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Essay on Democratic Decentralisation | Democratic Decentralisation Essay for Students and Children in English

February 14, 2024 by sastry

Essay On Democratic Decentralisation: Decentralisation can be defined as “the dispersion of decision making governance or distribution of functions and powers from a central authority to regional and local authorities.”

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Long and Short Essays on Democratic Decentralisation for Kids and Students in English

Given below are two essays in English for students and children about the topic of ‘Democratic Decentralisation’ in both long and short form. The first essay is a long essay on Democratic Decentralisation of 400-500 words. This long essay about Democratic Decentralisation is suitable for students of class 7, 8, 9 and 10, and also for competitive exam aspirants. The second essay is a short essay on Democratic Decentralisation of 150-200 words. These are suitable for students and children in class 6 and below.

Long Essay on Democratic Decentralisation 500 Words in English

Below we have given a long essay on Democratic Decentralisation of 500 words is helpful for classes 7, 8, 9 and 10 and Competitive Exam Aspirants. This long essay on the topic is suitable for students of class 7 to class 10, and also for competitive exam aspirants.

There are various forms of decentralisation. Privatisation is a type of decentralisation. Privatisation and deregulation means shifting responsibility for functions from the public to the private sector. Privatisation can range from public-private partnerships to allowing private enterprises to perform functions that had previously been monopolised by the government. Usually, though not always, privatisation and deregulation are accompanied by economic liberalisation and market development policies.

India’s fiscal deficit during 1990s, spectacular growth by economies of Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia due to the indulgence of private sector; integration of world trade, changes in China and dissatisfaction with the performance of public sector all factors collectively contributed to the initiation of privatisation in India.

To begin with, in 1992, India opened up cellular and basic services to private players and then the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was constituted in 1997 as an independent regulator in this sector. Till 1986, telecommunication was a public utility owned by the Government of India. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) was created in 1986 as a Public Sector Enterprise (PSE) to facilitate telecommunication services in the cities of Delhi anol Mumbai. In all other places, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) was formed as a PSE on 1 st October, 2000 as a telecom service provider.

These state-owned incumbents with a large existing subscriber base dominate the fixed line service. However, with the entry of private players, today the Indian telecommunication industry is the world’s fastest growing industry with 826.93 million mobile phone subscribers, as of April, 2011, as liberalisation led to the entry of private players such as Bharti Airtel, Reliance Communications, Tata Teleservices, Idea Cellular and Aircel.

Privatisation of banks began in 1994 when the Reserve Bank of India issued a policy of liberalisation to license limited number of private banks, which came to be known as New Generation tech-savvy banks. Prior to this, SBI was in existence since 1955, apart from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) established in 1935, which controlled the central banking responsibilities.

Thus, Global Trust Bank was the first private bank after liberalisation, which was later amalgamated into Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC) and Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (HDFC) was the first bank to receive an ‘in principle’ approval from the RBI to set-up a bank in the private sector. At present, there are many private banks in India including leading banks like ICICI Banks, ING Vysya Bank, Jammu & Kashmir Bank, Karnataka Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, SBI Commercial, Dhanalakshmi Bank, Federal Bank, HDFC Bank, Karur Vysya Bank, UTI Bank and YES Bank.

Privatisation of insurance sector in India happened around the year 2000 when the government allowed private players to enter the Indian market. Although in the year 1 993, a road map for privatisation of the life insurance sector was laid, but it took another six years before the enabling legislation to pass the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act in the year 2000.

Resultantly, the newly appointed insurance regulator—Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) started issuing licenses to private life insurers. At present leading private sector life insurers are SBI Life Insurance, Metlife India, ICICI Prudential, Bajaj Allianz, Max New York Life Insurance, Sahara Life Insurance, Tata AIG, HDFC Standard Life, Birla Sun Life, Kotak Life Insurance, Aviva Life Insurance, Reliance Life Insurance, ING Vysya, Shriram Life Insurance, Bharti AXA, Future Generali, IDBI Fortis Life Insurance, AEGON Religare and Star Union Dai-ichi Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

In the electricity sector, the new wave of policy reforms designed to promote private participation has been driven by the need to expand the capacity and increase the reliability of systems, public sector budget constraints and the positive results of the private participation in other countries. Although in India electricity sector is still largely under the domain of public sector, but the inclusion of private sectors for capacity additions has also begun.

