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129 Freedom Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

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Freedom is a fundamental human right that allows individuals to act and make choices without constraints. It is a concept that has been debated and explored for centuries, with countless thinkers, philosophers, and activists offering their perspectives on what it means to truly be free. When it comes to discussing freedom, there are endless possibilities for essay topics. Here are 129 freedom essay topic ideas and examples to inspire your writing:

• The concept of freedom in a democratic society
• Freedom of speech and its limitations
• The role of freedom in shaping individual identity
• Freedom of the press and its importance in a democratic society
• The relationship between freedom and responsibility
• The impact of technology on freedom and privacy
• Freedom and equality: are they mutually exclusive?
• The importance of freedom in promoting creativity and innovation
• Freedom of religion and its implications for society
• The history of freedom movements around the world
• The role of education in promoting freedom and critical thinking
• Freedom and social justice: how are they connected?
• The impact of social media on freedom of expression
• Freedom and human rights: are they universal?
• The relationship between freedom and happiness
• The concept of economic freedom and its implications for society
• Freedom and the rule of law: how are they related?
• The impact of censorship on freedom of speech
• Freedom and democracy: are they inseparable?
• The role of the government in protecting individual freedoms
• The impact of colonialism on freedom movements in the Global South
• The importance of cultural freedom and diversity
• Freedom and globalization: how are they connected?
• The role of civil disobedience in promoting freedom and social change
• The impact of war and conflict on freedom
• Freedom and the environment: are they compatible?
• The role of art and literature in promoting freedom of expression
• Freedom and gender equality: are they interconnected?
• The relationship between freedom and security
• The impact of surveillance on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to protest
• The role of activism in promoting freedom and social change
• Freedom and the right to privacy
• The impact of capitalism on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to assembly
• The role of the United Nations in promoting freedom and human rights
• The impact of colonialism on freedom movements in Africa
• Freedom and the right to a fair trial
• The relationship between freedom and social mobility
• The role of technology in promoting freedom and democracy
• The impact of social media on freedom of information
• Freedom and the right to access information
• The role of education in promoting freedom and democracy
• Freedom and the right to healthcare
• The impact of poverty on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to clean water and sanitation
• The relationship between freedom and economic development
• The role of the media in promoting freedom and democracy
• Freedom and the right to education
• The impact of discrimination on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to employment
• The relationship between freedom and social welfare
• The role of civil society in promoting freedom and human rights
• Freedom and the right to housing
• The impact of climate change on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to food security
• The relationship between freedom and access to justice
• The role of international organizations in promoting freedom and human rights
• Freedom and the right to a clean environment
• The impact of globalization on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to political participation
• The relationship between freedom and social cohesion
• The role of NGOs in promoting freedom and human rights
• Freedom and the right to social security
• The impact of corruption on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to participate in cultural life
• The relationship between freedom and social inclusion
• The role of the private sector in promoting freedom and human rights
• Freedom and the right to participate in decision-making
• The impact of armed conflict on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to non-discrimination
• The relationship between freedom and social protection
• The role of the judiciary in promoting freedom and human rights
• Freedom and the right to access justice
• The impact of natural disasters on individual freedoms
• Freedom and the right to participate in public affairs
• The role of the state in promoting freedom and human rights
• Freedom and the right to access public services
• The impact of migration on individual freedoms

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What Is Freedom of Speech and Why Is It Important?

By: Henrique Bertulino

As part of American history and the United States constitution, people live in a diverse society in which people have the right to speech and express their opinions in their own way. Many human beings believe that people should have the freedom of speech without any restrictions, including hate speech, but others believe differently. Some people feel that freedom of speech just protects speaking, while others feel that it also covers art, literature, and other forms of expression.

Freedom of Speech Essay Topic Ideas

Essay example: social distancing is important during the coronavirus pandemic, it supports the title, it’s written in standard english, it exudes authority, it has too much information included, it’s using redundant information, it’s not written in a simple language, sources of information.

Many of the 1689 Bill of Rights provisions were ultimately included in the First Amendment Right. The Declaration of Independence is a part of it. The US Constitution, which contains several amendments known as the Bill of Rights, is the highest legislation in Congress. According to the Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights ensures that the federal government can never deprive American citizens in the United States of America of their fundamental rights, such as freedom of the press, freedom of religion, free expression, and due process of law. Americans also have basic rights and extra civil rights under several federal and state laws.

The American constitution interprets freedom of expression as the definition of freedom, tending to play a massive role for the students and social media as it allows different points of view in both education and politics. Some students believe that we are free to speak whatever we want, regardless of how contentious it may be. Students can broaden their perspectives on a subject by having the opportunity to share their thoughts.

• How Slavery Affects Personal Freedom
• The Benefits and Disadvantages of Unlimited Freedom
• Freedom and Equality in North Korea
• Controversies over Freedom of Speech and Internet Postings
• Gender and the Black Americans Freedom Movement
• Modern Racism Against African Americans
• Human Freedom During the Civil War
• How the Law Limits Academic Freedom?
• Speech Rights and the Modern Media
• The Real Meaning of Redress of Grievances or Right to Petition
• Open Government and Coronavirus
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Needs Amendments
• Covid-19 and Human Rights
• Freedom of Expression and the Right to Education

Coronavirus is one of the most severe crises that our country and the whole nation are now experiencing. Since the start of this global pandemic, many lives have been taken away. Not only the lives of those who have been afflicted but also the living circumstances and economic position of our economy.

Beyond the urgent and challenging work at hand, the topic of how to reopen our society in the aftermath of the epidemic produced by the new coronavirus raises significant difficulties for social researchers.

As the worldwide epidemic continues to spread, we must safeguard ourselves and others around us by considering what measures we should take now that we are living in a new normal.

Wearing a face mask is one of the main lessons for preventing the transmission of coronavirus, and it should be accompanied by physical distance and hand cleanliness. Most people think about these things, but when the economy slowly reopened and individuals move around for a livelihood, they tend to overlook the relevance of social distance.

What is social distancing? Keeping a secure barrier between oneself and others who aren't from your home is known as social distance, sometimes known as "physical distancing." To practice social or physical distancing in both indoor and outdoor places, keep a distance of at least 6 feet (approximately two arm lengths) from anyone who isn't a member of your family.

Why practice social distancing? COVID-19 is disseminated mostly among persons who are in close proximity (within 6 feet) over an extended length of time. Droplets from an infected person's mouth or nose fly into the air and land in the mouths or noses of those who are nearby when they sneeze, cough, or talk. Because individuals can spread the virus before they even realize they're sick, it's vital to keep at least 6 feet away from others at all times, even if you - or they - don't show any symptoms. For persons who are at a higher risk of severe disease from COVID-19, social separation is very crucial.

Many people's personal circumstances or conditions make social distance difficult to practice in order to avoid the development of COVID-19. Still, people should also know that essential practices today have a significant effect on our society and the future.

Essay Analysis

Why is it a good essay?

An excellent essay is a piece of writing intended to convince or educate the audience about the subject. Each paragraph essay should include a different core concept or topic sentence. An essay or paper that is properly organized should flow smoothly and support the topic together. This way, the reader will be able to understand your point of view better.

The sample essay did just that, even providing various information in support of the subject.

The essay generally correctly uses English. It has complete and comprehensible sentences. It also followed the basic structure of introduction, body, and conclusion.

If you're not confident with your English usage, there are many online sources like Studybay that can assist you in your essay writing . There is no need to stress over your assignments anymore.

One way to make your readers interested in how the essay will flow is to infuse authoritarianism. It doesn't mean that you should be using aggressive words. It only means that your points are specific and undeniable.

The writer presented facts on why social distancing is important. These facts are irrefutable because legal institutions already disseminate the same information with research backing their claims.

What parts need improvements?

Instead of talking about the obvious effects of the pandemic, the writer could have focused more on why they support social distancing. As a freedom of speech essay, they could have talked about their whys without hindrances, even persuading the reader to open an argument or side with their point of view.

How to avoid: Make a draft before writing your essay. Write down points you want to include, and make sure that they all support your topic. You can also take into consideration counterarguments and answer them in the essay. In writing an essay, the more information, the more confusing it’ll be. So only take what you need and use them appropriately.

For example, there are better ways than to keep repeating “within 6 feet,” it may even be better to remove it completely so there will be more space for other information. An essay should be compact yet filled with important information.

How to avoid: Use synonyms or altogether remove the repeating information in exchange for a new one that also supports your topic of free speech.

Especially if you expect your readers to be the general population, who are not experts in any field, using simple language is the best. This way, your essay won't be confusing, and your essay's ideas won't be lost in a sea of words. You might think that using complex and complicated words may make you look smart, but in reality, it will only make your paper look superficial.

How to avoid: Explain your points in the simplest way possible. Take into account who your readers will be and pretend to be them. To see if it's simple enough, read through the sections of your essay. If you understand it with just one read, then you’re good to go. You can also ask your friends to read your essay and ask them for inputs.

There are many sources of information that you can find offline and online. However, you need to be careful about what you pick, as your essay's arguments will depend on their relevance.

When searching online, look for credible sites such as official government pages, quality journals, and credible news sources. Here are some trusted online sources you can use, no matter what your subject is:

• Science.gov
• Encyclopedia Britannica
• Oxford Academics
• The New York Times
• Foreign Affairs
• Smithsonian Magazine
• National Bureau of Economic Research
• The Economist

Without national security, we are all responsible for our own words and deeds, and what we do may have a significant impact on others. As we interact in this ever-changing society, whatever culture or race we belong in, we must accept everyone's distinct cultures and beliefs. We may as well safeguard the harmony that binds us all by having respect for each other.

In writing your freedom of speech essay, we must be clear about why someone's safety is more significant than free expression and why a boundary must be drawn. The inability of censorship across lines of communication such as the Internet may lead to tolerance of free expression, although this is not assured.

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27 Freedom of Speech Examples

Chris Drew (PhD)

Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

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Freedom of Speech refers to the right of any citizen to express their thoughts, ideas, and opinions without fear of government restraint or censorship (Legal Information Institute, 2020).

The notion of free speech extends beyond verbal communication. It can also defend our rights to use offensive sign language and body language, engage in symbolic and artistic expressions (e.g., flag burning), and even wear clothing that others may find offensive or revealing. Take, for example, the case of Cohen v. California, where the Supreme Court protected an individual’s right to wear a jacket with an expletive as a form of political protest.

Another practical example can be seen in newspapers or media outlets, who are often protected from government persecution by free speech laws. In liberal democracies like the USA and France, the free press are permitted to criticize the government openly.

Free speech helps defend our robust democracies, and makes our political systems more free, fair, and open than nations like Vietnam, China, Hungary, Turkey, and Cambodia whose governments largely control the media and therefore have a stronger monopoly over state power (Lidsky & Cotter, 2016).

