confidence. We argue that FBMs do not require special memory mechanisms and are best characterized as involving both forgetting and mnemonic distortions, despite a high level of confidence. Factual memories for FBM-inducing events generally follow a similar pattern. Although no necessary and sufficient factors straightforwardly account for FBM retention, media attention particularly shapes memory for the events themselves. FBMs are best characterized in term of repetitions, even of mnemonic distortions, whereas event memories evidence corrections. The bearing of this literature on social identity and traumatic memories is also discussed.

PubMed Disclaimer

Related information

Grants and funding.

R01 MH066972/MH/NIMH NIH HHS/United States

LinkOut - more resources

Full text sources.

Europe PubMed Central
PubMed Central

Other Literature Sources

scite Smart Citations
Citation Manager

NCBI Literature Resources

MeSH PMC Bookshelf Disclaimer

The PubMed wordmark and PubMed logo are registered trademarks of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Unauthorized use of these marks is strictly prohibited.

research on flashbulb memories has found that

NOT EXACTLY ROCKET SCIENCE

9/11 memories reveal how flashbulb memories are made in the brain

I have only ever seen one car crash and I remember it with crystal clarity. I was driving home along a motorway and a car heading the opposite way simply veered into the central reservation. Its hood crumpled like so much paper, its back end lifted clear off the tarmac and it spun 180 degrees before crashing back down in a cloud of dust. All of this happened within the space of a second, so the details may be different to what I remember. But the emotions I felt at the time are still vivid – the shock of the sight, the fear for the passengers, the confusion over what had happened.

Many studies have shown that peoples’ memories become particularly clear when it comes to traumatic or shocking events. Even learning about a shocking event, rather than witnessing it first-hand, can produce unusually clear recollections. Many of us still remember where we where when we learned that famous figures like Princess Diana or John F. Kennedy had died (I found out about Diana on the toilet).

Scientists have suggested that this type of event triggers a process that produces a very specific and exceptionally vivid type of memory called a ‘ flashbulb memory ‘. This concept has been kicking around since the 1970s, but the evidence that flashbulb memories actually exist is inconsistent.

Tali Sharot and colleagues from New York University decided to find some proper answers by studying the brain activity of people remembering a traumatic event. Doing such experiments would normally be ethically impossible – you cannot after all willingly traumatise someone in the name of science. But Sharot did not need to – unfortunately for us, the twenty-first century has already provided its fair share of traumas.

On September 11, 2001, the people of New York experienced terror and devastation on a massive scale. If any event led to the formation of flashbulb memories, this one would. Sharot recruited 24 people who had witnessed the World Trade Centre attacks first-hand and asked them to remember either the attacks, or a random event from another summer.

She found that people who were in Downtown Manhattan near the attacks had distinctly different memories than those who were twice as far away in Midtown. The Midtown group recalled their 9/11 memories in the same way as their generic ones. But the Downtown group remembered their 9/11 experiences more vividly, strongly and confidently and gave both longer and more detailed descriptions. They reported seeing the towers “burning in red flames”, smelling the smoke and hearing “the cries of people”.

Not content with relying on descriptions, Sharot used a brain scanner to see if these differences were mirrored in the volunteers’ brains – specifically, in a small region called the amygdala , the brain’s emotional control centre. The amygdala affects how memories are stored in the long-term and animal studies have shown that this storage is influenced by stress hormones. Sure enough, when asked them to think about 9/11, the Downtown group showed much greater activity in their left amygdala, while the Midtown group did not.

Despite these results, Sharot is still tentative about concluding that flashbulb memories, as they are classically defined, exist. Nonetheless, her results clearly show that experiencing a shocking event yields a very different and exceptionally vivid type of memory than the humdrum occurrences of daily life. These memories – flashbulb or not – are formed through a special mental route which involves the amygdala.

And Sharot’s brain scans turned up something more unexpected. When the Downtown group thought about 9/11, they also showed much lower activity than normal in the parahippocampal cortex. This part of the brain is thought to be involved in processing and recognising details of a scene or event. If its neurons are dimmed during shocking situations, this could explain why people who experience surprising events remember how they felt, but cannot reliably provide details.

During the tragic shooting of Jean Charles de Meneses in 2005, eyewitnesses proved to be wildly inaccurate, with first-hand accounts of his clothing, police action, and the number of shots fired clearly contradicting each other. If emotions are prized over details in memories of shocking events, how much value can we truly place on eyewitness accounts?

Reference: T. Sharot, E. A. Martorella, M. R. Delgado, E. A. Phelps (2007). How personal experience modulates the neural circuitry of memories of September 11 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104 (1), 389-394 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0609230103

History & Culture

History & Culture
Out of Eden Walk
Mind, Body, Wonder
Here Not There
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Your US State Privacy Rights
Children's Online Privacy Policy
Interest-Based Ads
About Nielsen Measurement
Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information
Nat Geo Home
Attend a Live Event
Book a Trip
Inspire Your Kids
Shop Nat Geo
Visit the D.C. Museum
Learn About Our Impact
Support Our Mission
Advertise With Us
Customer Service
Renew Subscription
Manage Your Subscription
Work at Nat Geo
Sign Up for Our Newsletters
Contribute to Protect the Planet

What Are Flashbulb Memories?

What were you doing when you learned that Abraham Lincoln was assassinated? The event was unlikely to have been a significant one for you. It obviously was a significant event for people at the time, though, as evidenced by an 1899 study by psychologist F.W. Colegrove that recorded their experiences. Colegrove found that despite 33 years of distance from the event, people reported their whereabouts including small details of the occasion with great confidence.

Much later, in 1977, Roger Brown and James Kulik asked people to report what they were doing when they heard that John Kennedy was shot in Dallas. They concluded that there is “hardly a man now alive” who cannot recall the circumstances in which they learned that Kennedy was assassinated. Such detailed reports were termed “flashbulb memories” by the investigators, who commented that it was as if a flashbulb had gone off capturing a fine-grained picture of the details surrounding the event.

They proposed that these highly emotional, vivid memories might be caused by a different mechanism from the processes underlying the formation of other autobiographical memories. They labeled the mechanism print now , underscoring the arguably indelible, vivid, and elaborated nature of flashbulb memories. They also suggested that such “flashbulbs” are more likely for events that are personally more consequential. In support of this claim, they found that only 13 of 40 Caucasian participants had a flashbulb memory for hearing that Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated, compared to 30 of 40 African American participants.

Psychologist Ulric Neisser cast doubt on the validity of such supposed flashbulb memories by describing one of his own. “For many years I have remembered how I heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred the day before my 13th birthday,” he wrote. “I recall sitting in the living room of our house — we only lived in that house for one year, but I remember it well — listening to a baseball game on the radio. The game was interrupted by an announcement of the attack, and I rushed upstairs to tell my mother.” He goes on to say that the memory had gone on so long and was so vivid that he never questioned it until he realized its absurdity. In particular, it dawned on him that of course nobody broadcasts baseball games in December, which was the month in which the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred.

More formal evidence suggesting that flashbulb memories may often be invalid was provided by the results of a study by Ulric Neisser and Nicole Harsch on recollections of the space shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986. The morning after the event, first-year college students wrote a description of how they heard the news, and then answered questions based on the categories of experience used by Brown and Kulik, such as: What time was it? How did you hear about it? Where were you? What were you doing? Who told you? How did you feel about it? Two and a half years later, the same students, now seniors, wrote a further description of how they had heard the news and answered the same questions about their experience.

The results revealed large differences between the original and later reports for many of the participants. A group of judges measured the consistency of the reports by estimating the extent of such changes; they found that the consistency was generally low, with a mean score of 2.95 out of a possible 7. Eleven of the 40 participants had a score of 0, having changed their answers to all the questions! Despite the changes, the participants were highly confident in the accuracy of their reports.

The consistency of reported flashbulb memories declined over a 10-year period, but the participants’ confidence in their accuracy remained high.

Flashbulb memories are defined as those related to learning about some shocking event, and a number of studies have compared these memories with “event memories” for the objective details of the occurrence (e.g., that there were four airplanes involved in the 9/11 attack). One such investigation examined flashbulb memories for the 9/11 attack over a 10-year period. Notably, that investigation included 15 coauthors, allowing for the comparison of reports from different geographic regions. As it happened, large differences across geographic areas were not found except that flashbulb memories were more likely in New York City than elsewhere.

The results showed that both flashbulb and event memories declined rapidly across the first year, but did not do so appreciably over the following years. As in other studies, the consistency of reported flashbulb memories declined over a 10-year period, but the participants’ confidence in their accuracy remained high, whereas the confidence for details of event memories declined. The inconsistencies that occurred during reports of flashbulb memories were likely to be repeated in later reports rather than corrected. Inaccurate event memories were quite likely to be corrected, however, possibly as a result of people viewing media reports.

Studies have also attempted to pin down the crucial components of flashbulb memories, with likely candidates including surprise, the distinctiveness of the event, the consequences for the person, and their resulting emotional state. In the words of investigators, “Consistent findings have proven elusive,” but it seems to us that the major recurring characteristics of such memories are surprise and shock, and often an incident concerning some well-known public figure.

Commenting on the nature of flashbulb memories, Neisser wrote that two narratives that are normally kept separate — the course of both history and our lives — are momentarily put into alignment. One widely agreed-on difference between everyday autobiographical memories and flashbulb memories is that confidence in flashbulb memories remains high despite the decline in their consistency, whereas event memories decline in both consistency and confidence over time. The vividness, elaborateness, and ease of retrieval of flashbulb memories likely account in part for the high confidence assigned to them. Again, memory is not indelible although it is sometimes thought to be so.

Fergus Craik taught in the Department of Psychology at the University of Toronto and then worked at the Rotman Research Institute in Toronto until his retirement. He is a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Larry Jacoby was a faculty member in the Department of Psychology at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

This article is excerpted from their book “ Memory ,” in the MIT Press Essential Knowledge series.

	There’s a fine line to tread between preparing our kids for the challenges their generation will face, and not bombarding them too soon with harsh reality. \|
	A phenomenon referred to as “population stereotypes” helps explain how predictable human responses create the illusion of telepathy. \|
	To look up at the sky and see a road for the gods, a great river, or the final resting place of your ancestors is deeply human. \|
	Many policymakers believe that the international reaction to the use of nuclear weapons would be severe. A new study challenges this assumption. \|

Flashbulb Memory

Living reference work entry
First Online: 25 July 2023
Cite this living reference work entry

Jennifer M. Talarico 3

62 Accesses

Flashbulb memories are long-lasting, vivid, confidently held memories of the reception context for learning about surprising, important, public events that were not directly experienced. Initially thought to be distinguished by their remarkable accuracy, evidence of omission and commission errors are as common in these memories as in ordinary autobiographical memories. Rather, it is the durability, vividness, and confidence with which flashbulb memories are held that seem to differentiate them from everyday memories. The substance of flashbulb memories are mundane experiences, made remarkable only due to their association with remote, public events. When a consequential public event occurs, that event captures attention due to its novelty and disruption of ongoing experience. The event is also likely to evoke a strong emotional response, frequently as a result of its resonance with aspects of identity. Subsequently, rehearsal processes, as supported via social networks, reinforce the interpretation that the public event was important and noteworthy. These linkages between particular event features and resulting memory characteristics provide fertile ground for investigators interested in social, emotional, and cognitive interactions in mnemonic function. Further, the apparent paradox of why a personal memory of hearing surprising news should seem so unforgettable suggests that the flashbulb memory phenomenon will continue to resonate with the general population.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Alea N, Bluck S (2003) Why are you telling me that? A conceptual model of the social function of autobiographical memory. Memory 11(2):165–178

Article Google Scholar

Belli RF, Schuman H, Jackson B (1997) Autobiographical misremembering: John Dean is not alone. Appl Cogn Psychol 11(3):187–209

Berntsen D (2009) Flashbulb memories and social identity. In: Luminet O, Curci A (eds) Flashbulb memories: new issues and new perspectives. Psychology Press, New York, pp 187–205

Google Scholar

Berntsen D, Thomsen DK (2005) Personal memories for remote historical events: accuracy and clarity of flashbulb memories related to world war II. J Exp Psychol Gen 134(2):242–257

Bohn A, Berntsen D (2007) Pleasantness bias in flashbulb memories: positive and negative flashbulb memories of the fall of the Berlin Wall among East and West Germans. Mem Cogn 35(3):565–577

Breslin CW, Safer MA (2011) Effects of event valence on long-term memory for two baseball championship games. Psychol Sci 22:1408–1412

Brewer WF (1988) Memory for randomly sampled autobiographical events. In: Neisser U, Winograd E (eds) Remembering reconsidered: ecological and traditional approaches to the study of memory. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 21–90

Chapter Google Scholar

Brown NR (2016) Transition theory: a minimalist perspective on the organization of autobiographical memory. J Appl Res Mem Cogn 5(2):128–134