Major PSUs involved in the generation of electricity include National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) and Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCI). Besides PSUs, several state level corporations are also involved in the generation and intrastate distribution of electricity. In the private sector, major capacity additions are planned in Reliance Energy, Tata Power and RPG Group CESC.

Decentralisation is an answer to the problems of the centralised sector. Decentralisation in the government sector helps to solve problems of economic decline, lack of funds, performance issues and reservation for minorities. In the area of politics, its objective is to vest more power with citizens or elected representatives. Economic decentralisation brings about privatisation of public institutions, through deregulation, abolition of restrictions on business competing with government services, such as postal services, school etc. Decentralisation has also been executed in various technologies like water purification, waste disposal, agricultural technology and energy technology.

Short Essay on Democratic Decentralisation 200 Words in English

Below we have given a short essay on Democratic Decentralisation is for Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. This short essay on the topic is suitable for students of class 6 and below.

Internet is a good example of a successful decentralised network. Wikipedia, the online Encyclopaedia, storing information on a plethora of topics, is also decentralised as it allows users to add, modify or delete content via the internet. Social networking sites are also decentralised systems that have greatly changed our lives. Information technology used to facilitate interactions of the government with the citizens, is referred to as e-Government. It is indeed a good initiative to boost democratisation. Education, health care and petroleum are some of the other sectors that have been decentralised and are among the fastest growing sectors of the economy today. Thus, decentralisation of public sector enterprises that began with the economic reforms of the 1990s has yielded tangible benefits to the country.

However, dangers of decentralisation loom large. For example, if the technical capacity or functioning of a system is weak, it will definitely result in poor quality products and services. Coordination for national policies can become complex and resource distribution can become uneven. A few local elites can grab power and hindrances in proper decision-making can surface. In the absence of a higher competent authority, monopoly and anarchy can give way to chaos and suppression of public interests.

Thus, decentralisation is both a boon and a bane to the economy. It is to be used as an ‘instrument of change and empowerment of the masses’ and not to earn quick money by few individuals pursuing their selfish interests.

Democratic Decentralisation Essay Word Meanings for Simple Understanding

• Dispersion – an act, state, or instance of dispersing or of being dispersed
• Monopolised – to obtain exclusive possession of
• Incumbents – holding an indicated position, role, office etc., currently
• Reform – the improvement or amendment of what is wrong, corrupt, unsatisfactory etc
• Constraint – limitation or restriction
• Democratisation – transition to a more democratic political regime
• Tangible – definite, not vague or elusive
• Elites – persons of the highest class
• Anarchy – a state of society without government or law
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Decentralizing for a Deeper, More Supple Democracy

Jean-paul faguet, ashley m. fox, caroline pöschl.

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Read the full essay here .

We review recent evidence regarding decentralization and state strength and argue that decentralization can deepen democracy without compromising state strength if adequately designed. We examine how decentralization affects five key aspects of state strength: 1) Authority over territory and people, 2) Conflict prevention, 3) Policy autonomy and the ability to uphold the law, 4) Responsive, accountable service provision, and 5) Social learning. We provide specific reform paths that should lead to strengthening in each. Decentralizing below the level of social cleavages should drain secessionist pressure by peeling away moderate citizens from radical leaders. The regional specificity of elite interests is key. If regional elites have more to lose than gain from national schism, they will not invest in politicians and conflicts that promote secession. Strong accountability mechanisms and national safeguards of minority rights can align local leaders’ incentives with citizens’, so promoting power-sharing and discouraging local capture or oppression. “Fragmentation of authority” is a mistaken inference; what decentralization really does is transform politics from top-down to bottom-up, embracing many localities and their concerns. The state moves from a simpler, brittler command structure to one based on overlapping authority and complex complementarity, where government is more robust to failure in any of its parts. Well-designed reform, focusing on services with low economies of scale, with devolved taxation and bail-outs prohibited, should increase public accountability. Lastly, we advance a novel way that decentralization can strengthen democracy: by allowing citizens to become political actors in their own right, the small scale of local politics should promote social learning-by-doing, so strengthening political legitimacy, state-building, and ‘democratic suppleness’ from the grassroots upwards.