Freedom of Speech Examples

• Peaceful protest signs: Peaceful protest signs are protected under free speech laws in most liberal democracies. They represent the direct expression of an individual’s or group’s thoughts and concerns on a political matter (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). These signs serve as a non-violent way to demand action, raise awareness, or critique governmental or societal issues. Regardless of the message’s popularity, the freedom to publicly display such signs is protected under freedom of speech, as long, however, as they do not incite violence or unlawful actions.
• Expressing religious beliefs: Freedom of speech in most liberal-democratic nations covers the public expression of religious beliefs (Roth, 2015). This includes wearing religious symbols, discussing religious topics, or participating in religious rituals in public. Importantly, this freedom is granted equally to all religions and even no-religion atheists and agnostics, who have the freedom to promote their non-beliefs. Such a law allows for a diverse array of religious expressions in public forums such as online and in universities.
• Wearing symbolic clothing: The Supreme Court of the USA has upheld the right of individuals to wear expressive clothing as a form of symbolic speech (Cohen v. California, 1971). This can include everything from protest t-shirts to flag pins and allows individuals to wear their opinions literally on their sleeves.
• Artistic expressions of dissent: Artistic expressions, including painting, music, and theater, are vehicles to express dissenting ideas or critique societal norms (Reitman, 2014). These expressions allow for creative commentary on the prevailing cultural, political, or social climates , contributing to the diversity of discourse within society. However, this would not be protected if the art were painted onto other people’s or public property, such as in the case of graffiti art.
• Criticizing government actions: In most liberal democratic nations, freedom of speech also includes the right to voice dissent publicly and criticize government policies or actions (Stroud, 2011). This encourages transparency and accountability, empowering citizens to serve as a check on governmental power.
• Satirical commentary on society: Protected under freedom of speech in many nations, satirical commentary allows for a critique of individuals, groups, and societal norms through humor and irony (Stankiewicz, 2017). Satire plays a vital role in maintaining a healthy society by promoting dialogue about difficult issues in a manner that engages audiences and provokes thought. For example, Charlie Hebdo’s incendiary satirical pictures of Islamic figures was offensive, but allowed, under France’s robust free speech laws.
• Advocating for social change : One of the most potent uses of free speech is the ability to advocate for social change (Meyerson, 2010). This can occur in many ways, such as public speeches, organized protests, or social media campaigns, allowing individuals and groups to bring attention to societal issues and push for change.
• Publicly debating controversial topics: Freedom of speech upholds the right to participate in public debate on controversial topics (Fish, 2016). Such debates often expose varying viewpoints and challenge assumptions , (even if you’re ill-informed!).
• Sharing scientific theories: Academic freedom, a facet of freedom of speech, allows researchers to share scientific theories or findings even if they are controversial (Karran & Mallinson, 2017), without facing fear of being fired. This is a central concept in the tenure system in the USA. This openness promotes progress and innovation by enabling knowledge exchange and peer scrutiny.
• Blogging personal political views: Blogging platforms provide a space for individuals to express their political opinions freely and discuss matters of public concern (Sunstein, 2017). This democratizes access to political discourse and helps cultivate a more informed public, but may also unfortunately spread misinformation – which is a key downside of free speech.
• Writing a critical book review: Freedom of speech permits individuals to write and publish critical reviews of books (or other forms of media), helping to facilitate discourse and contribute to the literary or artistic community (D’Haen, 2012). Such reviews, positive or negative, aid in the critical reception and evaluation of the work, influencing its public reception, but, generally, if not slanderous, cannot be censored.
• Political campaign speeches: When politicians deliver speeches during their campaign, they practice their freedom of speech (Kenski & Stroud, 2016). Their speeches allow voters to understand their stances on various issues, crucial for informed voting. They’re often critical of the government, but yet are allowed, in order to sustain a robust democratic society.
• Publishing an investigative article: Investigative journalism, protected by freedom of speech, involves in-depth reporting to uncover hidden issues in society or government (Tumber & Waisbord, 2019). It serves as a watchdog, promoting transparency , and accountability. This allows papers like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal to release cutting-edge investigative journalistic pieces.
• Whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoing: Freedom of speech protects whistleblowers who expose unethical practices within corporations, serving as a fundamental check on corruption and wrongdoing (Kohn, 2010). This form of expression is critical for maintaining trust and integrity within industries.
• The right to offend: Freedom of speech includes the right to offend, meaning individuals are allowed to voice opinions or ideas, however, potentially offensive they may be to some (Strossen, 2018). This freedom allows for a wide range of expressions, fostering diverse and dynamic dialogue within society.
• The right to silence: Often conceptualized as “the right to remain silent,” this right protects individuals from self-incrimination and stands as an integral aspect of free speech (Franks, 2014). This guarantees individuals’ liberty to choose when and how they express themselves. In the USA, this is protected under the 5th amendment.
• Social media activism: Activism through social media platforms falls under the umbrella of freedom of speech (Loader & Mercea, 2011). This allows individuals to raise awareness, mobilize supporters, and campaign for change at unprecedented speeds and scales.
• Public speaking at a rally: Individuals addressing a crowd at a public rally exercise their freedom of speech by expressing their beliefs and advocating for causes they support (Tufekci, 2017). Public speeches can rally support, influence opinions, and draw attention to essential issues.

See Also: 40 Types of Freedom

Free Speech and the US Constitution (First Amendment)

While encased in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, freedom of speech was originally designed to maintain civil liberties an open, democratic society whereby all individuals could express their comments and opinions freely (Stroud, 2011).

The framers believed that unchecked and unrestricted discussion would lead to the truth, and bad ideas would be debunked by the good ideas. This idea is often described in the metaphor ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’.

The USA has one of the most libertarian readings of free speech, and while other liberal democracies protect speech, none are quite as robust in their protections than the USA.

Interestingly, freedom of speech also covers the right to be silent. For instance, the Fifth Amendment of the United States constitution protects an individual’s right not to make self-incriminating statements under interrogation, often conceptualized as “the right to remain silent” (Franks, 2014).

The Constitutional Limits of Free Speech

Freedom of speech does not mean absolute freedom . Contrary to some misconceptions, this right is not without its boundaries (Smith & Kavanagh, 2015).

There are indeed restrictions that one must adhere to, such as libel, slander, obscenity, sedition, and incitement, to name a few.

For instance, hate speech that incites violence or harm towards a specific group is typically not protected by the right to free speech in the USA (Brimelow v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 2012).

Famous Freedom of Speech Cases in the United States

Tinker v. des moines (1969): student vietnam war protests.

This landmark case marked a significant decision protecting students’ rights to free speech (Abernathy, 2007). John Tinker and his fellow anti-war agitators were suspended from their Des Moines school for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States argued that their actions we free speech. Being non-disruptive of minimally disruptive, are protected. The court stated, “students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” establishing a precedent for future freedom of speech cases in education settings, such as the freedom to wear political slogans on your clothing at public schools.

New York Times Co. v. United States (1971): Defending Press Freedom

In this case, better known as the “ Pentagon Papers Case ,” the government tried to prevent the New York Times from publishing classified documents containing information that the US government was trying to hide because it demonstrated unfavorable information about the USA’s role in the Vietnam War (Rudenstine, 2014). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York Times. It affirmed the principle of no prior restraint, which means that the government cannot stop the publication of a news story pro-actively, except in extremely rare circumstances. This case reaffirmed the robustness of press freedom in the USA.

Texas v. Johnson (1989): The Right to Flag Burning

This case involved Gregory Lee Johnson who burned an American flag as a form of political protest. This led to his arrest under a now-defunct Texas law banning “flag desecration” (Goldstein, 2016). The Supreme Court overturned his conviction stating that Johnson’s act was symbolic speech and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. Here, we can see that ‘speech’ isn’t just about speaking but also symbolism . This decision significantly reinforced the idea of protection for symbolic speech under the freedom of speech.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010): Money is Speech

This case addressed the issue of campaign financing, where the court found that giving money to a political candidate was seen as ‘political speech’ and therefore protected by the first amendment (Magarian, 2010). Citizens United, a non-profit organization, challenged a regulation barring corporations and unions from funding political campaign ads. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Citizens United . This, in turn, allowed unlimited corporate spending in elections, asserting that such “political speech” was protected under the First Amendment. Detractors – including myself – think this case essentially positioned corporations as people, which is ridiculous, and led to the devastating hyper-politicization of elections we see to this day.

Snyder v. Phelps (2011): The Right to Offend

This case involved the Westboro Baptist Church’s right to picket military funerals with fundamentalist anti-military sentiments, resulting in an emotional distress lawsuit from the father of a fallen marine (Carpenter, 2011). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Westboro Baptist Church . The justices argued that the expression represented matters of public concern, thus protected under the First Amendment, no matter how offensive this behavior truly was.

Schenck v. United States (1919): The Limitations of Free Speech

Charles Schenck, Secretary of the Socialist Party, was arrested for distributing leaflets opposing the draft during World War I (Lewis, 2008). The Supreme Court upheld his conviction under the Espionage Act, ruling that Schenck’s actions posed a “clear and present danger” to national security. This case is important as it established the “clear and present danger” standard for limiting freedom of speech. Although, in my opinion, this ruling was counter to many other Supreme Court findings that held very absolutist perspectives toward free speech, and demonstrated the constant right-wing leanings of US supreme courts over the years.

While “freedom of speech” can often seem like an expansive term, understanding its roots in the democratic principles of open discussion and societal checks and balances can offer some enlightening contexts. However, as discussed above, there are indeed certain conditions and restrictions and, like any freedom, it necessitates responsible handling. Interestingly, strong free speech laws in the USA have led to many perverse outcomes which demonstrates that they may be too lenient; while in my home country of Australia, free speech is often protected, but the laws are much more strict. Finding the right balance is extremely difficult.

Abernathy, M. (2007). First Amendment Law Handbook . Thomson/West.

Brimelow v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 132 S. Ct. 2681 (2012).

Carpenter, D. H. (2011). Westboro Church’s Funeral Picketing is Free Speech . Supreme Court Debates.

Franks, D. D. (2014). The Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy, Due Process , and the Nature of the Interrogation Process. Routledge.

Goldstein, R. (2016). Flag Burning and Free Speech: The Case of Texas v. Johnson. University Press Of Kansas.

Legal Information Institute. (2020). Freedom of Speech. Cornell Law School. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/freedom_of_speech

Lewis, A. (2008). Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment. Basic Books.

Lidsky, L. B. & Cotter, R. T. (2016 ). Freedom of the Press: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution . Greenwood.

Magarian, G. P. (2010). The Democracy of Direct Speech. Wm. & Mary Law Review, 97.

Rudenstine, D. (2014). The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case. University of California Press.

Smith, K. E., & Kavanagh, D. (2015). Freedom of Speech: The History of an Idea . Penn State University Press.

Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche News: The Politics of News Choice . Oxford University Press.

• Chris Drew (PhD) https://helpfulprofessor.com/author/chris-drew-phd-2/ 10 Reasons you’re Perpetually Single
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2 thoughts on “27 Freedom of Speech Examples”

Hi Professor Drew: I am so-o-o-o enjoying your site. I am an ESL teacher, and I use it extensively to introduce the students to American culture. I really like the deep dives into specific topics, like The American Dream, and Freedom of Speech. A fantastic resource! Thank you!

Hi Jane, thanks so much for reaching out and I’m so glad my website is a useful resource for you. All the best with your teaching!

Regards, Chris.

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50 Persuasive Speech Topics for High School Students

September 9, 2024

Throughout high school, students will be asked to write about topics and make compelling arguments for certain positions. These persuasive speeches and other writing assignments train a student's communication skills. Creating a compelling, persuasive speech is a powerful skill that will help students in all aspects of their careers, not just in writing courses. The ability to write persuasively will especially have a huge effect on your admissions results when writing your personal statements and essays for college. 