Brown R, Kulik J (1977) Flashbulb memories. Cognition 5:73–99

Colegrove FW (1899) Individual memories. Am J Psychol 10(2):228–255

Coluccia E, Bianco C, Brandimonte MA (2010) Autobiographical and event memories for surprising and unsurprising events. Appl Cogn Psychol 24:177–199

Coman A, Manier D, Hirst W (2009) Forgetting the unforgettable through conversation: socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting of September 11 memories. Psychol Sci 20(5):627–633

Congleton AR, Berntsen D (2020) It took me by surprise: examining the retroactive enhancement effect for memory of naturally unfolding events. J Appl Res Mem Cogn 9:300–309

Conway MA (1997) The inventory of experience: memory and identity. In: Pennebaker JW, Paez D, Rimé B (eds) Collective memory of political events: social psychological perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp 21–45

Conway MA, Bekerian DA (1988) Characteristics of vivid memories. In: Gruneberg MM, Morris PE, Sykes RN (eds) Practical aspects of memory: current research and issues, Vol. 1. Memory in everyday life. Wiley, Chichester, pp 519–524

Dudukovic NM, Marsh EJ, Tversky B (2004) Telling a story or telling it straight: the effects of entertaining versus accurate retellings on memory. Appl Cogn Psychol 18(2):125–143

Hirst W, Phelps EA, Buckner RL, Budson AE, Cuc A, Gabrieli JDE, Johnson MK, Lustig C, Lyle KB, Mather M, Meksin R, Mitchell KJ, Ochsner KN, Schacter DL, Simons JS, Vaidya CJ (2009) Long-term memory for the terrorist attack of September 11: flashbulb memories, event memories, and the factors that influence their retention. J Exp Psychol Gen 138(2):161–176

Hirst W, Phelps EA, Meksin R, Vaidya CJ, Johnson MK, Mitchell KJ, Buckner RL, Budson AE, Gabrieli JDE, Lustig C, Mather M, Ochsner KN, Schacter D, Simons JS, Lyle KB, Cuc AF, Olsson A (2015) A ten-year follow-up of a study of memory for the attack of September 11, 2001: flashbulb memories and memories for flashbulb events. J Exp Psychol Gen 144(3):604–623

Kızılöz BK, Tekcan AI (2013) Canonical categories in flashbulb memories. Appl Cogn Psychol 27(3):352–359

Larsen SF (1992) Potential flashbulbs: memories of ordinary news as the baseline. In: Winograd E, Neisser U (eds) Affect and accuracy in recall: studies of “flashbulb” memories. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 32–64

McCloskey M, Wible CG, Cohen NJ (1988) Is there a special flashbulb-memory mechanism? J Exp Psychol Gen 117(2):171–181

Morse CK, Woodward EM, Zweigenhaft RL (1993) Gender differences in flashbulb memories elicited by the Clarence Thomas hearings. J Soc Psychol 133(4):453–458

Neisser U (1981) John Dean’s memory: a case study. Cognition 9:1–22

Neisser U (1982) Snapshots or benchmarks? In: Memory observed: remembering in natural contexts. W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, pp 43–48

Neisser U (1986) Remembering Pearl Harbor: reply to Thompson and Cowan. Cognition 23:285–286

Neisser U, Harsch N (1992) Phantom flashbulbs: false recollections of hearing the news about challenger. In: Winograd E, Neisser U (eds) Affect and accuracy in recall: studies of “flashbulb” memories. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 9–31

Pew Research Center (1999) Technology triumphs, morality falters. 1999 millennium survey. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/1999/07/03/technology-triumphs-morality-falters/

Rubin DC, Kozin M (1984) Vivid memories. Cognition 16(1):81–95

Rubin DC, Wetzler SE, Nebes RD (1986) Autobiographical memory across the lifespan. In: Rubin DC (ed) Autobiographical memory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 202–221

Scoboria A, Talarico JM, Pascal L (2015) Metamemory appraisals in autobiographical event recall. Cognition 136:337–349

Stone CB, Mercy A, Licata L, Klein O, Luminet O (2013) Mnemonic differences and similarities across opposing social groups: the linguistic conflict at the University of Leuven as a case study. J Appl Res Mem Cogn 2(3):166–172

Stone CB, Luminet O, Takahashi M (2015) Remembering public, political events: a cross-cultural and -sectional examination of Australian and Japanese public memories: remembering public, political events in Australia and Japan. Appl Cogn Psychol 29(2):280–290

Stone CB, Gkinopoulos T, Hirst W (2017) Forgetting history: the mnemonic consequences of listening to selective recountings of history. Mem Stud 10(3):286–296

Svob C, Brown NR (2012) Intergenerational transmission of the reminiscence bump and biographical conflict knowledge. Psychol Sci 23(11):1404–1409

Talarico JM, Rubin DC (2003) Confidence, not consistency, characterizes flashbulb memories. Psychol Sci 14(5):455–461

Talarico JM, LaBar KS, Rubin DC (2004) Emotional intensity predicts autobiographical memory experience. Mem Cogn 32(7):1118–1132

Talarico JM, Bohn A, Wessel I (2019) The role of event relevance and congruence to social groups in flashbulb memory formation. Memory 27(7):985–997

Thompson CP, Cowan T (1986) Flashbulb memories: a nicer interpretation of a Neisser recollection. Cognition 22:199–200

Tinti C, Schmidt S, Sotgiu I, Testa S, Curci A (2009) The role of importance/consequentiality appraisal in flashbulb memory formation: the case of the death of Pope John Paul II. Appl Cogn Psychol 23(2):236–253

von Restorff H (1933) Über die Wirkung von Bereichsbildungen im Spurenfeld. Psychol Forsch 18:299–342

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Lafayette College, Easton, PA, USA

Jennifer M. Talarico

You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jennifer M. Talarico .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Science and Tech, Trondheim, Norway

Lucas M. Bietti

Institute of Culture and Memory Studies, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Martin Pogacar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this entry

Cite this entry.

Talarico, J.M. (2023). Flashbulb Memory. In: Bietti, L.M., Pogacar, M. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_27-1

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_27-1

Received : 29 November 2022

Accepted : 30 November 2022

Published : 25 July 2023

Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-030-93789-8

Online ISBN : 978-3-030-93789-8

eBook Packages : Springer Reference Literature, Cultural and Media Studies Reference Module Humanities and Social Sciences Reference Module Humanities

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Find a journal
Track your research

22 August 2024: Due to technical disruption, we are experiencing some delays to publication. We are working to restore services and apologise for the inconvenience. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/universitypress/about-us/news-and-blogs/cambridge-university-press-publishing-update-following-technical-disruption

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings .

Login Alert

> Affect and Accuracy in Recall
> The theoretical and empirical status of the flashbulb memory hypothesis

Book contents

Frontmatter
List of contributors
1 Introduction
Part I Empirical studies
Part II Developmental studies
Part III Emotion and memory
Part IV Theoretical issues
11 Special versus ordinary memory mechanisms in the genesis of flashbulb memories
12 Remembering personal circumstances: A functional analysis
13 Constraints on memory
14 The theoretical and empirical status of the flashbulb memory hypothesis
Author index
Subject index

14 - The theoretical and empirical status of the flashbulb memory hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2010

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of “flashbulb” memory and contrast it with other forms of human memory. The construct of flashbulb memory was introduced in a seminal paper by Brown and Kulik (1977) to account for memories of events such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Brown and Kulik described flashbulb memories as memories for the circumstances of hearing about a highly surprising and consequential event. These memories were said to be like a photograph, to show very little forgetting, and to be produced by a special purpose biological mechanism. Most recent work on this topic derives from the Brown and Kulik paper, and this chapter will begin with a conceptual analysis of that paper. The analysis will examine, in turn, each of the major theoretical and empirical claims of the original Brown and Kulik paper.

Brown and Kulik – theory

Circumstances (news reception context)

The core phenomenon described by Brown and Kulik (1977) is that certain events give rise to memories that show little forgetting. These flashbulb memories include both the central event and the circumstances in which one learned of the event.

Mental imagery

It appears to me that Brown and Kulik believe that the recollection of flashbulb memories involves the occurrence of visual images. Brown and Kulik do not state this explicitly, but it is the only interpretation I can give to their statement that flashbulb memories have a “primary, ‘live’ quality that is almost perceptual” (p. 74).

Access options

Save book to kindle.

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle .

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service .

The theoretical and empirical status of the flashbulb memory hypothesis
By William F. Brewer
Edited by Eugene Winograd , Emory University, Atlanta , Ulric Neisser , Emory University, Atlanta
Book: Affect and Accuracy in Recall
Online publication: 22 March 2010
Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664069.015

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox .

Save book to Google Drive

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Publications
Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

Advanced Search
Journal List
HHS Author Manuscripts

Long-term memory for the terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb memories, event memories, and the factors that influence their retention

More than 3,000 individuals from seven US cities reported on their memories of learning of the terrorist attacks of September 11, as well as details about the attack, one week, 11 months, and/or 35 months after the assault. Some studies of flashbulb memories examining long-term retention show slowing in the rate of forgetting after a year, whereas others demonstrate accelerated forgetting. The present paper indicates that (1) the rate of forgetting for flashbulb memories and event memory (memory for details about the event itself) slows after a year, (2) the strong emotional reactions elicited by flashbulb events are remembered poorly, worse than non-emotional features such as where and from whom one learned of the attack, and (3) the content of flashbulb and event memories stabilizes after a year. The results are discussed in terms of community memory practices.

Brown and Kulik (1977) suggested the term flashbulb memory for the “circumstances in which one first learned of a very surprising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) event,” for example, hearing the news that President John Kennedy had been shot. Since Brown and Kulik's description of their findings, the range of topics addressed in studies of flashbulb memories has grown substantially, from initial questions about special mechanisms ( McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988 ; Neisser & Harsh, 1992 ) to more recent questions about the impact of aging and dementia ( Budson, Simons, Sullivan, Beier, Solomon, Scinto, et al., 2004 ; Budson, Simons, Waring, Sullivan, Hussoin, & Schacter, 2007 ; Davidson, Cook, & Glisky, 2005), the history of post-traumatic stress disorder ( Qin, Mitchell, Johnson, Krystal, Southwick et all, 2003 ), as well as the role of social identity [e.g., as seen in the presence or absence, respectively, of flashbulb memories of French citizens and French-speaking Belgians of the death of French President Mitterraand ( Curci, Luminet, Finkenauer, & Gisle, 2001 ; see also Berntsen, 2008 ; Hirst & Meksin, 2008 )]. Researchers have also begun to investigate memories for the flashbulb event itself ( Curci & Luminet, 2006 ; Luminet, Curci, Marsh, Wessel, Constantin, Genocoz, et al., 2004 ; Pezdak, 2003 ; Shapiro, 2006 ; Tekcan, Berium, Gülgöz, & Er, 2003 ). In this literature, the term flashbulb memory refers to memory for circumstances in which one learned of the event and would include memories of where, when, and from whom one learned of, for instance, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The term event memory refers to memory for facts about the flashbulb event and would include, for instance, that four planes were involved in the 9/11 terrorist attack and that both the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were targets. 1

Flashbulb memories and their associated event memories are often considered special because they involve events that are not ordinary or everyday, and usually are not personally experienced, but rather, they are public and emotionally charged ( Neisser, 1982 ). It is the public nature of flashbulb memories and their associated event memories that ensures the memories strongly influence both individual and collective identity ( Berntsen, 2008 ; Hirst & Meksin, 2008 ; Neisser, 1982 ). Their role in shaping identity depends, of course, on their being retained ( Bruner, 1990 ; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000 ). Surprisingly, whereas much is known about how well flashbulb and event memories are retained over a period of approximately a year, much less is known about their long-term retention. This relative neglect applies not just to the issue of the amount retained, but also to differences in the kind of information that is retained over the long-term and the factors that might affect the level and content of long-term retention. For instance, whereas many researchers have emphasized that flashbulb events inevitably elicit strong emotions from individuals, few researchers have contrasted the long-term retention of memories of these emotional reactions with the long-term retention of memories of other features of flashbulb memories, for example, who you were with when learning of the event, where you were, or how you were informed (see, however, Levine, Safer, & Lench, 2006 ). Moreover, although a number of psychological studies have related the level of retention to individual cognitive factors (e.g., rehearsal), none have discussed the contribution of memory practices, that is, the way a society goes about ensuring that a public event will never be forgotten by the public ( Hirst & Manier, 2008 ; Olick & Robbins, 1998 ; but see Hoskins, 2007 ). Memory practices may play a role in the retention of flashbulb and event memories given the public nature of the reference event.

The present paper, then, focuses on four issues: (1) the long-term retention of flashbulb and event memories, (2) the comparative retention of emotional reactions with the retention of other features of a flashbulb event, (3) possible difference in the underlying processing associated with the formation and retention of flashbulb and event memories, and (4) the factors that shape long-term retention, including the role of memory practices. It explores these issues in the context of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.