About the Authors

Jean-Paul Faguet   is professor of the political economy of development in the Departments of International Development and Government at the London School of Economics. He is the author of  Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below in Bolivia  (2012) .

View all work by Jean-Paul Faguet

Ashley M. Fox  is assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the State University of New York–Albany .

View all work by Ashley M. Fox

Caroline Pöschl  recently earned her doctorate from the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science .

View all work by Caroline Pöschl

Further Reading

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The Morass in Moscow: Boris Yeltsin and Russia’s Four Crises

• DOI: 10.1080/0961452042000284012
• Corpus ID: 154910371

Democratic decentralisation and local participation: a review of recent research

• Sylvia I. Bergh
• Published 1 January 2004
• Political Science
• Development in Practice

60 Citations

Decentralization and pro-poor participation in ghana: unmasking the barriers to inclusive grassroots development, the depoliticisation of development and the democratisation of politics in tanzania: parallel structures as obstacles to delivering services to the poor.

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User Committees: A Potentially Damaging Second Wave of Decentralisation?

Decentralization: the way forward for rural development, democratic decentralisation through a natural resource lens, democracy and decentralisation, between micro-politics and administrative imperatives: decentralisation and the watershed mission in madhya pradesh, india, democratic decentralisation through a natural resource lens: an introduction, good government in the tropics, related papers.

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Democratic Decentralisation in India

• 12 Oct 2022
• 12 min read
• GS Paper - 2
• Local Self Governance
• Co-operative Federalism

For Prelims: Panchayati Raj Institutions, 73 rd and 74 th Constitutional Amendments

For Mains: Democratic Decentralisation in India

Why in News?

It has been almost 30 years since the 73 rd and 74 th constitutional amendment Acts were passed to facilitate democratic decentralisation in India, but very little and actual progress has been made in this direction.

What is Democratic Decentralisation?

• Democratic decentralization is the process of devolving the functions and resources of the state from the Centre to the elected representatives at the lower levels so as to facilitate greater direct participation of citizens in governance.
• It implies that precisely defined governance functions are formally assigned by law to local governments , backed by adequate transfer of a basket of financial grants and tax handles, and they are given staff so that they have the necessary wherewithal to carry out their responsibilities.
• Local government, including panchayats, is a state subject in the Constitution, and consequently, the devolution of power and authority to panchayats has been left to the discretion of states.
• The Constitution mandates that panchayats and municipalities shall be elected every five years and enjoins States to devolve functions and responsibilities to them through law.
• These amendments added two new parts to the Constitution, namely, Part IX titled “The Panchayats” (added by 73 rd Amendment) and Part IXA titled “The Municipalities” (added by 74 th Amendment).
• The 11 th Schedule contains the powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats.
• The 12 th Schedule contains the powers, authority and responsibilities of Municipalities.
• Article 40: Organization of a village panchayat

What are the Major Achievements of the Local Bodies?

• The proportion of elected women representatives has been steadily rising since the enactment of the 73 rd Amendment Act.
• Currently, India has 260,512 Panchayats with 3.1 million elected representatives , of which a record 1.3 million are women.
• While there is merely 7–8% representation in Parliament and State Assemblies for women, an astounding 49% of elected local representatives (in states like Odisha it has crossed 50%) are women.
• The passage of the 73 rd and 74 th Amendments has created healthy competition among various states regarding devolution (the 3Fs: funds, functions, and functionaries).
• Kerala has devolved 29 of its functions to Panchayats.
• Rajasthan took the inspiration from Kerala to devolve many key departments such as health, education, women, and agriculture to PRIs.
• Similarly, Bihar came out with the idea of “Panchayat Sarkar” and states such as Odisha have increased 50% seats for women

What are the Issues with Local Governments in India?