With a powerful speech, students can express their opinions, influence others, and develop critical communication skills for school and the workplace. Choosing the right topic for a speech is often as important as how well it's written. To help you find the right topics for your audience, here are 50 persuasive speech topics you can use to help you get started with your writing. 

Want an expert's opinion on your college applications? Book a free strategy call and begin your admissions journey today! 

What Makes a Good Persuasive Speech Topic?

Compelling persuasive speech topics are relatable, debatable, and relevant. Students should investigate a topic they're passionate about and will intrigue an audience. Don't just take an easy position everyone can agree with—audiences are interested in ideas they may have never heard before, expressed enthusiastically by a passionate speaker. 

When ideating a topic, find something with clear, opposing viewpoints. Research the available arguments and present your speech in a way that promotes a meaningful discussion. For example, topics regarding the use of social media, the right to freedom of speech, and the Supreme Court are general and can engage a wide audience. 

Topics that everyone agrees with, have no opposing viewpoints, and require no research will not make for interesting speeches. Choose a topic that will challenge you and your audience, but avoid being offensive or controversial for its own sake. A topic you're genuinely interested in—like renewable energy for engineering students or social media platforms for communications students will make writing a compelling speech much more natural. With additional research and effective writing techniques, you can craft a speech to captivate an audience. 

How to Choose the Right Persuasive Speech Topic for Your Audience

Choosing the right topic starts with knowing your target audience. While ideating, consider:

• Who are you targeting? 
• What do you want to convince them? 
• What counter-arguments may they have? 

Think about those who would agree with you, be on the fence with you, and who would directly oppose your viewpoint. Writing persuasively is not just about presenting facts and hoping others agree. It's about making an emotional connection with your audience and using that impression to shift their thinking. 

Once you've given careful thought to those you'd be presenting to, brainstorm persuasive speech topic ideas that may resonate with them. Make a list of potential ideas and interrogate their merit. Consider current events, personal experiences, and issues others may relate to. Then, narrow down your list to the persuasive topics you would be most interested in—as an audience member and a researcher. 

Once you've landed on a few interesting topics, don't rest on them. Ask for feedback and get insights from family, friends, and teachers. Outside perspectives are important; others may have experiences that could provide you with valuable knowledge to use when refining your topic. 

50 Persuasive Speech Topic Ideas

School topics.

• The Benefits and Drawbacks of Mandatory School Uniforms
• How Effective is the School Grading System?
• How Students can Shape their Curriculum
• Is Homework Beneficial or Harmful?
• How Would Schools Handle a Four-Day Week?

Art and Humanities Topics

• Art or Vandalism: The History of Graffiti
• Art vs STEM: What Should Schools Prioritize?
• AI-Generated Media: How Do Humans Value Art?
• The Correlation Between Art and Mental Health
• Are Video Games the Ultimate Artform?

Social Issues Topics

• The Right to Protest: Traditional Movements vs Digital Activism
• Why do Wealthy Countries have Declining Birth Rates?
• Should For-Profit Prisons be Permanently Abolished?
• Is Healthcare a Human Right?

Environmental Issues

• Why Corporations Need Stricter Plastics Regulation
• Environmental Ethics: Human Development vs Species Preservation
• The Benefits and Drawbacks of Fully Electric Vehicles
• History of Geo-Engineering: Can Society Reverse Climate Change?
• What is Dark Oxygen? The Effect of Deep Sea Mining

Technology and Media Topics

• Should the Government Regulate the Coming AI revolution?
• Where Does Online Misinformation Come From?
• Why Does Social Media Affect Self-Image?
• The Right to Privacy: How Online anonymity affects people's behavior
• Why All Messaging Apps Should Have End-to-End Encryption
• Should Artificial Intelligence be Used in Creative Works?
• Should Social Media Platforms be Accountable for their Users?

Politics and Government

• Should Voting be Compulsory?
• How Public and Private Funding Affect Political Campaigns
• What is gerrymandering? 
• Why Do Some Countries Have Mandatory Military Service?
• The benefits and drawbacks of term limits for elected officials

Sports Topics

• Should esports be officially recognized as part of the Olympic Games?
• MMA and Boxing: The Ethics of Broadcasting Violence
• Has Football Become More Dangerous?
• Should Men and Women compete in the same Leagues? 
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Student Opinion

Why Is Freedom of Speech an Important Right? When, if Ever, Can It Be Limited?

By Michael Gonchar

• Sept. 12, 2018

This extended Student Opinion question and a related lesson plan were created in partnership with the National Constitution Center in advance of Constitution Day on Sept. 17. For information about a cross-classroom “Constitutional Exchange,” see The Lauder Project .

One of the founding principles of the United States that Americans cherish is the right to freedom of speech. Enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution, freedom of speech grants all Americans the liberty to criticize the government and speak their minds without fear of being censored or persecuted.

Even though the concept of freedom of speech on its face seems quite simple, in reality there are complex lines that can be drawn around what kinds of speech are protected and in what setting.

The Supreme Court declared in the case Schenck v. United States in 1919 that individuals are not entitled to speech that presents a “clear and present danger” to society. For example, a person cannot falsely yell “fire” in a crowded theater because that speech doesn’t contribute to the range of ideas being discussed in society, yet the risk of someone getting injured is high. On the other hand, in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, the court declared that even inflammatory speech, such as racist language by a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, should generally be protected unless it is likely to cause imminent violence.

While the text and principle of the First Amendment have stayed the same, the court’s interpretation has indeed changed over time . Judges, lawmakers and scholars continue to struggle with balancing strong speech protections with the necessity of maintaining a peaceful society.

What do you think? Why is the freedom of speech an important right? Why might it be important to protect even unpopular or hurtful speech? And yet, when might the government draw reasonable limits on speech, and why?

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Free Speech

Author: Mark Satta Category:  Social and Political Philosophy , Philosophy of Law , Ethics Word Count: 989

Want to criticize your government? Burn a flag? Wear a t-shirt that says f**k the draft?

Thanks to freedom of speech , in many places you can. [1]

But what exactly is freedom of speech? And what does it permit us to say? This essay will review some influential answers to these questions.

1. Protection from Government, Not Private Actors

Freedom of speech, sometimes called freedom of expression , is a legal right to express many beliefs and ideas without government interference or punishment. This freedom does not typically prevent private entities (e.g., ordinary citizens or private organizations) from limiting speech. [2]

If freedom of speech prevented private entities from limiting speech, freedom of speech could not be applied consistently because the freedom of speech includes the ability not to speak. [3] So, e.g., if a newspaper was forced to publish every piece of writing submitted to it, then that newspaper would lose some ability to not speak. Freedom of speech also includes the right not to listen to or receive other people’s messages. [4]  

The fact that freedom of speech only prevents government interference doesn’t entail that freedom of speech is irrelevant to action by private entities. Some argue that certain private entities ought to voluntarily conform to legal standards for speech protection: e.g., that private universities should conform to the free speech standards legally required by public universities. [5]  Freedom of speech is also sometimes understood more broadly as a social value.

2. Limits on Free Speech

Freedom of speech is not an unlimited right. All governments impose some limits on what kinds of speech they will protect. This is because freedom of speech, like all rights, must be balanced against other rights and values.

Common types of speech not protected by freedom of speech include threats of violence, false advertising, and defamation (i.e., false statements that unjustly harm someone’s reputation). [6]

Many democratic nations do not protect hate speech (i.e., speech intended to threaten, degrade, or incite hatred against a group or group member based on group prejudice). But some other nations, including the United States, treat hate speech as protected speech. Whether hate speech should receive free speech protection has been much debated in recent years. [7]

  But even protected speech can be limited to an extent by the government: e.g., freedom of speech does not permit just anyone to enter a military base or a class at a public university and start talking. This is true because, even though military bases and public universities are government-run, these spaces seek to achieve other important goals that justify limiting free speech.

Freedom of speech gives you much greater latitude in a public park, a public sidewalk, or in your own home. But even in public places like parks and sidewalks, freedom of speech allows for content-neutral restrictions on speech: e.g., a town can have a noise ordinance banning playing loud music in parks near residential neighborhoods after midnight.

But it is important that these restrictions be content- and viewpoint-neutral . [8] Thus, a town could not pass an ordinance limiting speech only about certain topics or from certain perspectives in the park. Such a rule would discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of the speech. An important part of freedom of speech is that the government cannot restrict speech just because it doesn’t like the topics or agree with the speaker. Freedom of speech also doesn’t allow for the suppression of ideas simply because those ideas are unpopular.

3. Expressive Conduct

Freedom of speech protects more than just spoken and written expression. It also protects many other activities through which ideas can be expressed: [9] e.g., in the United States, abstract art, non-lyrical music, and marching in a parade are all activities protected under the freedom of speech. [10]

There are controversies concerning which activities ought to be considered expressive conduct: e.g., there is substantial disagreement about whether political spending by corporations ought to be protected as free speech. [11] There are also disagreements about if and when the creation of products like wedding cakes and photographs ought to be considered protected speech. [12]

4. Prior Restraint versus Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of speech protects people against two different types of government interference: prior restraint and subsequent punishment .

A prior restraint prevents you from speaking: it restrains your speech prior to it being made. At one point, many legal scholars thought that freedom of speech meant only freedom from prior restraint. [13] That is no longer true.

Today, most everyone believes that freedom of speech protects people not only from prior restraint, but also from subsequent punishment (i.e., from being legally sanctioned for protected speech). This makes freedom of speech more robust because it protects people not only from having their protected speech restrained, but also from having their protected speech punished by the government.

5. Why is Free Speech Important?

Philosophers and legal scholars have given many different explanations for why free speech is important. Many scholars think there are multiple good reasons why we protect free speech. [14]

Three common rationales for free speech protections are that they help us (1) discover truth, (2) respect human autonomy, and (3) preserve democracy by allowing criticism of government.

Influential advocates of the idea that free speech helps us discover truth include writer John Milton, philosopher John Stuart Mill, and U.S. Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis. [15]

One common form of the truth discovery argument is that the best way to overcome false speech is with more speech. [16] Given what we know about how viral misinformation works, such a claim can appear implausible. [17] But even if this version of the truth discovery argument is mistaken, there may be weaker forms of a truth-preservation principle that provide us with good reason to safeguard free speech: e.g., someone might argue that the fallibility of political leaders requires them to avoid suppressing others’ ideas.

6. Conclusion

Freedom of speech is valuable. Protecting it first requires understanding it.

[1] See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio , Texas v. Johnson , and Cohen v. California .

[2] See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amend I .

[3] Gaebler 1982 .

[4] Corbin 2009 .

[5] Chemerinsky and Gillman 2017 .

[6] Maras 2015 , Redish and Voils 2017 , and Post 1986 .

[7] See, e.g., Waldron 2012 and Strossen 2018 .

[8] Jacobs 2003 .

[9] Tushnet, Chen, and Blocher 2017 .

[10] See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston .

[11] Hasen 2011 .

[12] Liptak 2017 .

[13] Rabban 1981 , Healy 2013 .