Consider the issue of long-term retention. From the extant research, it is not clear whether forgetting for flashbulb and event memories slows or accelerates after the first year. Three studies suggest that the rate of forgetting of flashbulb memories slows dramatically after the first year. Two of these studies based their conclusions on the vividness or accuracy of flashbulb memories. Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, and Kornbrot (2003) found that British citizens reported vivid, confidently held memories of the circumstances under which they learned of the death of Princess Diana, even after a delay of 51 months. Berntsen and Thomsen (2005) discovered that elderly Danes accurately remembered the weather on the day of the German W.W. II invasion of and withdrawal from Denmark.

Neither of these studies, however, employed a test-retest methodology, in which memories are assessed shortly after the flashbulb event and then after a significant retention interval. This methodology supplies a putatively reliable memory with which to compare the consistency of later recollections and is consequently the preferred means of studying flashbulb memories (see, however, Winningham, Hyman, & Dinnel, 2000 ). Kvavilashvili et al. did not have an initial assessment for a test-retest. Berntsen and Thomsen had verifiable information about the original event, but their documentary methodology does not permit as wide a ranging examination of mnemonic attributes as the test-retest method does. Relying on public records such as weather reports largely precludes exploring those attributes Brown and Kulik (1977) identified as the canonical features of flashbulb memories, for example, who the respondent was with, how the respondent reacted emotionally, or who the informant was. Bohannon and Symons (1992 ; see also Bohannon, 1988 ) conducted the third study, finding a slowing in forgetting, and did employ a test-retest methodology in their investigation of the Challenger explosion, but, in the end, based their conclusions about the rate of forgetting on cross-sectional data.

Two studies did ground their conclusions about long-term retention on the results of test-retests. Unfortunately, Neisser and Harsh (1992) employed only one retest in their study of the Challenger explosion, making any analysis of the rate of forgetting difficult. On the other hand, Schmolck, Buffalo, and Squire (2000) used two retests in their study of the announcement of the verdict in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial. They found that at 15 months, a little less than 40% of the flashbulb memories they examined contained no distortions, and only about 10% contained major distortions. At 32 months, the pattern was reversed: Only about 20% contained no distortions and over 40% of the memories contained major distortions. These results strongly support the claim that the rate of forgetting increases, rather than slows, over time.

Because of the controversy over the rate of forgetting of flashbulb memories, it is difficult to evaluate Talarico and Rubin's (2003) claim that, despite a flashbulb event's public and emotionally charged nature, the rate of forgetting of flashbulb memories is the same as the rate of forgetting of ordinary autobiographical memories. Talarico and Rubin suggested that flashbulb memories and ordinary autobiographical memories differ not in their rate of forgetting, but in the confidence with which they are held, with confidence in flashbulb memories remaining high, even as the memories are forgotten. Confidence in ordinary autobiographical memories declines as the memories are forgotten (see also Weaver, 1993 ). Talarico and Rubin, however, only tested retention intervals of eight months or less. Schmolck et al. (2002)'s findings indicated that flashbulb memories may be an exception to the pattern of forgetting observed for ordinary, autobiographical memories when long-term retention intervals are considered.

Talarico and Rubin (2003) compared their participants' memory for their reception event for 9/11 with a self-selected autobiographical memory – a memory of an “everyday” event from the three days before September 11. A perhaps more general point of comparison would be the forgetting curves obtained in diary studies ( Rubin, 2005 ). These studies involve the assessment of a wide-range of types of memories over a substantial period. The forgetting curves collected across studies are remarkably similar, showing rapid forgetting in the first year and then slowing. As a result, they indicate that autobiographical memories may follow the well-established pattern of forgetting documented since Ebbinghaus (1913/1964) . Linton (1986) , for instance, showed dramatic forgetting over the first year and then a much slower rate of forgetting of 6% for the next five years. Similarly, Wagenaar (1986) found a substantial decline of 20% in the first year for critical details and then a slower decline of approximately 10% for the next four years. If Talarico and Rubin's findings of equivalent forgetting of flashbulb and ordinary memories up to eight months extends to longer retention intervals, then the diary studies would suggest that the results of Schmolck et al. (2000) are an anomaly, and those of Bohannon and Symons (1992) , Kvavilashvili et al. (2003) , and Berntsen and Thomsen (2005) may be more typical.

In the present study, we asked whether the accelerated forgetting Schmolck et al. (2000) observed for the Simpson verdict between the first and third years applies as well to flashbulb memories for the terrorist attack of 9/11. Consequently, we assessed our participant's memory for 9/11 one week, 11 months and 35 months after the terrorist attack. We choose the 11 months and 35 months retention intervals because they were in the same time frame used by Schmolck et al., but minimized potential effects of anniversary commemorations.

In addition, we also examined the retention of associated event memories at one week, 11 months, and 35 months after the terrorist attack. The scant relevant literature on event memory is as inconclusive about long-term retention as the literature on flashbulb memories. Bahrick and his colleagues ( Bahrick, 1983 , 1984 ; Bahrick, Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975 ) have shown that neutral facts, such as the names of fellow college students, college streets, or college-learned Spanish vocabulary, are steadily forgotten for six years, and then, if still retained, preserved for decades to come. Along the same lines, Belli, Schuman, and Jackson (1997) found good retention after decades for newsworthy events such as the Tet Offensive, at least for participants for whom the event “defined” their generation. Neither of these studies examined whether respondents remembered the circumstances in which they learned of the event, making their relevance to the topic of flashbulb memories at best speculative. The flashbulb memory studies that also explored event memory indicate that for retention intervals of a year or less, event memories are subject to a steady decline (Finkenhauer, Luminet, Gisle, & Filipopot, 1998; Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003 ; Tekcan et al., 2003 ). In the only study that examined event memory at longer retention intervals, Bohannon and Symons (1992) found that event memories declined a substantial 20% between the 15-month and 36-month intervals, suggesting that, while the rate of forgetting may not accelerate, it clearly does not slow after a year.

Finally, as noted earlier, we also investigated whether long-term retention for emotional reactions to 9/11 differs from memory for other features of flashbulb memories, as well as what factors shape long-term retention of different features. There is almost no research comparing memory for emotional reactions with memory for other features of flashbulb memory (but see Qin et al., 2003 ). Levine and colleagues explored memory for emotional reactions to flashbulb events, but used relatively short retention intervals and did not make comparisons with other features, as we do here ( Levine, Prohaska, Burgess, Rice, & Laulhere, 2001 ; Levine, Whalen, Henker, & Jamner, 2005 ).

As for the factors that might affect retention, we explore whether any similarity in the patterns of forgetting of flashbulb memories and event memories implies that the processes that underlie the retention (and forgetting) of these two types of memories are the same. Some research on flashbulb memories and event memories would suggest that the underlying processes are similar. For instance, through their modeling of the formation and maintenance of flashbulb memories, Luminet, Curci, and their colleagues have argued that some factors involved in the formation of event memories overlap with those involved in the formation of flashbulb memories (e.g., rehearsal, see Luminet, 2008 , for a review). Their model also documented differences in factors uniquely involved in the formation of flashbulb memories, specifically, surprise and novelty. Testing the complex models developed by this group goes beyond a chief aim of the present paper – to explore long-term retention of flashbulb memories and event memories. Nevertheless, we investigated some factors that could putatively predict levels of forgetting. We also examined the way the content of the memories changes over time, on the assumption that if the predictors or content changes differ for flashbulb and event memories, then different processes may be involved.

We are not only interested in intrapsychic factors. We also present analyses in the General Discussion that suggest provide evidence that different retention curves reported in the literature can be attributed to different social memory practices.

Participants, recruitment, and procedure

Participants were recruited in Boston and Cambridge, MA; New Haven, CT; New York, NY; Washington, DC; St. Louis, MO; Palo Alto, CA; and Santa Cruz, CA. For Survey 1 (one week after the attack), tables were set up either on the campuses of the collaborators or in surrounding neighborhoods. Lab members also asked friends and acquaintances if they would be interested. In the survey, we asked if participants were willing to be contacted in a year for a second survey. All respondents indicated their willingness. Surveys and stamped return envelopes were given to all participants.

For Survey 2, we contacted respondents to the first survey through e-mail, the postal system, or both, and asked them if they wished to participate in the second survey. We also recruited additional participants, in the same ways, for both the second survey and a third survey, to examine possible effect of prior participation. For Survey 3, we recruited all participants who responded to Survey 1 and/or Survey 2 and added another group of new participants.

For all three surveys, participants were told that they had one week to fill out the survey and return it to the experimenters. There was both a paper version and a web-based version for Surveys 2 and 3. Participants recruited through the postal system received a survey, but were told they could use the web-based version if they wished. Those who were recruited through e-mail were told that they could fill out the web-based version or receive a paper version either through e-mail (as a pdf file) or in the post. We recruited participants between September 17, 2001 and September 21, 2001 for Survey 1; August 5 and August 26, 2002 for Survey 2; and August 9 and August 20, 2004 for Survey 3. We closed the website two weeks after the last day of recruitment and stopped accepting returned postal surveys five days later.

Table 1 shows the number of participants from each of the six recruitment locations. 38% of the respondents to Survey 1 completed Survey 2, while 18% of the respondents on Survey 1 completed both Surveys 2 and 3. For Surveys 2 and 3, 27% responded through e-mail. These return rates are comparable to other surveys without a monetary incentive or a follow-up query ( Baruch, 1999 ). We compared the responses to each question on the survey, one question at a time, and found no significant differences in the responses of the web-based and postal responses (in all cases, p > .4), thus we merged the data from the two formats. To make the exposition in this paper straightforward, we will confine most of our analysis to the 391 participants who filled out all three surveys.

Distribution of samples in which a participant responded on one or more than one survey

	Distribution Location

	Bos	NH	NYC	DC	STL	Palo	SC	Total
Participants
Multiple Responses
S1, S2 & S3	-	28	168	55	96	24	20	391
S1 & S2	59	21	121	37	97	34	18	387
S1 & S3	-	1	40	12	10	5	4	72
S2 & S3	-	39	111	39	11	1	9	210
TOTAL	59	89	440	143	214	64	51	1060
Single Responses
S1	15	152	572	212	117	128	71	1267
S2	-	74	158	104	33	32	64	465
S3	-	50	267	110	10	-	17	454
TOTAL	15	276	997	426	160	160	152	2186

Notes. Boston (Bos), New Haven (NH), New York City (NYC), Washington, DC (DC), St. Louis (STL), Palo Alto (Palo), Santa Cruz (SC).

Separate surveys were designed for each testing period, with Survey 1 serving as the model for the other two. The surveys were approximately 17 pages and took about 45 minutes to complete. Copies of the surveys can be found at http://911memory.nyu.edu .

All surveys began with a general statement of the aims of the project, a consent form, and a request for an identification code that would allow the experimenters to track questionnaires across the three survey periods. Table 2 summarizes the probes on the questionnaire in Survey 1 that figured in our present analyses. Questions 1 – 6 were relevant to establishing the consistency of flashbulb memories; Questions 7 – 11, the accuracy of event memories, and Questions 12 – 23 dealt with predictors, specifically, consequentiality (as assessed by personal loss or inconvenience), the intensity of the emotional response, and rehearsal (as assessed by attention to media and conversations). We did not attempt to cover the entire range of predictors found in the literature. In some cases, such as surprise and novelty, we expected uniformly high scores, making such data insensitive as a potential predictor. In other cases, such as prior knowledge, we were uncertain what to ask as we prepared the survey a few days after the attack (e.g., while we were constructing the survey, there were still questions about who carried out the attacks). Survey 2 followed a similar format to Survey 1, except that two versions were constructed and distributed such that participants were asked, in equal numbers, for the flashbulb memory questions either: (a) How confident are you that your recollection is accurate (different questions assessed time, source, place, etc.), or (b) How accurately do you think that you will remember two years from now? Participants responded on a 1 – 5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating. Survey 3 was similar to Survey 2, although the time frame for the forecasting questions was changed from two years to seven years. Eight demographic questions concluded the surveys, probing, among other things, for residency.

Relevant questions in Survey 1

For the following questions, we'd like you to tell us about your Please indicate your response by marking the appropriate point on the scales provided. Note that you may indicate partial numbers (e.g. 3.5)

about the attack? about the attack? about the attack? about the attack? about the attack? about the attack? of waking hours you have spent doing the following:

A coding manual for Survey 1 was developed after reading through 50 surveys to determine the range and nature of the responses. It was written to be a stand-alone document that would provide complete and independent guidance to a coder. Table 3 contains examples of the coding scheme. If 50 similar responses were coded as “other,” then the coding scheme was revised and this “new” option was added. The coding was then redone for this question. Such recoding was done for 14% of the questions. The coding manuals can also be found on http://911memory.nyu.edu .