• A number of conditions constrain the use of money, including inflexibility in spending the allocated budget.
• There is little investment in enabling and strengthening local governments to raise their own taxes and user charges.
• Some have their own building but without basic facilities like toilets, drinking water, and electricity connection.
• While GPs have internet connections, they are not functional in many cases. For any data entry purposes, panchayat officials have to visit Block Development offices which delay the work.
• Local governments do not have the staff to perform even basic tasks.
• Furthermore, as most staff are hired by higher level departments and placed with local governments on deputation, they do not feel responsible to the latter ; they function as part of a vertically integrated departmental system.
• States often postpone the elections and violate the constitutional mandate of five yearly elections to local governments.
• Local governments are merely acting as an implementation machinery rather than a policy-making body for local development. Technology-enabled schemes have further downgraded their role.
• Criminal elements and contractors are attracted to local government elections, tempted by the large sums of money now flowing to them. Thus, forming a market chain of corruption operates, involving a partnership between elected representatives and officials at all levels.
• However, there is no evidence to show that corruption has increased due to decentralisation.

Way Forward

• Gram Sabhas and wards committees in urban areas have to be revitalised to achieve the objective of people’s participation in real terms.
• Local government organisational structures have to be strengthened with sufficient manpower.
• Serious efforts should be made towards recruitment and appointment of support and technical staff to ensure the smooth functioning of panchayats.
• Devise a comprehensive mechanism for taxation at the local levels. Without local taxation, Gram Panchayats cannot be held accountable.
• It should also be ensured that grants are utilised in a proper and effective manner.
• Panchayats should also be encouraged to carry out local audits regularly so that Finance Commission grants are not delayed.

UPSC Civil Services Examination Previous Year Question (PYQ)

Q1. The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992, which aims at promoting the Panchayati Raj Institutions in the country provides for which of the following? (2011)

• Constitution of District Planning Committees.
• State Election Commissions to conduct all panchayat elections.
• Establishment of State Finance Commissions.

Select the correct answer using the codes given below:

(a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only  (d) 1, 2 and 3

• Article 243ZD of the 74 th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 related to municipalities provides that every State at the district level shall constitute a District Planning Committee, which would be responsible for consolidation of development plans prepared by the Panchayats and the Municipalities through proposing a development plan for the district as a whole. Hence, 1 is not correct.
• Article 243K of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 mandates that superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats shall be vested in a State Election Commission. Hence, 2 is correct.
• Article 243I of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 says that at the expiration of every fifth year; the Governor shall constitute a State Finance Commission to review the financial position of the Panchayats. It will make recommendations to the Governor in matters of distribution and possible allocation/ appropriation of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees between the State and the Panchayats and the grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State. Hence, 3 is correct. Therefore, option (c) is the correct answer.

Q2. The fundamental object of Panchayati Raj system is to ensure which among the following? (2015)

• People’s participation in development
• Political accountability
• Democratic decentralization
• Financial mobilization

Select the correct answer using the code given below

(a) 1, 2 and 3 only (b) 2 and 4 only  (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

• The most fundamental objective of the Panchayati Raj system is to ensure people’s participation in development and democratic decentralization. Hence, 1 and 3 are correct.
• Establishment of Panchayati Raj Institutions does not automatically lead to political accountability. Hence, 2 is not correct.
• Financial mobilization is not the fundamental objective of Panchayati Raj, although it seeks to transfer finances and resources to the grass root government. Hence, 4 is not correct. Therefore, option (c) is the correct answer.

Q3. Local self-government can be best explained as an exercise in (2017)

(a) Federalism (b) Democratic decentralisation (c) Administrative delegation (d) Direct democracy

• Democracy means decentralisation of power and giving more and more power to the people. Local self governments are looked upon as instruments of decentralisation and participatory democracy.
• To examine the working of the Community Development Programme (1952) and the National Extension Service (1953) and to suggest measures for their better working, the GoI appointed a committee in January, 1957 under the chairmanship of Balwant Rai G Mehta.
• The committee submitted its report in November, 1957 and recommended the establishment of the scheme of ‘democratic decentralisation’, which ultimately came to be known as Panchayati Raj or unit of Local Self Government. Therefore, option (b) is the correct answer.

Q. Assess the importance of the Panchayat system in India as a part of local government. Apart from government grants, what sources can the Panchayats look out for financing developmental projects? (2018)

Q. To what extent, in your opinion, has the decentralisation of power in India changed the governance landscape at the grassroots? (2022)

Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization

• Thematic Section
• Published: 05 March 2007
• Volume 50 , pages 43–49, ( 2007 )

Cite this article

• Jesse C Ribot  

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48 Citations

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Jesse C. Ribot analyzes how ‘democratic’ decentralization reforms in most developing countries, rather than empowering representative elected local government, have often resulted in a transfer of power to a wide range of local institutions, including private bodies, customary authorities and non-governmental organizations. This essay explores the logic behind choosing these institutions and the effects of recognizing these institutions on three dimensions of democracy: representation, citizenship and the public domain.