[14] Greenawalt 1989 .

[15] Milton 1644 (reprinted 1918) , Mill 1859 , Abrams v. United States (Holmes, J. dissenting ), Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J. concurring) .

[16] See, e.g., Milton 1644 (reprinted 1918) , Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J. concurring) .

[17] Wu 2018 .

Abrams v. the United States , 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston , 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

Whitney v. California , 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

Corbin, Caroline Mala. 2009. “The First Amendment right against compelled listening.” Boston University Law Review , 89 (3): 939-1016.

Chemerinsky, Erwin and Howard Gillman. 2017. Free Speech on Campus . Yale University Press.

Gaebler, David. 1982. “First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association.” Boston College Law Review , 23 (4): 995-1023.

Greenawalt, Kent. 1989. “Free Speech Justifications.” Columbia Law Review 89 (1): 119-155.

Hasen, Richard L. 2011. “Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence.” Michigan Law Review , 109 (4): 581-623.

Healy, Thomas. 2013. The Great Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America . Metropolitan Books.

Jacobs, Leslie Gielow. 2003. “Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations.” McGeorge Law Review , 34 (3): 595-635 .

Liptak, Adam. 2017. “Where to Draw Line on Free Speech? Wedding Cake Case Vexes Lawyers.” New York Times .

Maras, Marie-Helen. 2015. “Unprotected Speech Communicated via Social Media: What Amounts to a True Threat?” Journal of Internet Law , 19 (3): 3-9.

Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty . John W. Parker & Son.

Milton, John. 1918. Areopagitica . Cambridge University Press.

Post, Robert C. 1986. “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution” California Law Review , 74: 691-742.

Rabban, David M. 1981. “The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years.” Yale Law Journal , 90 (3): 514-595.

Redish, Martin H. and Kyle Voils. 2017. “False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency Principle.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal , 25: 765-799.

Strossen, Nadine. 2018. Hate: Why We Should Resist it With Free Speech, Not Censorship . Oxford University Press.

Tushnet, Mark V., Alan K. Chen, and Joseph Blocher. 2017. Free Speech Beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendment . New York University Press.

Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. The Harm in Hate Speech . Harvard University Press.

Wu, Tim. 2018. “Is the First Amendment Obsolete?” Michigan Law Review , 117 (3): 547-581.

For Further Reading

“Freedom of Expression – Speech and Press.” Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute.

van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  

Related Essays

Philosophy of Law: An Overview  by Mark Satta

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Theories of Punishment by Travis Joseph Rodgers 

Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought by David Antonini

John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ by Ben Davies

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About the Author

Mark Satta is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Purdue University and his JD from Harvard Law School. Some of his philosophical research interests include philosophy of law, epistemology, bioethics, and philosophy of language. MarkSatta.com

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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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Freedom of Speech in the United States

How it works

Freedom of speech has been protected in The United States by the First Amendment since 1791. For over 100 years, this right, though symbolically important, has sat dormant. However today, freedom of speech has been in the headlines due to its involvement in controversial topics surrounding the media, political correctness, and “hate speech”. Hateful beliefs and intolerance towards those with different characteristics exist throughout society and results in an environment of hate. Americans now have a hard choice to make of what freedom of speech means and where to draw the line on what it protects.

Freedom of speech is an essential right that grants all Americans the liberty to criticize the government and speak their minds without the fear of being censored. However, it is time to realize that speech directing hatred and vitriol at marginalized people does not advance freedom or liberty.

Allowing hate speech to be protected by the constitution leads to a hostile environment for those it is directed at, as well as it rallies harm and violence against innocent individuals of our society. This topic is often brought before our judicial branch of government, highlighting the relevance to society today. Other countries have worked hard to build an inclusive environment for their citizens and denounce hate speech. Understanding the importance of the US constitution is crucial, however there is room for growth and evolution with current societal beliefs.

Exploring the union of ideas and events that led to the declaration of “freedom of speech and of the press” are important influences in the development of the principle and where it stands today. Freedom of speech in America began off the basis of the English Bill of Rights enacted in 1689 from the English Parliament. According to David Bogen, the colonies attempted to follow the Parliament and secure freedom of speech in legislative debate (1). This is emphasized by the Articles of Confederation directing that “Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress….” (2). Declaring these principles allowed politicians to gain independence and protection against punishment for criticizing a legislator and avoid censorship by the government. Moving this privilege forward began with the inclusion of common individuals. It is this cross over that has led to a more controversial discussion. When dealing with free speech in the legislature, it was confined to an environment where it was powerless to cause any other harm. However, with the expansion of freedom of speech to society generally, the potential of speech to cause harm increased greatly. The final form of the first amendment states, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech or of the press” (3). This brings up a contradictory element of freedom of speech. In the federal system, only Congress can set national limits on speech; for example, making laws regulating commercial speech and copyright laws. However, the language of the first amendment clearly restricts Congress from interfering with freedom of speech. Bogen sheds some light on this paradox stating, “Under the Constitution only the whole body of the people acting through Congress even arguably has the power to restrict speech” (1). In conclusion, the fight for freedom of speech dates back to the regulations imposed on speech in England and Americans need for protection against prior restraints.

The progressive era brought around a time of change for the political status of expression rights. During this time legislatures began to discuss proposals limiting the scope of expression rights, however measures like this were rarely passed. This era also showed a transition in how individuals were using the constitution as a defense for free speech. According to Mark Graber, “Leading progressive thinkers insisted the public policy should promote the social interests of the community and that these interests could best be determined by elected officials and social science experts” (4). This highlights the discontent for the judiciary system having control over the fundamental principles of American government. Instead the policies should be flexible for revision when noticing consequences, they entail when acted upon. Grab states, “This interpretation of the nature of truth has been called ‘instrumentalism’ because the validity of concepts is measured by their observable consequences, rather than logical structure” (4). This means that the new intellectuals believe the laws should be ever changing in relation to the effect and consequences seen by the civilian population.

The argument of censorship in America has been apart the first amendments history since its institution. This debate is relevant to all citizens of The United States, especially minorities or other parties facing discrimination. Regulating “hate speech” eliminates both the direct and indirect harm that comes to the recipients. For some individuals, verbal abuse can render the workplace and educational environments unbearable. This utilitarianism value rests on the fact that the positive feelings invoked by hate speech is greatly outweighed by the disgust and fear that minorities feel by falling victim. In addition, constitutionalists, extremist and internet users find themselves on the same side of the argument, protecting speech and their ability to preach content without repercussions. They believe that freedom of speech is operating as a democratic principle and a democracy cannot legitimately restrict speech within public discourse, solely on grounds of the undesirable worldviews expressed.

Allowing hate speech to fall under the guise of freedom of speech fosters a hostile environment for minorities, allowing their human dignity to be vandalized. In recent years, this controversy has been played out on college campuses. College campuses provide an environment where individuals can be fluid with their social markers, such as lifestyle preferences and cultural habits. According to Peter Scott, “The increased diversity on campuses has had important implications for debates about ‘free speech’ and ‘political correctness’. The exercise of free speech that appears to threaten their identity or culture and even their still precarious foothold in higher education can easily be interpreted as intolerable” (5). Scott recognizes that no speech is absolute and college campuses do not follow the “anything goes” model. There are sensitives and vulnerabilities that should be respected. This is seen by students campaigning for campus buildings to be renamed, protesting controversial speakers on campus, and mutual respect within the academic community. It is also important that these core components of the university experience not be invoked too often to protect the progressive science and enlightenment occurring within students. A strong balance must be reached to have the best environment to foster the learning experience, which is based on the ability to have free thoughts.

One way to ensure a respectable balance is to have improved responses from people in positions of power when the controversial topic arises. There has been a rise in frequency of hateful incidents on college campuses over the past two years. According to Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “There has been a 77% increase in White supremacist propaganda during the 2017-18 school year, including nooses hung on trees to swastikas painted on Jewish professor’s office walls” (6). These actions are terrorizing and detrimental to students and professors who are trying to increase the wealth of the country they live in. Even in wake of these unsetting action, campus leaders are still stumbling in their responses, not fully condemning the hateful content of the messages. This leaves room for these ideas to be seeding in other vulnerable people’s heads and grow in to a much bigger problem. Individuals involved are not seeing any consequences for their actions which encourages them to continue at even larger extremes. Such neutral statements may be a way to combat the concerns regarding navigating free speech. However, free speech should not be positioned against hate speech, as if protecting free speech means there are constraints on denouncing hate. Strong responses are becoming more apparent, such as the vice president at Cornell for student life Ryan Lombardi expressing his “revulsion” (6) at a swastika being marked in the snow, and how denouncing hate is a “shared responsibility” (6). This answer helps assert core community values that knit the campus closer together rather than increase the divide. In addition to campus leaders speaking out, there needs to be more training for residential assistants and resources available for students to report or seek counseling for such events. Every person, no matter their race, religion, or gender deserve a supportive, all-inclusive learning environment to better themselves and in turn the world around them.

Groups that are targeted for hateful expressions due to race, religion, or ethnicity usually develop into victims of hate-related incidents. Hate speech threatens unlawful harm and incites violence towards members of these targeted groups. According to the 2017 FBI report ove hate crimes, “There were 7,106 single-bias incidents involving 8,493 victims. A percent distribution of victims by bias type shows that 59.6 percent of victims were targeted because of the offenders’ race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 20.6 percent were targeted because of the offenders’ religious bias; 15.8 percent were victimized because of the offenders’ sexual-orientation bias” (7). It would be naive to deny the relationship between hate speech and the hate crimes that follow. Governments functions are to protect individuals threatened with immediate violence and preserve social conditions that foster individual autonomy. Implementing stronger restrictions on these kinds of expression can save targeted individuals from immediate physical harm as well has serious psychological consequences. Eric Rosenberg highlights the detrimental effects hate speech and racism have on not only the individual but more importantly society. Egalitarianism is a doctrine that all people are equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities (8). It is a compelling ideal that emphasizes the rights that all people deserve and should not be sacrificed for the small gain of others. Rosenberg states, “The failure of the legal system to redress the harms of racism, and of racial insults, conveys to all the lesson that egalitarianism is not a fundamental principle; the law, through inaction, implicitly teaches that respect for individuals is of little importance” (8). This is confirmed in the increase of white supremist groups and religious bases being vandalized or destroyed. One of the most prominent cases of society being directed to ignore egalitarianism was made by President Trump concerning the Charlottesville rally in 2018. President Trump refused to outright condemn the white nationalists and even stated, “You also had people that were very fine people, on both sides” (9). This type of apathetic response only encourages extremists that there will be consequences for their actions and they can go about striping other people’s human dignities. The common saying, “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me”, minimizes the value that words have. However, one cannot protect free speech and demise hate speech by denying the power of speech.

One driving force behind the support for restricting hate speech is the success other countries have found and their avoidance to becoming an oppressive society. The fear Americans have is that they will be silenced, and the government will have complete censorship over all speech outlets.

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• Essay on Freedom of Speech in English Free PDF download

Download Important English Essay on the Topic - Freedom of Speech Free PDF from Vedantu

One of the fundamental rights of the citizens of India is ‘Freedom of Speech’. This is allowed to the citizens by a lot of countries to empower the citizens to share their own thoughts and views. This freedom of speech essay is for students of class 5 and above. The language used in this essay is plain and simple for a better understanding of the students. This freedom of speech essay example will help the students write a paragraph on freedom of speech in their own words easily.