Examples of coding schemes

(Only code for response)

(0) not stated, (1) TV, (2) Radio, (3) E-mail/IM, (4) Phone call (includes Phone messages), (5) Visual sighting, (6) Word-of-mouth, (7) Sounds/Screams/Sirens, (8) Other (Enter response in addendum)

Inasmuch as more than one response was possible, coder had to indicate which of the following options were given on the survey.

Not stated, spouse/lover, child, sibling, other blood relative, parent-in-law, child-in-law, sibling-in-law, other in-law, close friend, acquaintance friend, colleague, roommate, teacher, student, classmate, neighbor, fellow commuter, stranger, government official (police, fire department, etc), medical personnel (doctor, nurse, EMT), alone, and other.

To assess interrater reliability of the coding, at the end of the coding process for each survey, we randomly selected 10% of the surveys to be dual-coded. We then calculated for each question either kappas or Cronbach alphas (whichever was appropriate) for each question. Reliability ratings were good for both the short-answer questions and open-ended questions, in that they all exceeded .80.

General Considerations

As Luminet, Curci, Marsh, Wessel, Constantin, Gencoz, et al. (2004) noted, a large sample and numerous comparisons can produce misleading significant differences. Following their guidelines, we set a significance level of .01. Moreover, we report Cohen's d ( Cohen, 1992 ), for which .20 is indicative of a small effect size, .50 a medium effect size, and .80 a large effect size.

We began by comparing the rate of forgetting a year after the September 11 attack with the rate of forgetting after three years.

Coding considerations

We devised separate coding schemes for flashbulb memories and event memories. Our coding scheme for measuring the consistency of flashbulb memories differed from the one employed in Neisser and Harsch (1992) . We developed this new procedure because we wanted not simply to determine whether responses were consistent over time, but also how they varied in content from one survey to the next. In our measure of consistency of flashbulb memories, we matched the coding for Survey 1 with the coding of the other two surveys, producing consistency measures that contrasted Survey 2 with Survey 1 (S12) or Survey 3 with Survey 1 (S13). Two responses were consistent if they were coded in the same manner, with a “1” assigned if the items were consistent and a “0” if they were inconsistent. As Table 2 indicates, we focused on six of the canonical features of Brown and Kulik (1977) . The six consistency scores were averaged to form an overall measure of consistency, ranging from 0 to 1.

The Neisser-Harsch coding scheme allowed for graded scoring, whereas our scheme did not. That is, in Neisser and Harsch (1992) , a “correct response” could have received a score of “2” or “1,” with “0” reserved for clearly incorrect responses. Our measure was dichotomous. If a participant had originally wrote “I was listening to the TV as I got dressed” and later remembered “I was watching TV,” Neisser and Harsch would have scored it a “1” out of a possible two. We would have scored it a “1” out of a possible one (see Table 2 ). Consequently, when the various scores are summed over canonical features, the relative ranking of two participants might differ according to the Neisser-Harcsh and our coding schemes. In order to explore the relation between these two scoring procedures, we asked two coders to follow the Neisser-Harsch scheme for 50 participants' responses to the three surveys. The coders evidenced a high degree of interrater reliability, kappa = .81. The correlations between our overall consistency scores and the consistency score based on the Neisser and Harsch scheme were significant (S12: r = .29, p < .05; S13: r = .38, p < .01). Although these significant correlations are not large, they suggest that the pattern of results we observed would also have been found if we had followed the procedure specified by Neisser and Harsch. In order to assess this claim, we redid the analyses presented below in the section on “forgetting and flashbulb memories” using the scores derived from the Neisser-Harsch coding scheme. We found the same pattern of results as the one reported in this section for the Neisser-Harsch coding (in all cases, p < .05).

As for our coding scheme for event memory, we compared the answers to our probes about the event itself with the correct answers, as determined by news accounts. As Table 2 indicates, we probed for five different sets of facts: (1) number of planes, (2) name of airlines, (3) location of attacks, (4) location of President Bush, and (5) order of major events. With respect to the questions about the number of planes and about where President Bush was at the time, if respondents were correct, they received a score of 1. Otherwise, they received a 0. For the question about the identity of the airlines, each correctly identified of the two involved airline carriers received a score of .5. Furthermore, for each incorrectly mentioned airline carrier, we subtracted .25 from the total score, with a maximum penalty of .5. To keep the range of scoring between 0 and 1, we changed any negative score to a zero. We scored (9) in a similar manner, but since there were three crash sites, each correct response received a score of .33 and incorrect answers were penalized at a rate of .16. For (11), we had listed six possible events for the respondent to order (see Table 2 ). We calculated the Spearman Rank correlation between the respondent's order and the actual order. A negative correlation was recorded as 0. The total accuracy score was the average score across the five probes. Here and elsewhere, we use the term accuracy when discussing event memory; consistency when considering flashbulb memories.

Forgetting and flashbulb memories

We were chiefly interested in determining whether the rate of forgetting increased or slowed over the long term, specifically, between Survey 1 and Survey 3. As Table 4 reveals, 11 months after the attack (when Survey 2 was administered), participants offered consistent answers about their flashbulb memories only 63% of the time, on average. The decay over the next two years (when Survey 3 was administered) was much smaller, with a proportional decline of 9%, or an average of 4.5% a year. Although the difference between the consistency between Surveys 1 and 2 and the consistency between Surveys 1 and 3 was significant, t (390) = 5.21, p < .01, the effect size is small ( d = .28), providing further support that the rate of forgetting had slowed after the first year.

Consistency and Confidence Ratings

	Survey 1 to 2		Survey 1 to 3

	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Overall Consistency	.63	.20	.57	.23
Emotional Consistency	.42	.49	.37	.48
Correlation of Emotion z-scores	.48	.40	.42	.39
Overall Confidence ratings	4.41	.64	4.25	.93

In order to contrast memory for emotional reactions on hearing the news about 9/11 with other features of flashbulb memories, we separately tabulated the consistency of responses across the three surveys to an open-ended question about the emotional reaction of the respondent upon hearing the news ( Table 2 , Question 4). For both Surveys 2 and 3, the overall measure of consistency was significantly greater than the measure of consistency associated with the open-ended probe of emotion: for S12, t (375) = 8.72, d = .56, p < .01, for S13, t (364) = 9.17, d = .53, p < .01 (see Table 4 ).

Participants' relatively poor recollections of their emotional state can also be detected in their responses to the six questions that specifically asked them to rate the intensity with which they felt sadness, anger, fear, confusion, frustration, and shock ( Table 2 , Questions 14 –20). We were not interested in participants' recollection of the specific rating score they gave: This would require them to remember both the level of their intensity and the scale they used to express this intensity across surveys. Rather we were interested in their memory of the relation among different emotions, for example, whether, after 9/11, they felt more sadness than shock. To explore these relations, we translated the emotional ratings an individual participant gave into z-scores, calculated separately for each survey and each participant. We calculated Pearson Product-Moment correlations between a participant's z-scores on Survey 1 and Survey 2 and between a participant's scores on Survey 1 and Survey 3. Table 4 contains the average correlation for these two calculations. The correlation between Survey 1 and Survey 3 was significantly less than between Survey 1 and Survey 2, t (390) = 2.90, p < .05, but the effect size was small, d = .15, indicating that most of participants' forgetting of their emotional responses happened between Survey 1 and Survey 2. For an individual respondent, the correlation would need to be greater than .73 to be significant at the .05 level. Only 31.3% of the respondents had a correlation greater than .73 between Surveys 1 and 2 and only 25.3% between Surveys 1 and 3.

Finally, although the flashbulb memories were not consistent across surveys, confidence ratings were high (see Table 4 ). As noted, this pattern of inconsistent memories accompanied by high confidence rating suggests that a trademark of flashbulb memories extends across long-term retention periods ( Talarico & Rubin, 2003 ). The decline in confidence between Survey 2 and Survey 3 was not significant ( p > .30).

The pattern of results we found did not arise because we repeatedly tested our participants. In order to determine whether the small decline in overall consistency we observed between Survey 2 and Survey 3 could be attributed to an effect of filling out Survey 2, we compared the overall consistency scores for the sample that filled out only Surveys 1 and 2 ( M = .63; SD = .20) with overall consistency scores for the sample that filled out only Surveys 1 and 3 ( M = .55; SD = .23). The difference between these two consistency scores represented a significant decline, t (458) = 3.44, p < .01, again with only a medium effect size, d = .32. In order to explore further the effect of multiple surveys, we also compared the overall consistency scores on Survey 3 of the three-surveys sample with (1) the overall consistency scores for participants who only filled out Surveys 1 and 3 and (2) the overall consistency scores for participants who only filled out Surveys 2 and 3 (with Survey 2 now serving as the baseline). These two comparisons were not significant ( p s > .40). In addition, there were no significant differences between the various samples in terms of age, religion, residency, political viewpoint, gender, or race/ethnicity ( p s > .30). In other words, the large decline we observed between Surveys 1 and 2 and the smaller decline that occurred between Surveys 2 and 3 is probably not a result of our retesting procedure.

Forgetting and event memory

Similar to the consistency measure for flashbulb memories, the overall measure of event memory accuracy showed a pattern of slowing in the rate of forgetting for facts about 9/11 between the first and third year (see Table 5 ). Examining the overall measure of accuracy, an ANOVA revealed a main effect for survey, F (1, 390) = 88.5, p < .001, η p 2 = .19. The drop in accuracy from Survey 1 to Survey 2 was significant, with a decline of 13% and a medium effect size, t (390) = 11.81, p < .001, d = .61. We did not find a significant decline in accuracy from Survey 2 to Survey 3, t (390) = .77, p = .45.

Facts accurately remembered: Means of the Accuracy Scores and Standard Deviations (in parentheses)

	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3
Number of planes	.94	.86	.81
Airline Names	.86 (.30)	.69 (.38)	.57 (.42)
Crash Sites	.93 (.19)	.92 (.20)	.88 (.25)
Order of Events	.88 (.13)	.89(.11)	.86 (.14)
Location of Bush	.87	.57	.81
Saw Moore's film	.87	.60	.91
Did not see film	.86	.54	.71
Overall	.88 (.14)	.77 (.21)	.78 (.23)

Notes. Data was either nominal or interval. Nominal data is reported as frequencies, interval data as proportions. The proportions are reported with standard deviations.

A closer examination of the responses to each probe revealed a more complicated story than suggested by overall accuracy scores. As Table 5 indicates, the pattern of forgetting depended on the information being sought. There was no significant difference between the accuracy on Surveys 1 and 2 for two probes: the crash sites and the order of the events ( p s > .50). For the number of the planes, there was only a significant decline from Survey 1 to Survey 2, using a McNemar test, χ 2 (1) = 14.75, p < .001.

The names of the airline carriers showed a continuous decline across surveys and large effect sizes: Survey 1 vs. Survey 2, t (390) = 7.72, p < .001, d = .50; Survey 2 vs. Survey 3, t (390) = 6.21, p < .001, d = .30. We account for this result in the General Discussion section. As for the probes about the location of President Bush at the time of the attack, again, using a McNemar test, there was a significant decline from Survey 1 to Survey 2, χ 2 (1) = 95.43, p < .001, as well as a significant improvement from Survey 2 to Survey 3, χ 2 (1) = 68.81, p < .001. We attribute the increase in accuracy about the location of President Bush from Survey 2 to Survey 3 to what we call the Michael Moore Effect (also see Greenberg, 2004 ). Michael Moore's film Fahrenheit 911 brought dramatic attention to President Bush's location by featuring his reading of The Pet Goat in a Florida elementary school. Table 5 contrasts the frequency of correct responses for the question about President Bush's location for those who reported that they did or did not see the Moore film. There was no significant difference between those who did or did not watch the Moore film on Surveys 1 and 2, but a significant difference emerged on Survey 3, χ 2 (1) = 24.41, p < .001. In other words, there was a marked overall improvement between Surveys 2 and 3, with those who saw the movie showing a greater improvement for Survey 3 (52%) than those who had not (32%). The improvement of those who did not see the Moore film may reflect the extensive discussion in the media the Moore film generated about the six-minute segment of President Bush's Pet Goat reading. The even more dramatic improvement of the Moore movie watchers may have been because of the film itself.

The only significant correlation between overall consistency and overall accuracy was between the overall consistency measure between Surveys 1 and 3 and the overall accuracy measure on Survey 3, r = .10, p < .05.

In sum, the present results suggest that the rate of forgetting slows between the first and third years for both flashbulb memories and event memories. This result suggests that the Schmolck et al. (2000) results may be an anomaly rather than a characteristic portrait of the pattern of forgetting of flashbulb memories over the long-term. Moreover, the lower emotion consistency than overall consistency scores suggest that people may forget their emotional reactions to hearing the news of the attack more quickly than other aspects of flashbulb memories, such as, where they were, who told them, and how they were told.

Are there different processes underlying the similar patterns of forgetting for flashbulb memories and event memories?