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Democratic Representation and the Nature of Political Parties

Malaise in Political Representation: Citizen Attitudes and Sociocultural Tensions in Argentine Democracy

Introduction: Political Representation in France and Germany

WRI's recent 15-country comparative decentralization research project showed that despite the democratizing discourse associated with natural resource decentralizations and decentralization writ large, few decentralizations appear to be transferring significant powers to democratic local bodies ( Ribot, 2004 ; Ribot and Larson, 2005 ).

Producing multiple alternative channels to voice citizen concerns can also be a positive part of democratization.

I use the term public domain in distinction to what Fung (2003) calls the public sphere. Fung is interested in public interaction. I am interested in the powers (resources and domains of decision making) with respect to which the public can interact and over which public decisions are taken.

My use of ‘institutional choice’ differs from that of Ostrom (1999 : 193), who explores the choices by local individuals ‘among available alternatives’ for how these choices lead to institutional formation. I am talking of choices made by governments and international organizations that impose the “available alternatives’ on local individuals – thus constraining their options.

Local institutions are also actively choosing, postulating and imposing themselves for the opportunity to speak for local populations – this article's focus, however, is on effects of government and international organizations’ choices.

In 30 World Bank ‘community-driven development’ (CDD) project appraisal documents, it is difficult to determine how community is defined (by profession, self-selection, ethnic group, residence-based citizenship), nor how – that is through what mechanism – community ‘drives’ or is represented in development decisions.

For example, policies are often created to assure the survival of a given cultural community.

This type of recognition takes place through the transfer of powers, partnering in projects, engagement through contracts, or via participation in dialogue and decision-making. Recognition strengthens the chosen institutions, reinforcing the forms of belonging they engender and the identities of their members. I use the term recognition as ‘acknowledgement’ following Li (2001 : 625). The acknowledgment of local institutions, assessed by some agent as ‘asked for or deserved’, has multiple effects that can shape democratic inclusion.

Fung (2003) writes, however, about participation and governance as if representation is not key. All of his categories are about participation of civil society and of people within civil society in processes of decision-making. He does not seem to view representative forms of government as sufficient or even necessary to the democratic processes.

Fraser (2000 : 108) argues that recognition as an approach is marginalizing, eclipsing and displacing redistributive struggles. She calls this phenomenon ‘displacement’.

Recognition based on culture (identity politics), for example, may displace redistributive struggles. Privileging the misrecognition or depreciation of culture and identity as the causes of inequality embedded in “free floating discourses” often wholly ignores material and social bases of distribution. In this way, material inequality may be seen as merely an outcome of misrecognition ( Fraser, 2000 : 110–111).

Agrawal, Arun and Jesse C. Ribot (1999) ‘Accountability in Decentralization: A framework with South Asian and African cases’, Journal of Developing Areas 33: 473–502.

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Shows how ‘democratic’ decentralization may transfer power to private local bodies

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Ribot, J. Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization. Development 50 , 43–49 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100335

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Published : 05 March 2007

Issue Date : 01 March 2007

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100335

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Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook

The Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook conceptualizes decentralization as a reform that advances democracy and development in a context of stability and the rule of law. Decentralization invests new actors with public responsibilities. The newly involved actors that decentralization empowers (or “should” empower) include appointed officials in subnational administrations, elected officials in subnational governments, and increasingly engaged citizens themselves. For the purposes of this Handbook, decentralization is defined as the transfer of power from national governments to subnational governments or to the subnational administrative units of national governments. This definition is useful because it allows a discussion of decentralization’s two most common forms, deconcentration and devolution, without privileging one over the other. 

At its core, decentralization increases the ability of local governments to provide valued services, which it does by changing rather than eliminating the role of the central government. Decentralization’s promise is often accompanied by shortcomings, perils, and unforeseen consequences. While in many cases it has not yet fixed the problems it was adopted to help resolve, decentralization is not a “one-shot” experience, but rather a more iterative process that takes time to unfold and deliver on its many promises. 