Long Essay on Freedom of Speech

The phrase “Freedom of Speech” has been misinterpreted by some individuals who either do not actually understand the meaning of the phrase completely or have a totally different agenda in mind altogether. Every democratic country gives its citizens this freedom. The same is guaranteed by the Constitution of India too. Irrespective of your gender, religion, caste, or creed, you are guaranteed that freedom as an Indian. The values of democracy in a country are defined by this guaranteed fundamental freedom. The freedom to practice any religion, the freedom to express opinions and disagreeing viewpoints without hurting the sentiments or causing violence is what India is essentially made up of.

Indians stand out for their secularism and for spreading democratic values across the world. Thus, to save and celebrate democracy, enforcing freedom of speech in India becomes a necessity. Freedom of speech is not only about the fundamental rights, it’s also a fundamental duty to be done by every citizen rightfully so as to save the essence of democracy.

In developed democracies like the US, UK, Germany or France, we see a “freedom of speech” that is different from what we see in authoritarian countries like China, Malaysia or Syria and failed democratic countries like Pakistan or Rwanda. These governance systems failed because they lacked freedom of speech. Freedom of press gives us a yardstick to gauge the freedom of speech in a country. A healthy, liberal and strong democracy is reflected by a strong media presence in a country, since they are supposed to be the voice of the common people. A democracy that has a stomach for criticisms and disagreements is taken in a positive way. 

Some governments get very hostile when faced with any form of criticism and so they try to oppress any voices that might stand against them. This becomes a dangerous model of governance for any country. For example, India has more than hundred and thirty crores of population now and we can be sure that every individual will not have the same thought process and same views and opinions about one thing. A true democracy is made by the difference of opinions and the respect people have for each other in the team that is responsible for making the policies.

Before making a choice, all aspects and angles of the topic should be taken into consideration. A good democracy will involve all the people - supporters and critics alike, before formulating a policy, but a bad one will sideline its critics, and force authoritarian and unilateral policies upon all of the citizens.

Sedition law, a British-era law, was a weapon that was used in India to stifle criticism and curb freedom of speech during the pre-independence era. Through section 124A of Indian Penal Code, the law states that if a person with his words, written or spoken, brings hatred, contempt or excites tension towards a government or an individual can be fined or jailed or fined and jailed both. This law was used by the Britishers to stifle the freedom fighters. Today it is being used by the political parties to silence criticism and as a result is harming the democratic values of the nation. 

Many laws in India also protect the people in rightfully exercising their freedom of expression but the implementation of these laws is proving to be a challenge. Freedom of speech cannot be absolute. In the name of freedom of speech, hatred, tensions, bigotry and violence too cannot be caused in the society. It will then become ironically wrong to allow freedom of speech in the first place. Freedom of speech and expression should not become the reason for chaos and anarchy in a nation. Freedom of speech was stifled when article 370 got revoked in Kashmir. Not that the government was trying to go against the democratic values, but they had to prevent the spread of fake news, terrorism or any type of communal tensions in those areas.

Short Essay on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech allows the people of our country to express themselves, and share their ideas, views and opinions openly. As a result, the public and the media can comment on any political activity and also express their dissent towards anything they think is not appropriate.

Various other countries too provide freedom of speech to their citizens but they have certain limitations. Different countries have different restrictions on their freedom of speech. Some countries also do not allow this fundamental right at all and the best example being North Korea. There, the media or the public are not allowed to speak against the government. It becomes a punishable offence to criticize the government or the ministers or the political parties.

Key Highlights of the Essay - Freedom of Speech

Every democratic country gives its citizens the Freedom of Speech so as to enable the citizens to freely express their individual views, ideas and concerns. The freedom to be able to practice any religion, to be able to express individual secularism and for spreading democratic values across the world. In order to be able to save and to celebrate democracy, enforcing freedom of speech in India Is essential. Freedom of speech  about fundamental rights is also a fundamental duty of citizens in order to save the essence of democracy.  In a country, a healthy, liberal and strong democracy is always  reflected and can be seen through a strong media presence, as the media are the voice of the common people.  When faced with any form of criticism, we see some governments get very hostile,  and they  try to oppress  and stop any kind of  voices that might go against them. This is not favorable for any country. 

A good democracy involves all the people - all their various  supporters and critics alike, before they begin formulating any policies. India had the Sedition law, a British-era law that is used to stifle criticism and curb freedom of speech during the pre-independence era. The section 124A of Indian Penal Code, this law of sedition stated that if a person with his words, written or spoken, brings hatred, contempt or excites tension towards a government or an individual, then he can be fined or jailed or both. Using  freedom of speech, people spread hatred, unnecessary tensions, bigotry and some amount of violence too in the society. Ironically  in such cases, it will be wrong to allow freedom of speech. The reasons for chaos and anarchy in a nation should not be due to  Freedom of speech and expression. This law was stifled when article 370 got revoked in Kashmir, in order to prevent the spread of fake news, terrorism or any type of communal tensions in those areas.

Freedom of speech gives people of our country, the freedom to express themselves, to be able to share their ideas, views and opinions openly, where the public and the media can express and comment on any political activities and can also be able to express their dissent towards anything they think is not appropriate. Different countries have different restrictions on their freedom of speech. And it is not proper to comment on that .In Fact, there are some countries which does not allow this fundamental right , for example, North Korea where neither the media nor the public have any right to speak against or even for the government and it is a punishable offense to openly criticize the government or the or anyone in particular.

While freedom of speech lets the society grow it could have certain negative outcomes. It should not be used to disrespect or instigate others. The media too should not misuse it. We, the people of this nation, should act responsibly towards utilizing its freedom of speech and expression. Lucky we are to be citizens of India. It’s a nation that respects all its citizens and gives them the rights needed for their development and growth.

A fundamental right of every citizen of India, the  ‘Freedom of Speech’ allows citizens to share their individual thoughts and views.

FAQs on Essay on Freedom of Speech in English Free PDF download

1. Mention five lines for Freedom of Speech Essay?

i) A fundamental right that is guaranteed to citizens of a country to be able to express their opinions and points of view without any kind of censorship.

ii) A democracy’s health depends on the extent of freedom of expression of all its citizens.

iii) Freedom of speech is never absolute in nature.

iv) New Zealand, USA or UK rank  high in terms of freedom of speech by its citizens.

v) A fundamental right in the Indian constitution is the Freedom of Speech and Expression.

2. Explain Freedom of Speech?

A fundamental right of every citizen of India, Freedom Of Speech allows every citizen the freedom and the right to express all their views, concerns, ideas and issues relating to anything about their country. Freedom of Speech is never actual in nature  and has its limits too. It cannot be used for any kind of illegal purposes.The health of a democracy depends on the extent of freedom of expression of its citizens.

3. What happens when there is no Freedom of Speech?

A country will become a police and military state with no democratic and humanitarian values in it if there is no freedom of speech. Freedom of Speech is a fundamental right for all citizens, and a failure to not being able to express one’s ideas, beliefs, and thoughts will result in a non authoritarian and non democratic country.  Failure to have freedom of speech in a country would mean that the rulers or the governments of those countries have no respect for its citizens.

4. Where can we get study material related to essay writing ?

It is important to practice some of the important questions in order to do well. Vedantu.com offers these important questions along with answers that have been formulated in a well structured, well researched, and easy to understand manner. Various essay writing topics, letter writing samples, comprehension passages are all available at the online portals today. Practicing and studying with the help of these enable the students to measure their level of proficiency, and also allows them to understand the difficult questions with ease. 

You can avail all the well-researched and good quality chapters, sample papers, syllabus on various topics from the website of Vedantu and its mobile application available on the play store. 

5. Why should students choose Vedantu for an essay on the topic 'Freedom of Speech’?

Essay writing is important for students   as it helps them increase their brain and vocabulary power. Today it is important to be able to practice some important topics, samples and questions to be able to score well in the exams. Vedantu.com offers these important questions along with answers that have been formulated in a well structured, well researched, and easy to understand manner. The NCERT and other study material along with their explanations are very easily accessible from Vedantu.com and can be downloaded too. Practicing with the help of these questions along with the solutions enables the students to measure their level of proficiency, and also allows them to understand the difficult questions with ease. 

6. What is Freedom of Speech?

Freedom of speech is the ability to express our opinions without any fear.

7. Which country allows the highest level of Freedom of Speech to its citizens?

The USA is at the highest with a score of 5.73.

8. Is Freedom of Speech absolute?

No, freedom of speech cannot be absolute. It has limitations.

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205 Controversial Topics for your Essay, Speech, or Debate

Amanda Green was born in a small town in the west of Scotland, where everyone knows everyone. I joined the Toastmasters 15 years ago, and I served in nearly every office in the club since then. I love helping others gain confidence and skills they can apply in every day life.

Do you think social media platforms should censor politicians? No matter how important you feel this issue is relative to other issues of the day, you’re likely to have an opinion one way or the other. Why? Because it’s a controversial matter, and it immediately pushes some buttons in our brains.

What makes issues like this so engaging?

Controversial topics have two features that almost instantly grab people’s attention. On one side, they are both simple and familiar, and so are understandable without any effort. On the other side, they touch on sensitive matters that society as a whole has not yet come to terms with. This makes them tickle our inherent desire for closure. We want to make up our minds once and for all!

So if you’re looking for such a topic for your essay, speech, or debate, you’ve come to the right place!

We’ve compiled a list of hundreds of controversial issues organized by subject matter (You can visit our page on how to write a persuasive controversial essay if you want to improve your base skills). Whether you’re trying to come up with a topic for your science, psychology, history class – or nearly any other topic! – you’re sure to find an issue below that will keep your audience engaged, and even stir up some discussion.

In this article:

Political Debate Topics

Controversial criminal justice topics, controversial religious topics, controversial topics for teens, controversial science topics, controversial sports topics, controversial food topics, controversial nutrition topics, controversial animal topics, controversial topics in psychology, controversial relationship topics, controversial medical topics, controversial topics in nursing, controversial topics in biology, music controversial topics, controversial art topics, controversial history topics, funny controversial topics, what are the pros and cons of controversial topics.

As mentioned earlier, picking a controversial topic almost guarantees that you’ll command your audience’s attention. But such issues have downsides too. We go over the advantages and disadvantages of hot-button issues to help you make the right choice for your essay, speech, or debate.

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• Immediately engaging – Your readers or listeners are unlikely to doze off.
• Easy to find information on – You won’t have to look far to find credible information on controversial issues.
• Likely to keep you absorbed while researching – What’s interesting for your audience will probably keep boredom at bay for you too.
• Too sensitive for some people – These issues often have a strong emotional charge and may even be taboo for some, causing awkward situations.
• Hard to review all points – A huge debate has probably been raging on such topics, so it’s not so easy to cover all your bases and appear knowledgeable on the issue at hand.
• Hard to wrap up – These matters are controversial for a reason. It may be hard to come to a satisfactory conclusion, whether you’re presenting or debating.