Even though we found similar patterns of forgetting for both flashbulb memories and event memories, this does not mean that the same factors are affecting remembering and forgetting in the two cases. We address this issue by examining whether the same factors predict consistency and accuracy and whether the pattern of types of changes in content over the long-term are the same for flashbulb memories and event memories. If differences in predictors and content changes can be found between flashbulb memories and event memories, then different processes probably underlie the retention (and forgetting) of these two memory types.

Predictors of consistency and accuracy

We focused on five putative predictors: two probes of consequentiality—residency and the combination of personal loss and inconvenience – as well as emotionality, media attention, and ensuing conversation. We also examined the location in which a participant learned of the attack as a predictor, but it had no affect on our measures of consistency, confidence, or accuracy, and is not discussed further. As to residency, we divided our sample into New Yorkers and non-New Yorkers. Respondents who resided outside the city borders were classified as non-New Yorkers. We explored whether participants who lived in downtown Manhattan (near Ground Zero) differed from other participants, inasmuch as other researchers have found differences between the downtown population and the larger population (Galea & Vlahov, 2004; Sharot, Martorella, Delgado, & Phelps, 2007 ). We failed to find any differences on our measures of consistency, accuracy, or confidence using this distinction ( p s > .20).

In assessing the effect of personal loss and/or inconvenience ( Table 2 , Questions 12 and 13), we counted concrete answers such as damage of home, loss of business, personal injury to self, friend, or relative, cancellation of school, and/or lack of food. 2 We did not include psychological distress as a form of loss or inconvenience (e.g., felt anxious, lost appetite), although good arguments could be made to do so. This classification scheme should not adversely skew our results. If anything, it should decrease the likelihood of finding differences that might arise because of “personal loss or inconvenience,” inasmuch as it excludes from the “loss” sample participants who reported suffering psychological distress. An individual was said to “experience personal loss or inconvenience” if they stated one “concrete” example. According to this criterion, 40.4% of the respondents who completed all three surveys experienced personal loss or inconvenience.

In assessing emotional intensity, the surveys asked participants to rate the intensity of their emotions on a 1 – 5 scale, with 5 being most intense (see Table 2 , Questions 14–20). Inasmuch as we were mainly interested in the effects of participants' initial emotional reaction, we focused our attention on the responses recorded on Survey 1, deriving two measures of overall intensity from Survey 1's six emotional probes: (1) the average of the six emotions we probed for and (2) the highest rating given to the six emotions. These two measures were significantly correlated ( r = .70, p < .001). Both scores yielded enough variability to permit further analysis.

Questions (21) and (22) in Table 2 probed for what might be treated as effects of rehearsal, in particular, the level of media attention and the degree of ensuing conversation. In addition, on Survey 1, we asked respondents to indicate how they spent their days following the attack, assigning a percentage to a list of activities (see Table 2 , Question 23). We summed the percentages assigned to activities (a), (c), (d), and (e) to obtain a measure of attention to the media. The percentage associated with (b) reflected the level of ensuing conversation. The correlations between these percentage scores and the 1–5 rating of media attention and ensuing conversation were significant, respectively, r = .29, p < .005, and r = .33, p < .005. We use the Likert-scale ratings of media attention and ensuing conversation in our analyses.

We found a clear difference in the extent to which our five putative predictors correlated with the level of consistency of flashbulb memories and with the degree of accuracy of event memories. None of the five putative predictors appeared to be related to the consistency of flashbulb memories, in either Survey 2 or Survey 3 (see Tables 6 and and7). 7 ). We did find a suggestion that the consistency ratings of non-New Yorkers were actually greater than those of New Yorkers, t (298) = 2.00, p < .05, d = .24, a difference also found in Pezdek (2003) . Inasmuch as our difference did not achieve the .01 level of significance, we remain cautious in interpreting this counterintuitive trend. As far as emotionality is concerned, we failed to find any correlations between consistency and emotionality when separately calculating correlations for each of the six emotions probed for in the surveys.

Mean consistency, confidence ratings, and accuracy as a function of residence and personal loss or inconvenience

	Residence		Personal loss/Inconvenience
			Full Sample		non-NYC		NYC

	Non-NYC	NYC	None	Present	None	Present	None	Present
Consistency
S12	.65	.60	.64	.61	.64	.65	.63	.65
S13	.60	.56	.57	.56	.59	.61	.56	.57
Confidence
S12	4.51	4.57	4.53	4.52	4.68	4.51	4.68	4.51
S13	4.21	4.32	4.23	4.27	4.18	4.30	4.11	4.27
Accuracy
S1	.88	.89	.87	.90	.87	.89	.87	.89
S2	.74	.81	.74	.81	.70	.82	.84	.89
S3	.75	.82	.77	.81	.72	.82	.75	.75

Correlations between measures of emotion, media attention, ensuing conversation, and measures of consistency, confidence, and accuracy.

	Emotions		Media			Conversation

	Average	Highest	S1	S2	S3	S1	S2	S3
Consistency
S12	−.10	.01	−.07	−.03	−.01	−.05	−.02	−.03
S13	.02	.04	−.03	.03	.02	−.07	−.05	.01
Confidence
S12	.08	.10	.08	.13	.10	.18	.18	.04
S13	.02	.08	.06	.04	.28	.09	.05	.20
Accuracy
S1	.05	.06	.19	.04	.08	.16	.02	.03
S2	.03	.07	.21	.11	.06	.19	.18	.02
S3	−.01	.06	.14	.07	.12	.20	.11	.12

On the other hand, four of the five factors were related to the accuracy of event memory: residency, personal loss/inconvenience, ensuing conversation, and media attention. A three-way ANOVA on the three dichotomous factors – with survey, residency, and personal loss/inconvenience as the dependent variables and overall accuracy as the independent variable—revealed main effects for residency, F (1, 296) = 4.39, p < .05, η p 2 = .15, and survey, F (1, 296) = 38.54, p < .001, η p 2 = .12, , as well as a two-way interaction between personal loss/inconvenience and residency, F (1, 296) = 7.22, p < .01, η p 2 = .15, and a three-way interaction between survey, residence, and personal loss/inconvenience, F (1, 296) = 4.89, p < .05, η p 2 = .02 (see Table 6 ). As in Pezdek (2003) , the main effect for residency indicates that New Yorkers' event memory was more accurate than that of non-New Yorkers. The three-way interaction could be attributed to the failure to find any significant differences for Survey 1 ( p > .20). The two-way interaction between personal loss/inconvenience and residency can be traced to the significant differences between those with or without personal loss/inconvenience that emerged for the non-New Yorker sample on Survey 2, t (193) = 3.51, p < .001, d = .66, and on Survey 3, t (193) = 2.65, p < .01, d = .44, a difference that did not appear in the New Yorker sample on either survey ( ps > .20).

The relation between media attention and ensuing conversation, on the one hand, and accuracy, on the other, is revealed through correlational analyses (see Table 7 ). Accuracy on Survey 1 was significantly correlated with media attention and ensuing conversation in the first two weeks, but not with media attention and ensuing conversation over the 11 months or three years that followed. Accuracy on Survey 2 was correlated with initial attention to the media and initial conversations, but also the media attention and ensuing conversation over the next 11 months. Accuracy on Survey 3 was correlated with media attention and ensuing conversation in the first few days and over the 35-month period, as well as with ensuing conversation over the first 11-months.

We explored whether media attention and ensuing conversation served as mediators of our observed relation between memory accuracy and residency on the one hand, and personal loss/inconvenience on the other. We devised a measure of the cumulative level of media attention and ensuing conversation for the period of time covered by a particular survey by calculating the average of the ratings given on that survey and any previous surveys. For instance, to calculate the level of media attention relevant to Survey 3, we averaged over the rating of media attention provided in Surveys 1, 2, and 3. (For clarity's sake, media attention will refer to the rating participants gave to the question about how much they attended to the media on a particular survey. Level of media attention will refer to the averaged measure.)

Table 8 contains the levels of media attention and ensuing conversation after two weeks, 11 months, and 35 months. New-Yorkers and non-New Yorkers and those with or without a personal loss or inconvenience attended to the media equally; that is, we found no significant main effects or interactions for level of media attention ( p s > .30). This result suggests that media attention may not be a mediating factor for residency and personal loss/inconvenience. We did, however, find differences for the level of ensuing conversation. In a three-way ANOVA between survey, residency and personal loss/inconvenience, there was a main effect for survey, F (1, 285) = 265.34, p < .01, η p 2 = .48, and a significant interaction between residency and personal loss/inconvenience, F (2, 285) = 3.77, p < .05, η p 2 = .04. Non-New Yorkers with a personal loss or inconvenience talked significantly more about the attack than non-New Yorkers without a personal loss or inconvenience, for all three time periods (2 weeks: t (192) = 1.97, p < .05, d = .28; 11 months: t (183) = 2.71, p < .01, d = .40; 35 months: t (183) = 2.92, p < .03, d = .43). On the other hand, there was no significant difference in the conversations of those New Yorkers with or without a personal loss or inconvenience ( p > .50). These results nicely reflect the pattern of results we found for the effects of personal loss/inconvenience and residency on accuracy.

Average level of media attention and ensuing conversations for New Yorkers and non-New Yorkers with or without personal loss or inconvenience (PL/IN)

	Media			Conversations

	S1	S12	S123	S1	S12	S123
New Yorkers
Without PL/IN	4.36	4.01	3.78	4.53	4.12	3.89
With PL/IN	4.52	4.07	3.85	4.47	4.11	3.80
Overall	4.46	4.05	3.83	4.49	4.12	3.83
Non-New Yorkers
Without PL/IN	4.27	3.82	3.65	4.25	3.74	3.27
With PL/IN	4.34	3.98	3.73	4.52	4.11	3.75
Overall	4.29	3.87	3.67	4.33	3.85	3.56

To determine whether the level of ensuing conversation does indeed mediate the effects of residency and personal loss/inconvenience on accuracy, we conducted three mediational analyses on the non-New Yorkers' data ( Baron &Kenny, 1986 ). The independent variable was personal loss or inconvenience (for non-New Yorkers), the dependent variable was accuracy, and the mediational variable was the level of ensuing conversation. We focused on the non New-Yorkers because that is where the level of ensuing conversation differed as a function of personal loss/inconvenience (see Figure 1 ). For the initial two-week period, the level of ensuing conversation failed to predict accuracy. Personal loss/inconvenience of non-New Yorkers also did not predict accuracy. Thus, basic assumptions underlying the mediational analysis were violated. According to Baron and Kenny, partial mediation is suggested if the regression coefficient associated with the path from personal loss to event memory decreases when the mediating variable is included in the regression. By this standard, we found evidence for partial mediation for the 11-months and 35-months periods. As indicated by the Sobel (1982) test, at 11 months and 35 months, the mediator of level of ensuing conversation carried the influence of personal loss to event memory (11 months: test statistic = 2.01. p < .05; 35 months: test statistic = 2.04, p < .05). These analyses suggest that what mattered was not particularly where participants lived at the time of the attack or what personal loss/inconvenience they experienced, but how much they talked about the event.

An external file that holds a picture, illustration, etc.
Object name is nihms-219091-f0001.jpg

A four step process with (1) regression coefficient from analysis with level of ensuing conversation as the dependent variable and personal loss as predictor, (2) regression coefficient from analysis with event memory as the dependent variable and level of ensuing conversation as the predictor, (3) regression coefficient from analysis with event memory as the dependent variable and personal loss as the predictor, and (4) regression coefficients from analysis with event memory as the dependent variable and both level of ensuing conversation and personal loss/inconvenience as predictors. These latter coefficients are in parentheses. Analysis for the 11-month period is in regular type. Analysis for 35-month period is in bold type. Partial mediation occurs if the regression coefficient for personal loss associated calculated in Step 4 is less than the related coefficient calculated in Step 3.

In addition to consistency and accuracy, another important variable in studies of flashbulb memories is confidence. Although our five putative predictors did not have an effect on consistency, both media attention and ensuing conversation affected the level of confidence with which participants held their flashbulb memories (see Table 6 and especially Table 7 ). For Survey 2, how much respondents attended to the media and talked about the attack in the first 11 months was significantly correlated with level of confidence. As for their confidence after 3 years, what mattered was how much respondents attended to the media and talked about the attack over the three years, not just in the first few days or the first year.