This Handbook is designed to provide a theoretically-informed and empirically-supported foundation for USAID officers undertaking work in missions around the world. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to key concepts in decentralization, including its main dimensions, goals, and arenas. Chapter 2 further describes the primary dimensions and forms of decentralization; while Chapter 3 elaborates the three major goals that countries often pursue through decentralization. Chapters 4 and 5 are structured around the most important arenas in which USAID is likely to intervene. Specifically, Chapter 4 provides guidance about how to assess the national, subnational, and civil society environment in a given country; and Chapter 5 presents programming strategies that are targeted for each of these three arenas. Chapter 6 describes how USAID can reliably evaluate decentralization programs and learn from its experience. Chapter 7 presents concluding comments. 

Why Decentralize Power in A Democracy?

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Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization Baghdad, February 12, 2004             You are hearing today many outstanding analytical and technical presentations about the elements, advantages, and problems with respect to federalism and the decentralization of power.  I would like to speak briefly here to some of the broader political and philosophical issues.             As you have heard this morning, a growing number of countries are moving to adopt federal systems that devolve significant governing authority down from the center to lower levels, or at least for decentralizing some significant elements of government responsibility down to local government.             I want to address three questions today.  First, why are more and more countries moving to devolve and decentralize governing power?  Second, what has this trend meant for the quality of democracy and governance around the world? Third, what has it meant for the ability of countries to hold together peacefully as a unified state?

Why the Trend Toward Federalism?

            There are three broad reasons why so many countries are adopting federal systems, or greater political and administrative decentralization.  In some countries, federalism is adopted as a means of giving different ethnic and regional groups some autonomy and control over their own affairs.  The thinking is that if different ethnic and regional minorities have some autonomy, some ability to determine their own local affairs with respect to education, culture, and economic development, they will feel more secure, and be more willing to accept the authority and legitimacy of the larger national state.  I know there are concerns about this issue in Iraq, and I will return to it in a little while.             Second, federalism or devolution of power is adopted as a means of sharing power among lots of different political parties, which may or may not have some basis in ethnic or regional ties.  If democracy is to survive, it cannot be a winner-take-all system, particularly not one in which one party is always going to win, and thus take all.  When some governing responsibilities and resources are devolved to lower levels of authority, and when there are a lot of different provinces and municipalities whose governments will be chosen through elections, parties and groups that cannot win control of the central government may win the opportunity to exercise power in some of the lower-level governments  This increases their confidence in and commitment to the political system, and the sense among citizens generally that the system is fair and inclusive.  If groups with strong bases of support in the country are completely and indefinitely excluded from any share of political power at any level, they are likely to question and even challenge the legitimacy of the system.             Third, democracy has swept throughout the world as a basic value and framework of governance over the post three decades.  And decentralization is increasingly coming to be seen as a fundamental democratic principle.  It is not enough for people simply to be able to choose their national leaders in periodic, free, and fair elections.  In countries of moderate to large size, a good democracy requires that people be able to elect their own local leaders and representatives, and that these local governments have some real power to respond to the needs of the people.  In short, decentralization is increasingly being demanded from below, through pressure from the grassroots, and is embraced for its potential to enhance the depth and legitimacy of democracy.

How Federalism and Decentralization Enhance Democracy

            I have already begun to suggest, then, how federalism and other forms of decentralization can strengthen democracy and enhance its stability.  They may help to hold the country together by giving each group some control of its own affairs.  They may help to sustain the political system by distributing power among a wider array of political parties, each of which finds that it has some tangible stake in the system.  And it speaks to the aspirations of people and communities who simply want government to be closer and more responsive to their needs.             Let me continue with the functions that decentralization serves.  When government is closer to the people, it is more likely to be held accountable by them for its successes and failures in the provision of basic services, the maintenance of order, and the fair resolution of local issues and disputes.  Government tends to be more responsive when it is closer to the people.  That is why democracies are more and more embracing the principle of subsidiarity:  that each government function should be performed by the lowest level of government that is capable of performing that function effectively.             When there are multiple layers of elected government, as in a federal or politically decentralized system, there are other benefits for democracy.  Lower levels of elective office can constitute an arena for training and recruiting new political leaders, including women and young people who have not previously had a role in political life.  And these lower levels of democracy provide a more accessible means for citizens to become active in public affairs:  to question their local officials, monitor what they do, present their interests and concerns, and learn the skills and values of democratic citizenship. Typically, it is difficult for most citizens and organized groups to get access to the national parliament or the central ministries.  They need decentralized opportunities for access to decision-making power.  And those points of local access are more likely to be responsive if they are accountable to the people through elections.             Finally, decentralization of power provides an additional check against the abuse of power.  Of course, checks and balances are needed within the central government itself.  This is why there must be an independent parliament and judiciary, and effective auditing and counter-corruption mechanisms.  But federalism can provide an additional bulwark against the concentration and abuse of power.