Interesting Controversial Topics by Field

Below, we’ve compiled a catalog of fascinating controversial topics by field. Keep in mind that many of these spill over from one category to another, so there is some overlap. Is climate change a political or scientific issue? There’s a controversial question for you!

Controversy is where politics are born. There’s usually some point of disagreement about any matter related to public affairs – that’s why a politician’s main job is to debate and come to an agreement (ideally) on how to handle these issues. Or, as political scientist Harold Lasswell put it succinctly, politics is, “Who gets what, when, how.”

So political issues are controversial by definition. We’ve worked hard to provide you with the longest, most comprehensive list you’ll find anywhere, and any of these topics may be instantly captivating.

• Is democracy the best form of government?
• Should there be a minimum wage?
• Should the government intervene in the free market?
• Should the US government intervene in foreign affairs?
• Should there be term limits for US senators?
• Should the Electoral College be abolished in the US?
• Are there exceptions to the freedom of speech?
• Should hate speech be banned?
• Should the government ensure the protection of privacy?
• Is the gender pay gap real?
• Does institutional racism exist in the US?
• Is affirmative action helping or hurting?
• Is immigration helping or hurting the US?
• Should all illicit drugs be legalized?
• Should prostitution be legalized?
• Should abortion be banned?
• Should there be stricter gun control laws?
• Should automatic weapons be banned?
• Should military service be mandatory?
• Should water be a commodity or a human right?
• Should the government forgive all student debt?

Is justice being served? Few things get under people’s skin as much as perceived injustices. We are more or less programmed to seek fairness both for ourselves and for others. That’s why, similar to political topics, criminal justice issues are naturally engaging.

Appropriate punishment is salient now especially in the US after years of debates and protests related to the killings of minorities like George Floyd, Michael Brown, and Tamir Rice. More recently, the storming of the US Capitol, the role the President’s words had in inciting the perpetrators, and how liable they are when following their President’s words, are also hot-button issues. It’s hard to go wrong with a criminal justice topic.

• Is the death penalty ethical?
• Should people be jailed for drug-related offenses?
• Should police officers be charged for inappropriate use of force?
• Why are minorities disproportionately represented in the US prison population?
• Why does the US have the largest prison population in the world?
• Should mentally unstable people be charged with crimes?
• Should underage repeat offenders be tried as adults?
• Should there be more than 12 jurors in a jury?
• Should felons be allowed to vote?

Religion is a sensitive issue everywhere. Since it often concerns people’s innermost beliefs and principles, it’s not difficult to capture your audience’s attention with a religious topic. But beware that it’s also very easy to offend someone if you’re not careful.

Take religious freedom, for example – a concept interpreted in very different ways by different people. When in 2012 a Christian baker in Colorado refused to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple, was he exercising his religious freedom or discriminating against LGBTQ people?

• Is atheism a religion?
• Does religion do more harm than good?
• Should creationism be taught in schools?
• Should there be religious education in schools?
• Should religious symbols be banned from schools?
• Should schools’ curriculums consider religious points of view?
• Should public prayer be allowed in schools?
• Should religious institutions pay taxes?
• Are most religions inherently sexist?
• Is Buddhism more peaceful than other religions?

The teenage years are a transition period between childhood and adulthood, which causes a natural struggle between treating teens as children or adults. Can we hold teenagers accountable for crimes they committed? Or should their parents be responsible? Issues like this make a lively debate inevitable.

• Should we lower the voting age to 16?
• Should we lower the drinking age to 18?
• At what age should teens be allowed to date?
• At what age is it appropriate for teens to have sex?
• Should sex education be mandatory in school?
• Should teenage pregnancies be terminated?
• Should teens have access to birth control?
• Is cyberbullying as bad as real-life bullying?
• Is peer pressure good or bad?
• Does social media cause an increase in teenage suicide?
• Are beauty pageants harmful to teenagers’ self-esteem?
• Should teens be allowed to keep secrets from parents?
• Should energy drinks be banned for teenagers?
• Should mobile devices be banned at school?
• Is the school grading system effective?
• Should school uniforms be mandatory?
• Should teens be allowed to get tattoos?
• Should vaping be prohibited for teens?

Are you looking for more controversial topics for teens? Check out our other article where you can find 170+ controversial debate topics for teens , as well as the dos and don’ts when debating controversial topics.

Science has a very specific way of addressing controversies – by looking at evidence. When scientists disagree on something, they have to back their views with data and logical arguments. But scientific questions are often taken outside the realm of the experts and turn into social, political, or economic issues.

That’s why it’s important to be familiar with the concept of false equivalence – a fallacy in which a flawed or misleading argument is presented as equivalent to a sound and logical one. For instance, scientists have shown that the preponderance of evidence points to the reality of climate change. Media outlets and some politicians, however, sometimes present the issue as not settled. No matter whether climate change is real or not, saying that a politician’s opinion is as valid as a scientist’s – when we’re talking about that scientist’s field – is a false equivalence. Issues like that are bound to create a heated (pun intended) debate.

• Can scientists ever be objective?
• Should corporations fund research?
• Should science be optional in school?
• Why are women underrepresented in science?
• Is STEM education more valuable than training in humanities?
• Should cryptocurrencies be regulated?
• Should net neutrality be restored?
• Should robots have rights?
• Is AI a menace to humans?
• Is AI the next stage in evolution?
• Is technology helping or destroying Earth?
• Can renewable sources of energy replace fossil fuels?
• Is climate change a threat to humanity?
• Is cell phone radiation dangerous?
• Is climate change reversible?
• Should all cars be electric?
• Is nuclear energy safe?
• Does alien life exist?
• Could alien life have found Earth?
• Should humans try to colonize Mars?

Professional sports hold a lot of potential to create controversy. Hardly a week goes by without some major sports issue making the news. Whether it’s deflated footballs, kneeling during the anthem, or equal pay for male and female athletes, sports topics usually carry an emotional charge as most people have a strong opinion one way or the other .

• Should performance-enhancing drugs be allowed in sports?
• Are professional athletes paid too much?
• Are professional athletes good role models?
• Should college athletes be paid beyond scholarships?
• Should college athletes be tested for drugs?
• Is dance a real sport?
• Is video gaming a real sport?
• Is bodybuilding a real sport?
• Is cheerleading a real sport?
• Should mixed martial arts be banned?
• Should women compete against men in sports?
• Should female athletes be paid the same as male athletes?
• Should transgender athletes who used to be male compete in women’s sports?
• Do the Olympics do more harm than good for the cities hosting them?
• Are professional sports too damaging to athletes’ health?
• Is American football too dangerous for athletes?
• Should athletes who kneel for the anthem be sanctioned?

Sharing a meal with others unites us, but our opinions on food often divide us. Why is one part of the world starving, while another struggles with obesity? Is famine a result of a shortage or a distribution problem? Questions about food are important for humanity, which makes them compelling topics for discussion.

• Are genetically modified foods dangerous?
• Should genetically modified foods be labeled?
• Is organic food better than regular food?
• Is fast food responsible for obesity?
• Is food waste unavoidable?
• Is organic farming sustainable?
• Is factory farming unsustainable?
• Is grass-fed beef better than corn-fed beef?
• Is palm oil production causing deforestation?
• Can biotech foods save us from hunger?
• Should butter be stored in the fridge?

Nutrition is one of the most controversial scientific fields – dietary guidelines seem to be changing by the day. Is it OK to eat more than two eggs a day? Are carbs more unhealthy than fats? Issues like that are notoriously hard to resolve as even a carefully designed scientific study struggles to untangle the many factors that go into human health.

• Should we have nutrition classes in schools?
• Can a vegan diet help the environment?
• Is it healthier to be vegetarian?
• Is an all-meat diet healthy?
• Is dieting ever effective?
• Does fasting help or harm the body?
• Are gluten-free diets overhyped?
• Should we ban trans fat?
• Is sugar addictive?
• Are artificial sweeteners unhealthy?

Bring up the practice of eating dog meat in some countries to a dog lover, and you’ll more than likely evoke a very strong reaction. But how is it different from eating other social and intelligent mammals, such as pigs? There are many unresolved animal issues that can make for a captivating paper or presentation.

• Should animals have the same rights as humans?
• Should animals be considered individuals?
• Do animals have emotions?
• Do animals have consciousness?
• Is animal testing ethical?
• Should the fur industry be restricted?
• Are zoos helping or hurting animals?
• Should there be animals in circuses?
• Should we try to reverse extinction?
• Are humans destroying animal habitats?
• Is selective dog breeding unethical?
• Should bullfighting be banned?
• Should whaling be banned?

Many argue that psychology as a science is still in its infancy. There’s no consensus on a lot of the big questions related to people’s minds. Is there even a way to know what’s happening inside someone else’s head besides our own? A behaviorist would insist there isn’t.

• Is psychology a real science?
• Is depression a real disease?
• Are antidepressants effective?
• Is ADHD a real mental disorder?
• Is drug abuse a mental health issue?
• Is mental illness equivalent to physical illness?
• Should psychologists be allowed to prescribe drugs?
• Is prejudice against different people inherent?
• Is it ethical to “treat” homosexuality?
• Are social media sites addictive?
• Is social media connecting us or making us more isolated?
• Is pornography harmful to the psyche?
• Do video games cause violence?
• Is intelligence inherited?

Being in a romantic relationship involves constantly negotiating and renegotiating issues ranging from the most mundane to the most profound. On top of that, most adults are or have been part of a couple, making this a relatable and attention-grabbing subject.

• Is monogamy natural?
• Does divorce harm children?
• Should dating between co-workers be allowed?
• Should people date people much older than themselves?
• Is romantic love a prerequisite to marital satisfaction?
• Should arguments in a couple be avoided or encouraged?
• Should men and women have different functions in a relationship?
• Is it OK to keep secrets from your partner?
• Are long-distance relationships worth it?
• Is sex before marriage wrong?
• Is online dating good or bad?
• Are homosexual relationships natural?
• Should same-sex marriage be banned?
• Should LGBTQ people be allowed to adopt children?

Health is arguably the most important thing for a person. So it’s no surprise that we take issues related to health and medicine very seriously. Is there any point in prolonging a dying patient’s pain through life support? Questions like this are hard to give a definitive answer to, making them potent discussion topics.

• Are vaccines safe?
• Is Covid-19 manmade?
• Should immunization be mandatory?
• Should euthanasia be allowed?
• Is alternative medicine any good?
• Should healthcare be free?
• Is obesity a disease?
• Is circumcision healthy?
• Is stem cell research ethical?
• How harshly should medical malpractice be punished?
• Should Big Pharma be banned from charging too much for life-saving drugs?
• Should prescription drug manufacturers be held responsible for the opioid crisis?
• Should cannabis be prescribed as medicine?
• Should surrogate pregnancy be allowed?
• Should we use gene-editing in humans?
• Should the sale of human organs be allowed?
• Should genetic screening of embryos be legal?

If nurses are essential workers, why do they get paid so little? To get to the bottom of this, we need to go beyond the nursing profession and take a hard look at society as a whole. Besides, just like doctors, nurses face ethical dilemmas in their work every day, which creates a lot of room for debate.

• Are nurses compensated fairly?
• Should nurses’ shifts be shortened?
• Should nurses be allowed to prescribe drugs?
• Is the nursing profession better suited for women?
• Should nurses use artificial hydration and nutrition?
• Should nurses treat non-compliant patients?