Changes in the content of memories over time

The analyses of putative predictors suggest that the similar patterns in the rate of forgetting we found for flashbulb and event memories involve different underlying processes. We can further buttress this claim by examining the changes in the content of memories over time: Different pattern of changes for flashbulb and event memories would suggest that different underlying processes are involved in their retention (and forgetting). First, consider those flashbulb memories that were consistent and those event memories that were accurate. Did, for instance, the consistent flashbulb memories on Survey 2 remain consistent on Survey 3? Did the accurate event memories on Survey 1 remain accurate on Survey 2? And did the accurate event memories on Survey 2 remain accurate on Survey 3? The result in Figure 2 suggests that answers to these questions are mostly positive. In examining flashbulb memories, we separated responses concerning “objective” canonical features -- place, informant, ongoing activity at the time of the reception, and the activity immediately following the reception – from the one feature involving emotional reaction. For objective features, a consistent response on Survey 2 led 82% of the time to a consistent response on Survey 3. The results for event memory are similar, with accurate response on Survey 1 remaining accurate on Survey 2 and accurate responses on Survey 2 remaining accurate on Survey 3. The one exception to this pattern is the memories participants reported for their initial emotional reaction. A consistent response on Survey 2 remained consistent on Survey 3 only 44% of the time. This result is in line with our finding that the relative rated strength of different emotions changed across surveys (correlation of emotion z-scores, Table 4 ).

An external file that holds a picture, illustration, etc.
Object name is nihms-219091-f0002.jpg

For flashbulb memories, the proportion of consistent responses on Survey 2 that remained consistent on Survey 3 (as indicated by consistency/accuracy ), as well as the proportion of inconsistent responses on Survey 2 corrected , repeated , or given an other response on Survey 3. For event memory, the proportion of accurate responses on Survey 1 accurate on Survey 2 (S2: consistency/accuracy ), the proportion of accurate responses on Survey 2 that were also accurate on Survey 3 (S3: consistency/accuracy ), the proportion of inaccurate responses on Survey 1 corrected , repeated or given an other response on Survey 2, and the proportion of inaccurate responses on Survey 2 corrected , repeated or given an other response on Survey 3. Standard deviations are expressed in error bars.

What about changes to inconsistent/inaccurate responses from one survey to the next? Inconsistent/inaccurate responses in one survey could be followed up in the next survey in at least three ways: through correction, repetition, or alteration. For instance, an inconsistent response on Survey 2 (based on the responses on Survey 1) could be:

(1) Corrected in Survey 3. This is the proportion of inconsistent responses in Survey 2 revised in Survey 3 to be consistent with what appeared in Survey 1 (the corrected response proportion ),
(2) Repeated in Survey 3. This is the proportion of inconsistent responses in Survey 2 (when compared to Survey 1) that were repeated in Survey 3 ( the repeated response proportion ),
(3) Altered in Survey 3 to something other than the response on Survey 1. This is the proportion of inconsistent responses in Survey 2 remembered differently in both Surveys 1 and 3 (the other response proportion ).

In exploring these three options for flashbulb memories and their analogs for event memories, we did not include in our analyses those instances in which participants failed to answer a probe.

Is the frequency of one of these types of change larger than the frequencies associated with the other types? Does the pattern of frequency distribution differ for flashbulb and event memories? For objective features of flashbulb memories, participants tended to repeat their inconsistencies. For these features, there were significant differences between the proportion of repeated responses and the proportion of other responses , as well as between the proportion of repeated responses and corrected responses (both t -tests, p < .001). Such repetitions are concordant with a slowing rate of forgetting between Survey 2 and Survey 3. Moreover, the presence of repetitions suggests that a stable memory is forming after a year delay, with stories about the circumstances in which one learned of the terrorist attack remaining the same over the long-term, even if they are full of inconsistencies with the initial report. In contrast, participants were inclined to report remembering an emotion not reported in their original survey or in Survey 2 over either correcting or repeating a previous response (all t -tests, p < .01). This finding, again, is in line with our report of poor emotional memory.

The changes observed for event memories differed from what we observed for flashbulb memories, with event memories corrected rather than repeated from one survey to the next. We can determine the change in the content of event memories from Surveys 1 to 2 (indicated as S2 on Figure 2 ) and from Surveys 2 to 3 (indicated as S3 in Figure 2 ). We did not include the probe that asked participants to order the events because of the complexities arising when comparing both the degree of change and the nature of this change. For questions involving multiple answers (such as the name of crash sites), we examined each answer separately. As illustrated in Figure 2 , corrected responses were more common than either repeated or other responses, for both Surveys 2 and 3. Moreover, the proportions of corrected responses for event memories were greater on Surveys 2 and 3 than comparable figures for flashbulb memories. (All t-tests were significant at levels less than .005.) As for the uncorrected, inaccurate responses, on Survey 2, participants were as likely to say something else than repeat the errors they made on Survey 1. Survey 3 differed from Survey 2, in that for Survey 3, repeated responses were significantly greater than other responses, t (390) = 3.74, p < .001, d = .38. This latter finding suggests that, like flashbulb memories, a stable event memory may be emerging somewhere between the first and third year. Importantly, though, the content of this stable memory differs from the content of flashbulb memories: Event memories are converging on an accurate rendering of the past, whereas flashbulb memories are converging on personally accepted and confidently held, even if inconsistent, renderings. This difference strengthens the interpretation we advanced when considering the predictor data: That the retention (and forgetting) of flashbulb and event memories over the long-term involves different processes.

In this paper, we explored the long-term retention of flashbulb memories and the associated event memories. We investigated both the rate of forgetting and how different aspects of the memories might be forgotten at different rates, as well as the factors associated with the retention of both flashbulb memories and event memories.

Forgetting over the long-term

In the present study, the rate of forgetting of flashbulb memories in the first year was similar to that observed in other flashbulb memory studies, but, importantly, this rate of forgetting slowed substantially between the first and third year. This converges with other studies demonstrating a slowing rate of forgetting between the first and third years ( Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005 ; Bohannon & Symons, 1992 ). The current study, however, has the advantage of using a test-retest paradigm. The present study brings into question the generality of the results of Schmolck et al (2002), who found an increased rate of forgetting between the first and third years using a similar test-retest paradigm. Horn (2001) has also questioned the generality of Schmock et al., arguing that the steep forgetting Schmolck et al. observed between the fifteen-month and the thirty-second month tests may have been due to interference created by the announcement of the verdict of Simpson's civil trial in the sixteenth month. A similar confound probably does not arise for flashbulb memories of the terrorist attack of 9/11, the Challenger explosion, or the German invasion and withdrawal inasmuch as nothing so similar occurred during the retention periods of the respective studies for their respective samples.

When considered in conjunction with the other studies on long-term retention of flashbulb memories, then, the present study suggests that a slowing in the rate of forgetting after the first year is typical of flashbulb memories. In doing so, it supports and extends the findings of Talarico and Rubin (2003) , that is, that the rate of forgetting follows a similar pattern as found for ordinary autobiographical memories. The rate of forgetting found in the present study was similar to that found in most diary studies: 20% or more the first year and between 5% to 10% thereafter.

Our results also suggest that different aspects of the flashbulb memories may be forgotten at different rates. Memory for emotions can be quite unreliable ( Levine et al., 2006 ). Here we show that, despite the salience of the emotional reaction to flashbulb events such as 9/11, the memories of these emotional reactions tend to be forgotten more quickly than other aspects of the flashbulb memory, even over the long-term. The reason for this rapid forgetting needs to be further explored.

Our event memory results differ from those reported by Bohannon and Symons (1992) for the Challenger explosion, the only flashbulb memory study that examined event memory after three years. Bohannon and Symons found that forgetting continued to occur between the first and third year at approximately the same rate as it did in the first year, basing their conclusion on cross-sectional data, whereas we found a decline in the rate of forgetting when we examined longitudinal data, a finding consistent with work on memory for facts ( Bahrick, 1983 , 1984 ; Bahrick, Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975 ). We explain this difference across studies below.

Do different factors influence flashbulb and event memories?

Although the pattern in the rate of forgetting was the same for flashbulb memories and event memories over a three-year period, subsequent analyses of our data suggested that different processes may underlie these similar patterns. In particular, we failed to find any relation between five predictors (residency, personal loss or inconvenience, emotionality, media attention, and ensuing conversation) and flashbulb memories, but found significant relations for four of the five (all but emotionality) predictors for event memories. Moreover, we found that inconsistent flashbulb memories reported on one survey were repeated on the next survey, whereas inaccurate event memories tended to be corrected on the next survey. These data were not at ceiling, limited in variability, nor specific to the coding scheme we employed.

Other studies of flashbulb memories of 9/11 using a test-retest procedure reported similar failures to find predictors for consistency ( Curci & Luminet, 2006 ; Talarico & Rubin, 2003 ). It may be that various factors interact differently for different people. For example, some people may react emotionally and rehearse a flashbulb memory, whereas others may react emotionally and avoid rehearsing the memory. There could be enough variability in the population in the way various factors combine that comparing the effect of one of them on consistency across a population would be difficult. As a result, researchers might find low correlations for each factor in their flashbulb memory studies, even if in more controlled settings in which each factor is isolated they might find the predicted correlation. Luminet, Curci, and their colleagues have attempted to circumvent this problem by using structural equation modeling. Even this methodological advance has failed to produce uniform results (see Luminet, 2008 , for a review).

Memory practices

Our finding that the levels of media attention and ensuing conversation are correlated with accuracy of event memories suggests these two variables should figure critically in any account of retention of event memories. Both of these activities increase the degree to which the event memory is rehearsed ( Neisser, Winograd, Bergman, Schreiber, Palmer, & Weldon, 1996 ). In keeping with recent calls for a study of cultural products ( Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008 ) and for viewing the mind as extended ( Clark & Chalmers, 1998 ; Wilson, 2004 ), we also want to focus on the activity itself – the media attention or the ensuing conversation. Both media attention and ensuing conversation could be considered memory practices of a community , which refers to the way in which a community intentionally or unintentionally preserves its past ( Bourdieu, 1977 ; for reviews, see Hirst & Manier, 2008 ; Hirst & Meksin, 2008 ; Zerubavel, 1997 ). For many social scientists, memorials and commemorations are the prototypical memory practices ( Gillis, 1994 ). The practices of mass media in covering public, emotionally charged events and even the conversations people have about the event have also been treated as memory practices ( Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995 ; Dayan & Katz, 1992 ; Hirst & Manier, 2008 ; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008 ; Hoskins, 2007 ; Johnson, 2007 ). For ensuing conversation, people may be inclined to share memories of emotionally intense events, in part because they believe that doing so will help them deal with the emotion ( Rimé, 2007a , 2007b ). They may also discuss such events because of a social mandate. When meeting someone who has lost a loved one, some conversational acknowledgment of the death is mandatory. A similar social mandate may hold for public, emotionally charged events such as 9/11 ( Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003 ). As we saw, the practice of ensuing conversation can vary across communities: The level of conversation in New York, for instance, differed from the level of non-New Yorkers. Within a community, however, memory practices, such as conversations and media attention, appeared to be more uniform.

A social interactional approach suggests that a key to the difference between our results for event memory and those of Bohannon and Symons (1992) may lie in the memory practices surrounding 9/11 and the Challenger explosion. Although we cannot contrast the amount of conversation that followed the Challenger explosion with what followed the 9/11 attack, we can examine attention to the media, at least indirectly, by looking at media coverage (see Shapiro, 2006 , for a similar analysis). Figure 3 plots the accuracy of event memory over a three-year period and a rough estimate of the amount of media coverage of the attack over the same time period. 3 We estimated media coverage by using the New York Times as a reference text on Lexus-Nexus to determine the number of articles in the Times in which the phrase “September 11” or the conjunction of “Challenger” and “explosion” appeared. We then calculated the proportion of mentions over the number of days in the targeted period. To facilitate comparison, we recalibrated both the accuracy scores and the media proportions to z-scores calculated across the three time periods. As Figure 3 indicates, the pattern of forgetting Bohannon and Symons and we observed for event memory nicely mirrors the level of media attention. We found a similar pattern when we used The Boston Globe and U.S. News and World Report as reference texts in Lexus-Nexus.

An external file that holds a picture, illustration, etc.
Object name is nihms-219091-f0003.jpg

Relation between media coverage and memory accuracy for facts about the Challenger Explosion and the Terrorist Attack of September 11. Proportions of correctly remembered details were converted into z-scores, as were the frequencies with which an event was covered in the New York Times .

Memory practices might also help account for the differences in changes in content we found for both flashbulb memories and event memories. Event memories tended to be corrected over time. Such correction is what one would expect if a community is constantly retelling the story of the attack. Unlike the retellings, by an individual, which may be subject to cumulative source monitoring failures (e.g., Johnson, 2006 ), a community retelling, especially in the media, tends to be fact-checked, and, ceteris paribus , is presumed to be “correct.” That is, the media can serve a social/cultural reality monitoring function ( Johnson, 2007 ). The Michael Moore effect is a particularly vivid example of the ability of the media to correct inaccurate memories. The one exception to this general trend toward correction appears to be participants' memory for the names of the involved airlines. Memory for this fact continued to decline over the three-year period. This decline could also be explained by referring to community memory practices, if the names of airlines figured less critically in accounts of the 9/11 attack than, for instance, the number of planes. One could tell the story of 9/11 without mentioning the name of the airlines, but it would be much more difficult to avoid mentioning the locations of the attack or the number of planes involved. Films, such as United 93 , came out after the last survey.