What is Necessary for Federalism to Work in a Democracy

         I do not mean to suggest that federalism, or even more limited decentralization of power, is without risks and dangers for democracy.  In many democracies, old and new, local and provincial governments become not outposts of grassroots democracy but local fiefdoms, dominated by political bosses who do not play by democratic rules or respect citizens’ rights.  As local autocratic leaders enhance their power, they can rig elections and intimidate the opposition, creating a one-party state at the provincial level, even if the national system remains vigorously competitive.  I have seen this happen in countries like Nigeria.  But this is far from inevitable.             There is a way to prevent or correct this problem.  A federal democracy must establish that the national constitution, and the national judicial system, is supreme over local and provincial authorities.  Prosecutors, investigators and commissions at the national level must have the authority to investigate abuses of power, violations of rights, and charges of corruption in local and provincial governments.  Violators must be held accountable in the national courts, if they cannot be tried and punished at lower levels.  And levels of government below the center should not be allowed to maintain their own armies or militias.  That should be a national function.             There is also the problem of capacity for self-governance at the local and provincial level.  This can be a particular problem in terms of the ability to raise, budget, and expend resources.  In a country like Iraq, where the central government receives large streams of revenue from petroleum exports, a system can be developed to allocate some portion of this revenue automatically to the lower units of government, by a formula, perhaps largely based on shares of population, that is mutually negotiated and generally accepted as fair.  But still, lower governments must develop the capacity to administer the revenue and provide the necessary services.  Often, this requires a period of training and a phase-in of responsibilities devolved down from the center.  One of the most important lessons from other country experiences is that local governments should not be burdened with obligations to perform functions and provide services for which they do not have adequate revenue or training.

Is Federalism a Slippery Slope downward to Disintegration?

            A very legitimate fear of many who are wary of federalism is that, in a context of deep ethnic and regional divisions, it can lead to the break-up of the country, as in the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia.  These fears are real, but they are based on a mistaken reading of other experiences.  Divided countries have disintegrated at crucial moments precisely because they did not develop over time democratic means for the devolution of power that knitted groups together in a more authentic, voluntary, and legitimate political union.  When groups are held together in one nation mainly by force and fear, anxious minorities may seek to secede at the first sign of a weakening of central government power.  By contrast, when the national government, under the fresh political circumstances that attend the formation of a new democratic system, makes an early and sincere grant of autonomy, the consequence is almost always greater stability and unity, rather than secession.  This has been the case in India, Spain, Mexico, and Nigeria, for example.  By contrast, countries like Sudan and Sri Lanka have paid a heavy price in civil war and massive violence for the failure to accommodate aspirations for devolution.             I know many Iraqis fear that federalism is just a stalking horse or vehicle for the eventual break-up of the country.  As a political scientist who has studied group conflict and institutions to manage conflict in democracies, I sincerely do not believe that will be the case.  Federalism—as negotiated and structured by Iraqis in their process of constitution making during the coming year—will provide the means to hold Iraq together permanently, democratically, and peacefully.             As an independent academic who sympathizes with your concerns and aspirations, permit me a final reflection.  We in the United States do not wish for a divided or shattered Iraq.  There is a strong consensus within the U.S. that Iraq should be a unified and democratic state, and that federalism or devolution of power in some important ways will provide an important means toward those other two goals.  Remember that a century and a half ago we in the United States fought a civil war to hold our own country together, around basic principles of democracy, equality, and fairness.  We do not wish for other countries and peoples anything less than what we have, at great cost, achieved for ourselves.

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