Biology deals with nothing less than life itself! And what’s a more fascinating question than the origin of life? Although we seem to be far from deciphering this mystery, there are many other issues that both scientists and laypeople have good reason to debate.

• Is evolution up for debate?
• Did life emerge out of inorganic matter?
• Is there a viable alternative to the theory of evolution?
• How significant are the physiological differences between men and women?
• Is behavior determined by our genes or by our upbringing?
• Are there more than two genders?

If you’re a classical music lover, you’ll very likely scoff at the assertion that rock ‘n’ roll is the best musical genre. But who’s to say? Maybe someone will argue that there are objective measures of the quality of music. As with any issue that’s close to many people’s hearts, music can be an excellent topic for discussion.

• Is music getting worse over time?
• Is the pursuit of profit ruining music?
• Do music streaming services such as Spotify help or harm musical artists?
• Are violent or explicit lyrics harmful to society?
• Are rock stars a bad influence on children?
• Are The Beatles overrated?

Do you think Banksy will go down in history as one of the great artists, or do you see his works as cheap stunts? Either way, you’ll probably agree that art has changed almost beyond recognition since the time of Rembrandt. Whether that’s a good or bad thing is just one topic worth exploring.

• Is the value of art subjective?
• Should explicit art be censored?
• Who decides what constitutes art?
• Should an art piece always carry a message?
• Is contemporary art as good as classical art?
• Should any topic be out of bounds for art?

Hardly anyone would disagree that we should learn from history to avoid making the same mistake twice. But what exactly are history’s lessons is up for debate, and so make for great discussion topics.

• Are the two World Wars responsible for the relative state of peace since?
• Should the US pay reparations to African Americans because of slavery?
• Should Confederate statues in the US be taken down?
• Was Christopher Columbus a hero or a villain?
• Was the French Revolution inevitable?
• Is history always written by the victors?
• Is history bound to be repeated?

Are cats better pets than dogs? Does pineapple belong on a pizza? These are the kind of age-old debates we look into in our Funny Controversial Topics page.

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7 thoughts on “205 Controversial Topics for your Essay, Speech, or Debate”

Which is better, Chicago pizza or New York pizza?

Hey Nicole, just to answer your question personally I think Chicago pizza is too thick and I would choose New York pizza any day.

In my opinion Chicago pizza is clearly superior, and its thickness is one of its best attributes.

In my opinion New York pizza is clearly superior, and its thinness is one of its best attributes.

I second Chicago pizza lover’s statement, I think that Chicagos pizzas are much better!

In my very Italian opinion, true real pizza is Made in Italy only – the best. Cheers x 🙂

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Table of Contents

Arguments for freedom: the many reasons why free speech is essential.

• David Hudson

“The matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other freedom”— that’s how Justice Benjamin Cardozo referred to freedom of speech. 

This eminent Justice is far from alone in his assessment of the lofty perch that free speech holds in the United States of America. Others have called it our blueprint for personal liberty and the cornerstone of a free society. Without freedom of speech, individuals could not criticize government officials, test their theories against those of others, counter negative expression with a different viewpoint, or express their individuality and autonomy. 

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” This freedom represents the essence of personal freedom and individual liberty. It remains vitally important, because freedom of speech is inextricably intertwined with freedom of thought. 

Freedom of speech is closely connected to freedom of thought, an essential tool for democratic self-governance.

“First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end,” warned Justice Anthony Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002). “The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.”

There are numerous reasons why the First Amendment has a preferred position in our pantheon of constitutional values.  Here are six.

Self-governance and a check against governmental abuse

Free speech theorists and scholars have advanced a number of reasons why freedom of speech is important. Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn famously offered that freedom of speech is essential for individuals to freely engage in debate so that they can make informed choices about self-government. Justice Louis Brandeis expressed this sentiment in his concurring opinion in  Whitney v. California (1927): “[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”

In other words, freedom of speech is important for the proper functioning of a constitutional democracy. Meiklejohn advocated these ideas in his seminal 1948 work, “ Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government .” Closely related to this is the idea that freedom of speech serves as a check against abuse by government officials. Professor Vincent Blasi referred to this as “the checking value” of free speech. 

Liberty and self-fulfillment

The self-governance rationale is only one of many reasons why freedom of speech is considered so important. Another reason is that freedom of speech is key to individual fulfillment. Some refer to this as the “liberty theory” of the First Amendment.

Free-speech theorist C. Edwin Baker writes that “speech or other self-expressive conduct is protected not as a means to achieve a collective good but because of its value to the individual.” Justice Thurgood Marshall eloquently advanced the individual fulfillment theory of freedom of speech in his concurring opinion in the prisoner rights case  Procunier v. Martinez (1974) when he wrote: “The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity, but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.”

The search for truth and the ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor

Still another reason for elevating freedom of speech to a prominent place in our constitutional values is that it ensures a search for truth. 

FIRE's Guide to Free Speech on Campus

Campus guides.

Too many campuses still silence students who dare exercise their right to free expression.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed this idea in his “Great Dissent” in  Abrams v. United States (1919) when he wrote that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade of ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” This language from Holmes led to one of the most pervasive metaphors in First Amendment jurisprudence—that of the “marketplace of ideas.” 

This concept did not originate with Holmes, as John Milton in the 17th century and John Stuart Mill in the 19th century advanced the idea that speech is essential in the search for truth in their respective works, “Areopagitica” (1644) and “On Liberty” (1859). Milton famously wrote: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple, whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?” For his part, Mill warned of the “peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion” explaining that “[i]f the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” 

Informational theory

The marketplace metaphor is helpful but incomplete. Critics point out that over the course of history, truth may not always prevail over false ideas. For example, Mill warned that truth sometimes doesn’t triumph over “persecution.” Furthermore, more powerful individuals may have greater access to the marketplace and devalue the contributions of others. Another critique comes from those who advocate the informational theory of free speech. 

Coronavirus and the failure of the 'Marketplace of Ideas'

“If finding objective truth were the only value of freedom of expression, there would be little value to studying history,”  explains Greg Lukianoff of FIRE . “ Most of human thought in history has been mistaken about its assumptions and beliefs about the world and each other; nevertheless, understanding things like superstitions, folk medicine, and apocryphal family histories has significance and value.” 

Under this theory, there is great value in learning and appreciating what people believe and how they process information. Lukianoff calls the metaphor for the informational theory of free speech “the lab in the looking glass.” The ultimate goal is “to know as much about us and our world as we can,” because it is vitally “important to know what people really believe, especially when the belief is perplexing or troubling.”

Safety valve theory

Another reason why freedom of speech is important relates to what has been termed the “safety valve” theory. This perspective advances the idea that it is good to allow individuals to express themselves fully and blow off steam.

If individuals are deprived of the ability to express themselves, they may undertake violent means as a way to draw attention to their causes or protests. Justice Brandeis advanced the safety valve theory of free speech in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California (1927) when he wrote:

Those who won our independence believed . . . that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.

Tolerance theory

Free speech has also been construed to promote the virtue of tolerance: If we tolerate a wide range of speech and ideas, this will promote greater acceptance, self-restraint, and a diversity of ideas. 

Lee Bollinger advanced this theory in his 1986 work “The Tolerant Society.” This theory helps explain why we should tolerate even extremist speech. As Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent in  United States v. Schwimmer (1929), freedom of speech means “freedom for the thought that we hate.” This means that we often must tolerate extremist speech. As Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote in  Snyder v. Phelps (2011), we don’t punish the extremist speaker; instead “we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”

Freedom of speech holds a special place in American law and society for many good reasons.

As Rodney Smolla writes in “Free Speech in an Open Society,” “[t]here is no logical reason . . . why the preferred position of freedom of speech might not be buttressed by multiple rationales.” Freedom of speech is closely connected to freedom of thought, an essential tool for democratic self-governance; it leads to a search for truth; it helps people express their individuality; and it promotes a tolerant society open to different viewpoints. 

In sum, it captures the essence of a free and open society.

• Free Speech

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Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom Argumentative Essay

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Introduction

Freedom of speech is synonymous with freedom of expression. These two terms do not only explain the ability to speak or voice opinions without limitation or interference, but also the use of other means in communicating or impacting information.

This includes the use of expressions, music and art like painting, photography, and performing. In many countries, this freedom is provided for in as a basic freedom. Under the Universal Declaration of human rights in the United Nations there is a provision for this freedom. There are many genuine reasons why free speech is an important freedom.

Expressing oneself is a basic and important aspect of life and is also part of the basis for communication; it is more instinctive than learned. Throughout childhood and life, freedom of speech supports the learning of an individual through the acquisition of new views, ideas, concepts and theories in scientific, social and other fields of education.

One is able to participate in healthy debates and discussions, learn how to win and persuade in arguments and tolerate or even accept other people’s perceptions and ways of thinking. When an individual is able to express their ideas and opinions, it enables them to relate with others, participate in and enjoy interaction and bonding with other members of a group, team and community.

The main importance of speech learning and development is to facilitate expression and help an individual to live in harmony with other people in society, making sure that there needs are met and their rights, values and principles are not violated. Limiting or interfering with the freedom to speak and express oneself is a big violation of the basic rights of an individual and it restrains an individual from living a normal, productive and independent life.

Freedom of speech is an important aspect of social life in a civilized and democratic society. It enables people to make decisions on their rulers, systems of development and administration and initiate debates and discussions on important issues that concern public policy and governance.

People can voice their concerns over any problems or issues on accountability, responsibility and transparency of leadership. Freedom of speech is essential in the maintaining of law and order and making sure that there are checks and balances on individuals or groups which violate the law.

Although there has been debate on the justification of freedom of speech, it is important to realize that society cannot develop or advance when imparting of and access to information is impeded. In some instances privacy, control and protection of information is required but this does not mean that information should be completely barred from the public.

Freedom of expression is also important where social and cultural issues are concerned. When people are at liberty to express their opinions on critical issues concerning social values, norms and standards, social harmony and order is achieved.

In order to facilitate effective change which is inevitable, sensitive Issues concerning social life, like abortion, aesthesia, divorce, parenting, marriage etc. should be open to debate whether there is consensus or not. It is obviously clear that not all forms and means of freedom of expression that supported and defended but in order to prevent social tension and chaos people should be free to speak.

There are many reasons why free speech is an important freedom. Most societies agree that there should be clearly set guarantees on protecting and defending of this freedom without very little limitation except when it is very necessary and there has been general consensus on taking action against disbursement of information.

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IvyPanda. (2018, September 12). Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom. https://ivypanda.com/essays/why-free-speech-is-an-important-freedom/

"Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom." IvyPanda , 12 Sept. 2018, ivypanda.com/essays/why-free-speech-is-an-important-freedom/.

IvyPanda . (2018) 'Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom'. 12 September.

IvyPanda . 2018. "Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom." September 12, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/why-free-speech-is-an-important-freedom/.

1. IvyPanda . "Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom." September 12, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/why-free-speech-is-an-important-freedom/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom." September 12, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/why-free-speech-is-an-important-freedom/.