Whereas the memory practices of a community no doubt shaped the content of event memories of 9/11, there is little reason to expect that they should have a similar effect on flashbulb memories of 9/11. The memory practice of a community might lead its members to undertake similar mnemonic processing when it comes to memories for events, but, as we noted, members are more likely to be left to their own devises when it comes to flashbulb memories. Moreover, inasmuch as flashbulb memories are unique, a community as a whole rarely retells a single member's flashbulb memory across the community. Even when sharing of a flashbulb memory does occur in a small group, there may be no way to verify the accuracy of many details of a reported memory. Consequently, at least for objective features of flashbulb memories, the errors made at the end of the first year tended to persist into the third year. If a person falsely remembered that she was at work the first year, she tended to continue to remember (falsely) into the third year that she was at work. There may be nothing to lead her to suspect otherwise.

In emphasizing the role of public memory practices to account for the shape of the forgetting of event memories, we have sought to understand what people remember and do not remember, not only in terms of individual internal cognitive processes, but also in terms of community activities. Both approaches are necessary to account for memory for public events. The different forgetting curves observed for event memories can be traced to the way the different events were covered by the media. Moreover, continuing media coverage can account for the corrections that took place over time with event memory. Clearly, an understanding of memories for public events such as the terrorist attack of 9/11 cannot be achieved by pointing only to internal cognitive processes or to social influences on memory, but to the interaction between the two.

Acknowledgments

We thank the many student coders without whom this research project would have been impossible, as well as Brett Sedgewick, who assisted with the supervision of this project.

Support from the James S. McDonnell Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health, grant R01-MH0066972, is gratefully acknowledged.

Publisher's Disclaimer: The following manuscript is the final accepted manuscript. It has not been subjected to the final copyediting, fact-checking, and proofreading required for formal publication. It is not the definitive, publisher-authenticated version. The American Psychological Association and its Council of Editors disclaim any responsibility or liabilities for errors or omissions of this manuscript version, any version derived from this manuscript by NIH, or other third parties. The published version is available at www.apa.org/pubs/journals/xge

1 There is much terminological confusion in the literature. First, the term flashbulb memory could be construed as implying an accurate representation of the circumstances in which one learned of the emotionally charged public event. Although we use this term here, we do not mean to imply that the memories are accurate. Second, as used in the flashbulb memory literature, the phrase event memories is rarely qualified, but it is not meant to refer to all event memories, only those that involve events that elicit flashbulb memories. One should more accurately refer to memories for flashbulb events . However, the phrase can, with repetition, become awkward and hence we adopt the convention of referring to memories for flashbulb events simply as event memories .

2 To be specific, we excluded from our classification of “experiencing personal loss or inconvenience,” columns 107, 108, 113–115, 117–121, and 124–126, using the column numbers from the coding manual for Survey 1.

3 Bohannon and Symons (1992) and we tested participants at slightly different delays. Hence, we discuss testing period rather specific testing delays.

Assmann J, Czaplicka J. Collective memory and collective identity. New German Critique. 1995; 65 :125–133. [ Google Scholar ]
Bahrick HP. The cognitive map of a city – 50 years of learning and memory. In: Bower G, editor. The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory. Vol 17. Academic Press; New York: 1983. pp. 125–163. [ Google Scholar ]
Bahrick HP. Semantic memory content in permastore: Fifty years of memory for Spanish learned in school. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 1984; 113 :1–29. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Bahrick HP, Bahrick PO, Wittlinger RP. Fifty years of memory for names and faces: A cross-sectional study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 1975; 104 :54–75. [ Google Scholar ]
Baron RM, Kenny DA. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Social and Personality Psychology. 1986; 51 :1173–1182. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Baruch Y. Response rate in academic studies – A comparative analysis. Human relations. 1999; 52 :421–439. [ Google Scholar ]
Belli RF, Schuman H, Jackson B. Autobiographical misremembering: John Dean is not alone. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 1997; 11 :187–209. [ Google Scholar ]
Berntsen D. Flashbulb memories and social identity. In: Luminet O, Curci A, Conway M, editors. Flashbulb memories: New issues and new perspectives. Psychology Press; 2008. in press. [ Google Scholar ]
Berntsen D, Thomsen DK. Personal memories for remote historical events: Accuracy and clarity of flashbulb memories related to World War II. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 2005; 134 :242–257. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Bohannon JN., III Flashbulb memories for the space shuttle disaster: A tale of two theories. Cognition. 1988; 29 :179–196. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Bohannon JN, III, Symons VL. Flashbulb memories: Confidence, consistency, and quantity. In: Winograd E, Neisser U, editors. Affect and accuracy in recall. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge: 1992. pp. 65–90. [ Google Scholar ]
Bourdieu P. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge University Press; New York: 1977. [ Google Scholar ]
Brown R, Kulik J. Flashbulb memories. Cognition. 1977; 5 :73–79. [ Google Scholar ]
Bruner J. Acts of Meaning. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA: 1990. [ Google Scholar ]
Budson AE, Simons JS, Sullivan AL, Beier JS, Solomon PR, Scinto LF, Daffner KR, Schacter DL. Neuropsychology. 2004; 18 :315–327. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Budson AE, Simons JS, Waring JD, Sullivan AL, Hussoin T, Schacter DL. Memory for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on year later in patients with Alzheimer's disease, patients with mild cognitive impairment, and healthy older adults. Cortex. 2007; 43 :875–888. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Clark A, Chalmers D. The extended mind. Analysis. 1998; 58 :10–23. [ Google Scholar ]
Cohen A power primer. Psychological Bulletin. 1992; 113 :155–159. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Conway MA, Pleydell-Pearce CW. The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review. 2000; 107 :261–288. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Curci A, Luminet O. Follow-up of a cross-national comparison of flashbulb and event memory for the September 11 th attacks. Memory. 2006; 14 :329–344. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Curci A, Luminet O, Finkenauer C, Gisle L. Flashbulb memories in social groups: A comparative test-retest study of the memory of French President Mitterand's death in a French and a Belgian group. Memory. 2001; 9 :81–101. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Davidson PSR, Cook SP, Glisky EL. Flashbulb memories for September 11 th can be preserved in older adults. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition. 2006; 13 :196–206. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Dayan D, Katz E. Media events: The live broadcasting history. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA: 1992. [ Google Scholar ]
Ebbinghaus H. In: Memory; a contribution to experimental psychology. Ruger HA, Bussenius CE, translators. Dover; New York: 1913/1964. Original work published in 1913. [ Google Scholar ]
Echterhoff G, Hirst W. Thinking about memory for everyday and shocking events: Do people use ease-of-rtrieval cues in memory judgments? Memory & Cognition. 2006; 34 :763–775. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Gillis JR. Commemorations: The politics of national identity. Princeton University Press; Princeton, N.J.: 1994. [ Google Scholar ]
Greenberg DL. President Bush's false `flashbulb' memory of 9/11/01. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2004; 18 :363–370. [ Google Scholar ]
Hirst W, Echterhoff G. Creating shared memories in conversation: Towards a psychology of collective memory. Social Research. 2008; 75 :1071–1108. [ Google Scholar ]
Hirst W, Manier D. Towards a psychology of collective memory. Memory. 2008; 16 :183–200. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Hirst W, Meksin R. A social-interactional approach to the retention of collective memories of flashbulb events. In: Luminet O, Curci A, Conway M, editors. Flashbulb memories: New issues and new perspectives. Psychology Press; 2008. in press. [ Google Scholar ]
Horn DB. Confounding the effects of delay and interference on memory distortion: Commentary on Schmolck, Buffalo, and Squire. Psychological Science. 2001; 12 :180. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Hoskins A. Media and memory. Routledge; New York: 2007. [ Google Scholar ]
Johnson MK. Memory and reality. American Psychologist. 2006; 61 :760–771. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Johnson MK. Reality monitoring and the media. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2007; 21 :981–993. [ Google Scholar ]
Kvavilashvili L, Mirani J, Schlagman S, Kornbrot DE. Comparing flashbulb memories of September 11 and the death of Princess Diana: Effect of time delays and nationality. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2003; 17 :1017–1031. [ Google Scholar ]
Levine LJ, Prohaska V, Burgess SL, Rice JA, Laulhere RM. Remembering past emotions: the role of current appraisals. Cognition and Emotions. 2001; 15 :292–417. [ Google Scholar ]
Levine LJ, Safer MA, Lench HC. Remembering and misremembering emotions. In: Sanna LJ, Chang EC, editors. Judgments of time: The interplay of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Oxford University Press; NY: 2006. pp. 271–290. [ Google Scholar ]
Levine LJ, Whalen CK, Henker B, Jamner LD. Looking back on September 11, 2001: Appraised impact and memory for emotions in adolescents and adults. Journal of Adolescent Research. 2005; 20 :497–523. [ Google Scholar ]
Linton M. Ways of searching and the contents of memory. In: Rubin DC, editor. Autobiographical memory. Cambridge University Press; NY: 1986. pp. 50–67. [ Google Scholar ]
Luminet O. Models for the formation of flashbulb memories. In: Luminet O, Curci A, Conway M, editors. Flashbulb memories: New issues and new perspectives. Psychology Press; 2008. in press. [ Google Scholar ]
Luminet O, Curci A, Conway M, editors. Flashbulb memories: New issues and new perspectives. Psychology Press; 2008. in press. [ Google Scholar ]
Luminet O, Curci A, Marsh E, Wessel I, Constantin T, Gencoz F. The cognitive, emotional, and social impacts of the September 11 attacks: Group differences in memory for the reception context and the determinants of flashbulb memory. The Journal of General Psychology. 2004; 17 :171–181. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
McCloskey M, Wible CG, Cohen NJ. Is there a special flashbulb-memory mechanism? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 1988; 117 :171–181. [ Google Scholar ]
Mehl M, Pennebaker JW. The social dynamics of a cultural upheaval: Social interactions surrounding September 11, 2001. Psychological Science. 2003; 14 :579–585. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Morling B, Lamoreaux M. Measuring culture outside the head: A meta-analysis of individual-collectivism in cultural products. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 2008; 12 :199–221. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Neisser U. Snapshots or benchmarks? In: Neisser U, editor. Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts. W. H. Freeman & Company; San Francisco: 1982. pp. 43–48. [ Google Scholar ]
Neisser U, Harsh N. Phantom flashbulbs: False recollections of hearing the news about Challenger . In: Winograd E, Neisser U, editors. Affect and accuracy in recall. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge: 1992. pp. 9–31. [ Google Scholar ]
Neisser U, Winograd E, Bergman ET, Schreiber CA, Palmer SE, Weldon MS. Remembering the earthquake: Direct experience vs. hearing the news. Memory. 1996; 4 :337–357. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Olick J, Robbins J. Social memory studies: From “collective memory” to the historical sociology of mnemonic practices. Annual Review of Sociology. 1998; 24 :105–140. [ Google Scholar ]
Pezdek K. Event memory and autobiographical memory for events of September 11, 2001. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2003; 17 :1033–1045. [ Google Scholar ]
Qin J, Mitchell KJ, Johnson MK, Krystal JH, Southwick SM, Rasmusson AM, Allen ES. Reactions to and memories for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in adults with posttraumatic stress disorder. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2003; 17 :1081–1097. [ Google Scholar ]
Rimé B. The social sharing of emotion as an interface between individual and collective processes in the construction of emotional climates. Journal of Social Issues. 2007a; 63 :307–322. [ Google Scholar ]
Rimé B. Interpersonal emotion regulation. In: Gross JJ, editor. Handbook of emotion regulation. Guilford Press; New York: 2007b. pp. 446–485. [ Google Scholar ]
Rubin DC. Autobiographical memory tasks in cognitive research. In: Wenzel A, Rubin DC, editors. Cognitive methods and their application to clinical research. American Psychological Association; Washington, D.C.: 2005. pp. 219–241. [ Google Scholar ]
Schmidt SR. Autobiographical memories of the September 11 th attacks: Reconstructive errors and emotional impairment of memory. Memory & Cognition. 2004; 32 :443–454. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Schmolck H, Buffalo EA, Squire LR. Memory distortions develop over time: Recollections of the O.J. Simpson trial verdict after 15 and 32 months. Psychological Science. 2000; 11 :39–45. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Shapiro LR. Remembering September 11 th : The role of retention interval and rehearsal on flashbulb and event memory. Memory. 2006; 14 :129–147. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Sharot T, Martorella EA, Delgado MR, Phelps EA. How personal experience modulates the neural circuitry of memories of September 11. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. 2007; 104 :389–394. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Smith MC, Bibi U, Sheard DE. Evidence for the differential impact of time and emotion on personal and event memories for September 11, 2001. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2003; 17 :1047–1055. [ Google Scholar ]
Sobel ME. Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation models. In: Leinhart S, editor. Sociological methodology 1982. Jossey-Bass; San Francisco: 1982. pp. 290–312. [ Google Scholar ]
Talarico JM, Rubin DC. Confidence, not consistency, characterizes flashbulb memories. Psychological Science. 2003; 14 :455–461. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Talarico JM, Rubin DC. Flashbulb memories result from ordinary memory processes and extraordinary event characteristics. In: Luminet O, Curci A, Conway M, editors. Flashbulb memories: New issues and new perspectives. Psychology Press; 2008. in press. [ Google Scholar ]
Tekcan A, Berivan E, Gülgöz S, Er N. Autobiographical and event memory for 9/11: Changes across one year. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 2003; 17 :1057–1066. [ Google Scholar ]
Wagenaar WA. My memory: A study of autobiographical memory over six years. Cognitive Psychology. 1986; 18 :225–252. [ Google Scholar ]
Weaver CA. Do you need a “flash” to form a flashbulb memory? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 1993; 122 :39–46. [ Google Scholar ]
Wilson RA. Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences. Cambridge University Press; New York: 2004. [ Google Scholar ]
Winningham RG, Hyman IE, Dinnel DL. Flashbulb memories? The effects of when the initial memory report was obtained. Memory. 2000; 8 :209–216. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
Zerubavel E. Social mindscapes: An invitation to cognitive psychology. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA: 1997. [ Google Scholar ]

This page has been archived and is no longer being updated regularly.