Amdt1.7.8.4 School Free Speech and Government as Educator

First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Although the Supreme Court had previously held that students in public schools are entitled to some constitutional protection, 1 Footnote See, e.g. , W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510 (1925) . as are minors generally, 2 Footnote In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1 (1967) . Children are subject to some restrictions that could not constitutionally be applied to adults. E.g. , Ginsberg v. New York , 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding state law restricting access to certain material deemed harmful to minors, although not obscene as to adults). it established the controlling standard for assessing First Amendment rights in the school environment in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District . 3 Footnote 393 U.S. 503 (1969) . In that case, the Court articulated a need to balance students’ First Amendment protections with the goals and needs of educators and the community.

In Tinker , high school principals had banned students from wearing black armbands as a symbol of protest against the United States’ actions in Vietnam. 4 Footnote Id. at 504 Reversing the lower courts’ refusal to reinstate students who had been suspended for violating the ban, the Court set out a balancing test for applying the First Amendment in schools. 5 Footnote Id. at 514 . According to the Court, First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students, and neither students nor teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 6 Footnote Id. at 506 . Notwithstanding these protections, the Court affirmed the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. 7 Footnote Id. at 507 . On balance, therefore, school authorities may restrict expression to prevent disruption of school activities or discipline, 8 Footnote Id. but such restrictions must be justified by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 9 Footnote Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars , 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ). See also Papish v. Bd. of Curators , 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (state university could not expel a student for using indecent speech in campus newspaper); but cf. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding two-day suspension, and withdrawal of privilege of speaking at graduation, for student who used sexual metaphor in speech given to high school assembly).

The Court reaffirmed Tinker in Healy v. James , finding no basis to believe that, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. 10 Footnote 408 U.S. 169 (1972) . In Healy , the Court held that students’ rights of association, implicit in the First Amendment, were violated when a public college denied a student group official recognition as a campus organization. 11 Footnote Id. at 180 . Denying recognition, the Court held, was impermissible if it was based on factors such as the student organization’s affiliation with the national Students for a Democratic Society, on disagreement with the organization’s philosophy, or on an unfounded fear of disruption. 12 Footnote Id. at 187–90 . The Court suggested that how courts strike the balance under the Tinker inquiry may differ depending on the students’ ages. The Court emphasized that [t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ but also concluded that a college administration may require that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law. 13 Footnote Id. at 193 . Because a First Amendment right was in issue, the college had the burden to justify rejecting a request for recognition rather than the requesters to justify affirmatively their right to be recognized. Id. at 184 . See also Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance that forbade persons on grounds adjacent to a school to willfully make noise or to create any other diversion during school hours that disturbs or tends to disturb normal school activities).

In 1982, the Court faced a conflict between a school system’s obligation to inculcate community values in students and the free-speech rights of those students. In Board of Education v. Pico , the Court considered a case challenging a school board’s authority to remove certain books from high school and junior high school libraries. 14 Footnote Bd. of Educ. v. Pico , 457 U.S. 853 (1982) . The procedural posture of the case required the Court to assume that the books were removed because the school board disagreed with the books’ content for political reasons. 15 Footnote Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 872 . A plurality of the Court thought that students retained substantial free-speech protections and that among these was the right to receive information and ideas. 16 Footnote Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 866–67 . Although the plurality conceded that school boards must be permitted to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values, and that there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political, it reasoned that a school board was constitutionally prohibited from removing library books in order to deny access to political ideas with which the board disagreed. 17 Footnote Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 862, 864–69, 870–72 . Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens joined Justice William Brennan’s opinion fully. Justice Harry Blackmun believed that certain forms of state discrimination between ideas are improper and agreed that the government may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 878–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Byron White provided the fifth vote for reversal, and he would have avoided a dissertation on the First Amendment issue. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, he voted to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on an unresolved factual issue going to the reasons for the school board’s removal. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. The four dissenters argued that the Constitution did not prevent the school board from expressing community values in this way regardless of its motivation. 18 Footnote Justice William Rehnquist wrote the principal dissent. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 893 (Powell, J., dissenting), 921 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

The Court struck a different balance between student freedom and educator authority in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier , 19 Footnote 484 U.S. 260 (1988) . in which it relied on public forum analysis to hold that editorial control and censorship of a student newspaper sponsored by a public high school need be only reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 20 Footnote Id. at 273 . The Court distinguished the facts of Kuhlmeier from Tinker , explaining that [t]he question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker —-is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. 21 Footnote Id. at 270–71 . The student newspaper at issue had been created by school officials as a part of the school curriculum, and served as a supervised learning experience for journalism students. 22 Footnote Id. at 270 . Because the newspaper was not a public forum, school officials could maintain editorial control so long as their actions were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 23 Footnote Id. at 273 . Thus, a principal’s decision to remove an article describing student pregnancy in a manner believed inappropriate for younger students, and another article on divorce critical of a named parent, were upheld. 24 Footnote Id. at 276 .

In Morse v. Frederick , 25 Footnote 551 U.S. 393 (2007) . the Court held that a school could punish a pupil for displaying a banner that said, BONG HiTS 4 JESUS at a school-sponsored event even absent evidence the banner caused substantial disruption. 26 Footnote Id. at 401 . The Court reasoned that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use, 27 Footnote Id. at 397 . but indicated that it might have reached a different result if the banner had addressed the issue of the criminalization of drug use or possession. 28 Footnote Id. at 403 . In his concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito commented that the Court’s opinion provides no support for any restriction on speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue. 29 Footnote Id. at 422 .

While the Kuhlmeier and Morse cases focused on applying Tinker to on-campus speech, the Court addressed Tinker 's application to off-campus speech in its 2021 Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. decision. 30 Footnote No. 20-255 (U.S. June 23, 2021) . In Mahanoy , the Court held that while public schools may have a special interest in some off-campus student speech, there are several features of off-campus speech that diminish the unique education al characteristics that might call for the special First Amendment leeway to regulate speech that Tinker provided. 31 Footnote Id. at 5–7 . The Court identified three distinguishing characteristics of off-campus speech that the Court reasoned made the Tinker standards less applicable. 32 Footnote Id. at 7 . First, off-campus speech, in some circumstances, should fall within the zone of parental, rather than school officials', responsibility. 33 Footnote Id. Second, the Court reasoned that allowing schools to regulate off-campus speech would provide an opportunity to regulate student speech 24 hours a day, which may, in effect, chill students’ protected speech. 34 Footnote Id. Third, the Court emphasized that while a school does have authority to regulate speech that interrupts the school’s work, 35 Footnote The Court also reiterated that, pursuant to Tinker , schools have a special interest in regulating speech that ‘materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.’ Id. schools also have an interest in protecting students’ unpopular expressions, as America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy. 36 Footnote Id. Although the Court recognized that some off-campus speech—-such as severe bullying, threats, or participation in online school activities—may require school regulation, it was hesitant to establish any clear general rules about what constitutes off-campus speech. 37 Footnote Id. at 5–6 . In light of these considerations, the Court held that a school could not regulate a student’s social media posts that criticized the school because the circumstances of the speech—the fact that the posts were made at an off-campus convenience store on a personal cellphone to a limited group of people and did not name the specific school or school authorities—diminished the school’s interest in regulation. 38 Footnote Id. at 7–8 .

The line of cases from Tinker to Mahanoy address the First Amendment rights of school and university students. Teachers and other employees of schools also have rights, but those rights are generally analyzed under rules that apply to the government as an employer. 39 Footnote See, e.g. , Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents , 385 U.S., 589 (1967) . See also Amdt1.7.9.1 Loyalty Oaths , Amdt1.7.9.2 Political Activities and Government Employees , Amdt1.7.9.3 Honoraria and Government Employees , and Amdt1.7.9.4 Pickering Balancing Test for Government Employee Speech .

•   Jump to essay-1 See, e.g. , W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510 (1925) .
•   Jump to essay-2 In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1 (1967) . Children are subject to some restrictions that could not constitutionally be applied to adults. E.g. , Ginsberg v. New York , 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding state law restricting access to certain material deemed harmful to minors, although not obscene as to adults).
•   Jump to essay-3 393 U.S. 503 (1969) .
•   Jump to essay-4 Id. at 504
•   Jump to essay-5 Id. at 514 .
•   Jump to essay-6 Id. at 506 .
•   Jump to essay-7 Id. at 507 .
•   Jump to essay-8 Id.
•   Jump to essay-9 Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars , 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ). See also Papish v. Bd. of Curators , 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (state university could not expel a student for using indecent speech in campus newspaper); but cf. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding two-day suspension, and withdrawal of privilege of speaking at graduation, for student who used sexual metaphor in speech given to high school assembly).
•   Jump to essay-10 408 U.S. 169 (1972) .
•   Jump to essay-11 Id. at 180 .
•   Jump to essay-12 Id. at 187–90 .
•   Jump to essay-13 Id. at 193 . Because a First Amendment right was in issue, the college had the burden to justify rejecting a request for recognition rather than the requesters to justify affirmatively their right to be recognized. Id. at 184 . See also Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance that forbade persons on grounds adjacent to a school to willfully make noise or to create any other diversion during school hours that disturbs or tends to disturb normal school activities).
•   Jump to essay-14 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico , 457 U.S. 853 (1982) .
•   Jump to essay-15 Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 872 .
•   Jump to essay-16 Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 866–67 .
•   Jump to essay-17 Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 862, 864–69, 870–72 . Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens joined Justice William Brennan’s opinion fully. Justice Harry Blackmun believed that certain forms of state discrimination between ideas are improper and agreed that the government may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 878–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Byron White provided the fifth vote for reversal, and he would have avoided a dissertation on the First Amendment issue. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, he voted to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on an unresolved factual issue going to the reasons for the school board’s removal. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id.
•   Jump to essay-18 Justice William Rehnquist wrote the principal dissent. Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> Id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)"> id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 893 (Powell, J., dissenting), 921 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
•   Jump to essay-19 484 U.S. 260 (1988) .
•   Jump to essay-20 Id. at 273 .
•   Jump to essay-21 Id. at 270–71 .
•   Jump to essay-22 Id. at 270 .
•   Jump to essay-23 Id. at 273 .
•   Jump to essay-24 Id. at 276 .
•   Jump to essay-25 551 U.S. 393 (2007) .
•   Jump to essay-26 Id. at 401 .
•   Jump to essay-27 Id. at 397 .
•   Jump to essay-28 Id. at 403 .
•   Jump to essay-29 Id. at 422 .
•   Jump to essay-30 No. 20-255 (U.S. June 23, 2021) .
•   Jump to essay-31 Id. at 5–7 .
•   Jump to essay-32 Id. at 7 .
•   Jump to essay-33 Id.
•   Jump to essay-34 Id.
•   Jump to essay-35 The Court also reiterated that, pursuant to Tinker , schools have a special interest in regulating speech that ‘materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.’ Id.
•   Jump to essay-36 Id.
•   Jump to essay-37 Id. at 5–6 .
•   Jump to essay-38 Id. at 7–8 .
•   Jump to essay-39 See, e.g. , Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents , 385 U.S., 589 (1967) . See also Amdt1.7.9.1 Loyalty Oaths , Amdt1.7.9.2 Political Activities and Government Employees , Amdt1.7.9.3 Honoraria and Government Employees , and Amdt1.7.9.4 Pickering Balancing Test for Government Employee Speech .