For those with a personal stake, flashbulb memories burn bright

May 2005, Vol 36, No. 5

Print version: page 10

Danes with ties to the World War II Danish resistance movement have far more vivid, detailed and accurate memories of occupation and liberation than their countrymen who were unaffiliated with the resistance movement, according to a study in the May Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (Vol. 134, No. 2).

Furthermore, the memories of most of the study's participants were far more accurate than results of studies of short-range flashbulb memory would have predicted, according to lead researcher Dorthe Berntsen, PhD, of the University of Aarhus in Denmark.

The term "flashbulb memory" describes the vivid recall of time, place and other personal contextual information during a stressful, emotional and often historical event, like 9/11 or the German occupation and subsequent liberation of Denmark.

Past studies have traditionally tested short-range flashbulb memory, assessing participants immediately after a monumental event and then retested them after various time periods, such as one year. Most such studies have found that memory distorts emotions, personal involvement and external details, like the weather, quickly over time.

To see if having a personal stake would boost flashbulb memory accuracy, Berntsen and her Aarhus colleague Dorthe K. Thomsen, PhD, had 145 Danes ages 72 to 89, including 66 who had ties to the resistance movement, fill out a questionnaire asking for detailed descriptions of their memories of four different war-related events--the German invasion, the liberation, their most positive personal memory and their most negative personal memory.

To test the accuracy of participants' recall, Berntsen and Thomsen had both the older participants and a control group of younger participants, ages 20 to 60, fill out a questionnaire on factual details that could be corroborated against historical data, such as the weather, day of the week or the time of the day that the radio announced the liberation.

Danes who had lived through World War II performed five times better than the control group in recalling events related to the invasion and liberation. Moreover, the Danes affiliated with the resistance movement had significantly higher scores than the unaffiliated Danes on all areas of recall, which the authors say suggests that their strong recollections are due to a combination of "permastore"--a long period of stable retention after the initial memory decline--and an effect of social identity on personal memory.

The findings suggest that one's emotional intensity at the time of the event and subsequent rehearsal are critical to recalling the memory accurately, says Berntsen, adding that the results also imply that studies using relatively short test delays do not predict performance after several decades.

However, Berntsen notes that even flashbulb memories have flaws.

"The participants still made mistakes," she says. "But their memories were far more accurate than we would expect."

Berntsen plans to expand the study's methodology to further study flashbulb memories for remote historical events.

--Z. STAMBOR

Letters to the Editor

Send us a letter

IMAGES

What Are Flashbulb Memories?
One theory: Flashbulb Memory One Cognitive Process: Memory
PPT
Flashbulb Memories
PPT
PPT

COMMENTS

PSY367 Flashcards
Study with Quizlet and memorize flashcards containing terms like A lesson to be learned from the research on flashbulb memories is that _____., Experiments that argue against a special flashbulb memory mechanism find that as time increases since the occurrence of the flashbulb event, participants _____., According to the approach to memory, what people report as memories is based on what ...
Flashbulb Memory: What to Know About Vivid Recall
But research has found that flashbulb memories may not be as accurate as the people who experience them believe them to be. For example, a group of researchers looked at flashbulb memories after the September 11th attacks. The researchers were able to look at how people recalled these events over a ten year period to see how accurate the ...
Flashbulb Memories
The term flashbulb memories refers only to those autobiographical memories that involve the circumstances in which one learned of a public event. ... A substantial body of research has assessed Brown and Kulik's (1977) ... A correlation between measures of consequentiality and consistency is not always found (e.g., Hirst et al., ...
Flashbulb Memories: How Emotion Influences Cognition
Flashbulb memories are a fascinating but still unclear phenomenon. While research suggests that flashbulb memories 1) have a physiological basis, 2) include several factors such as event and ...
Flashbulb Memory In Psychology: Definition & Examples
Key Takeaways. A flashbulb memory is a highly vivid and detailed 'snapshot' of a moment in which a consequential, surprising, and emotionally arousing piece of news was learned. Roger Brown and James Kulik introduced the term 'flashbulb memory' in 1977 in their study of individuals' ability to recall consequential and surprising events.
Flashbulb Memories
R01 MH066972/MH/NIMH NIH HHS/United States. We review and analyze the key theories, debates, findings, and omissions of the existing literature on flashbulb memories (FBMs), including what factors affect their formation, retention, and degree of confidence. We argue that FBMs do not require special memory mechanisms and are best characterized ….
New insights into the formation and duration of flashbulb memories
The current research examined flashbulb memories for a loved one's medical diagnosis, focusing on individual and situational factors associated with memory development and endurance over time. ... Using two independent measures, the Flashbulb Memory Checklist and the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire, we found that a majority of diagnosis ...
New insights into the formation and duration of flashbulb memories
Flashbulb memories are vivid and salient memories for the moment one hears about a surprising, emotional, and significant event. The current research examined flashbulb memories for a loved one's medical diagnosis, focusing on individual and situational factors associated with memory development and endurance over time. An online survey collected memory narratives and subjective ratings from ...
Flashbulb Memories
Abstract. We review and analyze the key theories, debates, findings, and omissions of the existing literature on flashbulb memories (FBMs), including what factors affect their formation, retention, and degree of confidence. We argue that FBMs do not require special memory mechanisms and are best characterized as involving both forgetting and ...
Flashbulb memory: referring back to Brown and Kulik's definition
To address this issue, we refer back to Brown and Kulik's definition of FBM as a snapshot of the reception context of an important public news and propose a method to identify the contents of this snapshot. Although Brown and Kulik found that the majority of FBM's contents could be classified within six canonical categories (CCs), here we ...
Distinct processes shape flashbulb and event memories
Differences between positive and negative flashbulb memories have also been found, but the precise nature of these differences has varied from study to study. ... Thus, we assessed people's recall of the determinants of event and flashbulb memories. In future research, it would be interesting to test whether the model can be replicated when ...
9/11 memories reveal how flashbulb memories are made in the brain
These memories - flashbulb or not - are formed through a special mental route which involves the amygdala. And Sharot's brain scans turned up something more unexpected. When the Downtown ...
What Are Flashbulb Memories?
Flashbulb memories are defined as those related to learning about some shocking event, and a number of studies have compared these memories with "event memories" for the objective details of the occurrence (e.g., that there were four airplanes involved in the 9/11 attack). One such investigation examined flashbulb memories for the 9/11 ...
Flashbulb memory
A flashbulb memory is a vivid, long-lasting memory about a surprising or shocking event that has happened in the past. [1] [2]The term "flashbulb memory" suggests the surprise, indiscriminate illumination, detail, and brevity of a photograph; however, flashbulb memories are only somewhat indiscriminate and are far from complete. [2] Evidence has shown that although people are highly confident ...
Flashbulb Memory
Abstract. Flashbulb memories are long-lasting, vivid, confidently held memories of the reception context for learning about surprising, important, public events that were not directly experienced. Initially thought to be distinguished by their remarkable accuracy, evidence of omission and commission errors are as common in these memories as in ...
PDF Predicting confidence in flashbulb memories
Figure 1. Predicted model of flashbulb memory confidence. may suppose that they should accurately recall memories related to personally important and emotional events that they have ''successfully'' rehearsed. Researchers rarely present the relation of confidence to other flashbulb memory related experiences.
Flashbulb Memory
In more recent research, additional claims about the collective framing of flashbulb memories have been pursued. For example, in two studies of flashbulb memories for earthquakes ( Er, 2003; Neisser et al., 1996 ), investigators found differences between groups of subjects who experienced the event directly and those who found out about it ...
The theoretical and empirical status of the flashbulb memory hypothesis
The construct of flashbulb memory was introduced in a seminal paper by Brown and Kulik (1977) to account for memories of events such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Brown and Kulik described flashbulb memories as memories for the circumstances of hearing about a highly surprising and consequential event. These memories were said to be ...
Long-term memory for the terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb
Brown and Kulik (1977) suggested the term flashbulb memory for the "circumstances in which one first learned of a very surprising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) event," for example, hearing the news that President John Kennedy had been shot. Since Brown and Kulik's description of their findings, the range of topics addressed in studies of flashbulb memories has grown ...
An exploration of flashbulb memory
Flashbulb memory (e.g., memory of one's personal situation in relation to an extraordinary event, such as a surprise marriage proposal) has yet to be closely studied by consumer researchers, and its underlying processes remain a subject of ongoing investigation. These memories can be vivid and confidently held for years after the inciting event ...
Flashbulb Memories: Conceptual and Methodological Issues
Abstract. Although flashbulb memory research is now well established, it is still not clear exactly what researchers are referring to as flashbulbs, and what is the best way to address the ...
How personal experience modulates the neural circuitry of memories of
One of the challenges in studies of flashbulb memories has been to define an appropriate baseline task. The initial reports on flashbulb memories failed to include any comparative baseline . Later studies examined the consistency of such memories over time (3-5) or compared them with memories for everyday events . In contrast, the baseline ...
For those with a personal stake, flashbulb memories burn bright
Most such studies have found that memory distorts emotions, personal involvement and external details, like the weather, quickly over time. To see if having a personal stake would boost flashbulb memory accuracy, Berntsen and her Aarhus colleague Dorthe K. Thomsen, PhD, had 145 Danes ages 72 to 89, including 66 who had ties to the resistance ...

	There’s a fine line to tread between preparing our kids for the challenges their generation will face, and not bombarding them too soon with harsh reality. \|
	A phenomenon referred to as “population stereotypes” helps explain how predictable human responses create the illusion of telepathy. \|
	To look up at the sky and see a road for the gods, a great river, or the final resting place of your ancestors is deeply human. \|
	Many policymakers believe that the international reaction to the use of nuclear weapons would be severe. A new study challenges this assumption. \|

Flashbulb Memory: What to Know About Vivid Recall

Where Are Flashbulb Memories Stored in the Brain?

Examples of Flashbulb Memory

What Causes a Flashbulb Memory?

Can Flashbulb Memories Be False?

A Word From Verywell

Flashbulb Memory In Psychology: Definition & Examples

Key Takeaways

Examples of Flashbulb Memory

Here are several real-life examples of flashbulb memories:

Why do Flashbulb Memories Occur

The Photographic Model

The Comprehensive Model

The Emotional-Integrative Model

What Research Suggests

Neurology Related to Flashbulb Memory

Individual Differences

Relationship to Autobiographical Memory

Why are flashbulb memories so vivid?

Further Information

Save citation to file

Add to My Bibliography

Flashbulb Memories

Similar articles

Suggested Readings

Related information

LinkOut - more resources

Other Literature Sources

9/11 memories reveal how flashbulb memories are made in the brain

Related Topics

History & Culture

What Are Flashbulb Memories?

Flashbulb Memory

Access this chapter

Author information

Corresponding author

Editor information

Rights and permissions

Copyright information

About this entry

Download citation

Login Alert

Book contents

14 - The theoretical and empirical status of the flashbulb memory hypothesis

Access options

Save book to Dropbox

Save book to Google Drive

Long-term memory for the terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb memories, event memories, and the factors that influence their retention

Participants, recruitment, and procedure

General Considerations

Coding considerations

Forgetting and flashbulb memories

Forgetting and event memory

Are there different processes underlying the similar patterns of forgetting for flashbulb memories and event memories?

Predictors of consistency and accuracy

Changes in the content of memories over time

Forgetting over the long-term

Do different factors influence flashbulb and event memories?

Memory practices

Acknowledgments

For those with a personal stake, flashbulb memories burn bright

Letters to the Editor

IMAGES

COMMENTS